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Summary  
 
Trade, the practice of exchanging goods, services and capital, has existed as long as mankind 
and is claimed to have shaped our history. Even though these practices have generated 
significant benefits to societies around the world, trade also provokes human exploitation and 
destructive environmental effects. Trade connects buyers and suppliers, importing and 
exporting countries. In this dissertation, we connect both extremities of this trading 
relationship to find out if and how an importing country can address labour rights violations 
occurring at the bottom of the (agricultural) supply chain where goods are produced for its 
market.  
The objective of the research project constituting the base of this dissertation, could not be 
addressed by one discipline alone as it required a macro (EU trade policy) and micro (farm 
workers) level analysis. Our research approach is therefore interdisciplinary, developed to 
bridge two disconnected disciplines: political science to study the motivations behind and 
implementation of EU decisions on social trade conditionality and agricultural economics to 
study trade unionism and working conditions in pineapple plantations. The project was 
carried out by two PhD students, Deborah Martens and Annelien Gansemans, with different 
disciplinary backgrounds, respectively political science and agricultural economics, and their 
supervisors. 
The main question addressed in this dissertation is whether trade arrangements that were 
developed to promote labour rights through EU trade policy can improve labour conditions 
in third countries. In particular we have examined what these social trade instruments actually 
consists of as well as the relevance, or potential impact, of this approach. These questions are 
answered through an ensemble of academic articles gathered in the main section of this 
dissertation. Additionally, in the conclusions, the findings of the articles are combined with 
complementary data and insights obtained and developed over the course of the doctoral 
research.  
While other existing EU social trade instruments are also assessed in this dissertation, the main 
focus is on the EU bilateral trade agreements. More specifically, we focused extensively on the 
trade and sustainable development chapters and the civil society mechanisms established 
through these chapters. Through a case study of the EU-Central American Association 
Agreement, as well as labour conditions in the Costa Rican pineapple sector, we have 
connected the bottom of the supply chain (the workers in pineapple plantations) to an 
important importer of fresh Costa Rican pineapples, being the EU. In this context, we have 
paid particular attention to the existence and functioning of trade unions, as well as their 
participation to EU trade arrangements, as they can enable better working conditions by 
representing workers through social dialogue. 
 
   
A mixed methods approach was applied for the collection and analysis of the data. Empirical 
data was collected through a large number of interviews conducted in Belgium, Costa Rica 
and Honduras, focus groups with trade unions in Costa Rica, non-participants observations 
of the civil society meetings in Brussels, Costa Rica and Honduras, and a survey with members 
of the EU civil society mechanisms. The researchers cooperated in Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis, case study and content analysis.  
We found that civil society mechanisms in the trade agreement have contributed to the agency, 
the ability to act and choose, of trade unions. Yet, this advancement is negated by the 
incapacity of the instrument to deal with the anti-union context in Costa Rica. In other words, 
for EU trade arrangements to be more effective in terms of improving labour conditions in 
third countries, it has to address both the agency of trade unions as well as the institutional 
context in which they operate, as the latter influences the ability to transform agency into 
action. This transformation is necessary in order to improve the currently asymmetrical power 
relations between business and trade unions, which can in turn positively affect labour 
conditions in the country. 
Our research has identified the remaining great distance that exists between Brussels and the 
bottom of supply chains. Hence, the current EU approach is not able to exert influence across 
the different echelons of vertical labour governance which exists at international, national, 
sectoral and local level. In order to do so, the EU should improve the implementation of the 
existing social trade instruments and become much more assertive towards its trade partners. 
In addition, the EU should diversify its approach and focus on problematic sectors in each 
trade partner. 
In addition, our research did not provide evidence that the reputation of the EU market 
demanding high labour standards is reflected in the purchasing realities within the EU. In 
sum, workers have not yet reaped the benefits of EU social trade arrangements. This is 
especially the case for the most vulnerable, such as illegal migrant workers in plantations. 
  
 
   
Samenvatting 
 
Handel, de praktijk van het uitwisselen van goederen, diensten en kapitaal, bestaat al zolang 
als de mensheid en zou ook onze geschiedenis hebben gevormd. Hoewel deze praktijk 
aanzienlijke voordelen heeft opgeleverd voor samenlevingen overal ter wereld, heeft handel 
ook de uitbuiting van mensen en destructieve milieueffecten teweeggebracht. Handel verbindt 
kopers en leveranciers, importerende en exporterende landen. In dit proefschrift schakelen we 
beide uiteinden van deze handelsrelatie aaneen, om uit te zoeken of en hoe een invoerend land 
schendingen van arbeidsrechten die zich voordoen aan de basis van de toeleveringsketen (in 
de landbouwsector) waar goederen worden geproduceerd voor zijn markt kan aanpakken. 
Het doel van het onderzoeksproject dat de basis van dit proefschrift vormt, kon niet door één 
enkele discipline worden aangepakt omdat het een macro-analyse (EU-handelsbeleid) en 
micro-analyse (plantage-arbeiders) vereiste. Onze onderzoeksaanpak is daarom 
interdisciplinair, ontwikkeld om twee niet-verbonden disciplines aan elkaar te koppelen: 
politieke wetenschappen die de drijfveren achter en de implementatie van EU-besluiten over 
sociale handelsvoorwaarden bestudeert en landbouweconomie die zich buigt over vakbonden 
en arbeidsomstandigheden in ananasplantages. Het project werd uitgevoerd door twee 
doctoraatstudenten, Deborah Martens en Annelien Gansemans, met elk een verschillende 
disciplinaire achtergrond (respectievelijk politieke wetenschappen en landbouweconomie), en 
hun promotoren. 
De hoofdvraag in dit proefschrift is of de handelsinstrumenten die zijn ontwikkeld om 
arbeidsrechten te bevorderen via het EU-handelsbeleid, arbeidsomstandigheden in derde 
landen kunnen verbeteren. We hebben onderzocht uit wat deze instrumenten juist bestaan en 
wat de relevantie, of de potentiële impact, van deze aanpak is. Deze vragen worden 
beantwoord door middel van een verzameling wetenschappelijke artikels die gebundeld zijn 
in het hoofdgedeelte van dit proefschrift. Daarnaast worden in de conclusies de bevindingen 
van die artikels gecombineerd met aanvullende empirische gegevens en inzichten die werden 
verkregen en ontwikkeld in de loop van het doctoraatsonderzoek. 
Hoewel andere bestaande EU-instrumenten voor sociale handel ook worden behandeld in dit 
proefschrift, ligt de nadruk vooral op de bilaterale handelsovereenkomsten van de EU. Meer 
specifiek hebben we uitgebreid aandacht besteed aan het hoofdstuk over handel en duurzame 
ontwikkeling en de mechanismen die het maatschappelijk middenveld betrekken in de 
toezicht op de implementatie van dit hoofdstuk. Door middel van een case study van het 
handelsakkoord tussen de EU en Centraal-Amerika en de arbeidsomstandigheden in de Costa 
Ricaanse ananassector hebben we de basis van de toeleveringsketen (de werknemers in 
ananasplantages) verbonden met een belangrijke importeur van verse Costa Ricaanse 
ananassen, namelijk de EU. Hier hebben we ons gericht op het bestaan en de werking van 
vakbonden, en hun deelname aan de EU-instrumenten, omdat zij betere 
 
   
arbeidsomstandigheden mogelijk maken door werknemers te vertegenwoordigen via sociale 
dialoog. 
Voor het verzamelen en analyseren van gegevens pasten we een onderzoeksaanpak met 
verschillende methoden toe. Empirische gegevens werden verzameld via een groot aantal 
interviews in België, Costa Rica en Honduras, focusgroepen met vakbonden in Costa Rica, 
observaties van bijeenkomsten van het maatschappelijk middenveld in Brussel, Costa Rica en 
Honduras, en een enquête onder de EU leden van de mechanismen van het maatschappelijk 
middenveld. De onderzoekers werkten samen voor Qualitative Comparative Analysis, case 
study en inhoudsanalyse. 
We hebben vastgesteld dat de mechanismen van het maatschappelijk middenveld in de 
handelsovereenkomst hebben bijgedragen tot de agency, het vermogen om te handelen en te 
kiezen, van vakbonden. Deze vooruitgang wordt echter teniet gedaan door het onvermogen 
van het instrument om de anti-vakbondscontext in Costa Rica aan te pakken. Met andere 
woorden, om EU-handelsregelingen effectiever te maken in het verbeteren van de 
arbeidsomstandigheden in derde landen, moet het zowel de agency van vakbonden als de 
institutionele context waarin zij functioneren aanpakken. De institutionele context beïnvloedt 
namelijk het vermogen van vakbonden om hun agency om te zetten in actie. Deze transformatie 
is nodig om de huidige asymmetrische machtsverhoudingen tussen bedrijven en vakbonden 
te verbeteren. Die veranderingen kunnen dan op hun beurt de arbeidsomstandigheden in het 
land positief beïnvloeden. 
Ons onderzoek bevestigt dat er letterlijk en figuurlijk een grote afstand blijft bestaan tussen 
Brussel en de basis van toeleveringsketens. Vandaar dat de huidige EU-aanpak geen 
doorslaggevende invloed uitoefent op de verschillende trappen van de verticale labour 
governance die bestaat op internationaal, nationaal, sectoraal en lokaal niveau. Om dit te doen, 
zou de EU de implementatie van haar bestaande instrumenten voor sociale handel moeten 
verbeteren en assertiever moeten optreden ten opzichte van haar handelspartners. Bovendien 
moet de EU haar aanpak diversifiëren en zich concentreren op problematische sectoren in elke 
handelspartner. 
Daarnaast heeft ons onderzoek geen bewijs geleverd dat de reputatie van een veeleisende EU-
markt omtrent  arbeidsnormen, overeenkomt met de producten die de EU invoert. Kortom, 
werknemers hebben de vruchten van EU-instrumenten voor sociale handel nog niet geplukt. 
Dit is vooral het geval voor de meest kwetsbaren, zoals illegale migrantenarbeiders in 
plantages. 
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1. Introduction  
 
This dissertation is the result of a journey that started in December 2014 and ended in February 
2019. It departed from the wish to connect agricultural workers at the bottom of the supply 
chain to the EU market and to research if and how the latter could positively influence the 
labour conditions of the former.  
The research was conducted in the context of an interdisciplinary research project in which 
two disconnected disciplines were combined: political science to study the motivations behind 
and implementation of EU decisions on social trade conditionality and agricultural economics 
to study the working conditions in Costa Rican pineapple plantations. 
The dissertation is structured as follows: In the remaining of the introduction, the puzzle from 
which the research emerged as well as the status of the literature on our main subjects are 
discussed. This is then followed by the elaboration of the research design of the dissertation, 
introducing the overarching research questions addressed in the thesis. Subsequently, the 
methodology and methods used throughout the research are explained and an overview of 
the articles in the main body of the dissertation is given. The chapter following the introduction 
provides a comprehensive picture of our case study, Costa Rica and its pineapple industry. 
The main body comprises six articles that were written in the course of the PhD journey (see 
Table 1). In the conclusions, the answers to the main research questions are formulated based 
on the findings presented in the different articles, combined with complementary data and 
insights obtained and developed over the course of the doctoral research. These general 
conclusions are followed by reflections on the interdisciplinarity of our research, its main 
contributions as well as limitations and suggestions for further research. Finally, policy 
recommendations to improve the relevance and potential impact of EU social trade 
arrangements as well as labour governance in supply chains are presented.  
Table 1: Overview articles included in the dissertation 
 
• Article 1: The EU and Fair Trade: hands-off?  
Deborah Martens & Jan Orbie 
Book chapter in the Handbook on the EU and International Trade, S. Khorana & M. 
García (Eds.) (2018) 
 
• Article 2: Do labour rights matter for export? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 
pineapple trade to the EU 
Annelien Gansemans, Deborah Martens, Marijke D’Haese, Jan Orbie 
Academic article, published in Politics and Governance, 5(4), 93–105 (2017) 
 
26 
 
• Article 3:  Mapping variation of civil society involvement in EU trade agreements: A 
CSI Index 
Deborah Martens, Lore Van den Putte, Myriam Oehri, Jan Orbie 
Academic article, published in European Foreign Affairs Review, 23(1), 41–62 (2018) 
 
• Article 4: Explaining variation of civil society involvement in EU trade agreements  
Myriam Oehri, Jan Orbie, Deborah Martens, Lore Van den Putte 
Submitted to the Journal of European Integration 
 
• Article 5: Promoting sustainable development or legitimising free trade? Civil 
society mechanisms in EU trade agreements 
Jan Orbie, Deborah Martens, Myriam Oehri, Lore Van den Putte 
Academic article, published in Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 1(4), 526-546 
(2016) 
 
• Article 6: Trade unions in multi-stakeholder initiatives: what shapes their 
Participation? 
Deborah Martens, Annelien Gansemans, Jan Orbie, Marijke D’Haese 
Academic article, published in Sustainability, 10(11), 4295 (2018) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Additional contributions 
 
• Civil society meetings in European Union trade agreements: features, purposes, and 
evaluation (included in Annex) 
Jan Orbie, Deborah Martens, Lore Van den Putte 
Published as a CLEER Paper, 2016/3 (2016) 
 
• Civil society meetings in EU trade agreements: recommendations and lessons for 
EPAs (included in Annex) 
Deborah Martens, Jan Orbie, Lore Van den Putte, Yentyl Williams 
Published as an ECDPM Briefing Note, No. 93 (2016) 
 
• EU handelsakkoorden en beleidsruimte in ontwikkelingslanden: Wegschoppen van 
de ladder, of evenwichtig compromis? 
Deborah Martens, Niels Gheyle, Jan Orbie 
Commissioned study by 11.11.11, Coalition of the Flemish North-South Movement 
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1.1 Research puzzle  
Trade, the practice of exchanging goods, services and capital, has existed as long as mankind 
and is claimed to have shaped our history (Bernstein, 2008). Indeed, world trade has played 
an important role in the rise and fall of empires throughout the past and in the accumulation 
of wealth of today’s most affluent countries. Even though these practices have generated 
significant benefits to societies around the world, trade also provoked human exploitation and 
destructive environmental effects. Trade connects buyers and suppliers, importing and 
exporting countries, forming an organised social practice where structured and repeated 
exchange involve markets and regulatory (inter)national bodies (Risse, 2012). It is therefore 
considered to be an important site of global justice.  
In this dissertation, we want to connect both extremities of the trade relationship, namely the 
importing country, representing the consumer, and the worker in the producing country. 
Consumers in developed markets are said to have become more conscious about and sensitive 
to the circumstances in which their food, among other goods, is produced (Hainmueller et al., 
2015; Mosley, 2017). Nielsen (2016), found that a large majority of consumers worldwide feel 
more positively about companies that are transparent about where and how products were 
made, raised or grown; while Deloitte (2016) concluded that a small but growing number of 
consumer in the US choose a retailer based on their social impact, included the fair treatment 
of workers. In a Eurobarometer survey (2016) half of EU respondents were prepared to pay 
more for groceries from developing countries (such as fair trade products) to support people 
living in those countries. 
On the importing side of the trading relation, we want to focus on what the EU does to improve 
working conditions in producing countries. Its internal market of over 500 million consumers 
is an attractive prospective market for exporters. Consequently, the EU has considerable 
leverage to condition access to its market upon certain requirements and it usually does not 
shy away of externalising its market-related policies and regulatory measures (see Market 
Power Europe, Damro, 2012). Moreover, the EU is considered to be an actor which is 
structurally inclined to promote norms and values, including sustainable development and 
labour standards, beyond its borders (see Normative Power Europe, Manners, 2009). The EU 
trade-labour nexus, striving for the respect of labour norms through trade, generated different 
social trade instruments since the 1990s. In addition, it has been deepened and widened since 
the mid-2000s, becoming what Van den Putte & Orbie (2015) have called an ‘unobjectable 
norm’ in the EU’s current trade policy. Today, EU social trade arrangements typically require 
the respect for at least the Core Labour Standards defined by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO CLS). Inevitably, these developments raise questions on how the EU social 
trade instruments function as well as their relevance to the improvement of labour conditions 
in third countries.  
At the other end of the trading relation, workers produce goods to be exported to the European 
market. Ideally and depending on the labour conditions, this activity should advance, or at 
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least not deteriorate, the social development of these workers. The ILO CLS ‘Freedom of 
Association and Collective Bargaining’, is considered to be of particular importance for good 
working conditions as they are ‘enabling’ rights for all other rights at work (ILO, 2019). These 
rights allows workers to be represented by an independent worker’s organisation, a trade 
union, in industrial relations between employers and employees. Through social dialogue they 
provide a route to the negotiation of and access to specific working conditions such as a health 
and safety policy, living wage and working hours, which will in turn improve the social 
development of workers (Barrientos & Smith, 2007). 
If the trade of goods is being governed at macro-level by a formal framework, stipulating the 
need for the ratification and implementation of the ILO CLS, what can be expected for workers 
at micro-level? In other words, what is the relevance of EU trade arrangements for workers, 
and especially for their trade union rights, at the bottom of the supply chain? Workers active 
in the agricultural sector are generally the most socially vulnerable and lowest paid, 
labouring in what is often the ‘employer of last resort’ (Hurst, 2007). In addition, crops growing 
in plantations are mostly produced for export (Hancock, 2017), we are therefore especially 
interested whether plantation workers can benefit from working in a sector supplying the EU. 
These questions constitute the research puzzle in which we wonder whether the EU can 
improve labour conditions in third countries. More specifically, the relevance of EU trade 
arrangements for improving labour conditions and the extent to which workers benefit from 
working in (agricultural) supply chains exporting to the EU, a self-declared high labour 
standards demanding market, are two sides of the same coin and connect two ends of a supply 
chain. 
 
 
1.2 Status quaestionis 
While the research in this dissertation is embedded in the wider debate on Fair Trade and what 
constitutes fairness in trade, it is located at the intersection of three broad subjects: EU trade 
policy, civil society and labour conditions. The overlap between these subjects forms at least 
one relevant strand of literature which will be introduced below (see Figure 1). This concise 
status quaestionis situates the research of the dissertation, leading to the identification of 
research gaps and the formulation of the research questions. A more comprehensive literature 
review of each of these researched subjects is included in the different articles of the 
dissertation. 
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Figure 1: Visualisation of subjects addressed in this dissertation  
 
1.2.1 EU trade-labour linkage 
One of the key considerations leading to the creation of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) in 1919 was that ‘the failures of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an 
obstacle in the way other nations which desire to improve conditions in their own countries 
(ILO Constitution, as cited in De Schutter, 2015)’. This statement distinguishes the link 
between labour conditions and trade; it explains how countries exploiting their comparative 
advantage of low labour conditions to increase their international competitiveness, can 
discourage other nations to improve their labour rights situation. In addition to this collective 
action problem leading to labour conditions being ‘stuck at the bottom’, there is also a risk that 
competition leads to the deterioration of labour conditions in a ‘race to the bottom’ (Chan & 
Ross, 2003). Even though there is no consensus on the impact of trade on labour conditions, or 
on the impact of economic globalisation on sustainable development in general (Mosley, 2005; 
Silver, 2003), there is an interplay between international trade and labour conditions in 
producing countries.  
Whereas the ILO was established to address labour conditions globally, the complementary 
International Trade Organisation should have enabled a consistent approach in trade, 
employment and economic development (De Schutter, 2015). The International Trade 
Organisation, negotiated form 1946 to 1948, was however never created due to opposition 
within the US Congress. Instead, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which 
focussed solely on trade liberalisation, was institutionalised. The formal dissociation of trade 
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and labour issues culminated in the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995, 
where a potential social clause was again vetoed, this time by developing countries. The hard 
enforcement of WTO rules through economic sanctions stands in sharp contrast with the ILO’s 
limited clout. The ILO relies heavily on soft instruments of political pressure and reputational 
damage, confirming the subordinate status accorded to labour issues. As a result a 
fragmentation in international law can currently be observed, separating the governance of 
trade (tariffs, quotas and the whole range of non-tariff barriers) and supposedly non-trade 
issues (such as labour and environmental matters). 
However, since the mid-1990s, the EU started to pursue social objectives through its trade 
policy (Orbie, 2011). First, the EU further developed its existing unilateral instrument, the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), by creating additional beneficial market access for 
developing countries complying with the ILO CLS and certain environmental standards. Only 
small, lower-income and poorly diversified countries, which adhere to the good governance 
criteria are eligible (Hvidt Thelle et al., 2015). This regime still exists today, even though it has 
been modernised several times to be compatible with WTO rules and to improve its 
functioning.  
Second, due to the stalling negotiations of the multilateral WTO Doha Round, which started 
in 2001, the EU has turned its attention to bilateral trade agreements. Since the launch of the 
EU trade strategy ‘Global Europe’ in 2006, the conclusion of bilateral trade agreements 
securing reciprocal market access to foster (EU) competitiveness has been an explicit trade 
policy objective. At the time of writing, the EU has concluded 10 trade agreements1 with 17 
countries and more agreements are in the pipeline. These constitute the latest ‘generation’ of 
EU trade agreements and contain a new approach to the EU trade-labour linkage, namely a 
chapter on trade and sustainable development (TSD). Through these chapters, trade partners 
agree to uphold certain sustainable standards, among which the ILO CLS.  
There is a burgeoning body of literature on the EU trade-labour linkage and its social trade 
arrangements, researching the subject from different angles. While the unilateral GSP+ 
arrangement has been analysed by several authors (Bartels, 2007; Orbie & Tortell, 2009; Vogt, 
2015; Wardhaugh, 2013; Yap, 2013), most scholarly attention has been going to the bilateral 
agreements. Here, the EU approach is often juxtaposed with that of other key trade players 
such as the US (Ebert & Posthuma, 2011; Horn et al., 2010; International Institute for Labour 
Studies, 2015; Leeg, 2018; Oehri, 2014, 2015). Others have researched the defining features of 
the EU bilateral social trade (Van den Putte, 2016) or the internal dynamics behind it 
(Adriaensen & González-Garibay, 2013). Moreover, there is a growing interest for researching 
                                                     
1 with South Korea, Central America, Peru-Columbia-Ecuador, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Singapore, 
Canada, Vietnam and Japan. This enumeration does not include the Economic Partnership Agreements 
the EU is concluding with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. These implement the trade 
provisions of the Cotonou Agreement (2000) and thus do not fall within the ‘new generation’ of EU 
trade agreements. 
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the implications of EU labour provisions in third countries (Campling et al., 2016), leading to 
impact studies singling out EU trade partners: Harrison et al. conducted research in the 
Caribbean, Moldova and South Korea (2018), Marx et al. in Colombia (2016), Orbie et al. in 
Peru (2017), Tran in Vietnam (2017) and Smith et al. in Moldova (2018). Orbie & Van 
Roozendaal (2017) explain the existing confusion concerning the conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of impact studies when researching the consequences of EU labour 
provisions. In line with Van den Putte (2016), these authors distinguish between intermediate 
impact and ultimate impact. They also acknowledge a lack of data on the matter. 
Even though the main focus of the EU trade labour linkage so far has been on the ILO CLS, all 
new generation EU trade agreements also mention Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). This 
refers to mainly voluntary and business-driven initiatives, aimed at reconciling the economic, 
social and environmental ambitions of companies. It has also recently been rebranded to 
Responsible Business Conduct. Whereas Peels et al. (2016) are rather optimistic and consider 
these CSR provisions as a way to counterbalance business rights and responsibilities and to 
recognise the role of businesses in furthering labour rights, Waleson (2015) questions whether 
trade agreements can be an effective instrument to enforce a voluntary framework on non-
contracting parties to the agreement. Hanchez (2018) analysed the references to CSR in EU 
trade agreements and concluded that they are characterised by a low level of ambition. 
However, to our knowledge, no empirical research was conducted on this aspect of the EU 
trade labour linkage.  
 
1.2.2 EU trade governance 
For long, research on EU trade policy concentrated on the power dynamics between the 
European Commission and the European members states as well as on the economic 
dimension of trade. This focus has gradually widened and now includes non-state actors and 
‘non-trade’ issues such as sustainable development. In what follows, we will describe the 
evolution concerning the involvement of civil society in trade policy.  
Since the creation of the European Community in 1957, trade policy has been an exclusive EU 
competence. Scholars have termed the delegation of trade authority as ‘collusive delegation’, 
where the delegation to a higher level shields the pursued liberalisation process from 
protectionist actors interests (De Bièvre & Dür, 2005). Gheyle (2019) gives an account of the 
politicization of international trade policy and explains how the legitimacy of this policy began 
to erode when its scope and impact on other policy areas, especially internal regulation, grew. 
In the 1990s, it was mainly the multilateral level that came under fire, even though there was 
also much protest against the trade agreement between Canada, the US and Mexico. However, 
with the deadlock in the multilateral negotiations leading to the EU to focus on bilateral 
agreements, EU trade policy became a target as well.  
At the turn of the century, the contestation of EU trade policy coincided with a wider 
democratic legitimacy crisis of the EU and international organisations in general. Until then, 
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the idea that EU citizens granted a ‘permissive consensus’ to the EU had been dominant. 
However, with the waning of this consensus, the EU shifted its attention towards participatory 
democracy and the corresponding input-oriented dimension of democratic legitimacy, which 
results from “authentic participation and governance ‘by the people’” (see Finke, 2007; 
Scharpf, 1999). The Commission launched its aspirations for inclusive policymaking in its 
White Paper on European Governance (2001), where it asserts that “the EU’s legitimacy today 
depends on involvement and participation”. Even though this approach led to the creation of 
several instruments through which citizens could directly give their input, e.g. opinion polls 
or ad hoc consultations for specific policies, the emphasis was on the involvement of civil 
society. Also in academic circles, debates on the existence of a ‘European civil society’ and its 
potential as a bridge between citizens and EU institutions have been high on the agenda ever 
since (Armstrong, 2002; De Schutter, 2002; Finke, 2007; Kohler-Koch & Quittkat, 2013; 
Smismans, 2003, 2006; Steffek & Nanz, 2008). 
In this context and urged by the heavy anti-WTO protests in Seattle, DG Trade launched its 
Civil Society Dialogue in 2000. Even though these meetings were set-up as a mechanism for 
consultation, they turned out to be mainly briefing session from the Commission with no 
genuine attempt to seek a broader input into the formulation of policy (Hocking, 2004). Indeed, 
this mechanism has not bolstered the influence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on 
EU trade policy (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007; Jarman, 2007). The Civil Society Dialogue still exist 
today, however the contestation against TTIP and the corresponding politicization of EU trade 
policy have revived the mechanisms for civil society participation, generated more willingness 
to listen to civil society and lead to more transparency in trade negotiations (see Gheyle, 2019).  
Apart from these dialogues, another participatory instrument in EU trade policy was created. 
The TSD chapters of the new generation EU trade agreements (see supra) foresee the 
establishment of domestic advisory groups and transnational civil society meetings to monitor 
their implementation. When our research project was initiated, little was known about these 
mechanisms that were still being set-up2. Altintzis (2013) provided a first account of this new 
phenomenon by introducing the EU-Korea civil society mechanism. In addition, a quantitative 
study by Postnikov and Bastiaens (2014) painted a positive picture of the impact of civil society 
involvement in EU trade agreements on the improvement of labour conditions. In addition, 
Van den Putte (2015) compared the EU approach of civil society involvement in the monitoring 
of the implementation of labour provisions to that of US. 
 
1.2.3 Labour governance 
Labour rights were historically dealt with at governmental level, as states were responsible for 
developing labour laws in the 20th century in order to secure justice in employment relations 
                                                     
2 The first civil society meetings organised in the context of the EU-Korea agreement took place in 2012, 
those for the subsequent trade agreement with Central America in 2014. 
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(Langille, 2005). Through domestic labour law and the participation to dedicated international 
organisations such as the ILO, states have traditionally been the drivers of labour regulation.  
Gereffi and Mayer (2005) argued that globalisation has led to a number of governance deficits. 
One of them is that global production is no longer embedded in developed country 
governance institutions. On the contrary, supply chains have expanded around the globe 
beyond one state’s jurisdiction, and neither the domestic nor international institutions have 
been capable to govern them appropriately. Even though Gereffi and Mayer refer to broad 
societal issues, this deficit has also had an impact on the governance of labour rights where 
the role of the state seems to have diminished (Toffel et al., 2015). In turn, private entities such 
as multinational corporations, NGOs, and multi-stakeholder certification regimes are creating 
additional regulatory regimes for the improvement of labour conditions. According to Langille 
(2016) the rapid development of private, voluntary labour regulation schemes is the single 
most significant, albeit controversial, development in international labour governance. 
Global labour governance is thus a comprehensive concept incorporating the different tools 
developed to deal with labour rights issues. It comprises public (e.g. labour laws, ILO 
conventions, soft law initiatives), private (e.g. voluntary standards and codes of conducts) and 
hybrid, (i.e. a combination of both private and public initiatives) (Hassel, 2008; Meardi & 
Marginson, 2014). Much can be said about labour governance, however at this stage, we are 
interested in two particular aspects of labour governance: the interplay between public and 
private actors, and the role of trade unions.  
First, the ‘layering’ of multiple public and private rules has prompted research about the 
relationship between public and private initiatives (Bartley, 2011; Moon & Vogel, 2008; Toffel 
et al., 2015). Fransen and Burgoon (2017) found that public interventions tend to work 
complementary to, or even strengthen, private labour policy. In contrast, private interventions 
tend either to not affect, or to actually substitute and undermine public labour policy and 
regulatory efforts. In addition, Toffel et al. (2015) concluded that adherence to CSR (cf. private) 
commitments is not only associated with institutions in the supplier’s home country, but also 
with institutions in the global buyer’s home country. Anner’s research (2017) found that the 
potentially positive impact of CSR interventions will be negated in a labour repressive regime. 
He also emphasises the legitimacy of democratic state entities to enforce labour rights. As a 
result, Anner identified building state capacity and legitimacy in such regimes as part of the 
solution and refers to forms of state and inter-state influence to address this problem. In 
addition to state capacity, Berliner et al. (2015) as well as Mosley (2017) highlight the 
importance of political will together with the interests and priorities of relevant political actors 
in developing countries. These can be influenced by external pressure such as activists 
campaigns, reputation conscious multinationals and trade agreements. In sum, even though 
some voices claim the state is losing ground in labour governance and it is being replaced by 
private actors through ‘political CSR’ (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), others are pointing to an 
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important role for public actors to actively collaborate with private actors and to embed private 
initiatives in national and international institutions (Knudsen & Moon, 2017). 
Second, trade unions have traditionally played a crucial role in the promotion of labour rights 
by representing worker’s interests in (tripartite) social dialogue. These ‘industrial relations’, 
take place within individual companies, sectors and at the national policy level. This being 
said, trade unions across sectors and nations should not be considered as a homogenous 
group. Their functioning and strength depends to a large extent on the political economy and 
history of labour struggles of the country or region in which they occur (De Neve, 2008; 
Howell, 2005). In addition, the nature of the work (e.g. labour intensive) and how the sector 
operates (e.g. vertically or horizontally (dis)integrated) and the worker’s leverage also has in 
impact on workers’ mobilisation and their bargaining power (Estanque, 2009; Kelly, 1998; 
Silver, 2003). Besides their role in improving labour conditions, trade unions have also been 
attributed a broader function as vehicles for societal change, for instance concerning socio-
economic policies (Lucio, 2016), better governance (Cheol-Sung, 2007) and democratisation 
(Baccaro et al., 2018).  
In general, a decline in unionisation since the 1980s can be observed. Based on his analysis of 
the US labour movement, Brueggemann (2018) lists the following causes: union efficacy and 
worker affluence, internal failures of the labour movement, technological innovation, class 
fractionalisation, globalisation, employer strategy and the political context. However, some of 
these factors are not pertinent in other, less developed, countries. In addition, violence against 
trade unionists, which could potentially be categorised as political context as it occurs in 
labour repressive regimes, should also be taken into account. While some scholars analyse the 
decline of trade unions, there is also a growing body of literature on ‘union revitalization’, 
claiming that it is too early to cast off trade unions and their function in our societies 
(Balasubramanian & Sarkar, 2015; Freje & Kelly, 2003).  
In this dissertation, special attention will be given to labour conditions in the agricultural 
industry, and particularly to those of waged workers, not farmers, in the EU trade partners 
(see infra). The organisation of workers is particularly weak within this sector, as trade unions 
seldom emerge within food supply chains. When they do, they are often excluded from 
management discussions on wages or working conditions (Oxfam, 2018). There are different 
reasons why agricultural workers remain poorly organised (Hurst, 2007). While some of these 
difficulties are practical or financial, there are often also legal and administrative barriers in 
place. Moreover, agriculture workers often work on a temporary basis or are subcontracted, 
which makes it difficult to register as a trade union member. Even though there is a plethora 
of private standards and certifications in this sector which might improve labour standards in 
some cases, research has shown that they do little to challenge commercial practices or 
embedded social relations that underpin poor labour standards (Barrientos & Smith, 2007). 
This overview of the evolution of our subjects and the vast body literature written about them 
reveals that, even though much research has been done, there are still several research gaps to 
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be addressed. While the EU trade labour linkage has been researched extensively, questions 
on its consequences for labour conditions in the EU trade partner remain. In addition, there is 
a general need for empirical data on this linkage, especially resulting from interdisciplinary 
research focussing on one particular sector. Moreover, at the beginning of our research, little 
was known about the new governance mechanism created in the EU’s bilateral trade 
agreements. Finally, against the backdrop of these EU developments, the influence of non-
state actors and new approaches in labour governance should also be taken into account. Based 
on this knowledge, our research questions and research approach will be elaborated in the 
next section. 
 
 
1.3 Research design 
1.3.1 Research questions 
Since the outset the underlining purpose of our research, linking the two sides of the 
(agricultural) supply chain, has been to examine what the EU trade arrangements signify for 
labour conditions in third countries. Our main research question is therefore ‘Can EU trade 
arrangements improve labour conditions in third countries?’ 
Building on the literature introduced above, we have chosen to approach our research topic in 
a comprehensive manner. As a result, the sub-questions developed to answer the main 
research question have retained a broad focus. First, we want to give an overview of EU trade 
arrangements and how they function. Second, we want to assess the potential of these EU 
trade arrangements to actually improve labour conditions in third countries. As a result, the 
sub-questions underpinning the main research question are:  
- First, how do EU trade arrangements promote the improvement of labour conditions 
in third countries? 
- Second, how relevant is this approach to the improvement of labour conditions in 
third countries? 
We will further elaborate these research questions in the following paragraphs. In the 
conclusions, we will answer them by combining the findings from the articles in the main body 
of this dissertation with complementary information obtained and developed over the course 
of the doctoral research. 
 
1.3.2 RQ 1: How do EU trade arrangements promote the improvement of labour 
conditions in third countries? 
As discussed above, the EU has developed different instruments over the years in order to 
improve labour conditions. This dissertation focusses mainly on the TSD chapters in EU 
bilateral free trade agreements, as it is currently the most prevalent social trade instrument. 
36 
 
However, to put the features of this bilateral instrument in perspective, and to allow a certain 
degree of comparison, we will contrast it with the unilateral social trade instrument (the GSP+) 
and hybrid social trade instruments, which is an umbrella term for public-private initiatives. 
In addition to identifying the different existing social trade instruments, their main objectives 
will be discussed. These reflect the substantial content of the instruments concerning labour 
rights and specifies what the EU exactly promotes and wants to achieve. 
In order to come to a better understanding of how these instruments promote labour rights 
improvement in third countries, their governance and enforcement will be analysed. 
Governance refers to how objectives are implemented and monitored, and by whom. This can 
be the responsibility of public or private actors, or a combination of both. Since little is known 
about civil society mechanisms established in EU bilateral trade agreements, we will focus on 
different aspects of this new phenomenon. 
In terms of enforcement, we will look into the ways in which compliance with the instrument’s 
objectives is pursued. This can be either through a hard or soft approach (see International 
Institute for Labour Studies, 2015). Hard enforcement refers to a conditional approach where 
non-compliance with the labour commitments made in the trade instrument leads to sanctions. 
In contrast, soft enforcement or a promotional approach, is characterised by cooperative 
activities such as capacity building and dialogue.  
In sum, to answer the question how EU trade arrangements promote the improvement of labour 
conditions in third countries, an analytical overview will be given of the (1) different instruments, (2) 
their objectives, (3) governance and (4) enforcement. 
 
1.3.3 RQ 2: How relevant is this approach to the improvement of labour conditions 
in third countries in general? 
In order to assess the relevance of EU social trade instruments, we will first develop and 
operationalise a working definition, which will be applied in the conclusion of this 
dissertation.  
Even though ‘relevance’ is a concept that has been researched and defined across different 
academic disciplines, such as cognitive and information science and philosophy, it does not 
enjoy a special status in the context of political science or agricultural economics. 
Consequently, the common or ordinary meaning of the term ‘relevant’ will be used as a 
starting point. The Oxford Dictionary defines relevant as “closely connected or appropriate to 
what is being done or considered”, whereas Merriam-Webster Dictionary describes it as 
“having significant and demonstrable bearing on the matter at hand”. To further develop the 
understanding of relevance, a look at Gorayska & Lindsay’s (1993) work is helpful. They 
explain how relevance is, amongst other characteristics, goal-dependent and functional as it 
denotes the relation between means and ends. The authors specify that “an item (physical or 
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immaterial) is relevant to a goal if and only if it can be an essential element of some plan 
capable of achieving the desired goal”. In addition, the OECD Glossary provides us with a 
useful perspective on how to address relevance from a policy perspective. Here relevance is 
defined, in the context of international development, as “the extent to which the objectives of 
a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, 
global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies. Retrospectively, the question of relevance 
often becomes a question as to whether the objectives of an intervention or its design are still 
appropriate given changed circumstances” (OECD, 2002). 
These definitions indicate the two central elements of assessing relevance. On the one hand, 
there is the need to identify the goal that is pursued. The goal we will research is the 
improvement of labour conditions in third countries. In addition, the reference in the OECD 
definition to ‘the beneficiaries’ needs’ will be converted to ‘the needs of workers in third 
countries’.  On the other hand, the capacity to achieve that goal needs to be considered. This 
will be addressed by mentioning the ‘appropriateness’ of the EU instruments to their goal as 
well as whether these are ‘an essential element of a plan capable of achieving that goal’. In 
sum, the following working definition is formulated:  
For EU social trade instruments to be relevant they should be appropriate to the needs of workers in 
third countries as well as an essential element of a plan capable of achieving improved labour conditions. 
Due to their substantive difference, the two central elements of this working definition –needs 
of workers and essential element of a plan– will be elaborated separately.  
1.3.3.1 Needs of workers: the empowerment of trade unions 
Even though not all workers worldwide have exactly the same needs, there are some 
overarching principles that should be met on the ‘shop floor’. The ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998) is the most relevant reference as it is widely 
recognised and universally applicable. The Declaration contains the four Core Labour 
Standards, a set of four fundamental, universal and indivisible human rights: 
1. Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining 
2. The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour 
3. The effective abolition of child labour  
4. The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation 
This research will focus on the first standard, Freedom of Association and Collective 
Bargaining (FACB). Freedom of Association, also enshrined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), is both an individual and a collective right. It determines that everyone 
has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels, in 
particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right of everyone to 
form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests (European Commission, 
2019). Collective Bargaining is considered a key means through which employers and 
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employees, represented by their trade unions, can establish fair wages and working conditions 
(ILO, 2019). The objective of these negotiations is to result in a collective agreement that 
regulates terms and conditions of employment. 
FACB are considered to be particularly important as they are ‘enabling’ rights for all other 
rights at work (ILO, 2019). FACB allows for workers to be represented by an independent 
worker’s organisation in industrial relations between management and workers, ensuring 
participation in discussions and negotiations at company, sectoral and national level. FACB as 
enabling rights provides a route to the negotiation of and access to specific working conditions, 
such as a health and safety policy, living wage and working hours, which have been labelled 
‘outcome rights’ (Barrientos & Smith, 2007). 
Due to the potential positive influence of FACB on working conditions through the 
representation of workers by trade unions, the needs of workers will be assessed through the 
capability of the EU social trade instruments to empower trade unions. Our research is 
conducted in a context where trade unions encounter difficulties to be established and function 
properly (see chapter Costa Rican context). We therefore believe that for EU social trade 
instruments to be appropriate, they should contribute to the transformation of power relations 
that currently curb the functioning of trade unions. 
Empowerment is a concept that emerged in the context of international development in 
general and human development in particular, often focussing on women’s empowerment 
and poverty reduction. Drydyk (2013) mentions how “it is nearly customary to begin a 
conceptual article on empowerment by lamenting how confused the concept has become”. A 
few words should be said about our interpretation of empowerment. 
Anderson & Simm’s (2004) provide us with a useful description of empowerment: “the process 
of awareness and capacity building, which increases the participation and decision-making 
power of citizens and may potentially lead to transformative action which will change 
opportunity structures in an inclusive and equalising direction”. For our purpose we will 
replace ‘citizens’ by ‘trade unions’, while also distilling a number of aspects from this 
description that we believe matter for empowerment. First, there is the notion of an increased 
capacity of an actor to undertake action. We interpret this aspect as agency which is the ability 
and capacity of an actor to choose and act. Second, empowerment should be transformative. 
While, some scholars and practitioners focus solely on the possibility and expansion of ‘choice’ 
as being empowerment, we follow Drydyk (2013) in his claim that mere choice-expansion is 
not transformative. Empowerment requires this increased capacity and range of choices to 
lead to durable changes in inequality and power dynamics to the benefit of the (previously) 
less-powerful actor. Finally, and related the previous aspect, we see empowerment as a 
process leading to an outcome and not as a result in itself. Drydyk (2013) explains how 
empowerment does not refer to a state of affairs, but to a process of change with a certain 
outcome. 
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In our case, trade union empowerment would signify the process of increasing trade unions’ capacity to 
voice their interests. This would lead to balancing power dynamics in their favour in a durable manner.  
Even though the process is not by default conflictual or a zero-sum game, it is quite likely that 
such structural changes to the organisation of vested interests will incite resistance. In 
addition, it should also be mentioned that when a worker chooses to join a trade union, this 
can also be considered as empowering (see Drydyk, 2013). However since the EU social trade 
instruments analysed in this dissertation involve trade unions and not trade unionists or 
workers, we will focus on the collective rather than the individual level. 
1.3.3.2 Essential Element 
To be relevant, the EU social trade arrangements should, in our interpretation, also be an 
essential element of a plan capable of achieving improved labour conditions in addition to 
being appropriate to workers’ needs. 
The arrangement should thus be considered as an element of a broader plan. However, when 
examining international labour governance, it seems that there is currently no guaranteed plan 
to achieve proper labour conditions for workers worldwide. The landscape of labour 
governance initiatives is a hotchpotch of uncoordinated and overlapping mechanisms along 
vertical (local, sectoral, national and international) and horizontal (public-private) dimensions. 
It would, however, be beyond the scope of this dissertation to evaluate the international labour 
governance as a whole. In line with our research objective, we will focus on how EU social 
trade arrangements perform according to the context of the trade partner as well as ‘the plan’ 
they are part of. We will do so by assessing the coherence of the EU approach with the trade 
partner’s context and the other international components of the plan.  
In addition, the element should also be essential, entailing that it is a necessary, even crucial, 
part of the plan. This implies the need to know whether and to what extent the EU approach 
plays an indispensable role in the promotion of labour rights in third countries. Given the 
importance of the domestic context of a country, one could even wonder whether international 
arrangements such as those researched in this dissertation could ever be indispensable and 
not just remain accessory. However, since we focus on the international aspect of labour 
governance and we are interested in how these arrangements can influence the domestic 
context, we believe it is appropriate to determine the importance of EU arrangements at local, 
national and international level. It is however difficult to isolate the consequences of EU efforts 
as ‘the plan’ includes other national and international players. We will therefore conduct a 
(modest) counterfactual analysis in the conclusion, questioning whether the labour rights 
situation would have been the same in the absence of the EU social trade arrangements. 
In sum, whether the EU social trade arrangements are essential to the improvement of labour conditions 
in third countries will be assessed through (1) the coherence of the EU approach with the trade partner’s 
context and other international labour governance initiatives, (2) the indispensability of the EU 
arrangements both at local, national and international level. 
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In the next section we will describe the main characteristics of our research, explaining the 
choices we’ve made and which methods and methodology we used to answer the questions 
raised formulated above. 
 
 
1.4 Methodology 
An overview of the most important methodological aspects of the dissertation will be given 
through the main characteristics of our doctoral research. 
 
1.4.1 Demarcation of the research 
This dissertation is the result of an interdisciplinary research project in which the initial 
research objective, ‘Do EU trade arrangements enhance social development in the Global 
South’, was gradually narrowed down to examining the potential impact of the Association 
Agreement between the EU and Central America on labour rights in Central America, in 
particular in the Costa Rican pineapple industry.  
1.4.1.1 Potential impact and relevance 
We chose to focus on the relevance and potential impact of EU social trade arrangements 
instead of concrete changes in the labour conditions of workers as a consequence of EU trade, 
also termed outcome impact (Van den Putte, 2016) or ultimate impact (Orbie & Van 
Roozendaal, 2017). During the exploratory phase of the research, certain aspects of EU trade 
were found that deserved a closer look, even though it was too early to expect immediate 
concrete impact or the outlook for such impact was unpromising. The civil society mechanisms 
in particular drew our attention as an interesting arena to connect local trade unions with EU 
policy.  
Researching impact certainly has its merits, nevertheless, it should be noted that such research 
also bears certain challenges or weaknesses. First, there is ambiguity about what impact is. 
Hearn & Buffardi (2016) illustrate this through the variety of definitions of impact given by 
international developmental organisations. The scope can be narrow, “the difference in the 
indicator of interest with and without the intervention (World Bank as cited in White, 2009)”, 
or very broad “positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a 
development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended (OECD, 2002)”. 
Second, the disagreement on the definition of impact is extended to methodological 
discussions. Even within policy fields and academic disciplines there are different views on 
how impact should be measured and which methods are considered sufficiently robust 
(White, 2010). The third weakness of researching impact is that most often little attention is 
given to the political aspect of such research. Indeed, as debates focus on technical and 
methodological issues, questions related to power –who defines what impact is? how it is 
judged?– are often neglected (Hearn & Buffardi, 2016). The final criticism on impact studies is 
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that, even when impact is interpreted in its broadest sense, it only focusses on effective changes 
that have taken place, thereby neglecting the potential something can have. Whereas potential 
impact is mapped and analysed in ex ante impact assessments, potentiality disappears from 
the radar during the implementation phase.  
These arguments, together with the findings of our exploratory research and the practical 
consideration that the EU-CA AA had only been applied provisionally one year when our 
research project was initiated, prompted us to adopt a more open attitude an look at the 
potential impact though the assessment of relevance as operationalised in the previous section. 
1.4.1.2 Central America and Costa Rica 
The main argument to focus on Central America is that no other academic research efforts 
have been made so far to analyse the EU-Central American trade relations and its trade-labour 
linkage in particular. In addition, all Central American countries have been GSP+ beneficiaries 
and the EU-CA AA has been provisionally applied since 2013. We therefore hoped to be able 
to discern the potential consequences of the EU social trade arrangements. 
Even though other Central American countries are more notorious for labour rights violations, 
such as Guatemala and Honduras, Costa Rica was chosen for two reasons. First, since 
extensive field research was necessary for empirical data collection, the safety of the 
researchers had to be safeguarded. Trade union rights are a contentious topic in Central 
America and researchers focussing on this issue are not always welcomed with open arms. 
Moreover, trade unions are experiencing life-threatening violence because of their trade union 
activities in other Central American countries (ITUC, 2018). Such circumstances would be 
especially perilous for the research concerning the working conditions in the agricultural 
sector which requires a longer stay in a remote area.3 Accordingly, these circumstances led to 
the selection of a country we believed to be the safest option. Second, of all Central American 
countries, Costa Rica scores the best on social development (OECD, 2017). It also scores well 
for political and social integration in the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (2016), 
which is confirmed by the Civicus Monitor (2018) that evaluated the Costa Rican civic space 
as ‘open’. We therefor consider Costa Rica to be a most-likely case for a positive correlation 
between the EU social trade instruments.  
1.4.1.3 Agricultural sector and pineapples 
Worldwide, the agricultural sector is infamous for poor working conditions and income 
distribution (Cheong et al., 2013). Hurst (2007) wrote a comprehensive account on the 
precarious situation of agricultural wage workers. Concretely, this situation can be attributed 
to four factors: first, the employment is often unstable, temporary and  poorly paid, with wages 
well below those earned by industrial workers. Second, the sector also attracts the most 
vulnerable workers, which are often young, migrant and low-skilled (see also Barrientos & 
Kritzinger, 2004). Third, agricultural work is by its nature physically demanding, with a high 
risk of accidents due to the operation of machinery and the intensive use of chemicals. Yet, 
agricultural workers are among the least well protected in terms of access to health care, 
                                                     
3 This was conducted by Annelien Gansemans. 
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workers' compensation and insurance. Fourth, whereas collective bargaining is one of the 
principal instruments for defining the terms and conditions of employment, it is often not a 
significant feature in the agricultural sector. This is mainly because the respective institutions 
are lacking, governments do not encourage such negotiations, and trade unions tend to be 
weak (see also Oxfam, 2018). 
The Costa Rican pineapple sector was selected because it is a relatively recent and booming 
industry (see infra). The expansion of this export crop has affected local communities and 
workers and raises the issue of the effectiveness of current labour governance mechanisms. 
Moreover, the industry is confronted with many of the environmental and social challenges 
that booming export regions face around the world. In contrast to the banana industry, which 
has a long and eventful trade union history, we believe that the younger pineapple industry 
can give interesting indications of the potential consequences of EU social trade arrangements. 
 
Considering our research focus on EU bilateral trade agreements, the emphasis of the analysis 
in the articles and later on in the conclusions will also be on this instrument. The findings will 
therefore relate mainly to the EU-Central American Association Agreement. Whenever 
pertinent, these will be linked and compared to the unilateral and hybrid instruments. At 
unilateral level, there is only the GSP+ regime to compare with. In contrast there is a wider 
variety in the range of hybrid instruments. Here too, our focal point has been on the EU-
Central American trade relations and the Costa Rican pineapple industry. The three public-
private initiatives considered are the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) and the National Platform 
for the responsible production and trade of pineapples (Platform) in which EU member states, 
respectively the UK and the Netherlands, played an important role for the establishment of 
the initiative and the CSR workshops organised in the context of the EU-CA AA (see article 6 
for a detailed description). 
 
1.4.2 Interdisciplinarity 
The research objective and research questions introduced above cannot be addressed by one 
discipline alone as it requires a macro (EU trade policy) and micro (farm workers and rural 
households) level analysis. Our research project was therefore conceived to be 
interdisciplinary to bridge two disconnected disciplines: political science to study the 
motivations behind and implementation of EU decisions on social trade conditionality and 
agricultural economics to study the working conditions in pineapple plantations. 
The research project was carried out by two PhD students, Deborah Martens and Annelien 
Gansemans, with different disciplinary backgrounds, respectively political science and 
agricultural economics. Although their final thesis stands on their own and have an individual 
focus, both the EU politics and agricultural field perspectives are integrated in the research.  
Both disciplines were integrated in a multi-level approach which is reflected in the following 
research stages: First, theoretical frameworks and concepts derived from different literature 
strands are used. This includes institutional theory and literature on legitimacy and 
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effectiveness of public-private governance, deliberative democracy and EU external relations 
(political science), but also on the impact of fair trade and private standards and literature on 
rural livelihoods (agricultural economics). In addition, the researchers relied on knowledge 
from the industrial relations literature, management literature and the emerging body of 
global value chains perspectives (where political science and agricultural economics are, 
among other disciplines, combined). 
Second, both researchers and their (co-)supervisors collected data together. During joint 
exploratory field research in Costa Rica, they conducted interviews with trade unions at 
sectorial and national level, national government officials, EU officials and other relevant 
actors; field visits to banana and pineapple plantations; focus groups with trade unionists and 
farm workers and organised an academic workshop at the Universidad National de Costa Rica 
to get more acquainted with the national context and challenges for improving workers’ rights. 
When appropriate, Deborah and Annelien conducted (Skype) interviews with trade unions 
and NGOs together or participated together to pertinent events in Brussels. Third, a mixed 
methods approach was applied for the data analysis whenever relevant. In addition to the 
different data collection methods, the researchers cooperated in Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis, case study and content analysis.  
 
 
Figure 2: Visualisation unidisciplinary and interdisciplinary publications  
 
The interdisciplinary collaboration resulted in three types of outcomes. First, two joint 
publications were written: the first sets the scene of the EU trade-labour linkage and pineapple 
exports to the EU at macro-level (article 2 of this dissertation), while the second combines most 
of our insights acquired during the research project and analyses the micro-level (article 6). 
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Second, our research has culminated in the formulation of joint recommendations included in 
the conclusions of the dissertation. Finally, a less tangible outcome of our interdisciplinary 
research are the cross-fertilisations between the researchers throughout the process. 
Figure 2 visualises how the interdisciplinary research process evolved. It also shows that the 
articles that were not developed together served as building blocks for further collaboration. 
Our most important learnings on conducting interdisciplinary research are listed in the 
concluding reflections in the conclusion of this dissertation.  
 
1.4.3 Mixed methods 
As introduced in the previous section, a mixed methods approach was adopted to address our 
research question. More concretely, empirical data was collected through a large number of 
interviews (85) conducted in Belgium, Costa Rica and Honduras, two focus groups with trade 
unions in Costa Rica, 14 non-participants observations of the civil society meetings in Brussels, 
Costa Rica and Honduras, and a survey with members of the EU Domestic Advisory Groups. 
Annex A contains a detailed overview of the data collection. 
Moreover, data was analysed through legal document analysis, case study and content 
analysis. Since each article in the main body of the dissertation carefully explains the 
methodology used, we will not further elaborate this here.  
In addition, we have mentioned how crucial our exploratory research in Costa Rica turned out 
to be. Retrospectively, we noticed that most decisions and the common threads of our research 
stem from our field work there. It has laid the basis for an abductive approach in the majority 
of our research, in which we went back and forth between empirical information and 
theoretical knowledge. 
 
1.4.4 Overview Articles 
The main body of this dissertation consists of six articles that were written over the course of 
the PhD. Table 3 gives an overview of these articles and their research questions, research 
approaches, main findings and conclusions as well as their central concepts and how they 
focus on labour rights. Figure 3 then illustrates how the six articles relate to each other. 
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Table 3: Overview content articles 
 
Research questions Research approach Findings & conclusions 
Central concepts  
Focus  
labour rights 
1. The EU and Fair Trade: 
hands-off? 
 
Deborah Martens (DM) & 
Jan Orbie (JO) 
 
(Book chapter in 
Handbook on the EU and 
International Trade, 2018) 
What does Fair Trade 
mean? 
What is the EU position 
concerning Fair Trade? 
- Developed a conceptual 
framework to schematise 
meanings of Fair Trade 
along two axes: reformist 
vs revolutionary change 
and market vs state 
involvement 
- Applied framework to 
current and past EU Fair 
Trade initiatives  
- Fair Trade has opposing 
ideological and 
philosophical meanings 
- EU position has evolved 
towards a mainly 
neoliberal trade agenda. 
Piecemeal approach for 
Fair Trade objectives 
 
- Fairness in trade 
- Free trade 
- EU trade policy 
 
- Labour rights as one 
aspect of Fair Trade 
- Trade labour linkage 
2. Do labour rights matter 
for export? A Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis of 
pineapple trade to the EU 
 
Annelien Gansemans 
(AG), DM, Marijke 
D’Haese (MD), JO 
 
(Politics and Governance, 
2017) 
Are exporting countries 
complying with labour 
standards rewarded with 
a larger export share to 
the European market, 
especially in trade of 
agricultural products? 
- Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (= causes-of-
effects approach, explains  
different causal patterns) 
- Explaining the share of 
pineapple exports to the 
EU compared to other 
destinations 
- Conditions: labour 
rights, institutional 
quality, tariffs, distance 
- EU discourse promoting 
labour standards misses 
leverage effect on actual 
export decisions  
- Zero tariff necessary for a 
large export share to EU 
- Labour standards 
protection can make a 
difference when 
institutional quality’s weak  
- Latin American >< 
African cases 
Determinants of trading 
relations 
- Trade labour linkage 
- Race to the top/bottom 
- Collective Bargaining 
rights = enabling rights 
- Ethical consumerism 
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3. Mapping variation of 
Civil Society 
Involvement in EU trade 
agreements: A CSI Index 
DM, Lore Van den Putte 
(LVdP), Myriam Oehri 
(MO), JO 
(European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 2018) 
What are the similarities 
and differences in civil 
society involvement (CSI) 
across the new generation 
EU FTAs? 
- Systematic and 
comparative analysis of 
treaty provisions 
establishing CSMs in EU 
FTAs 
- Analysis based on an 
original codebook and 
resulted in a CSI Index 
- Some form of template  
- Large variation in CSI: 
• High (Canada, Korea) 
• Medium (Georgia, 
Moldova, Vietnam, 
Ukraine) 
• Low (Central America,  
Singapore, Peru-
Colombia, Ecuador) 
- Civil society 
involvement 
- Institutional 
perspective 
No specific focus on 
labour rights 
 
 
4. Explaining variation of 
civil society involvement 
in EU trade agreements 
 
MO, JO, DM, LVdP 
 
(submitted to Journal of 
European Integration) 
How can the variation in 
CSI in EU FTAs be 
explained? 
What determines CSI in 
EU FTA provisions? 
 
Five explanations were 
operationalised by 
calibrating different data 
sources into four scores 
which allowed for a 
systematic and 
comparative analysis 
- No explanation can fully 
and exclusively account for 
CSI variation 
- Most powerful 
explanation: third country 
resonance = the higher civil 
society participation is in a 
third country, the higher 
CSI will be in an EU FTA 
with that country. 
- To a smaller extent: EU 
experience  
- Not valid: EU 
protectionism, and EU 
norms, EU-third country 
trade power 
- Civil society 
involvement 
- Determinants of FTA 
provisions/ negotiation 
outcome 
- Importance domestic 
context trade partner  
Explanations on EU 
protectionism (low 
labour costs in third 
country) and EU norms 
(labour right violations) 
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5. Promoting sustainable 
development or 
legitimising free trade? 
Civil society mechanisms 
in EU trade agreements 
 
JO, DM, MO, LVdP 
 
(Third World Thematics, 
2017) 
Do civil society 
mechanisms legitimise the 
underlying neoliberal 
orientation of the 
agreements through co-
optation of critical actors? 
 
- Analysis of experience 
and perception of CSM 
participants 
- Data: survey with EU 
CSM participant, 
interviews, non-
participatory observation  
- no clear evidence of co-
optation 
- participants are aware of 
risks participation, 
however,  take a 
constructive stance  
- diverging perspectives 
between non-profit and 
business actors risk 
reinforcing existing power 
asymmetries 
- Civil society 
involvement 
- Co-optation 
- Insider-outsider 
dilemma 
- Diverging interests 
participants 
- Linkage free trade & 
sustainable development 
- More critical position 
labour representatives 
6. Trade unions in multi-
stakeholder initiatives: 
what shapes their 
participation? 
 
DM, AG, JO, MD 
 
(Sustainability, 2018) 
How to assess trade union 
participation in multi-
stakeholder initiatives 
(MSIs)?  
What enables and 
constrains this 
participation? 
- Developed analytical 
framework combining 
structural and agency 
dimensions: MSI design 
and trade union’s power 
resources 
- Within-case analysis of 
three MSIs in EU-Costa 
Rica pineapple supply 
chain 
- MSI design and 
implementation: 
shortcomings in 
representativeness, 
procedural fairness and 
consensual orientation 
- Trade union power 
resources: strong network 
embeddedness & improved 
infrastructural resources 
- Civil society 
involvement 
- Determinants of 
participation 
- Participatory 
governance & 
deliberation 
- Power asymmetry in 
MSIs 
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- Data: interviews, focus 
groups, non-participatory 
observation, document 
analysis  
had positive effect on 
participation. Lack of 
internal solidarity and 
unfavourable narrative 
resources affected 
participation negatively  
- Labour rights issues in 
Costa Rican pineapple 
industry 
- MSIs created to 
improve sustainable 
development,  
- trade union 
participation to these 
MSIs 
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Figure 3 visualises the bigger picture constituted by the articles in the main body of this 
dissertation and how these separate publications are related to one another. Whereas the first 
article is a more general piece discussing Fair Trade and the EU’s position herein, the others 
are placed on one of the two arrows that connect the EU as a trade actor, or importer, to 
workers at the bottom of the supply chain. As such the arrows move from the macro to the 
micro level. Each arrow represent a theme central to this dissertation, namely ‘EU-Costa Rica 
pineapple trade’ and ‘CSI in EU trade agreements’. The final article covers both topics.  
 
 
Figure 3: Overview and relationship of the articles 
 
50 
 
 
  
51 
 
References 
Adriaensen, J., & González-Garibay, M. (2013). The Illusion of Choice: the European Union 
and the Trade-Labor Linkage. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 9(4), 542-559.  
Altintzis, Y. (2013). Civil Society Engagement and Linkages in EU Trade Policy In T. Takacs & 
A. Dimopoulos (Eds.), Linking trade and non-commercial interests: the EU as a global role 
model? (Vol. 4). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Institute. 
Andersen, J., & Siim, B. (2004). Introduction: The Politics of Inclusion and Empowerment – 
Gender, Class and Citizenship. In J. Andersen & B. Siim (Eds.), The Politics of Inclusion 
and Empowerment. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Anner, M. (2017). Monitoring Workers’ Rights: The Limits of Voluntary Social Compliance 
Initiatives in Labor Repressive Regimes. Global Policy, 8(3), 56-65.  
Armstrong, K. (2002). Rediscovering Civil Society: The European Union and  the White Paper 
on Governance. European Law Journal, 8(1), 102-132.  
Baccaro, L., Benassi, C., & Meardi, G. (2018). Theoretical and empirical links between trade 
unions and democracy. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 40(1), 3-19.  
Balasubramanian, G., & Sarkar, S. (2015). Union revitalisation: a review and research agenda.  
Barrientos, S., & Kritzinger, A. (2004). Squaring the Circle — Global Production and the Infor-
malisation of Work in South African Fruit Exports. Journal of International Development, 
16(1), 81-92.  
Barrientos, S., & Smith, S. (2007). Do workers benefit from ethical trade? Assessing codes of 
labour practice in global production systems. Third World Quarterly, 28(4), 713-729.  
Bartels, L. (2007). The WTO Legality of the EU's GSP+ Arrangement. Journal of International 
Economic Law, 10(4), 869-886.  
Bartley, T. (2011). Transnational Governance as the layering of rules: intersections of public 
and private standards. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 12(2), 517-542.  
Berliner, D., Greenleaf, A., & Noveck, J. (2015). Building Capacity, Building Rights? State 
Capacity and Labor Rights in Developing Countries. World Development, 72, 127-139.  
Bernstein, W. (2008). A splendid exchange: how trade shaped the world. London: Grove Atlantic 
Ltd. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2016). Bertelmann Transformation Atlas 2016: Democracy Status.   
Retrieved from https://atlas.bti-
project.org/share.php?1*2018*TV:SDS1:MAP*DOA*TOPO:REGION:TOF 
Brueggemann, J. (2018). The Role of Organized Labor in Civil Society. Sociology Compass, 8(8), 
1033-1044.  
Campling, L., Harrison, J., Richardson, B., & Smith, A. (2016). Can labour provisions work 
beyond the border? Evaluating the effects of EU free trade agreements. International 
Labour Review, 155(3), 357-382.  
Chan, A., & Ross, R. J. (2003). Racing to the bottom: international trade without a social clause. 
Third World Quarterly, 24(6), 1011-1028.  
Cheol-Sung, L. (2007). Labor Unions and Good Governance: A Cross-National, Comparative 
Analysis. American Sociological Review, 72(4), 585-609.  
Cheong, D., Jansen, M., & Peters, R. (2013). Shared Harvests: Agriculture, Trade and Employment. 
Geneva: International Labour Organization and United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development. 
Civicus Monitor. (2018). Rating Costa Rica.  
Damro, C. (2012). Market power Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 19(5), 682-699.  
52 
 
De Bièvre, D., & Dür, A. (2005). Constituency Interests and Delegation in European and 
American Trade Policy. Comparative political studies, 38(10), 1271-1296.  
De Neve, G. (2008). Global garment chains, local labour activism: New challenges to trade 
union and NGO activism in the Tiruppur garment cluster, South India. In G. De Neve, 
P. Luetchford, J. Pratt, & D. C. Wood (Eds.), Hidden Hands in the Market: Ethnographies 
of Fair Trade, Ethical Consumption, and Corporate Social Responsibility. Bingley: Emerald 
Group Publishing. 
De Schutter, O. (2002). Europe in search of its Civil Society. European Law Journal, 8(2), 198-217.  
De Schutter, O. (2015). Trade In the Service of Sustainable Development : Linking Trade to Labour 
Rights and Environmental Standards. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
Deloitte. (2016). Capitalizing on the shifting consumer food value equation. Retrieved from 
Oakland: https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/consumer-
business/us-fmi-gma-report.pdf 
Drydyk, J. (2013). Empowerment, agency, and power. Journal of Global Ethics, 9(3), 249-262.  
Dür, A., & De Bièvre, D. (2007). Inclusion without Influence? NGOs in European Trade Policy. 
Journal of Public Policy, 27(1), 79-101.  
Ebert, F., & Posthuma, A. (2011). Labour provisions in trade arrangements: current trends and 
perspectives. Retrieved from Geneva:  
Estanque, E. (2009). Labour, Social Inequalities and Trade Unionism. RCCS Annual Review.  
Eurobarometer. (2016). The European Year for Development - citizen's views on development, 
cooperation and aid. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/sp441-devco-report-final_en.pdf 
European Commission. (2001). European Governance: a white paper. (COM(2001) 428). 
European Commission. (2019). Freedom of assembly and of association.   Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/aid-development-cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-
rights-eu/know-your-rights/freedoms/freedom-assembly-and-association_en 
Finke, B. (2007). Civil society participation in EU governance. Living Reviews in European 
Governance, 2(2).  
Freje, C., & Kelly, J. (2003). Union Revitalization Strategies in Comparative Perspective. 
European Journal of Industrial Relations, 9(1), 7-24.  
Gereffi, G., & Mayer, F. (2005). Globalization and the demand for governance. In G. Gereffi 
(Ed.), New offshoring jobs and global development. Geneva: International Institute for 
Labour Studies. 
Gheyle, N. (2019). Trade policy with the lights on: The origins, dynamics, and consequences of the 
politicization of TTIP. Ghent University, Ghent.    
Gorayska, B., & Lindsay, R. (1993). The roots of relevance. Journal of Pragmatics, 19(4), 301-323.  
Hainmueller, J., Hiscox, M. J., & Sequeira, S. (2015). Consumer Demand for Fair Trade: 
Evidence from a Multistore Field Experiment. Review of Economics and Statistics, 97(2).  
Hanchez, N. (2018). The development and promotion of global business and human rights 
norms: how far is the EU prepared to go? In F. Gomez Isa, C. Churruca Muguruza, & 
J. Wouters (Eds.), EU Human Rights and Democratization Policies: Achievements and 
Challenges. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Hancock, J. F. (2017). Plantation Crops, Plunder and Power: evolution and exploitation. Oxon: 
Routledge. 
Harrison, J., Barbu, M., Campling, L., Richardson, B., & Smith, A. (2018). Governing labour 
standards through Free Trade Agreements: limits of the European Union's Trade and 
53 
 
Sustainable Development Chapters. Journal of Common Market Studies, 1-18. 
doi:10.1111/jcms.12715 
Hassel, A. (2008). The evolution of a Global Labor Governance Regime. Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 21(2), 231-251.  
Hearn, S., & Buffardi, A. L. (2016). What is impact? Retrieved from London: 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10352.pdf 
Hocking, B. (2004). Changing the terms of trade policy making: from the ‘club’ to the 
‘multistakeholder’ model. World Trade Review, 3(1), 3-26.  
Horn, H., Mavroidis, P., & Sapir, A. (2010). Beyond the WTO? An anatomy of EU and US 
preferential trade agreements. The World Economy, 33(11), 1565-1588.  
Howell, C. (2005). Trade Unions and the State: the construction of industrial relations institutions in 
Britain, 1890-2000. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hurst, P. (2007). Agricultural workers and their contribution to sustainable agriculture and rural 
development/ FAO-ILO-IUF. Geneva: ILO. 
Hvidt Thelle, M., Jeppesen, T., Gjødesen-Lund, C., & Van Biesebroeck, J. (2015). Assessment of 
economic benefits generated by the EU Trade Regimes towards developing countries. Volume I. 
Brussels: European Commission. 
ILO. (1998). ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-
up.   Retrieved from 
https://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm 
ILO. (2019). 8. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining.  
International Institute for Labour Studies. (2015). Social dimensions of free trade agreements. 
Geneva: International Labour Organisation. 
ITUC. (2018). 2018 ITUC Global Rights Index: The World’s Worst Countries for Workers. Retrieved 
from Brussels: https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc-global-rights-index-2018-en-
final-2.pdf 
Jarman, H. (2007). The other Side of the Coin: Knowledge, NGOs and EU Trade Policy. Politics, 
28(1), 26-32.  
Kelly, J. (1998). Rethinking industrial relations: mobilization, collectivism and long waves. London: 
Routledge. 
Knudsen, J. S., & Moon, J. (2017). Visible Hands:  Government regulation and International Business 
Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kohler-Koch, B., & Quittkat, C. (2013). De-Mystification of Participatory Democracy: EU-
Governance and Civil Society. Oxford: Oxford Univerity Press. 
Langille, B. (2005). What is international labour law for? Geneva. 
Langille, B. (2016). Labor. In J. Katz Cogan, I. Hurd, & I. Johnstone (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of International Organizations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Leeg, T. (2018). Negotiating sustainable trade: explaining the difference in social standards in 
US and EU preferential trade agreements. Contemporary Politics. 
doi:10.1080/13569775.2017.1422093 
Lucio, M. M. (2016). Unhinging social dialogue: a review of the politics of pacts and the diverse 
uses and transformations of the concept of social dialogue. In V. Pulignano, H.-D. 
Kohler, & P. Stewart (Eds.), Employment relations in an era of change. Brussels: European 
Trade Union Institute. 
Manners, I. (2009). The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policies: Reflections from a Normative 
Power Perspective. European Foreign Affairs Review, 14, 785-2009.  
54 
 
Marx, A., Lein, B., & Brando, N. (2016). The Protection of Labour Rights in Trade Agreements: 
The Case of the EU-Colombia Agreement. Journal of World Trade, 50(4), 587-610.  
Meardi, G., & Marginson, P. (2014). Global labour governance: potential and limits of an 
emerging perspective. Work, employment and society, 28(4), 651–662. 
doi:10.1177/0950017014534007 
Moon, J., & Vogel, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility, Government, and Civil Society  
In A. Crane, D. Matten, A. McWilliams, J. Moon, & D. S. Siege (Eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mosley, L. (2005). Globalisation and the state: Still room to move? New Political Economy, 10(3), 
355-362.  
Mosley, L. (2017). Workers’ rights in global value chains: possibilities for protection and for 
peril. New Political Economy, 22(2), 153-168.  
Nielsen. (2016). What's in food and on our mind: ingedrient and dining-out trends around the world. 
Retrieved from New York City: 
https://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/nielsenglobal/eu/docs/pdf/Global%20Ingredie
nt%20and%20Out-of-Home%20Dining%20Trends%20Report.pdf 
OECD. (2002). Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management.  Retrieved 
from http://www.oecd.org/dac/2754804.pdf. 
OECD. (2017). OECD Reviews of Labour Market and Social Policies: Costa Rica. Retrieved from 
Paris: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/oecd-reviews-of-
labour-market-and-social-policies-costa-rica_9789264282773-en#page1 
Oehri, M. (2014). Comparing US and EU labour governance ‘near and far’ –hierarchy vs 
network? Journal of European Public Policy, 22(5), 731-749.  
Oehri, M. (2015). US and EU Labor Governance in the Dominican Republic: Contrasting the 
DR-CAFTA and the CARIFORUM-EPA De Jure and De Facto. Bulletin of Comparative 
Labour Relations, 89(Special Issue on Protecting Labour Rights in a Multi-polar Supply 
Chain and Mobile Global Economy), 93-112.  
Orbie, J. (2011). Promoting labour standards through trade: normative power or regulatory 
state Europe? In R. G. Whitman (Ed.), Normative Power Europe empirical and theoretical 
perspectives (pp. 161-186). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Orbie, J., & Tortell, L. (2009). The New GSP+ Benefi ciaries: Ticking the Box or Truly Consistent 
with ILO Findings? European Foreign Affairs Review, 15(5), 663-681.  
Orbie, J., Van den Putte, L., & Martens, D. (2017). The Impact of Labour Rights Commitments 
in EU Trade Agreements: The Case of Peru. Politics and Governance, 5(4), 6-18.  
Orbie, J., & Van Roozendaal, G. (2017). Labour Standards and Trade: In Search of Impact and 
Alternative Instruments. Politics and Governance, 5(4), 1-5.  
Oxfam. (2018). Ripe for change: Ending human suffering in supermarket suplly chains. Retrieved 
from Oxford: https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/cr-ripe-for-
change-supermarket-supply-chains-210618-en.pdf 
Peels, R., Echeverria, E. M., Aissi, J., & Schneider, A. (2016). Corporate Social Responsibility in 
International Trade and Investment Agreements: Implications for states, business and workers. 
Retrieved from Geneva:  
Postnikov, E., & Bastiaens, I. (2014). Does dialogue work? The effectiveness of labor standards 
in EU preferential trade agreements. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(6), 923-940.  
Risse, T. (2012). On global justice. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Scharpf, F. (1999). Governing in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
55 
 
Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. (2011). The New Political Role of Business in a Globalized World 
– A Review of a New Perspective on CSR and Its Implications for the Firm, Governance, 
and Democracy. Journal of Management Studies, 48(4), 899-931.  
Silver, B. J. (2003). Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization Since 1870. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Smismans, S. (2003). European Civil Society: Shaped by Discourses and Onstitutional Interests. 
European Law Journal, 9(4), 473-495.  
Smismans, S. (2006). Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Smith, A., Barbu, M., Campling, L., Harrison, J., & Richardson, B. (2018). Labor Regimes, 
Global Production Networks, and European Union Trade Policy: Labor Standards and 
Export Production in the Moldovan Clothing Industry. Economic Geography, 94(5), 550-
574.  
Steffek, J., & Nanz, P. (2008). Emergent Patterns of Civil Society Participation in Global and 
European Governance. In J. Steffek, C. Kissling, & P. Nanz (Eds.), Civil Society 
Participation in European and Global Governance: A Cure for the Democratic Deficit? 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Toffel, M., Short, J., & Ouellet, M. (2015). Codes in context: How states, markets, and civil 
society shape adherence to global labor standards. Regulation & Governance, 9(3), 205-
223.  
Tran, A. N. (2017). Forcing change from the outside? The role of trade-labour linkages in 
transforming Vietnam’s labour regime. Competition & Change, 21(5), 397-416.  
United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
Van den Putte, L. (2015). Involving Civil Society in Social Clauses and the Decent Work 
Agenda. Global Labour Journal, 6(2), 221-235.  
Van den Putte, L. (2016). The European Union’s trade-labour linkage. Beyond the ‘soft’ approach? 
(Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science), Ghent University, Ghent.    
Van den Putte, L., & Orbie, J. (2015). EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Surprising Rise 
of Labour Provisions. The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations, 31(3), 263-284.  
Vogt, J. S. (2015). A Little Less Conversation: The EU and the (Non) Application of Labour 
Conditionality in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 31(3), 285-304.  
Waleson, J. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility in EU Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreements: Towards Sustainable Trade and Investment. Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration, 42(2), 143-174.  
Wardhaugh, B. (2013). GSP+ and Human Rights: Is the EU’s Approach the Right One? Journal 
of International Economic Law, 16(4), 827-846.  
White, H. (2010). A contribution to current debates in impact evaluation. Evaluation, 16(2), 153-
164.  
Yap, J. (2013). Beyond ‘Don't Be Evil’: The European Union GSP+ Trade Preference Scheme 
and the Incentivisation of the Sri Lankan Garment Industry to Foster Human Rights. European 
Law Journal, 19(2), 283-301. 
 
56 
 
2. Costa Rican context 
 
Costa Rica, a country located on the Central American isthmus counting nearly five million 
inhabitants, is acclaimed for its political stability and social progress in a region of violence 
and high social inequality. Its life satisfaction levels are among the highest in the world: Costa 
Rica tops the Happy Planet Index (2018) and is ranked 13th in the World Happiness report 
(Helliwell et al., 2018). The country has invested for decades in public education and healthcare 
resulting in a near universal access to these services (OECD, 2017a). With a GDP per capita 
income of $11,677 in 2017, Costa Rica, an upper-middle income country, has higher standards 
of living and lower poverty rates than other countries in the region (World Bank, 2018). 
Concerning income inequality, Costa Rica is located on the Latin American average. Even 
though the country used to be one of the least unequal Latin American countries, income 
inequality increased sharply during the last two decades, reaching a Gini coefficient of 0.49 in 
2012 (where one is completely unequal) (OECD, 2017b). However, in general, Costa Rica’s 
socio-economic performance is evaluated as positive, even impressive. This progress is 
materialised through the country’s accession discussions taking place since 2015 to join the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The fundamental values 
of this ‘rich country club’ are the commitment to pluralist democracy based on the rule of law 
and the respect of human rights, adherence to open and transparent market economy 
principles and a shared goal of sustainable development (OECD, 2015). 
According to Trejos (2013) Costa Rica’s development can be attributed to three complementary 
sets of policies. The first set involves the substantial investments and unusual decisions made 
by Costa Rica during the 20th century concerning democracy, peace, education, healthcare and 
the environment. These explain the current high levels of human and institutional 
development and labour productivity. The second set refers to the stabilisation and 
liberalisation measures undertaken after the 1980-1982 debt crisis, which have allowed Costa 
Rica to maintain macroeconomic stability. The third set of policies refer to the measures 
opening the Costa Rican economy and promoting its exports and attracting foreign direct 
investment, amounting in diversification, technological improvement, higher incomes and job 
creation.  
The relevant aspects of these policy sets will be discussed below. To provide a comprehensive 
picture of Costa Rica, we will discuss its neoliberal turn as well as the nation’s trade and 
agricultural policy. This is then followed by an overview of Costa Rica’s main labour issues 
and how these persist in its pineapple sector.  
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2.1 Costa Rica’s neoliberal turn 
Costa Rica used to be an agro-exporting economy, highly dependent on the export of 
traditional agricultural products: coffee and bananas (Ferreira et al., 2018). To be less 
vulnerable to external economic shocks, Costa Rican authorities began to carry out a new 
strategy based on import substitution industrialisation throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In 
addition to joining the Central American Common Market in 1963, this resulted in the creation 
of new industries, such as textiles and shoes, and the increase of the share of manufactured 
goods to Costa Rica’s export. Until the 1980s Costa Rica experienced high rates of economic 
growth. Its economic model, based on social democratic tenets, generated real benefits for its 
population in terms of education, health and economic prosperity. 
From the late 1970s to mid-1980s, the country experienced its worst economic crisis in history, 
which stemmed from a combination of several external and internal factors (Gonzalez-Vega, 
1989; Seligson & Muller, 1987; Wilson, 1994). The Nicaraguan revolution (1978-1979) and the 
civil war in El Salvador (1979-1992) caused the total collapse of the Central American Common 
Market leading to Costa Rican exports to drop 60% between 1980 and 1986. In addition, oil 
prices soared while the coffee price plummeted and the banana export (the two main export 
commodities) declined, deteriorating the country’s export income. Costa Rica’s administration 
borrowed heavily on the international market to cover its trade imbalance, leading to an 
international debt of $4 billion by 1983, one of the largest per capita debts in the world at that 
time. The incapacity of Costa Rica’s administration to deal with the situation only exacerbated 
the situation. The magnitude of this economic crisis was unprecedented: an entire decade of 
economic growth was lost. 
A new administration was elected in 1982 which introduced a series of neoliberal measures, 
including privatisation of state-enterprises, reduction of government expenditures and 
opening Costa Rica’s economy to international trade through non-traditional export 
promotion and reductions in import tariffs (Clark, 2001). These policy measures were 
prescribed by the Washington-based financing institutions (International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank and US Department of Treasury) and were in line with the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ dictating a neoliberal structural reform agenda in exchange for loans to developing 
countries disrupted by economic and financial crises in the 1980s. Nevertheless, opinions vary 
whether these institutions (Marois, 2005) or internal pressure groups (Wilson, 1994) had the 
most decisive influence in Costa Rica’s neoliberal turn. Contrary to the majority of other Latin 
American countries, such as Peru, Mexico and Brazil, that opted for a radical approach to 
implement similar policy prescriptions, Costa Rica carried out the reforms gradually, similarly 
to Uruguay and Chile (Arnaut, 2013; Clark, 2001). Overall, the abandonment of the import 
substitution industrialisation model and the structural reforms are considered to have had a 
positive impact on Costa Rica’s economy. 
The reforms laid the foundations of a new economic model based on export diversification 
(see infra) and the attraction of foreign direct investment. Free trade zones, where fiscal 
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benefits are granted to companies investing in that area, were created to attract foreign firms 
and promote new exports (Ferreira et al., 2018). These free trade zones, or zonas francas, have 
played a key role in Costa Rica’s economic development and export supply since the 1980s. 
For instance, the arrival of Intel, investing $300 million in a microprocessor plant in 1997, has 
been, directly and indirectly, responsible for the shift in Costa Rica’s top exports from coffee 
and bananas to electronic products (see Ferreira & Harrison, 2012). In addition to electronics, 
Costa Rica successfully attracted foreign firms in medical equipment and service sectors. By 
2015, the structure of Costa Rica’s economy had become similar to that of service-oriented 
OECD countries (OECD, 2017b). Agriculture, however, still accounts for 5% of GDP in Costa 
Rica compared with 2.5% in the OECD on average. Besides services (76%), industry (19%) also 
continues to play an important role. 
In any respect, Costa Rica’s neoliberal turn has had a far-reaching impact on its political 
economy and society. Even though Costa Rica remains a social democratic country, we see the 
prioritisation of neoliberal policies, where the role of the state is being limited in favour of the 
free functioning of the market. The remainder of this section will describe how the country is 
proactively looking for new markets through the conclusion of free trade agreements, and 
how, as a result from export diversification, Costa Rica became the world biggest exporter of 
fresh pineapples. Finally we will also show how the new dominant ideology has impacted 
industrial relations in the country. 
 
 
2.2 Trade policy 
As introduced above, Costa Rica embarked upon a series of liberalisation measures after its 
financial crisis. Indeed, pursuing free trade fits with Costa Rica’s outward oriented 
development policy. The measures taken can be classified in four broad categories: the overall 
reform of the Costa Rican trading system, conclusions of trade agreements, import policy 
measures and export policy measures (OECD, 2017a). In the remainder of this section I will 
focus on the trade agreements that Costa Rica has concluded, as it is most relevant for the topic 
of this dissertation. 
To support the process of openness and greater integration with international markets, Costa 
Rica has been negotiating and signing bilateral investment agreements as well as multilateral, 
regional and bilateral trade agreements since the 1990s (SICE, 2019). The investment 
agreements were mainly concluded in the 1990s with a number of European (Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland), Latin and North American (Argentina, 
Canada, Chile, Paraguay, Venezuela) and Asian (Korea, Taiwan) countries, except for one with 
Qatar in 20104. 
                                                     
4 Date of signature, not entry into force 
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Costa Rica has been active in the multilateral trading system, where it became a member of 
the GATT in 1990 and was a founding member of the WTO in 1995 (WTO, 2019). As such, it 
grants most-favoured-nation treatment to all its trading partners. Costa Rica signed the 
plurilateral WTO Information Technology Agreement as well as the WTO’s intellectual 
property agreement and changes made to it concerning patents and public health. It also 
participated to the negotiations on financial services, accepting the Fifth Protocol to the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services. Costa Rica has been involved in several dispute 
cases, as complainant, respondent and third party.  
At regional level Costa Rica is member of the Central American Common Market (1960), the 
Free Trade Agreement between Central America, the Dominican Republic and the US 
(CAFTA-DR, 2004), the Free Trade Agreement with CARICOM, the Caribbean Community 
(2004), the EU-Central American Association Agreement (2012) and most recently the Free 
Trade Agreement between Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama and the EFTA states (Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) (2013).  
Finally, at bilateral level, Costa Rica has concluded trade agreements with the Dominican 
Republic (with CACM members) (1998), Chile (with CACM members) (1999), Canada (2001), 
Panama (with CACM members) (2002), Singapore (2010), China (2010), Peru (2011), Mexico 
(with CACM members and Panama) and Colombia (2013). Costa Rica has recently also signed 
a Free Trade Agreement with Korea, which has not yet entered into force.  
In sum, the enumeration above illustrates how Costa Rica’s has successfully assured beneficial 
market access for its exports. This is a concrete consequence of Costa Rica’s quest for new 
markets since the 1990s, in order to be able to export more and to be less dependent on the 
United States, which has been historically the leading market for the nation’s exports (Ferreira 
et al., 2018, interview 32). 
In 2017, the main export sectors were agriculture (27%), medical equipment (27%) and the food 
industry (15%) (PROCOMER, 2018). The most important export products were medical 
devices (25%), bananas (10%) and pineapples (9%). These were exported to Costa Rica’s main 
export destinations in the United States (41%), the rest of Central America (24%) and the 
European Union (22%). 
 
2.2.1 EU-Central America Association Agreement 
The EU-CA AA was negotiated between the EU and Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador from October 2007 to May 2010. During the nine 
negotiation rounds there was only little public and scholarly attention dedicated to the 
agreement both in the EU and in Central America. Mainly because the EU was pursuing a 
trade agreement with Peru and Colombia during the same period and most concerns were 
focussed on the human rights situation in Colombia. In Central America, CAFTA-DR, the 
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trade agreement with the US in force since 2007, remained the centre of attention (Bierbrauer 
& De Goede, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the EU aimed at securing access to the Central American market which was at 
least the equivalent to that of the US, entailing that the concessions in the agreement would be 
as far-reaching (Woolcock et al., 2012). Indeed, the trade pillar of the Association Agreement 
is a comprehensive free trade agreement, covering over 95% of tariff lines and trade as well as, 
among others, border services, establishment (but not investment protection), public 
procurement, intellectual property rights and regulatory barriers (such as technical barriers to 
trade and sanitary and phytosanitary measures) (Araujo, 2016). 
According to the Commission’s implementation report (2018b) the trade part of the agreement 
has seen a new vitality as EU trade flows with Central America grew by 7.2% in 2017. Trade 
in services between the two regions continued to increase and EU investment in the region 
remained relatively strong. In addition, the agreement is said to also have furthered regional 
economic integration in Central America. Overall, this draws a rather positive picture of the 
trade-aspects of the agreement. 
In 2017, there was a record in fruit exports from the region, with an annual 20% rise lifting the 
sector to almost 31% of total exports to the EU (European Commission, 2018a). The main 
products are bananas and pineapples, and Costa Rica is the main exporter of fruit with 76% of 
the region’s exports to the EU. 
In addition to the trade pillar of the EU-CA AA, which has been provisionally applied since 
2013, there are two other pillars, respectively on cooperation and political dialogue. Since the 
EU-CA AA is still awaiting ratification by all the EU member states5, these pillars have not yet 
entered into force. This had led to criticism by Central American civil society as well as the 
European Parliament. Interviewees explained how those pillars had contributed to the 
legitimacy of the agreement during the negotiations, as it was ‘more’ than just a trade 
agreement (interview 22, 45, 53). However, due to the long ratification process, civil society 
are said to be disillusioned about the EU’s intentions. In addition, a recent report produced by 
the European Parliament’s International Trade Committee states that the non-application of 
these two pillars creates an imbalance between trade-related issues and political issues, such 
as promotion of democracy and human rights (European Parliament, 2018).  
 
 
2.3 Agricultural policy 
Consistent with the reforms introduced above, major agricultural reforms were undertaken in 
Costa Rica from the mid-1980s onwards. The features of this neoliberal approach were and 
still are the liberalisation of agricultural trade, the promotion of more profitable non-
traditional agricultural exports, as well as internal deregulation, dismantling subsidies and 
                                                     
5 At the time of writing Austria, Belgium and Greece have not yet ratified the Association Agreement 
(General Secretariat of the Council, 2019). 
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other incentives for small farmers and basic grain production, and the enhancement of rural 
non-farm activities as an additional source of income for small farmers (Botella-Rodríguez, 
2018). As we are interested in the link between agriculture and trade, we will focus on the first 
two features with an analysis of the linkages between liberalisation and export diversification 
through the promotion of non-traditional agricultural products. 
Non-traditional export crops include: crops that have not been produced in a particular 
country before; crops traditionally produced for domestic consumption but now being 
exported, and crops now exported to new markets (Barham et al., 1992). Coffee, cotton, cattle, 
sugar and bananas are considered to be the five traditional Central American exports. Costa 
Rica has promoted non-traditional products in which it had a comparative advantage (OECD, 
2017a). Even though Costa Rica remains a successful supplier of traditional products, such as 
bananas, coffee and sugar, this diversification efforts have led to the cultivation of, among 
others, pineapple, African palm, citrus, melon, mango, root vegetables, peach, flowers and 
ornamental plants. 
Throughout the 1980s, the Costa Rican government reduced state support for traditional 
smallholder crops produced for the domestic market, while creating a range of subsidies and 
incentives for producers engaged in non-traditional crops and for exporting firms (Botella-
Rodríguez, 2018; Voorend & Robles Rivera, 2011). These incentives included tax exemptions 
and facilitated access to credit and land (OECD, 2017a). The approach attracted important 
foreign direct investment, mostly US firms, into agro-industrial activities (Botella-Rodríguez, 
2018). Foreign investment is particularly high in the cultivation of bananas, pineapples and 
palm. Chiquita, Dole and Fresh del Monte control more than 50% of the plantations for these 
crops (FAO, 2014). The diversification was also symbolised by an increase of high-tech 
agricultural producers that began to produce higher value exports (Ferreira et al., 2018). 
Examples of these new agro-industries are peeling, drying and roasting–vacuum packed 
coffee, packing of fruits and vegetables, the milling of rice and sugar cane and concentrated 
orange juice. 
This diversification of the Costa Rica’s agricultural supply along with the nation’s proactive 
opening of new markets through its trade policy resulted in a dynamic, non-traditional 
agricultural export sector. It has contributed (in addition to the changes made in other sectors) 
to Costa Rica’s economic growth, as a series of products has recently emerged as important 
foreign exchange generator (e.g. pineapples) (Ferreira et al., 2018). However, on the down-side 
it has brought about a dualistic structure in the Costa Rican agricultural sector: a strong 
agricultural export sector coexisting with a low-productivity, traditional sector producing 
mostly for the domestic market (OECD, 2017b). Indeed, the spillovers from the successful 
export sector dominated by medium-large farms to the weaker traditional sector, which is 
characterised by less competitive, small-scale farms has been limited. A second, and related, 
problematic issue is food security. As public support for small farmers has been dismantled 
and borders have been opened to artificially cheap and lower quality food from developed 
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countries, Costa Rica’s degree of reliance on imported food is high (Botella-Rodríguez, 2018). 
In 2008 rapidly rising international food prices demonstrated the problem for food security 
such dependence poses and Costa Rica has been developing strategies since then to counter 
this issue (OECD, 2017a). 
 
2.3.1 The Costa Rican pineapple boom 
Pineapple in particular has been a very successful crop. It has been cultivated in Costa Rica for 
more than 50 years. In its early stages, pineapple production was primarily grown for local 
consumption and to a some degree for processing (Ferreira et al., 2018). From 2000 onwards 
the country’s pineapple industry began to expand rapidly, from 11,000 ha to more than 44,000 
ha in 2018, producing more than 3 million tonnes (CANAPEP, 2018; FAOSTAT, 2018). This 
boom can be explained by four complementary factors: the pioneering role of the Pineapple 
Development Company - Del Monte (PINDECO), the introduction of a new pineapple variety 
in Costa Rica, the conductive export promotion of non-traditional crops and a growing 
international demand for tropical fruits.  
First, at the end of the 1970s, PINDECO turned pineapple production into a highly intensive 
monoculture, requiring high levels of technology. The Del Monte subsidiary contributed to 
the development of a highly efficient production system, in terms of the technology used, 
stimulus for research (e.g. for the development of new varieties) as well as the proper 
treatment of the fruit in packaging plants, efficient transportation and its connections to the 
international markets (Ferreira et al., 2018; Gonzalez, 2004). In sum, PINDECO gave a 
definitive thrust to expand pineapple production for export. It was also this company that 
introduced a new commercial variety of pineapple called MD2 or ‘golden’ pineapple, the 
second explanatory factor for Costa Rica’s pineapple boom. This variety gained in popularity 
because it is sweeter, higher in vitamin C, provides higher yields and lasts longer than the 
Smooth Cayenne variety, the common variety back in the 1980s. This variety thrives well in 
Costa Rica due to ideal agro-ecological factors (soil, climate, temperature and humidity). 
Third, as discussed above, the policy context providing incentives for the export of non-
traditional agricultural products attracted investors, which led to unprecedented growth in 
terms of area planted and total production. In addition, the available logistic infrastructure 
and commercialisation channels of banana multinationals played an important role (Gonzalez, 
2004; Guevara et al., 2017). Whereas other Latin American and African producers also 
introduced this MD2 variety in order to adjust to the new market requirement and remain 
competitive, they failed to compete with Costa Rica because their large-scale production 
conditions and infrastructure are less favourable (Krumbiegel et al., 2018; Vagneron et al., 
2009). Finally, the growing demand for tropical fruit (fresh, in cans, in juices, dried, and 
processed) in large markets such as the US and EU, expanded the world pineapple market, 
with Costa Rica taking the lead. 
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According to the National Agricultural Census of 2014 there are 1228 pineapple farms, of 
which 108 farms are larger than 100 ha (INEC, 2014). This entails that 91% of the total pineapple 
cultivation area is concentrated in the hands of large-scale plantations. The four largest 
companies –Del Monte, Dole, Grupo Acón and Fyffes– represent 71% of total production. 
Many small farmers have left the pineapple business. Farmers that remain grow traditional 
varieties for the local market or processing industry because they cannot meet the international 
quality requirements (Faure et al., 2015). 
In 2017, pineapple exports accounted for 9% of national exports or $940,7 million 
(PROCOMER, 2018). Over the last ten years, pineapple became equally important as banana 
exports (10%) which have a longer history in the country. About half of the Costa Rican 
pineapples are exported to the US market and the other half to Europe, where the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Italy are the entry gates to the European market. It should be noted that until the 
1980s, Cote d’Ivoire used to be the major exporter of fresh, Smooth Cayenne, pineapples to 
Europe. Its share declined from 93% in 1985 to 50% in 2000 (Vagneron et al., 2009). Now, more 
than 80% of all European pineapple imports are the sweet ‘golden’ MD2 from Costa Rica 
(Guevara et al., 2017).  
Even though pineapple production and export contribute to the Costa Rican economy, this 
booming business also has an environmental and social downside. Concerning the 
environment, pineapple production has led to land and water pollution due to the intensive 
use of pesticides (see Echeverría-Sáenz et al., 2012). In addition, the pineapple expansion has 
had an impact on Costa Rica’s forest cover. Jadin et al (2016) found related deforestation in the 
most ecologically valuable regions of Costa Rica. The reforestation efforts, in place to 
compensate the high deforestation rates in the 1980s, have increased the reforested area in 
general, but have not restored the ecological value that was destroyed. The social 
consequences will be addressed in the next section by focussing on the labour issues in the 
sector. In order to address these growing sustainability concerns, The UNDP launched the 
National Platform for the Responsible Production and Trade of Pineapple in Costa Rica in June 
2011 (see infra). 
 
 
2.4 Labour issues6 
In general, Costa Rica performs well on human rights. However, Costa Rican law and its 
implementation is not fully in conformity with international labour rights especially in the 
areas of collective bargaining and collective agreements (European Commission, 2016). 
Indeed, while Costa Rica is characterised by political and social stability, social dialogue 
between employers and workers remains fragmented and weak. Unionisation is especially 
                                                     
6 Written in collaboration with Annelien Gansemans. 
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low (1%) in the private sector, compared to 30% in the public sector (OECD, 2017b). The two 
main barriers for active and effective worker representation and unionisation are the need for 
labour code reforms and its effective implementation and the prevalence of alternative worker 
representation organisations in an anti-union culture.  
First, even though the nation has ratified the most important ILO conventions, its labour code 
needed to be reformed to enable stronger social dialogue and to design and implement labour 
market policies in a timely fashion (OECD, 2017b). In 2016, after more than a decade of 
negotiations, a labour proceedings reform bill was adopted (Act No. 9343), which is considered 
to be the most profound reform of the Costa Rican labour code since its enactment in 1943. The 
major changes in the law include quicker labour proceedings through oral litigation instead of 
relying exclusively on written filings and motions, less strict strike regulation, the 
reorganisation and specialisation of labour jurisdiction, the elimination of cost categorisation 
and the provision of legal assistance free of charge (ILO CEACR, 2017). If implemented 
properly, the reforms will improve Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining in the 
country, especially in the private sector (interview 82).  
Concerning the implementation of its labour code, Costa Rica’s labour inspectorate needs to 
be improved as its functioning is hampered by a lack of resources which affects the inspectors’ 
daily work. In addition to being understaffed, there were 92 inspectors in 2015 which is 
considerably below the ILO benchmark, these inspectors lack access to rural areas, map 
locations, transport and digitalisation of records which impedes effective enforcement (OECD, 
2017b). The effectiveness is also limited because inspectors are not entitled to collect fines on 
site (interview 29). Long juridical procedure, up to eight years, discouraged workers and 
unions to submit a dispute, because it is too costly and the chances on reinstalled employment 
are low. Hopefully the labour reform introduced above, which came into force in 2017, will 
address this issue in practice. 
Second, Costa Rican labour law contains a unique feature that permits the formation of 
solidarist associations, known as solidarismo or yellow unions. Solidarist associations represent 
the workers in one business or enterprise, they seek to promote workplace harmony and 
dissociate themselves explicitly from trade unions which are perceived and framed as being 
conflictual (Banana Link, 2009). Their most important function is a saving fund for workers to 
which both employers and affiliated workers contribute. Workers can borrow money and 
benefit from a Christmas bonus, severance payment and school material amongst others. 
These tangible benefits are an important incentive to join a solidarist association.  
Even though these solidarity associations are not permitted by law to negotiate working 
conditions and labour rights (Castro Méndez, 2017), they advanced an alternative approach to 
solve labour dispute, namely through the formation of a permanent workers’ committee. The 
leaders of the company’s solidarist association mostly organise the creation of these 
committees and are then elected by the workers to represent them in the committee (Abdallah 
Arrieta, 2008). However, the committees have no independence from management and no 
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legal means to challenge the actions of the employers (Mosley, 2008; Sawchuk, 2004). Due to 
low unionisation rates in general and the lower legal threshold for permanent committees (3 
workers) than for trade union (12 workers) to be recognised as a bargaining unit, there is an 
enormous disproportion between the number of direct agreements (126) and collective 
bargaining agreements (29) in the private sector (ITA, 2017).  
Even though the Labour reform represents a silver lining for the achievement of Freedom of 
Association and Collective Bargaining in Costa Rica, the prevalence of solidarismo is 
emblematic for the dominant anti-union culture in the country. Both employers and workers 
themselves tend to resist the creation and functioning of trade unions. This attitude started in 
the 1980s when long-lasting strikes in the banana sector in the Pacific region of Costa Rica led 
to the relocation of the plantations and consequently to job losses and an increase in poverty 
(Robert, 2008). This example has been put forward in a defamation campaign by employers 
and solidarist associations, which is fuelled by an important sector of the Catholic Church, that 
claims trade unions attempt to destroy the banana industry and the country. It should be noted 
that this incident coincides with the aftermath of Costa Rica’s economic crisis and neoliberal 
turn. This period had detrimental consequences for trade unions in Costa Rica and the current 
anti-union culture stems from this context of deregulation and austerity measures in which 
private employers created evasive structures and adopted a strong antiunion attitude (Frundt, 
2002). From this period onwards, a serious decrease in unionisation is observed, coinciding 
with a rise of solidarist associations (Sawchuk, 2004). While trade unions still have a negative 
reputation in Costa Rica, solidarismo is promoted by most influential actors in the country. 
Costa Rican employers and even officials explain this is a unique Costa Rican model, part of 
the country’s exceptionalism (interview 13, 14, 24). However, the ILO as well as national and 
international trade unions have asserted that solidarist associations, permanent committees 
and their direct agreements undermine the role of independent trade unions in protecting 
workers’ rights (Banana Link, 2009; ILO CEARC, 2010; ITUC, 2007). In addition to the legal 
hurdles, this constraining context explains why trade union membership is low in the Costa 
Rican private sector. 
 
2.4.1 Labour issues in the pineapple industry 
The Northern region bordering Nicaragua accounts for 56% of the national pineapple 
production (Guevara et al., 2017). It is also one of the most economic and social vulnerable 
regions of the country (García & Salazar, 2016). For many low skilled workers the pineapple 
industry is the sole employment provider in the area (Guevara et al., 2017). The Ministry of 
Labour reported that 31,340 workers are directly employed by one of the officially registered 
262 pineapple producers (CCSS, 2016). This coincides with the 32,000 jobs estimated by the 
Costa Rican chamber of pineapple producers (CANAPEP, 2018). However, this number does 
not take into account a considerable share of workers informally employed by subcontractors 
which are not recorded in labour statistics (Acuña, 2005). Building further on the general 
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context described above and drawing on field research conducted in 2015 as well as 
Gansemans’ distinction of labour issues characterising the Costa Rican pineapple sector 
(forthcoming) , three concerns will be discussed: the flexible contractual relations and weak 
employment protection, vulnerable migrant workers and limited workers’ representation. 
First, even though fresh pineapples are cultivated all year round and could thus generate 
permanent employment opportunities, there is considerable flexibility built into the pineapple 
labour market. This is partly due to an increased demand for temporary workers during a 
busy period peaking in May by reason of the rainy season. However, the main reason behind 
the labour market’s flexibility is the hiring and firing practices of plantation management 
(Voorend & Robles Rivera, 2011). Costa Rican labour law prescribes a probation period of three 
months after which there is an accumulation of labour rights such as a notice period for 
dismissal and severance pay. To avoid these increased social costs, workers are dismissed 
before the end of their probation period, resulting in workers rotating between companies 
every three months (interview 29; focus group 1 & 2). In addition, employers turn to 
subcontractors to employ workers, often undocumented Nicaraguans. 
The vulnerability of migrant workers is the second problematic labour issue in the Costa Rican 
pineapple sector. Migrant workers, mainly young male Nicaraguans, are often employed by 
subcontractors and are more prone to deal with inferior working conditions than regularised 
and native Costa Rican workers (Voorend et al., 2013). They face lower wages, employment 
without written contracts, a lack of a working permit and often also protective equipment 
(Ruiz & Vargas, 2014). In addition, subcontracted workers are confronted with difficulties to 
register as a union member and have little avenues to raise their precarious working situation 
(Acuña Gonzalez, 2009, 2011).  
Third, unsurprisingly, the constraining legal setting, anti-union climate and prevalence of 
solidarismo described above, has led to very limited independent worker representation in the 
pineapple industry. Trade unions in pineapple plantations are a rare phenomenon: only six 
trade unions exist in the Northern region with between 8 to 80 members per firm. These unions 
have struggled to achieve better working conditions as collective bargaining agreements have 
not yet been signed in the pineapple sector at the time of data collection because the unions do 
not manage to reach the sufficient number of unionised workers to pass the legal threshold of 
33%. In addition, the unions only exist at plantation level and there is little collaboration 
among them. They are fragmented and are not organised at sectoral level or affiliated to the 
same national federation. This situation has been raised by the ILO which has expressed its 
concerns on solidarist organisations hampering the functioning of trade unions in banana and 
pineapple plantations (ILO CEACR, 2014; ILO CEARC, 2017). There have been direct 
agreements concluded in pineapple plantations, however, contrary to agreements negotiated 
by trade unions, these agreements weaken the bargaining power of lower-productivity 
workers in particular and disadvantage workers because they do not result from balanced 
negotiations of two independent, adequately informed parties (OECD, 2017b).  
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15.  The European Union and Fair Trade: hands off? 
Deborah Martens and Jan Orbie 
 
 
 
 
15.1    INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the Lisbon Treaty (2009), promoting ‘free and fair trade’ has explicitly become one of 
the objectives of  the European Union’s (EU) relations with the wider world (TEU art 3.5, see 
Box 15.2). In addition, the latest trade strategy of  the EU, ‘Trade for All’ (2015), emphasises 
the need for a value-based trade policy. It refers to the promotion of sustainable development, 
human rights and good governance through trade and suggests several instruments to achieve 
this objective, including ‘fair and ethical trading schemes’ (European Commission, 2015, p. 
25). 
However, it remains rather unclear what the EU’s position concerning fair trade exactly is. 
The academic literature on the EU’s common commercial policy rarely refers to fair trade 
policies. An important obstacle for clearly understanding what the EU’s approach to this topic 
would be is the ambiguous meaning of the concept ‘Fair Trade’. Since there are divergent 
interpretations of Fair Trade, ranging from labelling of products, over support to the social 
movement, to the reform of the trading system, and even trade defence instruments, there is no 
established answer to that question. 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, on a conceptual level, a framework is developed to 
unravel the diverse meanings of ‘Fair Trade’ and to structure the debate. Second, from an 
empirical point of view, this framework is used to interpret the EU’s position and how it has 
evolved over time. 
The chapter is structured as follows: first the complexity and ambiguity of  the term ‘Fair 
Trade’ is briefly introduced, followed by an explanation and schematisation of  its sometimes 
complementary, sometimes opposing ideological and philosophical meanings. Once  the  
conceptual  confusion  associated  with  this  concept  is  clarified,  a  historical overview of  
the EU’s positions and initiatives concerning Fair Trade is given, enabling a better 
understanding of  where the EU Fair Trade policy is coming from and where it could be 
going. Finally, the framework developed in the first part will serve as a heuristic tool to map 
the EU’s position on the matter, followed by conclusions. 
 
 
15.2    WHAT’S IN A NAME? 
 
‘Fair Trade’ is a complex and multi-dimensional concept (Miller, 2017). There are several 
opinions on what fairness actually stands for and how it should be attained. In this regard, 
special attention should be given to the various spellings and the corresponding meanings of 
the term (see Box 15.1) as this distinction will also be used throughout the chapter. 
In addition to ‘Fair Trade’, other terms such as alternative trade, ethical trade, social trade, 
trade justice and sustainable trade are used. Even though these terms often remain undefined 
and are used interchangeably, each of them could be given a specific meaning. 
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BOX 15.1   VARIOUS SPELLINGS OF FAIR TRADE 
 
Fairtrade – one word – refers to products certified by Fairtrade Labelling Organisations International 
(World Fair Trade Organization et al., 2011).This product label is what most people will know as fair 
trade and has become the most popular and accessible model of fair trade to date. 
The term fair trade – two words and lowercase – is used to refer broadly to the social movement, 
concept and market, while FairTrade – two words, capitalised – is the umbrella term for the philoso- 
phies and practices committed to fairness in global trade (Valiente-Riedl, 2013). 
Respectively ‘fairtrade’, ‘fair trade’ and ‘Fair Trade’ move from a very narrow to an extremely 
broad  interpretation,  a  distinction  that  will  be  addressed  hereunder. These  spelling  rules  
are confirmed by other authors (for instance Fisher, 2009), however the notations are often mixed 
up, requiring a clarifying context. 
 
 
 
For instance, sustainable trade also includes organic products, and social trade is focused on 
ensuring that working conditions in global value chains meet minimum international standards, 
mainly referring to the adoption of  codes in the context of  Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) (Smith & Barrientos, 2005). 
Whereas all variations of Fair Trade have in common that they refer to achieving greater 
equity in international trade, there is no consensus on how this should be organised, what it 
should look like, or which actors should be involved. In the conceptual framework set out 
below, we will map the different interpretations of  the concept ‘Fair Trade’. These range from 
the narrow and pragmatic approach of fairtrade labelling schemes and CSR practices to a 
broader interpretation of changing the international trading rules, which is often referred to as 
‘trade justice’. Moreover, we will indicate that, parallel to this narrow and broad interpretation 
of  Fair Trade, different roles in scope and substance can be reserved for governments and/or 
market players. 
These extremes are gathered in a matrix that we will use to structure the debate (see Figure  
15.1).  The  framework consists of two axes. The first axis makes a distinction according to 
the extent of  systemic change necessary to achieve fair trade, and ranges from a reformist to 
revolutionary view (partly based on Walton, 2010). The second axis distinguishes the required 
role of  the government or public sector versus the market or private sector, in other words 
whether interventionism or neoliberalism prevails. Since these axes represent a continuum 
between the opposite extremes, there is no watertight seal separating them and gradations 
within each of the quadrants are possible. 
 
15.2.1    Reformist Fairtrade 
 
The  reformist  approach  is  pragmatic  and  narrow  in  the  sense  that  the  solutions  put 
forward to gradually achieve greater equity in international trade do not challenge the 
functioning of the current, market-oriented trading system (in particular the rules of the World 
Trade Organization [WTO]). 
Two distinct forms are included in the reformist approach. The first, ‘fairtrade’, is the most 
well-known interpretation of  ‘Fair Trade’, as it constitutes a concrete practice that can easily 
be visualised through the product-certification route (e.g. Oxfam label) or through the
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Figure 15.1    Conceptualisations of Fair Trade 
 
integrated-supply route (e.g. world shops) (Cremona & Marín Durán, 2013). The most 
commonly used definition of this notion of fair trade has been put forward by the fair trade 
movement and reads as follows: 
 
Fair Trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency, and respect, that seeks 
greater  equity  in  international  trade.  It  contributes  to  sustainable  development  by  offering 
better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, disadvantaged producers and workers – 
especially in the South. Fair Trade Organisations, backed by consumers, are actively engaged in 
supporting producers, awareness raising and in campaigning for changes in the rules and practice 
of conventional international trade. (World Fair Trade Organization et al., 2011) 
 
The fair trade social movement has put much emphasis on the marketing of fairtrade and it has 
been relatively successful in doing so (Murray et al., 2006). However, the impact of this notion 
of fairtrade has often been questioned (Dragusanu et al., 2014), not least because it is doubtful 
to what extent fairtrade can have any impact if  it continues to be a small (albeit growing) niche 
market. Also, the question whether fair trade should be mainstreamed or not has been strongly 
debated (Fridell, 2006; Jaffee, 2012; Murray et al., 2006; Raynolds, 2009). In addition, as the 
criteria underlying different labels can vary greatly, the lack of transparency between different 
labels has been criticised (Kolk, 2013; Raynolds et al., 2007). 
When combining this narrow interpretation of fair trade with the second axis, namely 
interventionist (government dominated) versus neoliberal (market dominated) approaches, 
different ways to achieve the ‘fairtrade’ objective can be discerned. Governments can actively  
support  fairtrade  labelling  schemes  and  sales  volumes. For instance, they can engage in the 
development of  state-led public labels, which for instance already exist at EU level for organic 
products. Here, governmental actors would be in charge of  setting the criteria, issuing the 
certification and providing the necessary follow-up. Governmental actors could also be 
involved in ensuring the credibility of private fairtrade labels, which is currently under
M4570 - KHORANA PRINT.indd   284 18/06/2018   08:18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
284    Handbook on the EU and international trade 
 
pressure, by monitoring and following up on their implementation. In addition, public 
authorities can develop supportive public procurement rules enabling the consumption of  
fairtrade products. Constituting important players in procurement markets, governments could 
influence the market and set an example by putting ethical principles at the forefront of their 
purchasing practices. In addition, governments could decide to install beneficial market access, 
i.e. low or no import tariffs, for fairtrade labelled products. 
The extent to which governments intervene in the creation and monitoring of labelling 
schemes, and link these to procurement rules and import tariffs, will move them further into 
the ‘regulated fairtrade’ quadrant of the matrix. Alternatively, moving away from more 
interventionist initiatives and allocating a bigger role to market actors, governments can limit 
themselves to the promotion of fairtrade products through awareness and information 
campaigns. Proceeding towards the neoliberal end of the spectrum, the business of labelling 
can be left entirely in the hands of private actors and remain voluntary. Governments then take 
a hands-off approach. Consumers’ demands and reputation determine which labels are credible 
enough and worth purchasing. The law of supply and demand decides to what extent some 
fairtrade labels may be more successful than others. 
 
The promotion of CSR, which has become an increasingly important buzzword in 
international business over the past decade, represents the second form of the reformist 
approach. CSR refers to businesses taking responsibility for their impact on society, 
reconciling their economic, social and environmental ambitions. CSR policies are self- 
regulatory, defined at company level (mostly via a corporate code of  conduct or third-party  
certification  [including  fairtrade]),  whereby  certain  principles,  rules  and  systems should 
ensure that the company’s actions are not only legal but also ethical (Hendrickx et al., 2016). 
Even though several definitions of  CSR exist, Dahlsrud (2008) identified five  consistently  
recurrent  dimensions,  namely  the  environmental,  social,  economic, stakeholder and 
voluntariness dimensions. Due diligence is a central concept for CSR, referring to the 
identification and management of  risks and the steps that a reasonable and prudent company 
should take in order to avoid them and reduce its liability (Bright, 2016). In the context of  
responsible business conduct, due diligence refers similarly to the steps taken by a business to 
identify, prevent and mitigate any adverse effects of their activities on  environmental,  labour  
and  human rights throughout their entire supply chains. By doing so, trade along the supply  
chain  becomes  fairer  for  those  involved. Companies have been increasingly active in setting 
up CSR policies. However, research has shown that these have in general brought only limited 
improvements (Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014). The main criticisms against CSR 
commitments concern their lack of  enforceability as well as the limited transparency and little 
of efforts done by businesses to disclose the impact of their activities. 
Even though CSR is originally a business-led practice, more interventionist options can also 
be envisaged. Governments could expand the existing legal obligations for businesses, 
especially the liability of the parent company in their home state for the impact of their own or 
their subsidiaries’ activities abroad. Other avenues by which governments could steer and 
shape CSR include setting rules for more transparency, multi-stakeholder initiatives to closely 
monitor certain sectors and companies, and interacting with private initiatives. The Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme, initiated in 2003 by the United Nations to stop the trade in  
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conflict diamonds and to ensure that this trade was not fuelling violence by  rebel  movements,  
illustrates  a  potential  approach  (European  Commission,  2014). Another example is the 
Bangladesh Sustainability Compact (see Box 15.3). Deviating less from the neoliberal part of  
the axis, governments can agree upon and manage to different degrees the implementation of  
non-binding principles that should be adhered to. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are cases in point. 
Similar to fairtrade labelling, however, governments often limit themselves to promoting 
awareness of CSR principles, relying on the self-regulating force of ‘ethical consumerism’. 
Walton (2010) suggests that fair trade is best characterised as an attempt to establish a form 
of ‘interim global market justice in a non-ideal world’ (p. 441). ‘Interim’ refers to the fact that 
fair trade is a second-best proxy in the absence of the wider implementation of justice at the 
global level. This insight brings us to the revolutionary side of our conceptualisation, where, 
in contrast to the fair trade option outlined above, structural changes to the current trade system 
are envisaged. 
 
 
15.2.1    Revolutionary Fair Trade 
 
On the other side of the vertical axis, the revolutionary approach is ideological and broad. Here, 
we find two opposed interpretations of  ‘Fair Trade’: the first one focuses on the fairness of 
the outcome of international trade practices, whereas the other interpretation looks mainly into  
their  procedural  fairness. We label both of them as revolutionary because the realisation of 
their core objective requires a structural change of the current trading system. 
First, ever since the emergence of the fair trade movement in the 1960s, the pragmatic 
strategy mentioned above was supposed to be a component of a larger agenda to make the 
international trading system fairer. In this context, the fair trade movement can be seen as a 
countermovement of de-commodification and social re-embedding (Raynolds, 2000) and as 
resistance to the hegemonic global capitalist market (Shreck, 2005). In other words, the broader 
objective is to counter the trend of unequal growth in favour of the West and to oppose the 
prevailing practice of treating the world and its resources merely as products to be sold or 
bought. The origins of the fair trade movement coincide with the calls within the UNCTAD 
and G77 for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) that would radically restructure the  
world trading system and abolish the structural dependence of the South on the North 
(Rothstein, 1979). In this context commodity arrangements were launched providing high and 
stable prices for producers in the South and protective measures to insulate them from 
international competition and foster industrialisation. Ideologically, the pleas for a NIEO can 
be seen as the globalisation and radicalisation of the ‘embedded liberalism’ compromise 
between states and markets that characterised the post-war economic consensus in the North. 
Here, fairness in trade depends on the consequences of a trading practice on the countries 
and their population. If these consequences are not fair, then the practice should be changed. 
Two issues are central in evaluating the outcome of trade. First, there is the issue of (global) 
distributive justice that handles the allocation of resources in societies (Boda, 2001; de Bres, 
2016; Miller, 2017; Rawls, 1999; Rescher, 2002; Risse, 2012). This topic has caused much ink 
to flow, and the much-debated distinction between equality and equity is particularly relevant
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when assessing the meaning of Fair Trade. Whereas equality refers to an equal distribution of 
wealth, equity puts this amount into perspective, adjusting the distribution to the needs of  the 
actors (de Bres, 2016; Starmans et al., 2017). A second pertinent issue concerning the outcome 
of trade is its intergenerational dimension (Boda, 2001). Here, the fairness of trade is assessed 
through the impact of trade on sustainable development (De Schutter, 2015). Scholars and 
activists have argued that trade should not only be more regulated in terms of social and 
environmental standards, but also reduced in absolute terms since current trade practices 
inherently impede long-term sustainability. 
Since  public  authorities  at  the  national  and  international  level  are  indispensable for 
the realisation of such systemic change, this interpretation is clearly located at the 
interventionist end of the horizontal axis. What this new trade system would look like is up for 
discussion, it would however allow countries, and especially developing and least developing 
countries (LDCs) to transform the rules in favour of their needs, enabling them to develop their 
economies according to their own preferences. It would drastically enlarge the ‘policy space’ 
of  national (or regional) authorities in the South and in the North for the pursuit of sustainable 
development objectives (Heron, 2011; Shalden, 2005; UNCTAD, 2014). 
 
Second, and radically diverging from the previous notion, Fair Trade can be seen as a 
synonym for undistorted free trade. Trade should be freed from barriers and discrimination.  
The  role  of  governments  is  limited  to  guaranteeing  the  ‘level  playing  field’,  for instance 
through competition policies. Accordingly, in trade policy circles, the term ‘fair trade’ has 
traditionally been used as a reference to certain trade protection instruments such as anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy. One could wonder why this interpretation is not simply tagged as 
free and unfree trade. 
According  to  the  classical  neoliberal  view  on  international  trade,  the  rules  of  the 
WTO  are  seen  as  the  best  guarantee  for  fair  trade,  whereas  ‘unfair  trade’ is  typically 
characterised as violations of these rules. From this perspective, the development towards a 
completely liberalised trading system is thus necessary. Even though this approach is in line 
with current developments, the full realisation of this objective would still represent a  radical  
change,  for  instance  by  prohibiting  agricultural  subsidies,  import  tariffs  and other  market  
interventions that are still allowed by the WTO. Importantly, free trade advocates are not 
necessarily opposed to (fairtrade) labelling, as long as this happens in a non-discriminatory 
and transparent way. When it comes to social clauses in international trade, free traders have 
always argued that voluntary and non-binding approaches such as labelling are more effective 
and less prone to protectionist abuses (Bhagwati, 2002). 
In this view the rules and procedures aiming at the creation of a level playing field are 
paramount, in contrast to focusing on the outcome of the trade practice discussed above. 
Nozick’s Entitlement Theory (1974) allows us to interpret a norm of conduct (of traders in our 
case), claiming that we can tell whether a distribution of goods is just or not by looking at its 
history: if goods were acquired and transferred legitimately – in our case, in line with WTO 
rules – then the resulting distribution of goods is just. If  they were not, then we have to ask 
whether the injustice was rectified (Green, 2009). 
In this interpretation of  undistorted free trade the role of  governments is limited to creating  
an  enabling  space  for  the  market  to  function  freely.  For  this  purpose  further liberalisation 
between states is necessary, both in terms of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. In addition, the free 
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trade agenda needs to be deepened. This entails the inclusion of domestic regulatory matters 
that have a, direct or indirect, impact on trade in liberalisation negotiation. The more this free 
trade agenda can be realised, the more trade relations will be considered ‘fair’. 
 
 
15.3    AN EU FAIR TRADE POLICY? 
 
After clarifying the different interpretations of  the concept of  Fair Trade, the question of the 
EU’s position on the matter can now be addressed. Before structuring the EU Fair Trade policy 
according to the framework introduced above (see Figure 15.1), we provide a historical sketch 
of the EU’s trade policy and relevant initiatives. 
 
15.3.1    NIEO-inspired Trade Initiatives 
 
Since the EU’s creation, trade and aid relations with the EU member states’ (former) colonies  
(later  grouped  as  the  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  [ACP]  countries)  have always 
received special attention. These relationships, formalised through the Yaoundé (1963, 1969) 
and Lomé conventions (1975, 1980, 1985, 1990) and the Cotonou Agreement (2000), have 
always been larded with an ethical development discourse (Langan, 2009). In the context of 
the scarcity of some commodities and the oil crises, as well as the growing assertiveness of 
newly independent developing countries, the EU (then still the European Community) 
developed a number of  initiatives that somewhat approached the ‘NIEO Fair Trade’ quadrant. 
For instance, the EU was the first to create a Generalised System of  Preferences (GSP) in 
1971, thereby enhancing Asian and Latin American countries’ access to the European market 
in a non-reciprocal way. In the same NIEO spirit, the first Lomé Convention established 
relatively ambitious trade-and-aid schemes aimed at intervention in international commodity 
markets such as Stabex, a compensatory finance scheme to stabilise export earnings of ACP 
countries, which was later extended to Sysmin for  mining  products  and  commodity  protocols  
providing fixed quotas and prices for bananas, sugar and rum. Lomé also established non-
reciprocal market access for the ACP countries. Despite significant limitations in design and 
obstacles in implementation, these initiatives at least partly echoed the NIEO demands for 
redressing the unequal distribution of benefits in favour of developing countries (Orbie, 2007). 
 
15.3.2    Neoliberal Shift 
 
These mechanisms were however gradually eroded through the 1980s and 1990s, 
demonstrating a shift towards more neoliberal EU trade policies. This culminated in the 
negotiation of the Cotonou Agreement, which abolished Stabex and Sysmin and introduced 
reciprocity in EU-ACP trade relations through Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). In 
line with a number of  WTO verdicts and internal agricultural reforms, the banana and sugar 
protocols were effectively abolished. Even though trade was still being linked  to  development  
and  other  value-based  objectives,  regulated  and  market-based fairtrade clearly became the 
most-favoured approach. 
First, this approach took shape through a number of  highly symbolic trade-related initiatives 
that are located between the ‘NIEO Fair Trade’ and ‘undistorted free trade’ quadrants:  the  
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first social  GSP  clause  introduced  in  1994,  linking  market  access  for developing  countries  
to  labour  standards;  ‘Everything  but  Arms’  (EBA)  since  2001, providing  duty-free  and  
quota-free  market  access  for  the  least-developed  countries (LDCs); the elaboration of  the 
GSP system with sustainable development and governance trade conditionality (GSP+) in 
2005; and the EU Aid for Trade Strategy in 2007. While underpinning the EU’s image of an 
ethical actor towards the Global South, these initiatives also endorse a neoliberal logic to EU 
trade relations with developing countries (Orbie & Martens, 2016). 
Second, the ‘market-based fairtrade’ interpretation has secured a place on the EU’s agenda. 
Especially the European Parliament paid attention to the calls of  the fair trade movement  and  
the  first  fairtrade  label,  Max  Havelaar,  which  was  launched  in  1988. The  Parliament  
issued  several  resolutions  on  the  matter  (in  1991,  1994,  1998,  2005), covering  several  
pertinent  Fair  Trade  themes,  including  structural  imbalances,  the WTO negotiations, policy 
coherence and coordination in the EU, and issues and suggestions concerning certification. 
The Commission then replied with rather descriptive Communications (in 1995, 1999, 2009) 
in which it elaborated on the concept of fair trade, adopting the fair trade movement’s 
definition mentioned above, and gave a brief outline of the situation at that time. The EU’s 
commitment to the aims and objectives of the WTO such as transparency and non-
discrimination are always emphasised, indicating that fair trade initiatives should respect these 
prescribed principles. As will be confirmed below, this ‘hands-offs’ approach is still  
maintained  today. In general, both the Parliament’s resolutions and the Commission’s 
Communications on fair trade have mostly addressed fair trade in the narrow and pragmatic 
sense (cf. market-based fairtrade). 
Finally, in the same period, during the development of  the European Constitutional Treaty, 
within the discussions of  the Working Group on External Action in 2003, fair trade was also 
included among the EU objectives in the wider world. This would subsequently be taken over 
into the Lisbon Treaty (see Box 15.2). Manners (2010) pointed to the apparent contradiction 
in the pursuit of  ‘free and fair trade’.  He considers the reference an interesting innovation and 
leaves the question of whether it is a meaningful declaration of principle – or not – open. 
According to Eeckhout (2011) this reference should be read as an instruction to take account 
of the interests of developing countries in the international trading system and not as a sign of 
support for trade defence measures (cf. undistorted free trade), because the reference is 
juxtaposed with ‘the sustainable development of the earth’, ‘solidarity and mutual respect 
 
 
 
BOX 15.2    ARTICLE 2.5 IN THE TREATY OF LISBON, AMENDING 
THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND THE 
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
(2008) 
 
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and 
contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable devel- 
opment of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication 
of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the 
strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of 
the United Nations Charter. [Emphasis added]
M4570 - KHORANA PRINT.indd   289 18/06/2018   08:18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The EU and Fair Trade: hands off?    289 
 
among peoples’, and ‘eradication of poverty and protection of human rights, in particular the 
rights of the child’. Interestingly, this novelty does not lean towards a more neoliberal trade 
order. However, as mentioned in the introduction, there is no univocal answer to the question 
of how the EU aims at realising this objective. However, rather than heralding a NIEO-style 
shift, we believe the reference indicates a growing preference for reformist approaches to fair 
trade. 
These initiatives can be understood in the context of increased activism from transnational 
advocacy groups and the growing discontent of developing countries faced with intensified 
international trade liberalisation. Growing anti-globalisation protests, such as the ‘Battle of 
Seattle’ in 1999, have made it clear that the legitimacy of the world trading system depends on 
its ability to incorporate developing country demands and address issues of  global trade justice 
(Stiglitz, 2006; Summers, 2001). Anti-EPA protests in the 2000s, and more recently anti-TTIP  
and  anti-CETA  activism  (against  the  EU  trade agreements negotiated respectively with the 
United States and Canada) throughout the EU, have only further illustrated the rising concerns 
with the fairness of  the EU’s trade policy. 
However, around the mid-2000s, it seemed that the commitments to Fair Trade had barely  
been  implemented.  The  Commission  had  engaged  in  a  more  radical  free  trade orientation 
through the EPAs, where the Commission increasingly emphasised the need for reciprocal 
market access and deep trade liberalisation. The EPAs have experienced a rough start and 
serious delays; however, more and more ACP countries have succumbed to the EU’s pressure 
and are in the process of finalising negotiations. Dicaprio and Trommer (2010)  note  that  by  
signing  EPAs,  developing  countries,  and  especially  LDCs,  engage more than ever before 
in international trade law. One third of the LDCs involved in EPA negotiations were not even 
WTO members in 2009. Through the EPAs they have been included in the neoliberal global 
trade regime and are more prone to WTO legislation. 
This trend towards neoliberal trade policies manifested itself even more clearly when the 
‘Global Europe – Competing in the World’ trade strategy for the EU was launched in 2006 by 
the then Trade Commissioner De Gucht. The basic message of the Global Europe strategy is 
that trade relations, and new trade agreements accordingly, should foster (EU) competitiveness  
and  should  therefore  be  pursued  with  emerging  markets. ‘Fairness’ is mentioned several 
times, but only in the context of  trade defence (cf. undistorted free trade). The implementation 
of the Global Europe strategy has been quite successful in terms of bilateral free trade 
agreements (FTAs). No fewer than nine trade agreements have been concluded since the 
strategy’s launch (South-Korea [2010], Central America [2012], Peru and Colombia [2012; 
with Ecuador joining in 2016], Canada, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova  and  Singapore  [2014]  
and  Vietnam  [2016]),  whereas  several  negotiations are advancing fast at the time of writing 
(such as with Japan, Mercosur and the modernisation of the agreement with Mexico). Other  
negotiations  are  stalled  but  not  cancelled (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines 
and the United States). Finally, more trade negotiations are in the pipeline, such as with New 
Zealand and Australia. 
 
15.3.3    Piecemeal Approach 
 
In addition to the continuation of the (revised) initiatives linking trade and development 
launched in the 1990s and early 2000s, the EU has tried to combine its neoliberal trade
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orientation with several ad hoc initiatives to curb certain negative consequences of  trade. 
These can be grouped into four clusters: the chapters on ‘trade and sustainable development’ 
(TSD) in EU bilateral trade agreements; the recent ‘Trade for All’ strategy;  several  initiatives  
addressing issues concerning human rights or sustainable development in a specific supply 
chain; and a continuing promotion of  fairtrade – in the narrow sense. 
All the new generation trade agreements, starting with the EU-Korea FTA, contain a TSD 
chapter. Here, adherence to key international labour and environment standards and 
agreements, the prudent use of  natural resources such as timber and fish, and the promotion 
of practices intended to favour sustainable development such as fair trade and CSR are 
included. These chapters also establish a monitoring mechanism which involved civil society 
of both parties. However, the TSD chapters have been criticised for being too weakly  
implemented and not enforceable. There is currently a reflection exercise ongoing within the 
Commission to address these criticisms and improve the functioning of these chapters 
(European Commission, 2017). 
The ‘Trade for All’ strategy (European Commission, 2015), Global Europe’s successor, 
which  was  published  when  the  EU’s  trade  policy  was  increasingly  politicised  mainly 
due to the negotiations of  the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), aspires 
to be a more responsible trade and investment policy. It therefore dedicates a chapter to a trade 
policy based on such values, in which it commits to a trade agenda promoting sustainable 
development, human rights and good governance. Several avenues are suggested to achieve 
this goal, including the improvement and implementation of existing trade instruments such 
as GSP+ and the TSD chapters mentioned above, fair and ethical trade schemes, and 
responsible management of supply chains. Even though the commitments described in this 
new strategy are very ambitious, it is currently too early to tell how successful and meaningful 
these will be. 
Moreover, the EU has developed several initiatives to address the negative consequences of 
specific products and supply chains (see Box 15.3). These are based on a mix of policies (trade, 
development, internal market and environment) and approaches (trade conditionality, 
reporting obligations, multi-stakeholder dialogue) and aim at improving social, environmental 
and human rights causes. These initiatives touch upon sensitive and complex issues and most 
of them display implementation difficulties. 
Finally, the EU’s, and that of the Commission in particular, ‘hands-off approach’ towards 
fairtrade labelling has remained on the agenda. The EU does not intend to play a role in the 
elaboration of fair trade criteria and their monitoring, since, according to the Commission, their 
interference would jeopardise the dynamism that private fair trade labelling initiatives have 
displayed  (European  Commission,  2009;  Malmström,  2015). However the EU seems willing 
to create a supportive environment for the advancement of fairtrade. First, fairtrade has been 
given more attention to in the EU public procurement policy. Dynamics created by EU member 
states that proved to be more ambitious in including fair trade criteria in public tenders and a 
number of European Court of Justice rulings in favour of this approach (Cremona & Marín 
Durán, 2013) have led to clearer provisions on social criteria in the latest 2014 EU public 
procurement regulations. Second, the Trade for All strategy dedicated considerable attention 
to promoting fair and ethical trade schemes. As such, DG Trade has committed to the  
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BOX 15.3    SUPPLY-CHAIN-SPECIFIC EU INITIATIVES 
 
Timber: The FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade) Action Plan adopted in 
2003 comprises development cooperation, trade agreements between the EU and timber-producing 
countries, public procurement, private sector and civil society involvement and more, in order to 
combat illegal logging and strengthen forest governance. Concrete progress has been slow, as most 
interested timber-producing countries are still in the negotiation phase. So far only Indonesia, 
Cameroon, Central Africa, Ghana, Liberia and the Republic of Congo are implementing the trade 
agreements enabling the FLEGT Action Plan. 
 
 
Garment industry: Following the Rana Plaza tragedy in 2013, the Bangladesh Sustainability 
Compact  was  launched,  involving  the  EU,  Bangladesh,  the  US,  Canada  and  the  ILO. Its  
aim is to improve respect for labour rights, factory safety and responsible business conduct in the 
sector.  If  successful,  this  distinct,  multi-stakeholder  approach  might  become  exemplary  in  a 
context where increasing attention is given to the need for sustainable supply chains. However, so  
far tangible results are few and critical voices have highlighted the failure of  Bangladesh to comply  
with  the  compact  and  the  absence  of  changes  on  the  ground.  In  April  2017,  the European 
Parliament called for binding legislation and has urged the Commission to deliver on its objectives. 
 
 
Conflict minerals: Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 
May 2017 (OJ L 130, 19.5.2017, pp.1–20) aims at breaking the vicious cycle between trade in 
minerals (more specifically tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold) and the financing of conflicts. The 
resolution results from a balancing act between the positions of the European Commission and 
European Council (voluntary guidelines) and the Parliament (binding rules). It contains a mixed 
approach with binding requirements for upstream companies (mines, processors, traders, smelters 
and refiners) and recommendations for downstream companies (EU manufacturers). 
 
In addition, measures are being taken to fight wildlife trafficking and trade in tools for torture and 
executions. 
 
 
promotion of fairtrade through EU FTAs, the EU Aid for Trade strategy and EU delegations. 
Market data related to fairtrade are to be gathered and more awareness-raising activities will 
be developed. In this context an ‘EU cities for fair & ethical trade award’ is currently being 
developed. 
In essence, the EU has radicalised its neoliberal free trade orientation while at the same time 
initiating several initiatives to offset the negative consequences of such free trade. Current 
Trade Commissioner Malmström recently summarized this approach during a speech (2017) 
by stating the following: 
 
Our trade and investment policy helps a fair global system. For trade to be fair, all players need 
to play by the rules. By engaging with our partners, we try to set those common rules, and shape 
globalisation. It helps the poorest on the planet to develop, through the economic partnership 
agreements and asymmetric preferences we provide. 
It helps to anchor our values. We have a new EU regulation on trade in conflict minerals, 
and in products used for torture and the death penalty. 
And  our  trade  agreements  include  significant,  binding  commitments  to  strengthen  
labour rights and environmental protection. . . . 
For trade and investment policy to be open and fair, it must be conducted in a transparent 
and responsible manner. (p. 3)
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This citation clearly contains references to both the revolutionary undistorted free trade 
position as well as the reformist regulated fair trade position. The latter is implemented through 
a piecemeal approach in which ad hoc initiatives are set up rather than a coherent and consistent 
policy. 
 
 
15.4    CONCLUSION 
 
In order to better understand the diverse meanings of Fair Trade, we developed a framework 
depicting how narrow reformist ‘fairtrade’ and broad revolutionary ‘Fair Trade’ views on the 
one hand, and limited or larger roles for governmental intervention on the other  hand,  result  
in  four  different  interpretations:  regulated  fairtrade;  market-based fairtrade; NIEO Fair 
Trade; and undistorted free trade (see Figure 15.1). 
This framework has served as a heuristic tool to interpret the EU’s position concerning Fair 
Trade (see Figure 15.2). Whereas the EU briefly flirted with the NIEO Fair Trade option 
through beneficial market access, export stabilisation and commodity protocols in the 1970s, 
the general neoliberal shift in Western politics in the 1980s and 1990s was also translated into 
EU trade policy. Around the hinge of the new millennium, the EU started to profile itself  as 
the leading force in favour of  a more ‘harnessed globalisation’ and as a  development-friendly  
international  actor. However, the initiatives put forward fitted mostly in both reformist and 
revolutionary neoliberal trade policy, in which trade rules would not fundamentally challenge 
the status quo. Besides, the commitments made in EU policy documents and the discourse 
engaged in towards ‘fairtrade’ and ‘Fair Trade’ were not translated into concrete action. This 
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neoliberal tendency became radicalised from the mid-2000s until today, resulting in an ever-
greater emphasis on trade liberalisation and reciprocity. Even though Fair Trade objectives, 
and especially those related to sustainable development, are still part of the EU’s trade agenda, 
these follow a piecemeal approach and do not question or challenge but rather reinforce the 
prevalence of the neoliberal trade system. 
At first glance the combination of ‘undistorted free trade’ with ‘regulated’ and ‘market- 
based fairtrade’ might seem paradoxical. However, this development can be interpreted in two 
different ways. First, the current hotchpotch of initiatives might be considered to be a 
steppingstone towards a more coherent and effective approach to achieving Fair Trade. 
Second, the combination of  increased emphasis on sustainable development and the creation 
of different initiatives to achieve this objective through trade combined with a compelling 
neoliberal trade policy might represent two sides of the same coin. In this case the sustainable 
development discourse and ad hoc initiatives are just palliative measures which help to 
legitimise the neoliberal trade policy. 
Time will tell whether references to ‘fair trade’ in the Lisbon Treaty and the ‘Trade for All’ 
strategy will eventually contribute to a radical change in the current neoliberal trade system, 
and otherwise whether the current reformist fair trade policy approaches will be considered 
fair by the population in Europe and its trading partners. 
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1. Introduction
Fruits and vegetables consumed in Europe are sourced
from all over the world. The EU is the world’s biggest
importer of agricultural products, ahead of the US and
China (European Commission, 2015a). Increasing global
trade and competitive pressure have changed the na-
ture of food production systems in the South, with sig-
nificant implications for rural populations (Hurst, 2005).
Many private voluntary governance mechanisms now
regulate the social and environmental conditions in pro-
duction, with private labels increasingly addressing pro-
duction process characteristics, including working condi-
tions (O’Rourke, 2003). At the same time, interest groups
in Europe put pressure on firms to limit their use of im-
ports from countries with poor labour practices through
naming and shaming campaigns targeted at companies
which fail to comply with social standards in their supply
chain (Fair Trade Advocacy Office [FTAO], 2015a). Policy-
wise, labour norms are increasingly considered in trade
agreements, the aim being to make trade conditional
upon compliance with international conventions (Van
den Putte & Orbie, 2015).
Despite the growing interest in labour issues among
firms, consumers and policy makers, the importance of
social conditions, such as the protection of labour rights,
as a determinant for trade remains understudied (In-
ternational Labour Organisation [ILO], 2016; Kucera &
Sarna, 2006). Most publications follow a logic of cost ef-
ficiency to explain trade performance, revealing a race
to the bottom in labour standards (Hefeker & Wunner,
2002). A question yet to be clarified, however, is whether
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exporting countries that comply with labour standards
are rewarded with a relatively larger export share to the
Europeanmarket, especially in trade of agricultural prod-
ucts. We address this gap in the literature by questioning
how levels of labour rights protection, in addition to in-
stitutional quality, tariff regimes and exporting countries’
distance to the EU, affect the share of unilateral exports
to the EU. We argue that countries with better levels of
labour rights protection, high institutional quality, prefer-
ential tariffs and closer distance export a relatively larger
share to the EU. Along the same lines, a producer country
far away from the EU, without good institutional quality
and/or with low protection of labour rights, is expected
to export a less important share of produce to the EU.
A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) approach
was used to determine the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for a high dependency on the EU market for a
country’s pineapple exports. This approach differs from
the analysis of trade flows in gravity models (Kucera
& Sarna, 2006), because it allows causal complexity to
be addressed by testing several paths or combinations
that lead to the same outcome (see infra). We focus
on fresh pineapples, an important agricultural export
product in terms of traded volumes around the world
and export value. This case selection is rooted in the
labour-intensive nature of production and highly visible
labour challenges.
As will be explained in the next section, consumers in
the EUmarket are said to be particularly sensitive to eth-
ical and labour issues, and this is manifested at different
levels, such as trade agendas, private labelling and con-
sumer behaviour. In this article we search for evidence
that labour protection levels do indeedmatter for a coun-
try to trade intensively with the EU. The remainder of the
article is structured as follows. In the next section, the
importance of labour standards in trade is explained and
a theoretical justification is provided for the conditions
considered in this study. Section Three justifies the QCA
methodology and describes the data sources. Section
Four discusses the results before concluding the article.
2. Theoretical Justification for the Included Conditions
2.1. Labour Rights as a Determinant of Exports
Trade between countries may be conditional on prior
levels of respect for labour rights in partner countries
(Mosley & Uno, 2007). According to conventional wis-
dom, businesses are likely to prefer low labour cost pro-
ducing countries over labour quality because of com-
petitive pressure and profit concerns. This would in-
duce a race to the bottom in labour conditions (Kucera,
2001). However, recent literature has demonstrated how
labour rights can affect trade positively. Proponents of
a positive labour rights-trade hypothesis assume that
countries, or firms, purposely select partners that per-
form well in terms of labour standards because of rep-
utational concerns or external ethically driven pressures
(Greenhill, Mosley, & Prakash, 2009). Moreover, devel-
oped countries could serve as role models for devel-
oping countries through market integration, which can
result in the harmonisation of institutions and regula-
tory arrangements (Kucera & Sarna, 2006; Neumayer &
de Soysa, 2006). At firm level, Toffel, Short and Ouel-
let (2015) found better labour rights compliance among
suppliers serving buyers located in countries where con-
sumers are wealthy and socially conscious. In addition,
Distelhorst and Locke (2017) concluded that importers
favour doing business with companies that comply with
basic labour and environmental standards.
The debate has intensified over the last few years, not
least because of the devastating consequences of the col-
lapse of the Rana Plaza building in Bangladesh (Reinecke
& Donaghey, 2015). There are indications that both Eu-
ropean consumers and public bodies across the EU have
increasingly valued labour rights protection in their con-
sumer decisions and public policies (Mosley, 2017).
The consumer is increasingly being considered as
an important actor and driver of labour governance,
both through purchasing power and voice power (Don-
aghey, Reinecke, Niforou, & Lawson, 2014; Kolben, 2017,
in this issue). Stolle and Micheletti (2013, pp. 96–98)
point to the European Social Survey (2003), and the
Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy Survey in the
US (2006), which demonstrated that about 31% of all
people interviewed reported engaging in “political” con-
sumption behaviour. Purposely buying labelled products
(buycotting) and rejecting other products (boycotting) re-
flects the individual responsibility taken by consumers to
foster sustainable development. In the US, 28% of the re-
spondents reported engaging in such political consump-
tion behaviour, while in European countries the level is
higher, exemplified by 60% of the respondents in Swe-
den. A recent survey on behalf of DG DEVCO revealed
that 50% of the respondents (out of 27,672 in the 28 EU
member states) would be prepared to pay more for gro-
ceries (such as fair trade products) fromdeveloping coun-
tries to support people living in those countries (Euro-
barometer, 2016). The retail sales of fair trade products,
the world’s leading ethical label, also point to a relatively
high demand for labelled products in the European mar-
ket. Global fair trade sales were estimated at EUR 7.3 bil-
lion in 2015. The EU is the most important region for fair
trade products, accounting for almost 80% of the world
retail sales, with the UK (30%) and Germany (13%) be-
ing the leading buyers of fairly produced products, while
the US accounts for 12% of sales (Fair Trade Interna-
tional, 2016).
The EU has elaborated a trade and investment pol-
icy based on values in its latest trade strategy, “Trade
1 The Fair Trade Advocacy Office proposed actions to the EU to require “transparency in supply chains and a system of due diligence…that requires
persons placing products on the EU market to ensure compliance with labour, environmental rights of the country of origin. This could be applied to
agricultural products and also to textiles” (FTAO, 2015b, p. 9).
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for All”. The Communication refers to the expectations
of EU consumers1 concerning respect for human rights,
labour rights and the environment during the production
of the goods they use (European Commission, 2015a,
p. 20). However, since most production occurs along
value chains that criss-cross developed and developing
economies alike, the Commission acknowledges the chal-
lenging reality of meeting these expectations. These ele-
ments are reiterated in the 2017 review of the EU trade
strategy (European Commission, 2017, pp. 2, 9–10). First,
high standards of labour protection are confirmed as
being fundamentals of the “Trade for All” strategy. Sec-
ond, the ambition to continue to make trade “a posi-
tive force around the globe” and to shape globalisation
to promote sustainable development with a trade policy
based on “EU and universal values” has been affirmed.
Third, consumer concerns are taken into account as “the
EU continues to pursue new avenues in making trade
policy more responsive to citizen’s concerns”. The Euro-
pean Parliament (2017) has confirmed these demands
from EU consumers in its resolution on the impact of in-
ternational trade and the EU’s trade policies on global
value chains, recalling that “no consumer wants to con-
tinue buying productsmadeby children or exploitedmen
and women”.
A number of EU trade instruments incorporate the
necessity to respect labour rights. In its Generalised
Scheme of Preferences plus (GSP+, see infra), the EU
grants beneficial market access to developing countries
that ratify and implement, amongst others, the ILO core
conventions (Velluti, 2015). In addition, all the new gen-
eration EU trade agreements, startingwith the EU–Korea
agreement in 2011, include a chapter on “Trade and Sus-
tainable Development”, in which the Parties pledge to
adhere to the ILO core conventions, amongst others (see
Van den Putte &Orbie, 2015). Finally, ad hoc instruments
have been developed to address labour rights violations
in specific value chains. For example, the Global Sustain-
ability Compact aims to improve labour conditions in the
garment industry in Bangladesh (Vogt, 2017, in this is-
sue). In addition to these trade instruments, the role
of and collaboration with private actors in labour gover-
nance have also received more policy attention and Cor-
porate Social Responsibility initiatives2 are increasingly
supported, directly and indirectly, by the EU (Knudsen &
Moon, in press).
Following this line of argument on the importance of
labour standards in EU trade, the article engageswith the
positive trade-labour assumption by examining whether
exports to the EU are conditional upon the level of pro-
tected labour rights in the exporting country. By confirm-
ing this assumption, we can broadly conclude that, in line
with claims made by policy makers, Europe is actually a
more social market. This also implies that exporting pro-
ducers and governments have an interest in improving
social conditions at firm and national level in order to
boost their exports to the EU. If the results reject the as-
sumption, we can conclude that the perception of the
European market as being very demanding with regard
to social standards is not in line with reality, resulting
in an overestimation of European consumer and retailer
power to raise the bar on social standards.
2.2. Institutional Quality as a Determinant of Exports
An enabling institutional environment attracts foreign in-
vestment and facilitates trade throughmore secure prop-
erty rights, contract enforcement and investor protec-
tion (Levchenko, 2007; Rodrik, 1996). Anderson andMar-
couiller (2002) showed that better institutional quality
leads to larger trade volumes. A similar positive influ-
ence of domestic institutions on bilateral trade flowswas
foundby Jansen andNordås (2004). Absence of good gov-
ernance, especially a weak regulatory framework, can be
an obstacle to trade (Méon& Sekkat, 2008). For example,
the decline in pineapple export share to the EU fromCôte
d’Ivoire since the mid-1980s was partly explained by po-
litical instability, high turnover of private and public insti-
tutions, withdrawal of state support for the agricultural
sector, and the civil war (Vagneron, Faure, & Loeillet,
2009). Institutions, as business facilitators, may also in-
directly affect trade through the relationship with invest-
ment (Pajunen, 2008). European importers particularly
value a positive institutional environment in-country, be-
cause a good judicial system makes it easier to do busi-
ness and facilitates contract enforcement (Richards, Gel-
leny, & Sacko, 2001).
2.3. Tariffs as a Determinant of Exports
Preferential or zero tariff rates in trade agreements can
foster exports through facilitated access to the European
market. Higher tariff rates for a specific product or coun-
try can work as a barrier, increasing export costs. How-
ever, the impact of tariffs differs by country and product
(Emlinger, Jacquet, & Chevassus Lozza, 2008).
The EU has developed a number of trade regimes to
manage access to its market. The EU provides preferen-
tial market access through bilateral agreements and has
elaborated specific trade regimes for developing coun-
tries. The latter aremainly unilateral trade arrangements
including “Everything but Arms”, initiatives providing
duty-free and quota-free access for the least developed
countries, the GSP, which allows vulnerable developing
countries to pay fewer or no duties on exports to the EU,
and the GSP+, which combines more generous market
access with sustainable development, governance and
trade conditionality. While the former colonies, mainly
referred to as the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
group, long stood at the top of the EU’s “pyramid of pref-
erences”, their position has been eroded. This has been
a gradual evolution in which reciprocal (yet still asym-
2 For example, several member states are actively involved in promoting sustainable supply chains by financially supporting and participating in multi-
stakeholder initiatives such as the Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative (Initiatief voor Duurzame Handel, IDH) and the UK Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI).
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metrical) free trade has trumped the development aspi-
ration of the EU trade agenda (for an overview see Orbie
& Martens, 2016).
In general, the classical policy instruments, such as
tariffs, have lost much of their importance due to liber-
alisation processes and new trade agreements (Hefeker
& Wunner, 2002). Indeed, in 2014, about 71% of all
agricultural imports entered the EU at zero duty, repre-
senting a value of EUR 72 billion (European Commission,
2015b). This demonstrates that factors other than tariffs
are expected to influence trade with the EU (Emlinger
et al., 2008).
2.4. Distance as a Determinant of Exports
Countries that are located close to the EUare expected to
export more to the EU because of lower transportation
costs (De Groot, Linders, Rietveld, & Subramanian, 2004).
Moreover, some of these countries may also benefit
from historical relations and development assistance to
strengthen their capacity in productive sectors through
infrastructure and human capital investment (Babarinde
& Faber, 2007). These historical ties may facilitate more
direct, stable export relations between producer firms in
the former colonies and buyers in the former European
colonisers (Emlinger et al., 2008).
3. Methodology
3.1. Case Selection
The fresh pineapple sector was selected due to its large
direct export flow with few processing steps in the value
chain, the labour-intensive production process, and the
increased consumption in Europe. Pineapples are pro-
duced in various countries, mainly on large plantations
dominated by threemultinationals: Del Monte, Dole and
Chiquita (Centre for the Promotion of Imports from De-
veloping Countries, 2015). The focal area for pineap-
ple production is Costa Rica, which is the largest fresh
pineapple exporter to the EU, accounting for 85% of Eu-
ropean supplies in 2013 (COMEXT, 2015). In fact, ACP
producers have lost a large market share while imports
from Costa Rica have multiplied over the past decade
(Vagneron et al., 2009), as Costa Rica started to cultivate
the MD-2 variety which is in high demand on the market.
The dataset used in this study consists of 44 pineap-
ple producing and exporting countries (i.e. actors or
units of analysis). The fresh pineapple export volumes
to the European market were derived from the United
Nations COMTRADE (2015) and Eurostat COMEXT (2015)
databases (HS code 080430). Countries with less than
500 metric tonnes of total export volume were ex-
cluded from the analysis because of their negligible eco-
nomic value, resulting in 26 valid cases—too few for
an econometric analysis and too many for an in-depth
qualitative analysis. Hence, a QCA modelling approach
was chosen.
3.2. Data Sources
3.2.1. The Outcome: EXP
The outcome is defined as the share of pineapple ex-
ports to the EU compared to other destinations. It rep-
resents the relative importance or dependency on the
EUmarket as a destination for pineapples in each export-
ing country considered in the model, which is quantified
by the volume of exported pineapples to the EU from a
specific country divided by the total pineapple exports
in that country for the year 2012. Our model does not
consider bilateral trade between individual countries as
could be done in gravity models; instead, it analyses uni-
lateral flows from the trade partner country to the Euro-
pean Union member states, which comprise one group
for this purpose, the EU market. Some countries, no-
tably in Africa, export exclusively or a large share of their
pineapple to the EU. In contrast, Latin American coun-
tries export only half of their total pineapple exports or
less to the EU as for them the US is an important market.
Asian countries mainly trade processed canned pineap-
ple, which we excluded from our analysis.
3.2.2. The Conditions: LAB, INST, TAR, DIST
LAB. There is no commonly approved index to mea-
sure and capture the different labour rights dimen-
sions (Anker, Chernyshev, Egger, Mehran, & Ritter, 2003;
Compa, 2003; Cuyvers & Van Den Bulcke, 2007; Teitel-
baum, 2010). Measures at firm level include wage, work-
ing time and occupational health and safety, which are
referred to as outcome rights (Barrientos & Smith, 2007).
At country level, the four core ILO conventions are gen-
erally mentioned, namely freedom of association and
the right to collective bargaining (referred to in the re-
mainder of this article as Freedom of Association and
Collective Bargaining [FACB] rights), no forced labour,
no child labour, and no discrimination at the workplace.
Out of these four dimensions we consider the collective
bargaining rights as the lever to improved labour con-
ditions in the agricultural sector where wages are low
and workers tend to be worse off compared to those
employed in other occupational sectors (Mosley, 2008).
These ‘enabling’ FACB rights are conducive to access to
outcome rights such as wage and working time (Barrien-
tos & Smith, 2007), yet the right to form an independent
workers’ organisation is still suppressed in many coun-
tries, especially in agricultural sectors where unionisa-
tion is low (Hurst, 2005). Neumayer and de Soysa (2006)
argued that globalisation is more likely to promote FACB
rights than the outcome rights.
The QCA model presented in this article uses the
most recent labour rights (LR) indicator (Kucera & Sari,
2016). The LR indicator distinguishes between two ele-
ments of workers’ rights: the legal ratification of the ILO
conventions (de jure) and their practical implementation
(de facto). The LR indicator consists of 108 distinct eval-
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uation criteria for de jure and de facto violations which
are grouped in five categories: (1) fundamental civil lib-
erties, (2) right of workers to establish and join organi-
sations, (3) other union activities, (4) right to collective
bargaining, and (5) right to strike. Factual information is
obtained from the coding of nine textual sources3. The fi-
nal indicator scores countries from 0 to 10 (respectively
the best and the worst possible score).
INST. The World Bank Governance Indicators are
widely used to measure institutional quality (Kaufmann,
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). The indicators are based on
the opinion of a large number of enterprise, citizen and
expert survey respondents, including 32 individual data
sources. It consists of six dimensionsmeasured on a scale
of −2.5 to 2.5 (with 2.5 as the best score): voice and ac-
countability, political stability, government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.
The dimension rule of law was selected in this study be-
cause it captures the perceptions of confidence in abid-
ing by the rules, in particular the quality of contract en-
forcement, property rights, police and courts, which is
relevant in trade relations (Kaufmann et al., 2010).
TAR.Wecompared the trade regime and the product-
specific tariff line for pineapple applied to each coun-
try in 2012, derived from the TARIC database (Euro-
pean Commission, 2016). Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay fell under the GSP+
scheme. Benin, Thailand, Togo and Uganda had an EBA
agreement. Other countries had aGSP agreement except
for the USA for which normal tariffs apply. The GSP trade
regime did not guarantee zero tariffs for pineapple in
the case of China, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Philippines and
Thailand. Therefore we opted to account for the varia-
tion in tariff lines for pineapple. A dummy variable was
constructed for having a zero tariff rate.
DIST. This article uses the distance measures
developed by the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) to determine the
distance between Brussels as Europe’s institutional cen-
tre and each capital city in the world (Mayer & Zig-
nago, 2011).
3.3. Qualitative Comparative Analysis
QCA differs in several respects from traditional statisti-
cal methods and is increasingly being applied in compar-
ative political research at country level (Giumelli & Van
Roozendaal, 2016; Pajunen, 2008).
First, the objective of the study is not to estimate if
a variable or an interaction term has a positive or nega-
tive significant effect on a dependent variable as in the
gravity model of Kucera and Sarna (2006), who found a
limited positive effect of FACB on total export trade. In-
stead, we seek to identify the different combinations of
conditions that lead to the outcome, the relative impor-
tance of the EU as export market, because it is theoreti-
callymore likely that various paths for specific cases bring
about this outcome.
Second, QCA and regression analysis have different
explanatory approaches, each of which lends itself to
different research questions and hypotheses (Vis, 2012).
QCA follows a causes-of-effects approach, because the
goal is to explain the different causal patterns in the
cases under study that produce specific outcomes (ef-
fects), such as dependency on the EU market for pineap-
ple exports in this study. Quantitative approaches adopt
an effects-of-causes approach, with the central objective
to estimate the average effect of one (or more) variables
in a sufficiently large sample. Hence, a QCA is well-suited
to address the question of why some countries are ex-
porting relativelymore to the EU andothers not, because
the outcome is probably shaped by combinations of fac-
tors and not by one causal model with individual factors
in isolation.
Moreover, QCA is especially appropriate for small to
medium n-samples where regressions are problematic
(Marx, Rihoux, & Ragin, 2014).We do not focus onworld-
wide bilateral trade flows (exports and imports between
all countries in the world) as in gravity models. Instead
we want to compare cases of countries having a high or
low dependency on exports to the EU, in particular for
pineapple as a labour-intensive agricultural product.
The essence ofQCA is to understand the combination
of conditions that is necessary and/or sufficient for a cer-
tain outcome. The QCA method focuses on relations of
implication (absence or presence of conditions), while in
regression models the causation is assumed to be linear,
testing hypotheses about relations of covariation or cor-
relation between the independent and dependent vari-
ables (Katz, Vom Hau, & Mahoney, 2005; Thiem, Baum-
gartner, & Bol, 2016).
A first advantage is that QCA allows for equifinality,
or in other words, different causal paths can explain the
same effect. This notion of equifinality is omitted inmost
mainstream statistical methods, which serve to assess
the average effect of one individual factor (Grofman &
Schneider, 2009). It is true that regression analysis can
also account for a combination of conditions through in-
teraction terms, but the interpretation is less straightfor-
ward than in QCA and the number of interaction terms
that can be included is limited (Vis, 2012). QCA cannot
simply be substituted by an interaction-based regression
model, because it is hard to deal withmany high order in-
teraction terms without violating statistical assumptions
(Marx et al., 2014). Even with interactions, regression
models are insensitive to the differences between neces-
sity and sufficiency (Grofman & Schneider, 2009, p. 669;
Vis, 2012, p. 173).
3 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (US Department of State), Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights (International Trade Union
Confederation—ITUC), ILO’s Reports of the Committee on Freedomof Association, Reports of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions
and Recommendations, Reports of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, Country Baselines Under the ILO Declaration Annual Re-
view, Representations under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution, Complaints under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, and the relevant national legislation
for non-ratifying countries.
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A second advantage is that QCA explains why specific
groups of cases fit with a combination of factors. More-
over, a coefficient might appear not statistically signifi-
cant in regression results or an extreme value might be
seen as an outlier, while it can still be informative and
crucial as a condition explaining the occurrence of a few
cases in aQCA solution (Grofman& Schneider, 2009; Katz
et al., 2005). QCA thus has the advantage that it has less
severe data requirements than regressions (Vis, 2012).
The following steps were adopted in the QCA ap-
proach. The number of cases complies with the minimal
number of cases needed for a QCA. This is calculated as
2k with k the number of conditions. As we consider four
conditions (see above), we need a minimum of 16 cases
to have a reliable solution. The 26 countries thus repre-
sent an intermediate N-situation, for which QCA is partic-
ularly adequate.
QCA is a set-theoretic approach to test causal com-
plexity based on the notion of sets, set membership
scores and set relations to find the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions. A condition is considered necessary if
whenever the outcome is observed, the condition was
present. A condition is sufficient if whenever the condi-
tion was present, the outcome also occurred.
In a QCA model, the outcome and conditions are for-
mulated in terms of set membership, with a value as-
signed to each individual case, indicating the extent to
which it belongs to the set. This data needs to be cal-
ibrated using empirical information on the cases in or-
der to assign set membership scores that vary between 0
and 1. Membership scores are calculated using both crisp
set (0 = out or 1 = in the set) as fuzzy set approaches.
Fuzzy set models allow for partial membership in the set.
When calibrating the fuzzy set data, a threshold or point of
indifference (0.5) needs to be defined; this allows a qual-
itative distinction to be made in the case of membership.
Fuzzy sets also require the selection of anchor points be-
tween full set membership (1) and full non-membership
(0). From the three commonly used calibration methods
(theory-guided qualitative, direct and indirect), we apply
the qualitative approach that identifies meaningful an-
chors based on conceptual and case knowledge.
Through such a qualitative calibration method, the
fuzzy set anchor points determined the threshold values
for each of the four levels within a set: 0 (no member-
ship), 0.33 (partial non-membership, more out than in
the set), 0.67 (partial membership, more in than out),
and 1 (full membership) (Table 1). For the outcome vari-
able, the cases with an export share of less than 0.05
were recalibrated as “no dependency” on the EUmarket
for pineapple export (0), values between 0.05 and 0.3
were assigned to the “low dependency” subset (0.33),
values between 0.3 and 0.7 belonged to the “interme-
diate dependency” subset (0.67) and values above 0.7
covered the “highly dependent” cases (1). The point of
indifference for the fuzzy set “many labour rights viola-
tions” is considered in the middle of the scale as 0.5,
meaning that cases passing this threshold are more in
the set (1) than out (0). For the crisp set enabling insti-
tution, the cases with a value below −0.50 on the orig-
inal scale of −2.5 to 2.5 were recalibrated to zero (no
enabling institutions) and above −0.5 to 1 (enabling in-
stitutions). The dummy of tariff rates is already binary
and did not have to be recalibrated. The distance to the
EU over 10,000 km was calibrated as “very far” (1), be-
tween 6,000 and 10,000 km as “far” (0.67), between
4,000 and 6,000 km as “intermediate” (0.33), and less
than 4,000 km as “close” (0).
Table A1 of the annex compares the calibrated data
used in the analysis with raw data values. The fit of a
QCA is measured by its consistency and coverage. ”Con-
sistency” measures the degree to which a relation of suf-
ficiency between a causal condition (or combination of
conditions) and anoutcome ismetwithin a given data set
(Ragin, 2006). Consistency values range from 0 (no con-
sistency) to 1 (perfect consistency). Once it has been es-
tablished that a condition or combination of conditions is
consistent with sufficiency, coverage provides a measure
of empirical relevance, or the extent to which this combi-
nation of conditions is covered by empirical cases. There
are three measures for coverage of different parts of the
solution in the case of equifinality (i.e. more than one
different solution path lead to the same outcome) (Ra-
gin, 2006). The solution coverage refers to how much is
covered by the solution term. The raw coverage (cov.r) in-
dicates which share of the outcome is explained by each
alternative path. The unique coverage (cov.u) refers to
the share of the outcome that is exclusively explained by
a specific alternative path.
The QCA package of the software programme R was
used to analyse the necessary and sufficient conditions.
4. Results
This section presents the results of the QCA model that
examines which (combined) factors are necessary and
Table 1. Calibration of anchor points for the conditions and outcome.
Set name Type Anchor points (range of calibrated values)
High importance EU (EXP) Fuzzy (0) < 0.05 (0.33) < 0.3 (0.67) < 0.7 (1)
Many labour rights violations (LAB) Fuzzy 0.5
Enabling institutions (INST) Crisp (0) < –0.50 < (1)
Zero tariff (TAR) Crisp 1 (zero tariff), 0 (no zero tariff)
Far from the EU (DIST) Fuzzy (0) < 4,000 (0.33) < 6,000 (0.67) < 10,000 (1)
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sufficient conditions for a high importance of the EU
market for pineapple exports. The first step in a QCA af-
ter calibration is to check for necessary conditions. This
is done separately from the analysis of sufficient condi-
tions, which is the second step.
4.1. Analysis of Necessary Conditions
The necessity solution is determined by a threshold of
consistency equal to 0.9 and the coverage should not be
lower than 0.5 (Ragin, 2006).
Table 2 shows one necessary condition for the occur-
rence of the outcome, namely zero tariffs, with a con-
sistency score of 0.937 and a coverage value of 0.527,
slightly above the corresponding threshold levels. When-
ever the outcome (relatively large share of pineapples
exported to the EU) occurs, the condition zero tariff is
present. This suggests that having a zero tariff is neces-
sary for a high relative importance of the EU market for
pineapple exports.
The analysiswas repeated for the non-occurrence (∼)
of the outcome and conditions, which is a qualitatively
different event than its occurrence. None of the neces-
sary conditions scored above the threshold level of 0.9.
4.2. Analysis of Sufficient Conditions
The truth table (Table 3) summarises all possible combi-
nations of the four conditions, here 16 rows, for the out-
come that the EU is an important export market. Each
row identifies the possible combinations of conditions
and the cases that belong to that combination. Some of
the rows in the truth table are empty because therewere
no empirical cases for these combinations of conditions.
Next, the truth table is minimised towards a con-
servative solution. For this purpose, an inclusion thresh-
old score for sufficiency of 0.75 or higher is considered
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012), which means that 75%
of the cases’ membership scores in a combination of
conditions must be consistent. Cases with a consistency
Table 2. Analysis of necessity for the (non-)occurrence of the outcome with consistency, coverage and relevance of neces-
sity values.
Consistency Coverage RoN
Conditions EXP ∼EXP EXP ∼EXP EXP ∼EXP
LAB 0.480 0.583 0.441 0.769 0.689 0.842
∼LAB 0.748 0.576 0.556 0.614 0.646 0.677
INST 0.469 0.522 0.385 0.615 0.619 0.722
∼INST 0.531 0.478 0.436 0.564 0.639 0.696
TAR 0.937 0.587 0.527 0.473 0.438 0.412
∼TAR 0.063 0.413 0.096 0.904 0.750 0.966
DIST 0.621 0.850 0.354 0.695 0.375 0.559
∼DIST 0.850 0.209 0.695 0.442 0.559 0.823
Notes: TAR: zero tariff; LAB: many labour violations; DIST: far from EU; INST: enabling institutions; EXP: high importance EU.
Table 3. Truth table for the importance of EU for pineapple exports with conditions TAR, LAB, DIST and INST.
TAR LAB DIST INST EXP n incl Cases
1 1 1 1 1 2 0.857 Panama, Colombia
1 0 0 0 1 3 0.856 Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo
1 1 0 0 0 1 0.749 Cameroon
1 0 0 1 0 1 0.732 Ghana
1 0 1 1 0 4 0.709 Costa Rica, Mauritius, South Africa, Uganda
1 1 1 0 0 1 0.449 Guatemala
1 0 1 0 0 7 0.440 Bolivia, Dom. Rep., Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Tanzania
0 0 1 1 0 1 0.187 Brazil
0 1 1 1 0 4 0.173 China, India, Malaysia, Thailand
0 0 0 1 0 1 0.080 USA
0 1 1 0 0 1 0.000 Philippines
0 0 0 0 ? 0 —
0 0 1 0 ? 0 —
0 1 0 0 ? 0 —
0 1 0 1 ? 0 —
1 1 0 1 ? 0 —
Notes: TAR: zero tariff; LAB: many labour violations; DIST: far from EU; INST: enabling institutions; EXP: high importance EU; n: number
of cases; incl: inclusion of sufficiency score.
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value higher than 0.75 were assigned a 1 in the outcome
for the minimisation process.
Table 4 suggests that the outcome is reached through
two solution paths, which is given in QCA notation4 as:
TAR*∼INST*∼DIST*∼LAB + TAR*INST*DIST*LAB⇒ EXP.
The first solution path suggests that the combination
of a zero tariff, being closely located to the EU, weak insti-
tutions and few labour rights violations are sufficient for
a high relative importance of the EU as an export market
for pineapples. This combination of conditions is found in
Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. The second solution path
suggests that the combination of a zero tariff, enabling
institutions, distance far from the EU, and many labour
rights violations also suffice for having a high relative im-
portance of the EU market in the case of Colombia and
Panama. Whenever one of these two combinations of
conditions is present, the EU market for pineapple ex-
ports is relatively important. Moreover, the outcome is
not attributable to a unique factor or individual condi-
tion. Results suggest that the quality of institutions is less
relevant in theWest African exporters of pineapples com-
pared to the Latin American exporters such as Colombia
and Panama. The reverse is true for the protection of
labour rights, which matters more for the West African
exporters than for Colombia and Panama.
Regarding the model fit, the solution has a consis-
tency value of 0.857, a score that indicates that some
cases deviate from the conditional patterns. The solution
coverage is 51% of the cases, meaning that half of the
cases are not explained by the solution, which limits the
generalisability of the results. The raw and unique cover-
age values are rather low for both paths. The first path
is covered by more cases and is of more empirical impor-
tance than the second path.
In sum, the model confirms that a combination of
conditions (protection of labour rights, institutional qual-
ity, tariff regime and distance) explain the relative share
of pineapple exports to the EU market. Surprisingly, the
solutions did not cover as many cases of pineapple ex-
porting countries as we had expected. This result is
probably influenced by the outcome definition, because
West African producers heavily rely on the EU market
for pineapple exports, receiving a score 1 on the out-
come variable. These countries have few alternativemar-
ket channels except for local consumption. The market
outlets for Costa Rican pineapples are ample. Half of the
Costa Rican pineapples go to the US market. Defined
in the way it is, the outcome variable underestimates
the importance of the EU for Costa Rican pineapples,
which are market leaders in terms of volume exported
to the EU.
5. Conclusion
The protection of labour standards is increasingly rele-
vant for trade relations because of consumers’ ethical
concerns and corresponding attention paid by firms and
policy makers. The Europeanmarket is an important des-
tination for agricultural export commodities and Euro-
pean firmsmight favour countries with good labour stan-
dards to establish their global value chains in addition
to decisions based on cost logic. However, our under-
standing of the extent to which labour standards play a
decisive role in exporting to the EU is limited. The ad-
vantage of QCA is that it allows the combination of con-
ditions that lead to the outcome to be determined. In
our study, the results distinguished between two distinct
paths, contrasting African to Latin American cases. On
the one hand, the combinations of few labour violations
and weak institutions are sufficient in the case of Benin,
Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. On the other hand, the combina-
tions of many labour violations and enabling institutions
are sufficient in the case of Panama and Colombia.
Our QCA analysis, based on countries that export
pineapples to the EU, shows that protection of labour
standardsmatters in a number of cases. However, it does
not always play a role, and it is never a sufficient condi-
tion on its own for determining exports to the European
market. Rather, we have shown that (1) having a zero tar-
iff is necessary for a large share of export to the EU, and
(2) labour standards protection can make a difference
when the institutional quality is weak.
The first finding highlights the relevance of preferen-
tial market access. Having zero tariff market access con-
stitutes a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a
relatively large export share to the EU. Interestingly, dis-
tance to the European market in itself does not appear
as a sufficient condition as it needs to be complemented
with other factors such as labour standards protection
and institutions. The second finding does indeed sug-
Table 4. Conservative solution of sufficient conditions.
Solution paths Inclusion Sufficiency Raw Coverage Unique Coverage Cases
Score
1) TAR*∼INST*∼DIST*∼LAB 0.856 0.302 0.302 Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo
2) TAR*INST*DIST*LAB 0.857 0.208 0.208 Colombia, Panama
Total Solution 0.857 0.510
Notes: TAR: zero tariff; LAB: many labour violations; DIST: far from EU; INST: enabling institutions.
2 In Boolean algebra +means (non-exclusive) OR, * stands for AND, while ∼ refers to the non-occurrence of a term.
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gest that labour standards protection canmatter but only
in combination with the quality of institutions. Specif-
ically, countries where labour standards are respected
have been relatively successful exporters to the EU mar-
ket even if the institutional context is weak (e.g. in Benin,
Côte d’Ivoire, Togo), whereas countries where labour
standards are violated will only have a large share of ex-
ports when their limited compliance with labour rights
is compensated for with a high institutional quality (e.g.
Panama, Colombia). Countries that do not manage to
compensate for their weak track record of labour rights
with a higher institutional quality (e.g. Honduras and
Guatemala) will not benefit from a larger relative export
share to the EU.
Further research needs to engage in amore profound
analysis of the interaction between the importance of in-
stitutional quality for determining export performance,
which has been well established in research on inter-
national trade, and compliance with labour rights con-
ventions. The finding that weak institutional quality in
the African cases did not hinder business probably re-
flects the political and economic relations which, histori-
cally, have facilitated trade with the ACP countries. In ad-
dition, the firm and retailer levels should be examined
more closely to determine how important compliance
with labour standards is in purchasing decisions and how
labour standards are monitored in global value chains.
Why and how exporters that respect labour standards
have managed to export successfully to the EU market
despite weak institutions (in African cases) remains to be
investigated more closely. Finally, it is unclear to what ex-
tent the findings can be generalised beyond the peculiar-
ities of pineapple to other agricultural commodities and
value chains such as garments.
We can conclude that even (Latin American) violators
of labour standards have a relatively large export share to
the EU, provided that they benefit from zero tariffs and
have good institutions. This calls into question whether
the image of the EU market as being very demanding in
terms of labour standards coincides with the purchasing
behaviour of importers, retailers and consumers, who
might not sufficiently reward or incentivise compliance
with labour standards at sourcing sites. Although the EU
is explicit in its discourse on promoting labour standards,
it appears to miss its intended leverage effect on actual
export decisions and consequently fails to drive higher
standards in sourcing sites.
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Annex
Table A1. Raw and calibrated data of the outcome and conditions.
EXP INST LAB TAR DIST
Case Cal. Raw Raw Cal. Raw Cal. Raw Cal. Raw Cal.
1 Cameroon 1 0.98 −1.04 0 15.61 0.56 0 1 15272 0.255
2 Côte d’Ivoire 1 0.98 −1.12 0 12.40 0.24 0 1 15126 0.216
3 Benin 1 0.93 −0.64 0 12.38 0.24 0 1 14948 0.180
4 Mauritius 1 0.92 −0.95 1 13.67 0.37 0 1 19453 0.927
5 Togo 1 0.86 −0.94 0 11.31 0.13 0 1 14979 0.182
6 Ghana 1 0.82 −0.04 1 12.02 0.2 0 1 15058 0.200
7 Panama 0.67 0.67 −0.23 1 16.67 0.67 0 1 18814 0.888
8 Dominican Republic 0.67 0.62 −0.7 0 13.81 0.38 0 1 17325 0.726
9 Thailand 0.67 0.52 −0.17 1 16.09 0.61 2.3 0 19261 0.917
10 Costa Rica 0.67 0.48 −0.47 1 12.9 0.29 0 1 19046 0.904
11 Ecuador 0.67 0.40 −1.16 0 14.17 0.42 0 1 19535 0.931
12 Colombia 0.67 0.38 −0.39 1 15.27 0.53 0 1 18874 0.892
13 South Africa 0.33 0.28 −0.11 1 11.68 0.17 0 1 19536 0.931
14 Honduras 0.33 0.10 −1.17 0 14.50 0.45 0 1 18916 0.895
15 Tanzania 0 0.02 −0.56 0 14.22 0.42 0 1 17242 0.714
16 Bolivia 0 0 −1.04 0 13.28 0.33 0 1 10261 0.958
17 Brazil 0 0 −0.11 1 14.07 0.41 2.3 0 19666 0.937
18 China 0 0 −0.49 1 10 1 2.3 0 17971 0.810
19 Guatemala 0 0 −1.1 0 17.08 0.71 0 1 19095 0.907
20 India 0 0 −0.1 1 16.83 0.68 2.3 0 16420 0.577
21 Malaysia 0 0 −0.51 1 16.65 0.67 2.3 0 10261 0.958
22 Mexico 0 0 −0.56 0 14.15 0.42 0 1 19259 0.917
23 Paraguay 0 0 −0.87 0 13.45 0.35 0 1 10417 0.963
24 Philippines 0 0 −0.55 0 15.81 0.58 2.3 0 10516 0.965
25 Uganda 0 0 −0.36 1 13.70 0.37 0 1 16219 0.540
26 USA 0 0 −1.6 1 14.57 0.46 5.8 0 15892 0.460
Notes: EXP: high importance EU; INST: enabling institutions; LAB: many labour violations; TAR: zero tariff; DIST: far from EU.
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Mapping Variation of Civil Society Involvement
in EU Trade Agreements: A CSI Index*
Deborah MARTENS**, Lore VAN DEN PUTTE**, Myriam OEHRI** & Jan ORBIE**
Civil society has apparently been granted an important role in the monitoring of the
sustainable development chapters in the new generation European Union (EU) trade agree-
ments. While a debate about the role and functioning of these civil society mechanisms is
emerging, we lack a profound comparative analysis of the treaty provisions establishing them.
In order to address this gap and to map the extent to which civil society is included in the
agreements, a Civil Society Involvement (CSI) Index is developed inductively and applied to
the ten relevant EU trade agreements. It concludes that although some form of template is
used, large variation exists. A distinction is made between three categories of CSI score: high
(Canada, Korea), medium (Georgia, Moldova, Vietnam, Ukraine), and low (Central
America, Singapore, Peru-Colombia, Ecuador). The outcome also reveals interesting nuances
within these categories and calls for further research on the rationale for and consequences of this
variation.
1 INTRODUCTION
Civil society organizations have, apparently, been granted an important role in the
discussion and monitoring of the sustainable development chapters1 in the new
generation of European Union (EU) trade agreements.2 Although civil society was
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1 While the formal name of these chapters is the ‘chapter on trade and sustainable development’, we
refer to them as the ‘sustainable development chapter’ to ensure reader-friendliness.
2 Our definition of ‘civil society’ follows the practice of the EU, referring to a wide range of non-state
actors including most importantly labour, environmental and business groups, but also organizations
working on human rights, animal rights, and consumer interests, for instance. P. Bouwen, Business
Interest Representation and Legitimate European Governance, in Civil Society and Legitimate European
mentioned in previous trade agreements,3 it is only since the EU-Korea agreement
that civil society mechanisms have become a standard and quite prominent feature
of EU trade agreements. While the US and Canada include civil society to some
extent in their agreements,4 the EU has opted for a more specific and elaborate
approach towards civil society involvement (CSI). These mechanisms arguably
reflect the distinctive, cooperative approach of the EU, which emphasizes dialogue
and collaboration over sanction-based enforcement.5 The approach also reflects the
EU’s ambition to involve civil society more in its internal6 and external7 policy-
making and implementation.
A debate about the role and functioning of the civil society mechanisms
created in the context of EU trade agreements is emerging.8 While the number
of such mechanisms has grown exponentially in recent years, alongside the
increasing number of EU trade agreements entering into force, there are no
systematic and comparative analyses of these mechanisms as yet. The limited
number of evaluations of the functioning of the meetings that have taken place so
far are mainly policy-oriented and their assessments diverge from a negative
‘talking shop’ to a positive ‘empowerment opportunity’.9 Indeed, we lack a
profound analysis of the treaty provisions on these civil society mechanisms,
hampering a sound evaluation.
Governance (S. Smismans ed., Edward Elgar 2006); European Commission, The Roots of Democracy and
Sustainable Development: Europe’s Engagement with Civil Society in External Relations (2012).
3 The EU trade agreements with Mexico (1997), South Africa (2000), and Chile (2002) mention a
vague possibility or desirability to consult civil society organizations.
4 US and Canadian trade agreements foresee the possibility for any person with an interest, in practice
often civil society organizations, to file a complaint if one of the Parties to the trade agreement is not
respecting its labour commitments. Both the US and Canada also established a permanent advisory
system to involve civil society in the implementation of the trade agreement. ILO, Assessment of Labour
Provisions in Trade and Investment Arrangements (ILO 2016).
5 M. Oehri, Comparing US and EU Labour Governance ‘Near and Far’: Hierarchy vs Network?, 22 J. Eur.
Pub. Pol’y (2015); E. Postnikov & I. Bastiaens, Does Dialogue Work? The Effectiveness of Labor Standards
in EU Preferential Trade Agreements, 21 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y (2014); ILO, supra n. 4.
6 European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper (2001); K. Armstrong, Rediscovering Civil
Society: The European Union and the White Paper on Governance, 8 Eur. L.J. (2002).
7 European Commission, supra n. 2.
8 J. Orbie, D. Martens & L. Van den Putte, Civil Society Meetings in European Union Trade Agreements:
Features, Purposes, and Evaluation (Centre for the Law of EU External Relations 2016).
9 EESC, Civil Society in Action – Monitoring Sustainable Development and Wider FTA Implementation:
Lessons to Be Drawn From the EU Experience, in Summary Report: EESC Session at Public Forum WTO
2012 (C. Miglioli ed., 2012); EESC, Briefing Note to the Attention of Mr. Dumitru Fornea for Trade Policy
Committee Dinner Organized by the Dutch EU Presidency, Discussion about the Trade and Sustainable
Development Chapters in EU Trade Agreements, including Civil Society Monitoring Mechanisms (2016);
EESC, EESC Evaluation of Civil Society Advisory Mechanisms in EU Free Trade Agreements (2016); D.
Martens, et al., Civil Society Meetings in EU Trade Agreements: Recommendations and Lessons for EPAs
(ECDPM 2016); Y. Altintzis, Civil Society Engagement and Linkages in EU Trade Policy, in Linking Trade
and Non-Commercial Interests: The EU as a Global Role Model? (T. Takacs & A. Dimopoulos eds, Centre
for the Law of EU External Relations 2013).
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As Postnikov and Bastiaens but also Lechner highlight, knowledge on the
design of the social provisions in trade agreements is key to understanding the
implementation and ultimate success of these provisions.10 In fact, during the civil
society meetings observed by the authors, the legal texts were used as a source to
discuss the mandate and set-up of the mechanisms and were referred to on several
occasions.11 We therefore expect the provisions on CSI to affect the practical
functioning and effectiveness of the mechanisms so a systematic and comparative
analysis seems indispensable. Only then will we be able to assess whether civil
society has been granted an important role in discussing and monitoring the
sustainable development chapters of recent EU trade agreements.
This comparative mapping is all the more relevant since there is uncertainty
about the extent to which civil society provisions actually differ across agreements.
On the one hand, there seems to be a common template with several key features
(see infra). In this context, the sustainable development chapter in the EU-Korea
agreement is often considered to be a ‘blueprint’ or ‘gold standard’ for the
subsequent agreements.12,13 From an institutionalist theoretical perspective and
according to existing research on EU external democracy promotion, EU nego-
tiators follow specific templates that are based on domestic institutional
prerequisites.14 If it is true that the civil society meetings are ‘toothless’ and merely
a ‘talking shop’, one can also expect that these ‘declaratory’ provisions do not
require thorough negotiations and therefore the same provisions would reappear in
every subsequent agreement. On the other hand, existing studies on EU external
10 L. Lechner, The Domestic Battle over the Design of Non-Trade Issues in Preferential Trade Agreements, 23
Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. (2016); Postnikov & Bastiaens, supra n. 5.
11 The authors attended the following civil society meetings: the transnational public meeting of the
EU-Peru-Colombia agreement (Dec. 2016), the transnational meeting of the EU-Central America
agreement (June 2016 and May 2015), the EU domestic mechanism of the EU-Peru-Colombia
agreement (Apr. 2016), a transnational meeting of the EU-CARIFORUM agreement (Apr. 2016),
the EU domestic mechanism of the EU-Central America Association Agreement (Mar. 2016) and a
meeting of the EU Delegation in Colombia with local civil society (Dec. 2015).
12 This is the main reason why we do not examine the EU-CARIFORUM agreement (2007). This
agreement constitutes an Economic Partnership Agreement implementing the trade provisions of the
Cotonou Agreement (2000). Therefore this agreement does not fall within the ‘new generation’ of EU
trade agreements. Specifically, it does not have a separate chapter on sustainable development and it
does not establish domestic civil society meetings (only a transnational meeting), which makes it
difficult to compare with the 10 agreements since Korea.
13 Personal interview, DG Trade, (Aug. 2016); F. Bossuyt, The Social Dimension of the New Generation of
EU FTAs with Asia and Latin America: Ambitious Continuation for the Sake of Policy Coherence, 14 Eur.
Foreign Aff. Rev. Special Issue, 703–722 (2009); F. Hoffmeister, The Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Agreements of the European Union – Concept and Challenges, in Trade Liberalisation and
Standardisation – New Directions in the ‘Low Politics’ of EU Foreign Policy (M. Cremona & T. Takács
eds, Centre for the Law of EU External Relations 2013).
14 See F. Bicchi, ‘Our Size Fits All’: Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean’, 13 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y
(2006); T. Börzel & T. Risse, One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy
and the Rule of Law, Workshop on Democracy Promotion (2004).
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relations found that there may be variations within the same template.15 Also when
it comes to CSI in the sustainable development chapter, Bartels alluded to differ-
ences across EU agreements.16
Accordingly, a new comparative study is timely for at least three reasons. First,
since Bartels’ study many more agreements containing civil society provisions have
been concluded and consequently one can expect even more variation. Second,
interviews and existing studies found that the sustainable development chapters of
at least some agreements involved tough negotiations between the EU and third
countries, thereby disqualifying the suggestion that they would be irrelevant and
unvarying.17 Third, growing contestation, especially since the negotiations with
the US and Canada, has been questioning the legitimacy of the EU trade agree-
ments. Ambitious CSI provisions can be a way to address current criticisms.18
We therefore take up the challenge of creating a more nuanced and accurate
picture of the design of CSI. In essence, we will provide a comprehensive over-
view of the variation in civil society provisions that exists between the different
agreements. Our main objective is to thoroughly map the extent to which civil
society is included in the sustainable development chapter of EU trade agreements.
For this purpose we develop a CSI Index based on five clusters and twenty-one
criteria and apply this to the ten ‘new generation’ trade agreements19 signed by the
EU. In doing so, we provide an innovative analytical tool that contributes to
existing databases mapping the design of trade agreements, such as the Design of
Trade Agreements (DESTA) database, which does not consider CSI as a separate
15 A. Wetzel & J. Orbie, The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion: Concepts and Cases (Palgrave 2015).
16 L. Bartels, Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU Free Trade Agreements, 40 Legal
Issues Econ. Integration (2013).
17 Personal interview, supra n. 13; personal interview, Secretary of Economic Development Honduras
(June 2016); personal interview, EESC (Nov. 2016); ICAES & Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Guía
didáctica de formación: Las Rondas de Negociación sobre un Acuerdo de Asociación U.E. – C.A. (2013).
18 More critically, increasing EU trade agreement’s legitimacy through CSI can also be interpreted as co-
optation of civil society. See J. Orbie, D. Martens, M. Oehri & L. Van den Putte, Promoting Sustainable
Development or Legitimising Free Trade? Civil Society Mechanisms in EU Trade Agreements, Third World
Thematics (2017).
19 EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement (negotiations concluded in 2009), EU-Peru-Colombia Trade
Agreement (2010), EU-Central America Association Agreement (2010), EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement (2011), EU-Moldova Association Agreement (2013), EU-Georgia Association
Agreement (2013), EU-Peru-Colombia-Ecuador Trade Agreement (2014)*, EU-Canada
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (2014), EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
(2014), EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (2016). For the sake of simplicity we will refer to these
preferential trade agreements uniformly as ‘trade agreements’.
*In this analysis the accession of Ecuador to the EU trade agreement with Colombia and Peru is
treated separately because the provisions establishing the civil society mechanisms could – in theory –
have been renegotiated. Art. 329 on accession by other Andean countries states that the EU ‘shall aim
at preserving the integrity of this Agreement’, suggesting that ‘flexibility’ should be limited to
concessions on market and investment related issues in the annexes, ‘and any aspect for which such
flexibility were necessary for the accession’. The question what is ‘necessary’ is of course a political
one.
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category in its codebook, and the TRade & ENvironment Database (TREND),
which maps environmental provisions in trade agreements, including public invol-
vement in the implementation of the agreements.20
Methodologically, this article applies an inductive approach, starting from the
empirical observations in the different EU agreements. Throughout this process, a
codebook was developed, resulting in an overall CSI Index, allowing us to
comparatively assess the agreements. From this, several provisional conclusions
and findings concerning the involvement of civil society in the monitoring of
EU trade agreements will emerge that can be used for further, theory-testing
research.
The article is structured as follows. After this introduction, the CSI Index will
be developed in the section 2. A section 3 will then apply this CSI Index system-
atically to map the civil society provisions in the new EU trade agreements. This
will reveal a surprising amount of variation between the agreements which will
then be analysed. The conclusions will outline the main findings and suggest
avenues for further research.
2 DOWN TO THE LAST DETAIL: THE CSI INDEX
Overall, three recurrent features characterize all the CSI in the sustainable develop-
ment chapter of EU trade agreements. First, they refer to a domestic group (mostly
called ‘domestic advisory group’) in which representatives of three constituencies
(labour, environment, and business) of each signatory Party (both within the EU and
within its trading partner(s)) participate. Second, they establish a transnational
mechanism where the members of the domestic mechanism and/or other civil
society organizations of both the EU and its trading partner(s) meet annually.
Third, they foresee some interaction between these two mechanisms and the inter-
governmental body (between the EU and its trading partner(s), the so-called Parties)
that meets annually in relation to the implementation of the sustainable development
chapter. However as will be illustrated throughout the article, within this common
template, there is significant diversity between different EU trade agreements. The
CSI Index spelled out below was developed in order to identify and map all these
differences. For this purpose, we elaborated several clusters and criteria of CSI,
resulting in an overall CSI Index that provides a general indication of the extent to
which civil society is involved in a particular EU trade agreement.
The codebook and the scores for the different criteria were developed in an
inductive way. The criteria and their scores were informed by the authors’ earlier
20 See at: http://www.designoftradeagreements.org/, and http://www.chaire-epi.ulaval.ca/trend
(accessed Nov. 2016).
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research based on document analysis, interviews, field research, and participant
observation.21 The development of the codebook and the attribution of the scores
were fine-tuned through a ‘double blind’ approach that proceeded in five phases in
order to increase the intercoder reliability. First, two researchers independent from
each other constructed a codebook deriving general clusters and specific criteria
from the CSI provisions in all recent EU trade agreements. Second, both research-
ers shared their codebook with each other in order to agree on the clusters, specific
criteria, and operationalization of the different codes. In the third phase the
researchers applied the aggregated codebook to the provisions of the agreements.
Fourth, the results were once again compared and final decisions on the codes and
operationalization were made. Finally, the criteria and results were shared with
policymakers working on the topic who largely subscribed to this coding as well as
to its results.
This exercise resulted in twenty-one criteria which are categorized into five
clusters (see Annex for the codebook). These clusters concern (1) the participants’
independence from the Parties, (2) the scope of membership, (3) the operation of
the transnational meetings, (4) the interaction among civil society and interaction
with the government(s), and (5) the involvement in the dispute settlement
mechanism. By engaging in this coding exercise described above, the criteria are
able to cover all relevant variation existing in the agreements since the EU-Korea
agreement.22 Each of the criteria is scored according to the authors’ assessments of
their CSI.23 The subsequent paragraphs set out the five clusters and their (sub)
criteria in general terms. A more detailed overview can be found in the codebook
in the Annex.
2.1 INDEPENDENCE OF PARTICIPANTS
The first cluster concerns the independence of participants from the Parties taking
part in the civil society mechanisms. First, there is variation regarding the explicit
terms used to indicate the concept of ‘civil society’. In the EU-Singapore (Article
13.15.4) and EU-Vietnam agreement (Article 15.4) the term ‘stakeholders’ is
employed, while the term ‘civil society’ is used for all other agreements. This is
relevant because even though this word choice stems from cultural preferences, it
may have significant implications for the kind of organizations that participate in
21 List of observed meetings, supra n. 11.
22 The codebook might need to be updated if current negotiations, such as the EU-Japan agreement or
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States, lead to novelties.
23 The scores provided in Table 1 merely reflect variation in the involvement of civil society and are not
intended to be interpreted as if a score of 18 (EU-Ukraine) would mean that CSI is twice as much as a
score of 9 (EU-Peru-Colombia).
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the mechanisms and the links they have with the state.24 Second, independence of
civil society determines whether the autonomy of participating civil society is
explicitly mentioned. This is the case in all agreements except for the EU-Peru-
Colombia and EU-Ecuador agreements. Third, selection reflects the way civil
society representatives will be designated. Specifically, there is variation in whether
the composition and consultation of the domestic mechanisms should be in
accordance with domestic law. Such a provision gives a considerable amount of
leeway to the governments to organize the mechanism according to their own
preferences, as is the case for the EU-Vietnam (Article 15.4) and EU-Peru-
Colombia agreements (Article 281). In this cluster, CSI will be rated higher
when the meetings are more independent from the Parties.
2.2 SCOPE OF MEMBERSHIP
The second cluster concerns the scope of membership which is characterized by
great diversity. Four criteria were discerned. A first criterion refers to the specificity
of membership of the domestic mechanism. While some agreements such as the EU-
Korea, EU-Peru-Colombia, and EU-Ukraine agreements only vaguely mention
the groups that can participate, others are much more specific. For instance, the
EU-Canada agreement mentions that the domestic labour mechanism involves
‘employers, unions, labour and business organizations, as well as other relevant
stakeholders as appropriate’ (Article 23.8.4). The CSI is higher when the member-
ship of a group is more concretely described, as it reflects a more specific commit-
ment to include certain groups. A second criterion, novelty, concerns the need to
establish a new domestic mechanism. In most cases the use of existing mechanisms
is allowed. The EU-Central America agreement enables the employment of
existing mechanisms but points out that the Parties ‘shall offer existing bodies the
opportunity to reinforce and develop their activities with the new perspectives and
areas of work provided by this Title’ (Article 294.4 footnote 45). Only the EU-
Korea agreement obliges the governments to set up a new mechanism to deal with
sustainable development (Article 13.12.4). CSI will be higher in this case because
there is a separate mechanism that is specifically mandated to deal with the
sustainable development dimension of the trade agreement. When existing
mechanisms can be used, there is less certainty that these will discuss or monitor
the trade agreement, let alone the sustainable development chapter. A third
24 Personal interview, supra n. 13; H. Volkhart, Studying Civil Society Across the World: Exploring the
Thorny Issues of Conceptualization and Measurement, 1 J. Civil Soc’y (2005); C. Spurk, Understanding Civil
Society, in Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment (T. Paffenholz ed., Lynne Rienner
Publishers 2010).
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criterion indicates the specificity of membership of the transnational mechanism. In the
EU-Vietnam agreement, for example, it is mentioned that members of the domes-
tic mechanisms meet in the transnational meeting (Article 15.5), while the EU
agreement with Peru-Colombia and Ecuador only foresee a session with civil
society organizations and the public at large (Article 281.1). CSI is scored higher
when the participants in the transnational mechanisms include the members of the
domestic mechanisms together with other additional groups than when the public
at large can meet without any continuity in membership whatsoever. A final
criterion concerns the potential presence of state actors. The possibility for ‘local public
authorities’ to take part in the civil society mechanisms is only explicitly mentioned
in the case of the EU-Central America agreement (Article 294.5). As their pre-
sence could potentially limit the possibility to speak out freely and may strengthen
the governmental interference in the ‘selection’ (see criteria supra), CSI is rated
higher when their presence is not explicitly permitted.
2.3 OPERATION OF TRANSNATIONAL MECHANISM
A third cluster concerns the operation of transnational meetings and consists of
three criteria. The first criterion refers to the deadline for the Parties to agree on the
operation of the transnational mechanism. While in most agreements it is specified
that the Parties should determine the operation within one year after the entry into
force of the agreement, this is not explicitly stated in the cases of the EU-Central
America, EU-Singapore, and EU-Canada agreements. As we expect such a dead-
line to ensure that the transnational mechanism is on the agenda of the Parties and
their intergovernmental body and will therefore take place in time, we provide a
higher CSI score for it. The second criterion relates to the reoccurrence of the
transnational meetings. In the EU-Singapore agreement the transnational meetings
are to take place within the first two years after the entry into force of the
agreement and thereafter ‘as necessary’ (Article 13.15.3), whereas all other agree-
ments mention that this mechanism shall meet once a year. We expect CSI to be
higher when they are to meet frequently. A third criterion concerns the dependence
of the transnational meeting on the intergovernmental body to be convened or organized
(sometimes in conjunction with the Parties’ own meetings). For example in the
case of the EU-Central America agreement ‘the Parties agree to organize and
facilitate a bi-regional Civil Society Dialogue Forum for open dialogue’ (Article
295.1). Only in the case of the EU-Korea and EU-Ukraine agreements does the
organization of the transnational meeting not depend formally on the Parties. We
give CSI a higher score in these cases, as it provides more possibilities for the
transnational mechanism to determine its own meeting frequency.
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While the first three clusters refer to the establishment and functioning of the
civil society mechanisms, the last two clusters concern the relationship of these
mechanisms with other bodies or processes created in the context of the sustainable
development chapters. The latter clusters mirror the interaction between the civil
society mechanisms, their relationship to the governments, and their involvement
in the dispute settlement procedure.
2.4 INTERACTION
A fourth cluster concerns interaction, both among civil society mechanisms and
between them and the Parties. The first criterion reflects the interaction among civil
society mechanisms. In the cases of the EU-Korea, EU-Ukraine, and EU-Canada
agreements, the possibility for direct interaction between the transnational and the
domestic mechanism is created. In our codebook, CSI is rated higher when it is
explicitly mentioned that both mechanisms can communicate as it creates a formal
communication channel between them.
A second criterion covers the interaction between civil society and the Parties. Four
subcriteria are identified to describe the variation in the interaction. The first
subcriterion concerns interaction between the domestic mechanism and the Parties.
The EU-Moldova agreement, for example, mentions that the domestic mechan-
isms may submit views or recommendations to the Parties, including on their own
initiative (Article 376.4). The second subcriterion refers to interaction between the
domestic mechanism and its own government. This is the case in the EU-Peru-
Colombia (Article 281), EU-Ecuador (Article 281), EU-Singapore (Article
13.15.5), EU-Canada (Article 23.8.4), and EU-Vietnam (Article 15.4) agreements
where the domestic mechanisms may, ‘on their own initiative’, submit views or
recommendations to their respective Parties on the implementation of the sustain-
able development chapter. The third subcriterion highlights interaction between
the transnational mechanism and the Parties. This interaction is, for example, explicitly
included in the case of the EU-Georgia agreement, where ‘the Parties shall present
an update on the implementation of this Chapter to the joint civil society dialogue
forum’ (Article 241.3) and the views and the opinions of the joint civil society
dialogue forum ‘shall be submitted to the Parties’ (ibid.). The fourth subcriterion
reflects the interaction between the transnational mechanism and the Parties by means of
the domestic mechanism. This possibility is only foreseen in the cases of the EU-
Korea, EU-Ukraine, and EU-Canada agreements.
The above-mentioned interaction between civil society and the government
(s) can take place at different levels, ranging from one-way communication (e.g.
the EU-Moldova agreement where the domestic mechanisms ‘may submit views
or recommendations on the implementation of this Chapter, including on its
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(their) own initiative’ (Article 376.4)) to two-way communication in which civil
society and governments are obliged to react to each other’s communications. This
is the case for the EU-Canada agreement (see infra). This gradation was also taken
into account while scoring the different provisions.
2.5 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM
A fifth and final cluster reflects the involvement of civil society in the settlement of
disputes between the Parties.25 CSI in these mechanisms creates more opportunities
for civil society organizations to provide input and enforce the commitments made
in the sustainable development chapter. We can identify six criteria. A first
criterion concerns whether communications of the domestic mechanism can form the
basis of government consultations. This is only the case for the EU-Korea agreement
(Article 13.14.1). CSI is rated higher when this possibility is explicitly mentioned.
A second criterion concerns the involvement of the domestic mechanism in government
consultations. In the EU-Georgia (Article 242.5) and EU-Moldova (Article 378.5)
agreements, it is mentioned that ‘where appropriate, that Sub-Committee may
seek the advice of the DAG(s) [domestic mechanism(s)] of either or both Party(ies)
or other expert assistance’. CSI is rated higher when a domestic mechanism can
take the initiative to provide input to the consultations. A third criterion concerns
the advisory role of the domestic mechanism to the Panel of Experts during its proceedings.
This role is again explicit in the EU-Korea agreement (Article 13.15.1) as well as in
the EU-Ukraine agreement (Article 301.1). CSI is rated higher when the Panel of
Experts is expected to seek its advice than when this possibility is not foreseen. A
fourth criterion concerns whether the Panel of Experts informs the domestic mechanism
about the outcome of its proceedings. This is the case both in the EU-Korea (Article
13.15.2) and EU-Ukraine (Article 301.2) agreements. In the case where it is
mentioned that the outcome of the Panel of Experts report shall be made available
to the domestic mechanism, CSI is rated higher, since the civil society are kept
abreast and as such involved. A fifth criterion refers to the governments informing the
domestic mechanism about the implementation of the report drawn up by the Panel of
Experts. CSI is scored higher when both the responding and requesting govern-
ments are required to inform their domestic mechanism. This is, for example, the
case in the EU-Canada (Article 23.10.12) and EU-Singapore (Article 13.17.9)
agreement. A sixth criterion determines the involvement of the civil society
25 In EU trade agreements, the sustainable development chapters are excluded from the general dispute
settlement system of the trade agreement as a whole. When a violation of labour or environmental
provisions arises, the issue can be discussed in government consultations. As a last resort, a panel of
experts can be established. However, no sanction is foreseen if the panel’s recommendations are not
followed up.
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mechanisms in monitoring the implementation of the report drawn up by the Panel of
Experts. In the EU-Georgia agreement this possibility is explicitly mentioned
while it is not the case in, for instance, the EU-Peru-Colombia agreement. CSI
is rated higher when civil society may submit observations in this regard.
3 SIGNIFICANT VARIATION: OUTCOME AND COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS
Table 1 presents the scores on the different criteria and clusters, based on the
codebook that was developed for this purpose. This mapping exercise shows a
strong variation between the different EU trade agreements. Overall (see ‘Total’ in
Table 1), some agreements score much higher on the CSI Index than others. In
addition, there is variation within and between different clusters. Some agreements
have a similar score on the overall CSI Index while featuring significantly different
scores on separate clusters and criteria, respectively.
This section provides a more general picture of the broad variation found and
elaborates on the substantial differences between the CSI provisions. It is structured
around the overall scores of the CSI Index. Therefore a distinction between three
groups is made. First, the EU-Canada and EU-Korea agreements belong to the
group with the highest score. This can mainly be attributed to their emphasis on
participants’ independence, membership scope, and most of all dispute settlement.
Second, the EU-Georgia, EU-Moldova, EU-Vietnam, and EU-Ukraine agree-
ments constitute the intermediate group. All of them score relatively high on the
criteria referring to membership scope, transnational meeting, and interaction
between civil society and the Parties. Third, the EU-Central America, EU-
Singapore, EU-Peru-Colombia, and EU-Ecuador agreements constitute the
group with the lowest scores on each cluster.
3.1 HIGH CSI
In the first group, the EU-Canada agreement scores comparatively high.
Concerning the membership scope, it is the only agreement that creates separate
domestic groups for labour and environmental issues. Another unique provision is
the obligation of the governments to follow up annually on the communications
from the transnational civil society meetings: ‘any view or opinion of the Civil
Society Forum shall be presented to the Parties directly, or through the consulta-
tive mechanisms (…) The Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development
shall report annually on the follow-up to those communications (Art. 22.4.4(b))’.
This obligatory two-way communication results in a remarkably high score for the
criterion on interaction with the Parties. The EU-Canada trade agreement also
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scores high on the dispute settlement cluster where the domestic group can give
advice to the government consultation and is involved in the monitoring of the
implementation of the report of Panel of Experts.
The EU-Korea trade agreement was the first EU agreement creating civil
society mechanisms. It also scores high, however with a different emphasis on
certain criteria than the agreement with Canada: the determining clusters here
concern the scope of membership and dispute settlement. First, the EU-Korea
trade agreement is the only agreement establishing new domestic groups for the
specific purpose of this agreement. Contrary to the other agreements, it is not
stipulated that existing groups can be consulted for this purpose. Moreover, it is the
only agreement where the closed transnational meeting comprises only the mem-
bers of each domestic group and not additional members. In addition, this transna-
tional mechanism does not depend on the Parties to convene these meetings and
can determine its own meeting frequency. This strong independence is a rare
provision, only shared with the EU-Ukraine agreement.
Second, in the EU-Korea trade agreement the domestic groups can play a
more important role in providing input for the dispute settlement mechanisms.
This is different from the EU-Canada agreement where civil society can play a role
in the follow-up of these mechanisms. It should also be noted that this agreement
scores remarkably low on interaction with the Parties. Contrary to the EU-Canada
agreement, no interaction is foreseen between the domestic group and the Parties,
and the provision describing the interaction between the transnational meeting and
the Parties is much weaker: ‘The Parties can present an update on the implemen-
tation of this Chapter to the Civil Society Forum. The views, opinions or findings
of the Civil Society Forum can be submitted to the Parties directly or through the
Domestic Advisory Group(s)’ (Art. 13.12.3)’.
3.2 MEDIUM CSI
In the intermediate group, the CSI Index scores are close to each other. The civil
society provisions in the EU-Georgia and EU-Moldova agreements are identical.26
Interestingly, however, there are significant differences between the scores on the
clusters and criteria of these agreements and the EU-Vietnam and EU-Ukraine
agreements.
For some criteria, the EU-Georgia, EU-Moldova, and EU-Vietnam agree-
ments display strong resemblances. For instance, the three agreements score rela-
tively high on interaction with the Parties. First, two-way communication is
26 An interesting difference with the other agreements is the explicit reference to civil society organiza-
tions established in their ‘own territories’.
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created by the obligation of the governments to report on the implementation of
the sustainable development chapter during the transnational meetings together
with the submission of the report (EU-Vietnam) and views and opinions (EU-
Georgia and EU-Moldova) of these transnational meetings to the Parties. Second,
the possibility is created for the domestic mechanisms to communicate their views
and recommendations to their own government (specified in the EU-Vietnam
agreement) or potentially to both governments through the intergovernmental
body as it is not specified in the EU-Georgia and EU-Moldova trade agreements.
This explicit reference to ‘its respective party’ in the EU-Vietnam trade agreement
(Article 15.4) is a notable difference. In addition, the criteria on civil society
interaction with the dispute settlement mechanism are exactly the same in all
three agreements. Here, the domestic mechanisms may give their advice during
government consultations, and they are informed about and may submit, together
with the transnational mechanism, observations on the implementation of the
report of the Panel of Experts. These agreements do not score as high as the
EU-Korea or EU-Canada agreements because the provisions referring to the
consultation of the domestic groups to receive input for the dispute settlement
mechanisms remain more voluntary.
However, the EU-Vietnam trade agreement scores differently on several other
criteria and shows some peculiarities. On the one hand, it scores very high on the
membership score of the transnational meetings as it involves both the domestic
groups and other stakeholders. This is unique compared to all the other agree-
ments. On the other hand, it scores low on other criteria. As indicated in the
previous section, the agreement only refers to ‘stakeholders’ and never to ‘civil
society’ (similar to the EU-Singapore agreement). In addition, the selection of the
members of the domestic groups is determined by domestic procedures (as with
the EU-Peru-Colombia and EU-Ecuador agreements).
Interestingly, the EU-Ukraine agreement differs from the others in the
intermediate category, including the agreements with the other Eastern
Partnership countries Georgia and Moldova. The following provisions are
noteworthy. First, regarding the transnational meeting, and similarly to the
EU-Korea trade agreement, this meeting in the EU-Ukraine agreement is
more ambitious since it does not depend on the Parties to be convened.
Second, even though the EU-Ukraine agreement scores similar to the others
on civil society interaction, a closer look at the criteria reveals significant
differences. For instance, the EU-Ukraine agreement foresees the possibility
for the domestic group to function as an intermediary for communications of
the transnational meeting. The latter is a provision only shared with the EU-
Korea and EU-Canada agreements, and is the only communication channel
created for interaction between civil society organizations in the domestic
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groups and transnational meetings. Third, the EU-Ukraine agreement scores
particularly low on dispute settlement, where it does not involve civil society
in the government consultation and the follow-up of the Panel of Expert
report.
3.3 LOW CSI
The third group consists of the EU-Central America, EU-Singapore, EU-Peru-
Colombia, and EU-Ecuador trade agreements. These agreements score low on all
clusters. For instance, they all score very low on scope of membership and
operation of the transnational meeting, and extremely low on the cluster on
dispute settlement. However, there are noteworthy peculiarities and differences,
which will be discussed here.
There are two particularities that are unique to the EU-Central America
agreement. First, there is a provision creating the opportunity to enforce existing
bodies should they be consulted as domestic groups; this positively influences the
CSI score. Second, there is a possibility to involve state actors, namely ‘local public
authorities’; this negatively influences the CSI score.
Even though the EU-Singapore agreement has the same overall score as the
EU agreement with Central America, it differs from the other agreements in this
group on certain criteria. First, the EU-Singapore agreement contains, albeit weak,
CSI provisions in the dispute settlement mechanism. This is contrary to the EU-
Central America and EU-Colombia-Peru agreements, which do not refer at all to
CSI in dispute settlement. Second, the EU-Singapore, EU-Peru-Colombia, and
EU-Ecuador agreements score lower than the EU-Central America agreement on
the interaction between the transnational meetings and the Parties; however, the
three agreements level this by mentioning the possibility for the domestic group to
submit views or recommendations to their respective Parties. Third, the EU-
Singapore agreement only refers to ‘stakeholders’ and never to ‘civil society’.
Fourth, it also scores the lowest of all the agreements on the operation of the
transnational meetings. In this context, the agreement does not mention a deadline
by when the Parties should agree on the operation of the transnational meeting.
This provision is included in all agreements except for the EU-Singapore and EU-
Central America agreements. In addition, and contrary to all other agreements, the
EU-Singapore agreement does not explicitly foresee an annual transnational meet-
ing. The organization of these meetings depends entirely on whether a meeting of
the intergovernmental body takes place, which is not guaranteed as it ‘shall meet
during the first two years after the agreement enters into force and thereafter as
necessary’ (Article 13.15.3). This explains the low score on the criteria ‘reoccur-
rence’ and ‘dependence to intergovernmental body’.
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The EU agreements with Peru-Colombia and Ecuador score lowest on the
CSI Index for a number of reasons. First, in contrast to all other agreements, there
is no mention of the need for the members of the domestic groups to be
‘independent’. Second, their selection should be ‘in accordance with domestic
law’, thus depending on domestic procedures as is the case in the EU-Vietnam
trade agreement. Third, the transnational meeting constitutes a ‘session with the
public at large’ where the members of the domestic group ‘are allowed to
participate’, resulting in a very vague description of the required participants,
which is much weaker than in most other agreements.
In sum, we have shown that there is considerable variation between CSI in EU
trade agreements. The CSI Index makes it possible to distinguish three categories of
trade agreements: those with a high, medium, and low level of CSI. In addition, we
identified more subtle variations between agreements within the same category, and
a number of particularities that make ‘high CSI’ trade agreements score lower on
some criteria and ‘low CSI’ agreements score higher on specific criteria. We have
thus largely confirmed that there is a significant degree of flexibility within the
general template of CSI in the sustainable development chapter.
4 CONCLUSION
This article aimed to shed light on a new phenomenon in the most recent
generation of EU trade agreements, namely the involvement of civils society in
the sustainable development chapter. Drawing on an innovative CSI Index con-
sisting of twenty-one criteria in five different clusters (i.e. participants’ indepen-
dence from governments, scope of membership, operation of transnational
mechanism, interaction, and dispute settlement mechanism), it allowed comparison
of different degrees of CSI in ten EU agreements concluded with sixteen coun-
tries. This detailed mapping revealed a remarkable degree of variation in the extent
to which civil society organizations can be involved. We found that, notwith-
standing the fact that a common template is used, there appears to be crucial
variation between agreements. We identified three categories of agreements (high,
medium, and low CSI) and analysed relevant differences between and within these
categories.
With this study we aimed to provide a nuanced picture of how EU trade
agreements exhibit CSI. We can thus increase our knowledge on the role of civil
society in EU trade agreements beyond ex ante involvement of interest groups, that
is during EU trade agreement negotiations,27 and beyond ex post learning and
27 A. Dür & D. De Bièvre, Inclusion Without Influence? NGOs in European Trade Policy, 27 J. Pub. Pol’y
(2007).
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dialogues of civil society actors after the EU-Korea trade agreement,28 inaugurat-
ing a new generation of CSI. The study also emphasizes that transnational civil
society engagement in trade agreements is not limited to the North American
context29 but has also evolved in recent years in the EU approach. Even more,
while CSI on labour-related issues in US trade agreements is normally linked to
public complaints and, if deemed appropriate by decision makers, to state-actor
meetings,30 the EU has pioneered a promising multifaceted approach for CSI
which in the best case allows for regular, independent, and transparent interactions
on trade-related issues of interest to a broader public.
Now that the CSI provisions in EU trade agreements have been meticulously
mapped and their variation thoroughly analysed, the stage is set for further research
on the explanations for this large variation. These could relate, for example, to
institutional EU path dependency, leading to an incremental CSI ambition; trade
power asymmetries, where the strongest partner can impose its will; the level of
sustainable development in the trade partners, where the trade partner with the
lowest level of sustainable development strives for a low level of CSI; EU compe-
titiveness interests, where the EU aims to reduce or eliminate the trade partners’
comparative advantages by increasing their sustainable development standards;
existing civil society participation, where high civil society participation in the
trade partners is reflected in high CSI in the trade agreement; and finally the trade
partners’ negotiation skills and capacity. This knowledge would lead to a better
understanding of the conducive and hindering conditions for CSI, which will be
relevant even beyond the scope of CSI in EU trade agreements.
In addition to the explanations for CSI variation, our findings invite further
research on the implications for the implementation of the CSI provisions. While
we could show that CSI varies considerably between EU agreements, there is still
uncertainty to what extent higher CSI in agreements also leads to higher CSI in
practice. To be sure, the more precise the requirements are in a trade agreement,
the more legal inducement exists to actually involve civil society actors. To
illustrate, due to a lack of specific requirements, the transnational mechanism of
the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), the so-called
Consultative Committee, was only inaugurated six years after the EPA had been
signed.31 Moreover, a recent study on Peru’s compliance with the sustainable
development chapter of the EU-Peru-Colombia agreement indicated how on
eight different criteria the low level of commitment in the treaty had already had
28 Postnikov & Bastiaens, supra n. 5.
29 T. Kay, NAFTA and the Politics of Labor Transnationalism (Cambridge University Press 2011).
30 M. Oehri, US and EU Labor Governance in the Dominican Republic: Contrasting the DR-CAFTA and the
CARIFORUM-EPA De Jure and De Facto, 89 Bull. Comp. Lab. Rel. (2015).
31 Oehri, supra n. 5 and n. 30.
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consequences in policy practice, including the domestic mechanisms’ little or no
independence and the use of existing but not effectively functioning advisory
groups.32 And yet, while relevant articles in EU trade agreements set a starting
point for CSI, procedural guidelines on the actual functioning of CSI mechanisms
are normally agreed upon during the inauguration of these mechanisms.
Accordingly, further research should look into the actual functioning and effec-
tiveness of CSI in EU trade agreements.
ANNEX: CODEBOOK CIVIL SOCIETY INVOLVEMENT INDEX
A. Independence participants:
i. Term:
stakeholder: 0
civil society mentioned once: 1
civil society mentioned more than once: 2
ii. Independence mentioned:
not mentioned: 0
mentioned: 1
iii. Selection domestic mechanism:
explicit mention of domestic procedures: 0
no mention of domestic procedures: 1
B. Scope membership:
i. specificity domestic mechanism:
labour, environment, sustainable development: 0
other groups (e.g. workers’ organizations) explicitly mentioned: 1
separate domestic mechanisms for labour & environmental issues: 2
ii. Novelty:
new or existing: 0
new or existing with comment to reinforce existing groups: 1
new: 2
iii. Transnational:
public at large: 0
list relevant organizations: 1
include members domestic mechanism, open: 2
include members domestic mechanism, closed: 3
32 J. Orbie & L. Van den Putte, Labour Rights in Peru and the EU Ttrade Agreement: Compliance with the
Commitments Under the Sustainable Development Chapter, ÖFSE Working Paper Series (Austrian
Foundation for Development Research 2016).
60 EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW
include domestic mechanism as a whole, open: 4
iv. Presence state actor:
yes: 0
not mentioned: 1
C. Operation transnational meeting:
i. Deadline for Parties
no: 0
yes: 1
ii. Reoccurrence:
‘as necessary’: 0
once a year, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties: 1
iii. Independence from the intergovernmental body for organization:
no: 0
yes: 1
D. Interaction:
i. Among domestic and transnational mechanisms:
no communication: 0
one way communication (domestic to transnational or vice versa): 1
ii. Civil society mechanisms and governmental actors:
a. Domestic mechanism & Parties
b. Domestic mechanism & own government
c. Transnational & governmental actors (Parties/intergovernmental
body)
d. Domestic mechanism as intermediate for transnational
no communication: 0
one-way communication (X to Y or Y to X) can/may: 1
one-way communication (X to Y or Y to X) shall/will: 2
exchange of views or conduct a dialogue: 3
two-way communication (X <-> Y) can/may: 4
two-way communication (X <-> Y) shall/will: 5
follow-up: X reacts to communication Y: shall/will: 6
E. Dispute Settlement mechanism:
i. Domestic mechanism communication basis for initiating Government
Consultations
no: 0
may/can: 1
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ii. Government consultation/Committee asks advice from domestic
mechanism (during proceedings):
no: 0
may/can: 1
will/shall/should: 2
own initiative DAG: 3
iii. Panel of Experts asks advice from domestic mechanism (during
proceedings):
no: 0
may/can: 1
will/shall/should: 2
iv. Panel of Experts informs domestic mechanism about outcome:
no: 0
may/can: 1
will/shall/should: 2
v. Parties inform domestic mechanism about implementation Panel of
Experts’ report :
no: 0
responding Party shall inform: 1
responding and requesting Party shall inform: 2
vi. Civil society mechanisms involvement in monitoring of implementa-
tion Panel of Experts’ report:
no: 0
stakeholders may submit observations: 1
domestic mechanism may submit observations: 2
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Despite an overall trend towards more civil society involvement (CSI) in trade agreements 
signed by the European Union (EU), the extent to which civil society actors can engage in the 
context of the chapter on trade and sustainable development varies significantly. The CSI Index, 
analysing 10 EU trade agreements with 16 countries, reveals high (Canada, South Korea), 
medium (Georgia, Moldova, Vietnam, Ukraine), and low (Central America, Singapore, Peru-
Colombia, Ecuador) degrees of CSI. This paper aims to explain this surprising and remarkable 
variation. Based on qualitative-interpretative assessments and drawing on interview data, 
primary documents, and secondary literature, we examine five plausible explanations. While 
none of these can fully and exclusively account for CSI variation, the ‘third country domestic 
resonance’ explanation, considering the degree of civil society participation in domestic policy 
making, turns out to be most powerful. In addition, we found evidence of learning experiences 
drawn by the EU over time. 
 
Keywords: EU, trade agreements, civil society, sustainable development, labour rights 
 
Introduction 
Involvement of civil society in global governance has been growing over the last decades (Hall, 
et al., 2014, Scholte, 2004). International institutions increasingly allow “participation of 
different sets of actors” (Raustiala and Victor, 2004), including NGOs, corporations, and 
foundations (Alter and Meunier, 2009; Tallberg et al., 2014). However, the degrees of access 
and potential influence of non-state actors varies throughout different institutions. Only 
recently, and partly with a view to specific policy fields, have scholars started to offer 
explanations for this variation (e.g., Betsill and Corell, 2001; Tallberg et al., 2014).  
The trend of increased openness in a variety of formats is also found in the European Union 
(EU). Since the White Paper on European Governance (2001), the EU has strongly emphasized 
                                                          
1 Current affiliation: Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein to the United Nations in New York, 
USA 
2 Current affiliation: Flemish Department of Foreign Affairs 
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the role of civil society in various policy fields. This also includes EU trade policy, an area that 
has witnessed heavy contestation with the ‘battle of Seattle’ against the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in 1999, the STOP EPA campaign in the 2000s, and most notably the 
recent protest against the EU trade agreements with Canada and the US. In response to concerns 
about the implications of its trade policy on, firstly, democracy, and secondly, sustainable 
development, the ‘new generation’ of EU trade agreements has included a separate chapter on 
‘trade and sustainable development’. These ‘TSD chapters’ create mechanisms for civil society 
organisations to discuss and monitor the parties’ commitments to sustainable development in 
the context of the trade agreement. These new mechanisms, that were first introduced in the 
EU-Korea trade agreement in 2010, typically contain two elements. First, a domestic civil 
society mechanism, often called domestic advisory groups, in which representatives of three 
constituencies (labour, environment and business) within the EU and its trading partner(s) 
participate. Second, a transnational mechanism where civil society of both parties meet together  
(Orbie et al., 2016). 
While EU policymakers clearly promote these mechanisms as important instruments to make 
trade policy more fair and legitimate (European Commission, 2015; European Parliament, 
2009, 2017), academic research on the topic is still at an early stage. Most scholars have focused 
on human rights and labour provisions in TSD chapters (Bartels, 2013; Campling et al., 2015), 
often contrasting the EU’s approach with that of other key trade players such as the US (Ebert 
and Posthuma, 2011; Horn et al., 2010; International Institute for Labour Studies, 2015; Oehri, 
2015a, 2015b; Leeg, 2018). There are only a few studies that (partly) consider the civil society 
meetings (Altintzis, 2013; Harrison et al., 2018; ILO, 2016; Orbie et al., 2016; Postnikov and 
Bastiaens, 2014; Van den Putte, 2015). However, these studies typically lump all the TSD 
chapters and the civil society provisions of the ‘new generation’ trade agreements together, 
without paying attention to differences between the agreements. Indeed, there is an implicit or 
explicit assumption that the same templates on civil society involvement come back in all 
agreements. Studies have also shown that the EU tends to use templates or ‘one size fits all’ 
approaches in its foreign relations (Bicchi, 2006; Börzel and Risse, 2004) including trade policy 
(Araujo, 2016; Hoffmeister, 2013; Jurje and Lavenex, 2014). 
In the case of CSI, although the EU uses the same ‘template’ of domestic and transnational 
mechanisms, there is surprising variation in how exactly these are defined and organised. While 
this variation has been mapped in our previous research that developed an innovative CSI Index 
(Martens et al., 2018), we do not yet understand why CSI diverges so significantly across the 
different EU trade agreements. Explanations for this variation require careful scrutiny for at 
least two reasons. First, the formulation of civil society mechanisms in the treaties is a very 
political matter, not least because it touches on labour and human rights, environmental and 
democratic governance issues that are sensitive within domestic politics. Second, how civil 
society mechanisms are formulated in the text largely affects their actual working in practice. 
As was shown in different reports on Peruvian non-compliance with several sustainable 
development commitments and its failure to consult with civil society appropriately (EPRS, 
2018; Orbie et al., 2017; Plataforma Europa Perú, 2017), the legal wording of the provisions 
has important consequences on the obligations of the parties and how the EU can enforce them 
(see Malmström, 2018). 
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The purpose of this paper is therefore to explain the significant variation of CSI degrees across 
EU trade agreements. We will elaborate five plausible explanations that are prevalent in the 
literature and policy debates and validate them by looking into the most appropriate data for the 
estimated explanation. Since the number of agreements is relatively small, explanations are 
inevitably complex and literature is almost non-existing, quantitative or standardised 
approaches are not entirely appropriate to conduct this research. Nonetheless, we aim to go 
beyond a purely interpretive, single case study method and produce insights that are to some 
extent generalizable. Therefore, we engaged in a more pragmatic approach whereby the five 
explanations were operationalized by calibrating different data sources into four scores which 
allowed for a systematic and comparative analysis. 
There is a growing amount of comparative studies on the design of trade agreements (see Dür 
and Elsig, 2015). Whereas the comprehensive Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database 
does not mention civil society involvement as a separate category, Raess and Sari (2018) 
included institutions overseeing the labour-related commitments and the involvement of third 
parties in their dataset. Accordingly, this paper wants to contribute to a better understanding of 
the dynamics behind the legal design of agreements. In more theoretical terms, it also 
contributes to global governance literature on civil society access and influence (Hall et al, 
2014; Keohane et al., 2000). 
This article is organised as follows. The next section discusses differences between the civil 
society provisions in EU trade agreements. Subsequently, we present five explanations for this 
variation, followed by their operationalisation. This allows us to evaluate the accuracy of each 
explanation in the next section. In the discussion and concluding sections, we highlight this 
study’s findings and the implications it has for politics and research.  
 
Varying civil society involvement 
Variation in the extent to which civil society appears in the TSD chapters has been overlooked 
by existing literature and policy debates. This section discusses this variation, thereby 
synthesizing earlier research (Martens et al., 2018) and laying the groundwork for the following 
sections. Through the comparative mapping of all the relevant EU trade agreements, we 
constructed a CSI Index that features five clusters. The first cluster, the independence of 
participants, concerns the extent to which participants in these civil society mechanisms are 
truly independent from the Parties. The second cluster, the scope of membership, reflects among 
others whether the agreement specifically sets out which groups can participate in the 
mechanisms and whether state actors can be present. The third cluster, the operation of the 
transnational mechanism, deals with the conditions under which the transnational mechanism 
is organised. The fourth cluster concerns interaction, both among the civil society mechanisms 
as well as between them and the Parties. The fifth and final cluster reflects CSI in the settlement 
of disputes between the Parties concerning the implementation of the TSD chapter.  
Applying this CSI Index to 10 EU trade agreements allows us to distinguish three levels of CSI: 
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high, medium and low CSI scores (see Table 1). First, the EU-Canada and EU-Korea 
agreements belong to the group with the highest score. This can mainly be attributed to their 
emphasis on participants’ independence, membership scope, and most of all dispute settlement. 
These are the only two agreements requesting the establishment of specific and new 
mechanisms to deal with the monitoring of sustainable development commitments. What 
particularly characterizes these agreements is also that the domestic civil society mechanisms 
play an important role in the dispute settlement mechanism that applies in the case of violation 
of the sustainable development principles.  
Second, the EU-Georgia, EU-Moldova, EU-Vietnam, and EU-Ukraine agreements constitute 
the medium group. The EU-Georgia, EU-Moldova and EU-Vietnam agreement all score 
relatively high when it comes to the interaction of the mechanisms with the Parties and the 
involvement in dispute settlement. The EU-Ukraine agreement, while having a similar total 
score on all five clusters, is different from the other agreements in this category. Most 
importantly, it has a more ambitious transnational meeting, the interaction between civil society 
mechanisms is stronger, and it scores lower on involvement in the dispute settlement 
mechanisms. 
Third, the EU-Central America, EU-Singapore, EU-Peru-Colombia, and EU-Ecuador 
agreements constitute the group with very low scores on, among others, the scope of 
membership, the operation of the transnational meeting, and involvement in the dispute 
settlement mechanism. For example, unlike all other agreements investigated, the EU-
Singapore and EU-Central America agreements do not foresee a deadline by when the Parties 
should agree on the operation of the transnational meeting. While the EU-Singapore agreement 
contains some, albeit weak, references to CSI in the dispute settlement mechanism, the EU-
Central America, the EU-Colombia-Peru and the EU-Ecuador agreements do not refer at all to 
civil society in this regard.  
Theorizing variation: five explanations  
Drawing on relevant theories of international relations and EU studies, secondary literature 
expert interviews with EU officials, and discussions with academic peers, we elaborate on the 
five most plausible explanations for the level of CSI in EU trade agreements. They include EU 
experience, EU protectionism, and EU norms, EU-third country trade power, and third country 
resonance. While sustainable development has various dimensions, we focus mainly on labour-
related variables, as labour rights concerns were the original reason to include TSD chapters 
and labour issues have also been the most contested parts of the chapters. 
EU experience: The first explanation derives from new-institutionalism which highlights 
institutional frameworks. When reflecting on the political integration of the EU social and 
labour market policy since the mid-1980s, Jensen (2000) introduced the idea of 
legalistic/institutional forms of spillover, meaning that the relevant treaties in the field have 
been revised based on specific goals of previous treaties. A similar picture emerges as far as 
labour rights provisions in EU trade agreements are concerned: they have evolved over the 
years and feature distinctive generations (Bossuyt, 2009, p. 703; ILO, 2016, pp. 39-41; Van den 
Putte et al., 2013, p. 47). The EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
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(negotiated 2002-2007) is the first agreement to include a mechanism for transnational dialogue 
with civil society actors. Previous EU agreements signed with Mexico in 1997, South Africa in 
1999, and Chile in 2002 did not contain such mechanisms. However, the CSI mechanism in the 
EU-CARIFORUM EPA is different from the ‘new generation’ trade agreements as it covers 
the agreement as a whole (not specifically trade and sustainable development) and there is no 
domestic component (only transnational). The subsequent EU-Korea trade agreement 
(negotiated 2007-2009) pioneers a template in which the TSD chapter explicitly refers to CSI 
mechanisms at both the domestic and transnational level. This extension from the 
CARIFORUM EPA to the new generation agreements may be seen as a legalistic and 
institutional spillover as theorised by Jensen (2000). According to the same logic it may be 
expected that every subsequent agreement would become more ambitious in involving civil 
society. Indeed, this was also suggested by an EU negotiator who emphasised that the European 
Commission is constantly reviewing the negotiation processes to see how they can improve. 
Therefore the negotiation text they table has become much more detailed (interview, DG Trade, 
4 August 2016). With trade policy becoming increasingly contested (Siles-Brügge, 2014; 
Young, 2017), and at the same time more and more integrated in the EU’s external action since 
the Lisbon treaty (2009), expectations for more political provisions such as CSI have increased. 
As the EU undergoes a learning process both with regard to negotiation and implementation, it 
can thus be expected that civil society provisions in EU trade agreements have become 
incrementally more ambitious over time. 
EXPL 1: The more recently a partner country has concluded a trade agreement with the 
EU, the higher CSI is in an EU trade agreement with that country.  
 
EU protectionism: In light of a mercantilist perspective, linking trade with labour provisions 
can be motivated by a rational actors’ desire to maximise material benefits (Bhagwati, 2002). 
A social clause at multilateral level has been specifically opposed by developing countries, 
which feared “Western protectionism” (Vandenberghe, 2008, p. 563) and the potential 
elimination of their competitive advantages due to stricter labour rights. Lechner (2016) found 
that non-trade issues, such as labour and environmental provisions, become more important in 
trade agreements when protectionist concerns trump pressure for trade liberalisation. In the US 
the perils of a “race to the bottom” of working conditions is said having influenced the way the 
US included labour standards in its trade policy instruments (Gonzalez-Garibay, 2009, pp. 767-
768). Also the EU is not spared from such assumptions. Several EU trade partners perceive the 
EU’s trade-labour linkage as protectionist (e.g., ibid., p. 783; Vandenberghe, 2008, p. 563). The 
involvement of CSI in EU trade agreements, which aims at facilitating the protection of labour 
standards, could accordingly be seen as an instrument of protectionism as it increases labour 
standards abroad and thus defends the EU labour market.  
EXPL 2: The more protectionist interests the EU has towards a partner country, the 
higher CSI is in an EU trade agreement with that country. 
 
EU norms: The EU trade-labour nexus is not merely conceived of as a strategy of material 
incentives, it has also been read from a normative perspective (e.g., Behrens and Janusch, 2012; 
Manners, 2009). This perspective assumes that the EU functions as an advocate of human and 
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labour rights as it is concerned about the protection of workers in other countries. In the absence 
of a strong foreign policy apparatus, the EU will use external relations instruments such as trade 
agreements to pursue these normative goals. The underlying logic is that for a number of 
reasons the EU is predisposed to act normatively, diffusing European norms such as democracy, 
human rights, social solidarity, sustainable development, anti-discrimination and good 
governance (Manners, 2002, pp. 242-243), all of which relate closely to labour rights and the 
associated civil society meetings (Orbie, 2011, pp. 162-165). As noted by Manners, the long-
term institutionalisation of opportunities for dialogue through the agreements’ civil society 
mechanisms is perhaps more important than the short-term success or failure of EU promotion 
of labour rights (Manners, 2009, p. 801). When labour rights are seriously violated in third 
countries, it becomes all the more necessary to include stronger social conditionality and the 
concomitant civil society monitoring mechanisms in EU trade agreements with these countries. 
According to this explanation, the partner states’ labour rights behaviours will affect the extent 
of CSI in trade agreements with the EU. 
EXPL 3: The more EU (labour related) norms are disrespected in a partner country, 
the higher CSI is in an EU trade agreement with that country. 
 
EU-third country trade power relation: (Neoclassical) realist considerations need to be taken 
into account when aiming to explain EU foreign policy making in general (Pollack, 2012, pp. 
8-9; Rynning, 2005; Toje and Kunz, 2012) and EU trade policy outcomes in particular (Garcia, 
2013, p. 523; Ross Smith, 2015). In light of this perspective, power relations plays a critical 
role when convincing other states to accept principles they would not accept otherwise (see 
Börzel and Risse, 2012, p. 13). The EU’s “trade power” (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2006) and 
“market power” (Damro, 2012) are considered important sources of EU influence in external 
rule promotion. When power asymmetries are in its favour, the EU can impose its models upon 
third countries, by using agreements among other instruments (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 
2009, p. 803). Departing from the EU’s self-declared objective to promote a high level of CSI 
through trade agreements (European Commission, 2015, pp. 18-19), the corresponding 
explanation reads as follows: 
EXPL 4: The more dependent a partner country is on trade with the EU, the higher CSI 
is in an EU trade agreement with that country. 
 
Third country resonance: Inversely, the agreement may reflect the preferences of third 
countries. Since a greater role for civil society directly relates to democracy and human rights, 
this is often considered extremely sensitive for the EU’s negotiation partners (interview, Costa 
Rican official, 22 June 2015; Honduran official, 10 May 2016; DG Trade, 4 August 2016). 
Therefore, we also consider third countries’ domestic political structures when explaining CSI 
in EU trade agreements. This is relevant as EU external rule promotion can be shaped by the 
compatibility with the institutional structures of third countries’ domestic politics (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 804). Regarding the system of government, “the more authoritarian 
a regime is, the less likely the EU is to influence domestic institutional change” (Börzel and 
Risse, 2009, p. 12). This applies particularly to EU demands for domestic reforms including 
human rights and democracy (ibid.). Raess et al. (2018) also point to the importance of domestic 
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factors as they found that strong trade unions in democracies lead to more far-reaching labour 
provisions than in authoritarian regimes as governments are less accountable in the latter. 
Accordingly, the democratic quality of a third country is likely to influence the extent of CSI 
in EU trade agreements as this is a way to further increase democratic practices and to allow 
civil society actors to have a voice in trade-related issues (see also Dür and De Bièvre, 2007). 
The domestic resonance explanation, deriving from an institutionalist perspective, is the 
following: 
EXPL 5: The more a partner country’s domestic system is democratic, the higher CSI 
is in an EU trade agreement with that country. 
 
Operationalisation 
In order to assess their explanatory value, we further operationalize each explanation. We 
developed a score for each explanation and for every agreement that reflects to what extent a 
higher CSI can be expected. These scores are based on a number of data sources that were 
chosen based on three criteria: they provide recent and up to date information, they are of high 
quality and do not display inconsequent fluctuations, and they are available for all the countries 
thereby allowing for comparative analysis.  
To evaluate the accuracy of EXPL 1 on EU experience, we determine the month and the year 
in which the negotiations of a trade agreement between the EU and a partner country were 
concluded. The conclusion date is the most relevant one because we know from published 
negotiating texts and interviews that the TSD chapter is typically negotiated at the very end of 
the process (interview, DG Trade, 4 August 2016).  
We measure EXPL 2 on EU protectionism by the labour costs of the EU trade partner.  It is 
assessed by the third country’s minimum wage as this constitutes a primary determinant for 
labour costs.3 The data are derived from the Doing Business Report of the World Bank (2016) 
that measures regulatory quality and eﬃciency of 189 economies.4 As labour costs constitute 
one of several other determinants of competitiveness, for a robustness check, we take into 
account the Global Competitiveness Report by the World Economic Forum (2016) which is the 
most comprehensive assessment of national competitiveness of 140 economies worldwide.5 
The overall global competitiveness scores produced in this report are in line with the minimum 
wage scores of the Doing Business Report. 
For EXPL 3 on EU norms we measure the degree of a third country’s domestic labour rights 
behaviour based on its overall record of freedom of association and collective bargaining 
(FACB). FACB are core values of the ILO and as such they are enshrined in the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998), among other key 
documents. The protection or violation of these process rights generally facilitate or restrict the 
                                                          
3. See also http://www.ilo.org/ilostat-files/Documents/description_EAR_EN.pdf  
4. See also http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-
Reports/English/DB16-Chapters/DB16-Mini-Book.pdf (accessed July 2016). 
5. See also http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/ (accessed July 2016). 
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promotion of social dialogue and worker rights overall.6 We rely on the comprehensive FACB 
Indicators provided by Sari and Kucera (2016) for the year 2015, which classifies the countries 
according to a scale from 1 (least labour rights violations) to 10 (most labour right violations).7 
We assess EXPL 4 on EU-third country trade power relation with the variable of asymmetric 
trade interdependence as it indicates the power dynamics in the relationship between the EU 
and a partner country. We generate this data by the EU’s and the partner country’s mutual 
exports and imports in total goods based on the trade statistics of 2015, available on the websites 
of the European Commission. As trade power cannot be seen independently from political 
power (Galtung, 1972, p. 29, pp. 55-56), we conduct a robustness check by linking the political 
influence the EU enjoys over a trade partner to the degree of CSI in their trade agreement. In 
this regard, we measure the sphere of influence the EU has over third countries in line with four 
intensities of institutional association (see also Lavenex, 2004): neighbourhood policy, 
development cooperation, transnational cooperation, and weak bilateral relationship. 
We determine the accuracy of EXPL 5 on third country resonance by the degree to which civil 
society actors can participate in domestic policy making of the EU’s trade partner. Thus, we 
measure not so much the quantity or quality of civil society, but rather its effective participation. 
Not only does civil society participation constitute an essential component of democracy, it also 
approximates best domestic resonance. We rely on the Transformation Index of the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung (2016) which measures, among other aspects of democracy, the extent to 
which the political leadership enable the participation of civil society in the political process. It 
draws on a scale from 1 (lowest civil society participation) to 10 (highest civil society 
participation).8 
Subsequently, the data were calibrated into four categories ranging from low (one cross) to high 
(four crosses) expected CSI. This calibration of the scores into four sets draws on case and 
context knowledge of the authors as well as their qualitative-interpretative assessments (e.g. 
Basurto and Speer, 2012, p. 165; Ragin, 2008). Table 1 summarises the calibrated scores of the 
different indicators. According to the respective explanation, more crosses would indicate 
higher CSI. Building on this analysis, the next section evaluates the relevance of each 
explanation. 
                                                          
6. See also ILO at http://ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-
standards/freedom-of-association/lang--en/index.htm (accessed April 2017). 
7. See also http://labour-rights-indicators.la.psu.edu/about (accessed July 2016). 
8. See also https://www.bti-project.org/de/4579/materialien/bti-2016/  (accessed July 2016). 
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Table 1. Calibrated scores of the explanations per trade partner (more x = higher expected civil society involvement) 
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Discussion 
Building on the previous sections, we aim to assess which explanation(s) can account for the 
difference between high, medium, and low CSI countries, as well as more subtle differences 
between clusters of CSI.  
First, the EU experience explanation does not hold as far as the overall CSI is concerned. We 
have no strong evidence that CSI would have gradually expanded since the EU-Korea 
agreement. On the contrary, the agreement with Korea, which is the first one of the ‘new 
generation’ and often considered as the ‘gold standard’ or ‘blueprint’ for subsequent agreements 
(Hoffmeister, 2013), has one of the highest CSI scores. With the exception of the EU-Canada 
agreement, all agreements negotiated since Korea scored lower on the CSI Index. Also recent 
agreements deviate (significantly) from the EU-Korea agreement CSI score, such as the low-
scoring EU-Singapore (signed in 2014) and the medium-scoring EU-Vietnam (signed in 2015) 
agreements.  
And yet, there are signs of a learning process when looking more closely at the clusters. We 
note subtle evolutions over the past decade. Notably, more emphasis is put on the interaction 
between civil society and the Parties. Whereas the EU-Korea trade agreement scores extremely 
low on this cluster, subsequent agreements are (much) more far-reaching. For example, the EU-
Korea agreement did not foresee any interaction between the civil society mechanisms and the 
Parties. This was rectified through the rules of procedure of the intergovernmental body 
overseeing the implementation of the TSD chapter. The omission of this provision was thus 
corrected and this practice has been included in the subsequent agreements. In addition, the 
language of the provisions, evolving from ‘can’ to ‘shall’, has become increasingly obligatory. 
That all subsequent agreements score higher than the EU-Peru-Colombia agreement may also 
be attributed to a learning experience. The implications of the weak provisions on civil society 
have become clear in practice, for instance that the Ministry of Labour of Peru can attend and 
even chair the domestic meetings, and that the EU institutions should not be informed about the 
agenda and meetings of the domestic Peruvian and Colombian mechanisms (Orbie and Van den 
Putte, 2017, pp. 13-14). EU officials acknowledge that it was a mistake to omit the word 
‘independent’ and to be so lenient on the composition of the domestic group in the Peru-
Colombia agreement, issues that have been corrected in subsequent agreements (interview, DG 
Trade, 4 August 2016). 
According to the same interviewees, a learning effect has also taken place in relation to 
Vietnam. Although Vietnam does not have the highest CSI, it has indeed a surprisingly high 
value taken into account the very limited participation of civil society in the domestic political 
system. Officials closely involved suggest that the negotiations on the EU-Vietnam agreement 
(started in June 2012) took place at a time when the initial experiences with the civil society 
meetings under the EU-Korea, EU-Peru-Colombia, and EU-Central America agreements could 
be evaluated (first transnational meetings respectively in June 2012, February 2014 and in 
November 2014). 
Second, the EU protectionist explanation seems difficult to be confirmed with regard to the 
overall CSI classifications. There are no strong indications that the EU would be more 
demanding towards countries with low minimum wages that enjoy competitive advantages 
towards the EU. Despite exhibiting (very) low minimum wages, the EU agreements with 
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Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Vietnam score only intermediate. Similarly, the trade 
agreements with the Andean and Central American countries, situated in the midsection of the 
minimum wage range, score low on the CSI Index. Moreover, the two highest CSI scoring 
countries (Canada and Korea) have (relatively) high minimum wages. The only case being in 
line with the EU protectionist explanation is Singapore, a country with a comparatively high 
minimum wage featuring one of the lowest CSI scores.  
The clusters show the same tendency as the overall CSI scores. The only exception is the cluster 
on interaction among civil society and governments. Here, when excluding Canada from the 
analysis, we see an upward trend starting with less ambitious CSI provisions concerning 
interaction in the agreements with countries with higher minimum wages to more ambitious 
provisions in the agreements with countries showing lower minimum wages. This evolution 
could indicate that the EU pushes for more interaction in more competitive countries, however 
further research would be necessary to confirm this claim. Overall, there is no consistent pattern 
supporting the EU protectionist explanation. These findings confirm existing research that 
concluded that the EU’s social trade agenda has not been motivated by economic interests 
(Burgoon, 2009). 
Third, one might find a justification for the EU norms explanation that CSI will be higher if 
workers’ rights are more severely violated in the agreements with Korea (problematic labour 
rights, high CSI) and Singapore (less problematic labour rights, low CSI). However, it would 
be hard to maintain that the rest of the data display a clear pattern confirming this third 
explanation. In fact, the extent to which the fundamental labour rights of FACB have been 
respected cannot account for the CSI variation across the agreements. While workers’ rights 
are severely disrespected in Vietnam, the agreement belongs to the medium CSI category. 
Similarly, while there are clear concerns about labour rights in Guatemala, Colombia, and 
Panama, the same countries belong to the low CSI category. Canada, where these rights are 
clearly more respected, scores the highest on CSI. In parallel to the analysis of the overall 
scores, the results of the clusters are dispersed and no clear patterns appear in the clusters.  
Interestingly however, in the clusters ‘scope membership’ and ‘dispute settlement mechanism’ 
both extremes (trade partners disrespecting the most and the least FACB rights) score high. 
This indicates on the one hand that the domestic context of the country might be influential, in 
this case especially for countries adhering to the norms advanced by the EU (see infra domestic 
resonance). On the other hand, these cluster results suggest that the EU considers these aspects 
as particularly important when negotiating with countries severely disrespecting FACB rights, 
in this case Korea and Vietnam. As such, the latter confirms the EU norms explanation.  
Fourth, the EU-third country trade power explanation can also be clearly dismissed with regard 
to the overall CSI degrees. Due to the most asymmetrical trade balance, the EU has the most 
trading power towards the Central American countries. However, the CSI score of the trade 
agreement between both regions is in the lowest category. On the other hand, those countries 
towards which the EU is less powerful (Canada and Korea) belong to the highest CSI category. 
Moreover, two countries that score relatively high on asymmetrical interdependence (Ukraine 
and Vietnam) still belong to the medium group of CSI. Similarly, the results of the clusters are 
very dispersed and do not show any patterns indicating the relevance of trade power in the level 
of CSI. Thus, the data go against the expectation that a higher asymmetrical trade 
interdependence would involve a higher CSI.  
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This finding was confirmed by the robustness check assessing the link with the political power 
of the EU in relation to its trade partner. Indeed, EU-third country political power hardly affects 
the degree of CSI in trade agreements. For instance, three countries (Georgia, Moldova, and 
Ukraine) have an aspiration to become EU member states and are therefore more obedient to 
EU influence. However they only belong to the medium category of CSI in EU FTAs. In 
contrast, although Canada is a transnational cooperation partner to the EU and thereby not 
submissive to the EU, it scores high with regard to the CSI Index. These findings on the limited 
effect of trade and political interdependence corroborate extant literature on labour-related 
mechanisms in EU (and US) agreements more generally (Oehri, 2015a). The only exception 
that confirms the trade and political power explanation is the EU-Vietnam agreement. It scores 
medium on the CSI Index and the EU-Vietnam relationship features asymmetrical dependency. 
The EU is an important development cooperation donor in Vietnam which also increases the 
EU’s trade negotiation power. Within the European Commission, it was suggested that Vietnam 
would not have agreed with a relatively ambitious TSD chapter if this would not be 
compensated with substantial aid (interview, DG Trade, 4 August 2016).  
Fifth, the explanatory power of the third countries’ domestic resonance explanation seems 
much stronger as far as the overall CSI degrees are concerned. Our data do indeed suggest that 
the higher civil society participation is in a third country, the higher CSI will be in an EU trade 
agreement with that country. Most countries that score (very) low on civil society participation, 
such as Panama, Guatemala, Singapore, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Nicaragua, equally 
belong to the low CSI category. Several countries that score (very) high on civil society 
participation, equally score high (Canada) or medium (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia) on the CSI 
Index. The results are somewhat distorted by the considerable variation within the Central 
American group on civil society participation (where Costa Rica and El Salvador score quite 
high). And yet, this could be explained by the fact that the EU-Central America trade agreement 
is a regional agreement and as such influenced by the low score on civil society participation 
of the majority of Central American states, reflecting a lowest common denominator. Overall, 
a tendency emerges from the data whereby countries that have high domestic civil society 
participation equally tend to agree on more far-reaching CSI provisions in a trade agreement 
with the EU.  
This pattern is confirmed when looking into the clusters individually. This is especially the case 
for the cluster on participants’ independence. The clusters dealing with the scope of the 
membership, the interaction and dispute settlement mechanism also confirm the domestic 
resonance explanation, however they reveal two special cases. The agreement with Korea 
shows a light deviation, as the CSI in the agreement is slightly higher than the civil society 
participation witnessed in the country. A second, and more apparent, deviation from this 
domestic resonance expectation is the EU-Vietnam trade agreement. Scoring extremely low on 
civil society participation, Vietnam nevertheless belongs to the intermediate CSI category. 
Several explanations for this remarkable finding can be advanced, such as the EU experience 
and EU-third country power relations, which have been elaborated above. Besides, a relatively 
high CSI score for the EU-Vietnam agreement is coherent with the EU’s broader normative and 
developmental policy goals towards Vietnam. In several documents the EU has identified the 
lack of independent civil society as a problematic issue to be addressed through aid programmes 
(European Commission, 2014; Hoang, 2015).  
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Conclusion 
This paper aimed to shed light on a new phenomenon in the most recent generation of EU trade 
agreements, namely civil society involvement in the context of sustainable development. We 
aimed to explain varying degrees of civil society involvement in 10 EU agreements by 
systematically analysing five plausible explanations (i.e. EU experience, EU protectionism, EU 
norms, EU-third country trade power relations, and third country resonance). We found that, 
while none of the explanations can fully and exclusively account for CSI variation, the third 
country domestic resonance explanation, which takes into account the degree of civil society 
participation in domestic policy making, turns out to be most powerful. In other words, the more 
civil society is already involved in the domestic political system of a partner country, the more 
ambitious civil society provisions in the EU trade agreement will be.  
Moreover, the more detailed study of the clusters showed that time also matters: first, an 
increase in civil society interaction with governmental actors can be observed, and second, civil 
society provisions in the recent agreement with Vietnam are more ambitious than would be 
expected from the domestic context because of learning from the implementation of existing 
agreements. These insights corroborate the EU experience explanation to some extent. In 
contrast, we could not find consistent patters supporting the protectionist, normative, and power 
based explanations.  
These findings resonate with literature calling for the examination of foreign policy from the 
perspective of the country to which the policy is targeted (Keuleers et al., 2016). They also 
contribute to broader literature on EU external democracy promotion that acknowledges 
internal democratic structures of partner countries to be influential in joint cooperation, both in 
the EU neighbourhood (Van Hüllen, 2012) and beyond (Simma et al., 1999). 
Even though we did not find relational patterns in combinations of the different explanations, 
further research into the way explanations can interact is all the more relevant as the EU is 
currently (re-)negotiating trade agreements with a variety of partner states, such as Chile, 
Mexico, MERCOSUR and Tunisia. Further research could analyse additional factors such as 
bargaining tactics during the negotiations, or the partner country’s involvement in other trade 
agreements that opens the door to civil society involvement (e.g. Vietnam’s TTP or Central 
America’s CAFTA-DR). Finally, future research should address the implementation of civil 
society provisions in EU trade agreements, focusing on varying CSI in practice.  
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ABSTRACT
This study critically reflects on the involvement of civil society 
actors in the sustainable development chapters of recent EU trade 
agreements. It discusses how civil society mechanisms may legitimise 
the underlying neoliberal orientation of the agreements through 
co-optation of critical actors. Starting from a critical perspective 
and drawing on evidence from innovative survey data, qualitative 
interviews and participatory observations, it concludes that, despite 
overall criticism, there is no clear evidence of co-optation. While 
being aware of the risks their participation entail, EU participants 
take a constructive position. Nevertheless, diverging perspectives 
between non-profit and business actors risk reinforcing existing 
power asymmetries.
Introduction
In response to growing concerns and contestation about the sustainable development impli-
cations of free trade agreements, the European Union (EU) has included a sustainable devel-
opment (SD) chapter in its recent trade agreements. This chapter typically creates 
institutionalised mechanisms for civil society participation. These civil society mechanisms 
aim to discuss and monitor the sustainable development dimension of the trade agreement. 
It has been argued that they constitute an original and distinctively European approach to 
promoting labour rights, environmental principles and economic development through 
trade. Each of the trading partners organises its own domestic mechanisms, which then 
meet annually in the transnational mechanism. The number of mechanisms is likely to 
increase dramatically in the coming years and decades, given the growing volume of trade 
agreements being concluded.
While very little is known about the functioning and relevance of these mechanisms, 
some criticism has already been voiced by civil society actors, academics, Members of the 
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC).1 Most call 
for institutional improvements, such as more efficient management, more representative 
composition of the participants, better feedback mechanisms with the governments and 
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budgetary support for travel and practical organisation. Some of these shortcomings have 
been (partly) acknowledged by EU officials.2
The above-mentioned shortcomings all have in common that they are compatible with 
the dominant neoliberal paradigm that free trade contributes to sustainable development 
and that civil society mechanisms ought to play a role in this process. Instead of these insti-
tutional shortcomings, and in line with the general objective of this collection, we aim in 
this article to explore a much-needed fundamental critique of how the civil society mecha-
nisms may contribute to legitimising the underlying free trade orientation of the agreement. 
In particular, with the deadlock of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round and the 
increasing importance of bilateral and regional trade agreements, it is important to critically 
reflect on the opportunities and limits of civil society mechanisms in (European) trade agree-
ments as well as on their potential incorporation into a neoliberal paradigm.3 This tension 
between resisting free trade agreements for their (alleged) adverse impact on sustainable 
development, on the one hand, and using the agreements’ mechanisms for the purpose of 
improving sustainable development or at least preventing harmful consequences, on the 
other, will be situated theoretically and illustrated empirically in this study.
Thus, our critical evaluation involves both a theoretical and an empirical dimension. 
Theoretically, we discuss how and why the involvement of civil society in international trade 
agreements may be problematical. Specifically, we point to the danger of co-optation, 
whereby critical voices are being silenced and induced to be more constructive. This entails 
the ‘insider-outsider dilemma’ for civil society organisations: should they reform the system 
‘from within’ by participating in the mechanisms established by the agreement, knowing 
that this may equally serve to legitimise the entire free trade agreement?
Empirically, we examine the experiences of the European members of the civil society 
mechanisms. Evidence comes from an innovative survey (conducted in August and 
September 2016) with EU business, labour, environmental and other representatives par-
ticipating in the civil society mechanisms established in the EU trade agreements.4 In addition 
to the survey, we draw on 15 qualitative interviews conducted in Brussels, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Honduras and Peru with civil society actors participating in civil society mechanisms, 
as well as participatory observation in the EU-Colombia-Peru and EU-Central America domes-
tic and transnational civil society meetings held in 2015 and 2016.
Whereas both the theoretical and the empirical parts focus on the civil society mecha-
nisms and how these may serve to legitimise the free trade agreements, they are embedded 
within a broader critical analysis of the trade-sustainable development nexus. As such, three 
critical questions recur in the theoretical and empirical parts: the impact of (EU) free trade 
agreements on sustainable development, the relevance of the sustainable development 
chapters in EU agreements and most importantly the role of the civil society mechanisms 
in this regard.
Our data reveal the insider-outsider dilemma that European civil society members, espe-
cially those from labour and other non-profit organisations, are facing through their involve-
ment in the mechanisms. While these organisations hold (very) critical views on the impact 
of (EU) free trade agreements on sustainable development, they also actively participate in 
the mechanisms and acknowledge the pitfalls of co-optation. The position of business rep-
resentatives is more straightforward: they hold more positive evaluations across the board, 
both on the benefits of free trade and the role of the civil society mechanisms (business 
representatives even recognise their potential to legitimise free trade).
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The article is structured as follows. First, we provide an overview of the mechanisms and 
their rationale. Second, we draw from several strands of the critical studies literature to situate 
the possibly problematic role of civil society mechanisms in EU trade agreements. Third, we 
address the same issue based on empirical findings from the survey and interviews. Finally, 
we formulate provisional conclusions and questions for further research.
Institutional criticisms
The establishment of civil society mechanisms in the context of EU trade agreements is a 
recent phenomenon. The first EU trade agreement to create a separate mechanism involving 
civil society was the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), which was 
concluded in 2008. This agreement includes commitments on labour and environmental 
standards and sets up a transnational civil society mechanism, known as the Consultative 
Committee. The new generation of EU trade agreements, launched by the ‘Global Europe’ 
strategy,5 of which the EU-Korea agreement was the first in 2011.6 Three changes were carried 
through in these new generation agreements: first, labour and environment provisions were 
grouped in a separate SD chapter; second, in addition to a transnational mechanism, each 
agreement establishes domestic civil society mechanisms; third, the legal provisions con-
cerning the set-up of these mechanisms are elaborated in more detail.
Even though there is some variation in the legal texts, the civil society mechanisms created 
in the new generation of EU trade agreements are characterised by three recurrent features. 
First, a domestic civil society mechanism is set up in which representatives of three constit-
uencies (labour, environment and business) of each Party (the EU and its trading partner(s)) 
participate. This is often called the Domestic Advisory Group (DAG). Second, a transnational 
civil society mechanism is created where the members of the domestic mechanisms and/
or other actors from both the EU and its trading partner(s) meet annually. Third, there is 
some interaction between these two mechanisms and the intergovernmental body (com-
prising officials of the EU and its trading partner(s)). This body meets annually to discuss the 
implementation of the SD chapter.
Currently, civil society mechanisms have been activated in the framework of the agree-
ments with Korea, Peru-Colombia, Central America, Moldova, Georgia and the CARIFORUM 
states.7 Although the mechanisms are a relatively new phenomenon, several aspects have 
already been criticised by a variety of actors. A first cluster of criticism concerns the organ-
isation of the mechanisms, which are viewed as too improvised.8 It has also been suggested 
that the domestic mechanisms should convene more frequently, for instance through vid-
eoconferencing, to ensure substantial progress and continuity.9 Another avenue recom-
mended to ensure continuity and better organisation is creating a coordinating mechanism 
such as a secretariat.10 Whereas the EESC fulfils this role for the EU DAGs, there is no equivalent 
body for the EU’s trade partners.11 This limited secretarial support reflects a general lack of 
budgetary resources for the organisation of the mechanisms.12
A second area of criticism concerns the composition of the mechanisms, and more spe-
cifically the selection procedures. Although there are no indications that the European 
Commission deliberately excludes critical voices, the selection procedures are not transpar-
ent. This is all the more so in the EU’s partner countries, where representatives are not always 
independent from the government, for example in Peru, Colombia and Honduras.13 
Furthermore, there is a lack of awareness of the existence and role of these mechanisms, 
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affecting the level of civil society participation.14 The lack of financial resources also has a 
significant impact on some civil society actors’ opportunities to attend meetings.15
A third criticism relates to the accountability of governments. It is often unclear whether 
and how governments follow up on the outcomes of these mechanisms. If participants feel 
that their views are not taken into account, this may lower their satisfaction and lead to 
‘consultation fatigue’, which risks undermining the efforts invested in the civil society mech-
anisms.16 Moreover, it is not always clear whether domestic mechanisms in third countries 
are operational and effective.17
All of these criticisms refer to flaws in the functioning of the mechanisms and concentrate 
on institutional improvements. As such, they do not fundamentally question the underlying 
assumptions that free trade contributes to sustainable development and that civil society 
mechanisms can be instrumental for this purpose. In the remainder of this article, we aim 
to go beyond institutional criticisms and critically analyse how the mechanisms may legiti-
mate free trade by reducing civil society opposition through co-optation. The next parts will 
attempt to address this question from a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
Critical reflections
In order to provide a more profound critique, this part will draw from several theoretical 
strands in academic literature and situate the potentially problematic role of civil society 
mechanisms within broader critiques of the free trade – sustainable development nexus.
Free trade and sustainable development
Even though there is no consensus on the impact of economic globalisation on sustainable 
development,18 there are concerns that free trade can have detrimental consequences for 
labour and environmental conditions. Liberalisation can lead to a race-to-the-bottom as 
countries and firms are tempted to engage in social dumping in order to increase their 
competitiveness.19 Likewise, it can create incentives for industry to produce in an ecologically 
unsustainable manner in order to reduce production costs.20
Moreover, a conventional preoccupation with liberalisation largely assesses immediate 
economic benefits of enhanced market access while neglecting longer-term costs such as 
reduced regulatory policy autonomy.21 In fact, several authors evaluate the prevailing global 
trade governance as ultra-restrictive on policy space and as having a negative impact, espe-
cially on developing countries.22 Bilateral free trade agreements, even more than the multi-
lateral WTO rules, may limit governments’ scope to adopt measures aimed at enhancing 
social policy or increasing environmental protection.23
Although EU leaders assume that free trade brings economic growth, which can reduce 
social injustice and environmental degradation and mitigate other crises,24 it is still unclear 
whether the EU is actually able to ‘square current neo-liberal trade policy with the preser-
vation of ecological and social diversity’.25 Such doubts are based on the observation that 
EU trade policy-making features unequal power relations in which corporate interests dom-
inate at the expense of social and environmental voices.26 Accordingly, EU free trade is at 
risk of fulfilling neoliberal demands while leaving sustainable development aspects behind. 
The EU’s free trade agenda has been particularly criticised in relation to the EPAs with the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific group of countries. Reviewing a number of studies on the 
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‘dangers of premature liberalisation’ and the limits to policy space as a result of these agree-
ments in West Africa, Langan and Price point out that the neoliberal trade agenda is also 
subscribed to by African elites.27 The EU’s neoliberal trade agenda has been further radicalised 
since the 2006 Global Europe trade strategy, which launched a range of bilateral free trade 
agreements with Asian and Latin American countries,28 and more recently the negotiations 
with Canada, Japan and the US. While earlier critiques concerned the impact of the EU’s free 
trade agreements within developing countries,29 the protests against the EU-US Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have sparked growing concerns about policy space 
for sustainable development objectives within the EU.30
In order to mitigate the potentially negative effects of trade agreements on sustainable 
development, the European Commission added a chapter on environment and social aspects 
in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA and has included a SD chapter in its bilateral trade agreements 
since the agreement with Korea (see supra). The growing discursive attention to sustainable 
development is also illustrated by the 2015 ‘Trade for all’ strategy. Here, it is emphasised that 
‘[t]he EU has been leading in integrating sustainable development objectives into trade policy 
and making trade an effective tool to promote sustainable development worldwide’.31
Nevertheless, it seems the SD chapters in EU trade agreements do not go far enough in 
ensuring that free trade does not hamper sustainable development, let alone contribute to 
it. To start, they have been criticised on the grounds that their purposes are too vague32 and 
for being designed in such a ‘soft’ way that they are, for example, not able to deal adequately 
with labour violations.33 The European Commission claims that this reflects its cooperative 
approach in dealing with labour and environmental issues. A DG Trade official formerly in 
charge of sustainable development argued that the EU’s goal is to deal with the root causes 
of violations of labour rights rather than with the symptoms, as the US does by having a 
binding dispute settlement system for labour violations.34 Furthermore, these provisions are 
designed in a conservative and flexible way: conservative because there are no specific 
requirements for modifications to domestic law, as long as core labour rights are not sys-
tematically violated and softening of domestic labour laws does not have an impact on trade 
and investment; and flexible because they leave ample discretion for the governments as 
regards implementation of the labour protection commitments at the domestic level and 
the functioning of the civil society mechanisms.35 This is in sharp contrast to economic con-
cessions, which are generally formulated in a much more binding and precise way.
From a more negative stance, one could even argue that the chapter is only included to 
ensure support for the free trade agreement, a practice that can be observed in other parts 
of the world. By way of illustration, during negotiations on the North American Agreement 
on Labor Cooperation, a side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) between the US, Canada and Mexico, in 1993, voices from labour expressing reser-
vations towards the NAFTA became more silent.36 Similarly, the North American Agreement 
on Environmental Cooperation, NAFTA’s other side agreement concluded in 1993, helped 
to mobilise support for the NAFTA from environmental groups.37 In the same vein, van 
Roozendaal38 argues that in the case of the EU-Korea agreement, the inclusion of labour 
standards could be regarded ‘as a symbolic act to increase the support for free trade agree-
ments without expectations that they would be effective’. This critical perspective might 
also hold true for other agreements concluded by the EU. Given the increasing contestation 
of EU trade policy and the growing power of the European Parliament in this area, the inclu-
sion of SD chapters has become all the more important in order to guarantee public and 
political support for trade agreements.
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Civil society participation
Adding a sustainable development dimension to EU trade agreements is not always enough 
to legitimise these intergovernmental accords. In fact, a political institution can be ques-
tioned per se by the broader public as political support for an institution is not predetermined 
but has to be granted. Allowing participatory practices can be a way of obtaining support 
for a system.39 At the same time, however, they entail risks for those participating.40 More 
precisely, participation can be either transitive or intransitive, moral, amoral, or immoral, free 
or forced and spontaneous or manipulative. In essence, whereas transitive forms of partic-
ipation are oriented towards a specific goal, intransitive forms are reduced to a partaking 
process without any predefined purpose. Moreover, participation can pursue ethically or 
unethically defined goals. Free participation, furthermore, can be distinguished from a form 
of participating in which people are asked or pushed into partaking in operations which are 
not of interest to them, purely for the sake of participation.41
This manifestation of participation can also be understood as ‘co-optation’, which, in the 
context of policy-making, describes a process where states aim to divert the goals or demands 
of civil society (groups) to serve different, less transformative agendas. It can, furthermore, 
characterise a process by which civil society (groups) are co-opted into working ‘from within’ 
and thus cooperate with state actors to pursue certain goals.42 Finally, in contrast to spon-
taneous participation, in manipulated forms of participation participants do not feel they 
are forced into doing something, but are led to actions which are inspired or directed by 
manifestations of power outside their control.43 This last dimension is in line with the 
Foucauldian notion of governmentality, which assumes a form of power which, while outside 
the sphere of formalised and centralised power structures, nevertheless enables control to 
be exerted over society.44 Accordingly, and even somewhat counter-intuitive to its rhetoric 
of empowerment, participation leaves room for fundamental criticism. In this regard, Cooke 
and Kothari45 speak of participation’s ‘tyrannical potential’, which is manifested in the ille-
gitimate or unjust use of power through inclusive practices.
In light of these potentially negative effects of participation, three kinds of reactions to 
invitations for participation can be distinguished: inside, outside and inside-outside 
responses. Whereas the first type describes a strategy to defend vested interests from within 
by critically participating in certain initiatives, the outside response is characterised by actors’ 
decision to ‘opt out’; this means engagement outside the forum in order to build alternatives. 
The inside-outside response can be described as an oscillation between the two positions, 
comprising simultaneous or sequential engagement from within and protest from the 
outside.46
Given these alternatives with their respective advantages and disadvantages, actors find 
themselves in a dilemma. This insider-outsider dilemma surrounding participatory practices 
is of particular relevance for civil society actors. From a Gramscian point of view, civil society 
can be seen as a sphere which either stabilises and reinforces or transforms governmental 
hegemony.47 As extant literature illustrates, the involvement of civil society can help to 
improve the democratic legitimacy of global governance in general48 and EU trade policy 
in particular.49 Accordingly, participation by civil society actors entails the same risks as 
outlined above. In the context of trade liberalisation, the peril of being co-opted might be 
particularly imminent for non-profit actors such as environmental, human and labour rights 
groups as they are, in contrast to business, traditionally more critical towards the neoliberal 
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agenda.50 Apart from that, it is more difficult for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
than for firms to defend their interests due to limited resources in terms of personnel and 
funding.51
The case of the WTO demonstrates a form of civil society participation which can be 
described as co-optation. In fact, the transformative potential of global civil society such as 
NGOs has been ‘taken in’ by the multilateral trade institution and its dynamics. In essence, 
civil society engagement against the WTO’s neoliberal agenda from within the WTO has not 
resulted in alternative discourses and perspectives in debates and deliberation. Instead, civil 
society actors have themselves adopted technocratic and neoliberal forms of advocacy over 
the years.52
Inhibiting the potential of civil society for purposes of a neoliberal nature might also be 
a strategy applied by the EU. With the inclusion of critical civil society actors in a trade instru-
ment, the democratic legitimacy of this instrument is likely to increase. Put differently, res-
ervations that civil society actors have towards EU trade agreements can be undermined by 
the possibility to participate in policy-making in the context of these agreements. Such an 
assertion is substantiated with regard to the new generation of EU trade agreements. The 
limited literature on this topic has indeed suggested that the civil society mechanisms are 
‘at risk of legitimising free trade deals’.53 Creating support for the trade agreement and assur-
ing its ratification has been referred to as the mechanisms’ ‘instrumental purpose’.54
Co-optation is further manifested in the limited power given to civil society groups in the 
context of EU trade policy. At the EU level, despite the access that was granted to NGOs via 
the Civil Society Dialogue within DG Trade, these actors have not been able to influence 
trade policy outcomes in any real sense.55 A similar picture is revealed in the context of civil 
society mechanisms in EU trade agreements: while EU domestic and transnational mecha-
nisms convene in practice, participating civil society cannot articulate enforceable rules for 
the governments. As a recent study illustrates, ‘[i]nitial assessments from stakeholders indi-
cate that participation is time-intensive but recommendations and provisions are non-en-
forceable’.56 This limitation underlines the restricted role of civil society actors in relation to 
sustainable development in the context of EU trade agreements. In summary, a critical per-
spective suggests that providing civil society with a role in trade agreements, but at the 
same time restricting their influence in policy-making, may be a way of silencing potential 
criticism of neoliberal orientations.
This theoretical exploration will inform the empirical insights in the following part, which 
analyses the positions of the European members of the civil society mechanisms. Again, the 
critical evaluation of the civil society mechanisms will be related to broader questions on 
(EU) free trade agreements and the sustainable development chapters.
Empirical perspectives
Free trade and sustainable development
When asked about their opinions of the ‘impact of free trade on sustainable development’, 
labour representatives as well as other non-profit organisations such as environment, devel-
opment, human and animal rights organisations’ replies vary slightly from positive to 
extremely negative, but the main tendency is towards the negative (see Figure 1, 
Non-profit).57
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What is perhaps surprising is that non-profit organisations are only moderately negative 
on the consequences of free trade (see Figure 1) and EU trade agreements (see Figure 2) for 
sustainable development. The option ‘extremely negative’ was indicated only a few times, 
whereas more than one third of these representatives were neutral or even positive on the 
relevant questions. Non-profit organisations are neither unanimously nor radically negative 
about these issues. Despite tendencies towards the critical end of the spectrum, a significant 
minority assesses the impact of (EU) trade agreements positively and only a very small minor-
ity makes an extremely negative evaluation (see Figures 1 and 2).
This might lead to the conclusion that these civil society organisations have become less 
critical through their co-optation within EU mechanisms. If we consider the anti-TTIP and 
anti-CETA protests, which took place at the time when the survey was held (August-
September 2016) and are remarkably strong both in terms of intensity (heavily anti-trade) 
and scope (proliferation of civil society organisations mobilising against these agreements), 
we might have expected a more outspokenly negative evaluation by labour, environmental, 
development, human rights and animal welfare organisations. In other words, non-profit 
organisations participating in the mechanisms seem generally less critical of free trade and 
EU trade agreements than most civil society organisations that are campaigning on trade 
issues. Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that this more positive inclination 
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of the participants in the civil society mechanisms is caused by co-optation. Our methodol-
ogy does not make it possible to make a pre–post measurement (before/after participation) 
or to use a control group (non-participants). We did, however, ask the civil society participants 
whether participation in the mechanisms had changed their evaluation of the EU trade 
agreement. On this question, most non-profit organisations indicated that they had not 
changed their views (see Figure 3). There may also be a self-selection effect in that organi-
sations that are radically against free trade agreements do not participate in the mechanisms 
because they are not willing to do so or because they have not been selected by the European 
Commission.
Importantly, further qualitative data suggest that civil society representatives are aware 
of the dangers of co-optation. Even respondents who are very critical of free trade and EU 
free trade agreements in general attempt to be actively involved in the mechanisms in order 
to make the best of the situation. Several interviewees from civil society acknowledge that 
their participation in the mechanisms may have the (in their eyes) perverse effect of legiti-
mising the free trade agreement as a whole. As one respondent who is a member of an 
environmental organisation wrote:
‘It’s primarily a tool by the Commission to show that the EU is integrating environmental and 
social issues in trade agreements.’
Non-profit organisations seem to be clearly aware of the pitfalls as well as the opportunities 
that the civil society mechanisms offer and seem to be struggling with the ‘inside-outside 
dilemma’ that these pose for them. One NGO representative who has experience with several 
transnational and domestic civil society mechanisms formulated this as follows:
A cabaret artist portrays the EU as a kind of ‘humanist capitalist’: not shooting on people at 
the border but letting them drown in the sea; and feeling bad about it. So full of contradic-
tions. Hence, yes, the CSD [civil society dialogue] can be seen as an attempt by the institu-
tions to promote and improve sustainable development, BUT this is done under the premise 
of a trade liberalisation regime and framework which contradict sustainability goals. FTAs (free 
trade agreements) are an agenda of increasing competition, of resource exploitation, of false 
measurements (GDP, externalisation of costs), etc. that contradicts sustainability goals. In other 
words, sustainable development is equated with growth; that is why DG Trade can organise 
those kinds of CSDs and include sustainable development chapters. So they have appropriated 
and incorporated sustainability…
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Figure 3. changed opinions about the free trade agreement (in percentages; business n = 10, non-profit: 
n = 32).
THIRD WORLD THEMATICS: A TWQ JOURNAL  535
Furthermore, the same person argued that ‘the core of the trade agreement has not changed 
just because there are consultative bodies [involving civil society] or DAGs set up; if there is 
any impact, it is limited […].’ Another development NGO representative stated that he finds 
it important to negotiate on the conclusions of the meetings until the very last minute, even 
if he is very critical of the impact of free trade and EU trade agreements on policy space for 
sustainable development. From our observations of the EU-Peru-Colombia and EU-Central 
America mechanisms, some representatives of non-profit organisations attempt to use the 
mechanism to highlight shortcomings in third countries’ compliance with labour, environ-
mental and human rights standards. In so doing, they criticise the impact of the EU trade 
agreement in this regard, trying to get the most out of it. Others attend the civil society 
mechanisms, yet are more passively involved or work behind the scenes.
When discussing their role in the EU-Peru-Colombia DAG, one member from another 
development NGO illustrated the insider-outsider dilemma in very literal terms as follows:
Look where we are standing now… Before, we were shouting against the agreement on the 
streets; today, we are helping to implement it inside this building.58
Two years earlier, another participant in these mechanisms had expressed it as follows:
You see, this is a governmental process and then we’re asked to come in to basically defend 
these free trade agreements. Now many of us […] have substantial conflicts and issues with the 
kind of free trade agreements and the economic agenda behind it. And for the Commission, for 
the government, this is a way to say we’re smoothing the edges and we get civil society in there 
and they can help us to address the worst issues. But the fundamental drivers and the way we 
design trade relations remain contentious. At least for us, […] it’s a way to invite the protest on 
the street into the agreement.59
One opponent of the EU-Central America trade agreement decided, after opposing the 
agreement as a whole, to join the civil society mechanisms because then at least they would 
still have a platform available to fight possible negative consequences of the agreement.60 
He too decided to participate in the civil society mechanisms, not in spite of but because of 
his opposition to it.
Civil society mechanisms
When considering the survey questions on participants’ evaluation of the civil society mech-
anisms, a mixed picture emerges. When asked to rate their experience with the civil society 
mechanisms according to a number of statements ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to 
‘strongly agree’, non-profit organisations not only endorsed the critical statements but also 
(moderately) subscribed to the opportunities that the mechanisms offer. Three statements 
in the survey relate to the critical perspective: whether the civil society mechanisms are there 
‘to guarantee ratification of the agreement’, ‘to reduce opposition to the agreement’ and ‘to 
legitimise the agreement with the larger public’. Each of these statements relates to the 
possible function of the mechanisms as legitimising free trade instead of promoting sus-
tainable development. Notwithstanding some exceptions, the large majority of respondents 
from non-profit organisations agree with these statements. Again, however, a constructive 
position emerges: only a slight minority ‘strongly agrees’, and overall evaluations are rather 
moderate (see Table 1).
More surprisingly, these rather negative evaluations go together with positive assess-
ments of the mechanisms. Our data illustrate that these representatives recognise potential 
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benefits of the civil society mechanisms. Not only are non-profit organisations ‘only’ mod-
erately critical about the mechanisms in terms of legitimising free trade, but they also accept 
that these can promote sustainable development, foster discussions on the topic and most 
of all contribute to building alliances with other organisations. Although these respondents 
are not overly enthusiastic about these functions, they do recognise their potential.
Also in the blank spaces that respondents could fill in, this ‘critical but constructive’ posi-
tion of non-profit organisations becomes clear. While a few comments relate to the insid-
er-outsider dilemma and the risk of legitimising free trade (see supra), most of them express 
frustrations with the practical functioning and impact of the mechanisms. Some refer to the 
mechanisms’ limited dynamic and the absence of a real impact: As a representative of a 
non-profit development organisation participating in the EU-CARIFORUM Consultative 
Committee claims,
[t]here is not much life in between the meetings… They seem to be one-off events.
A similarly disillusioned opinion on the impact of civil society mechanisms is expressed by 
a labour representative member of several mechanisms:
The meetings are not working and do not amount to anything. But if we would leave, there 
would be a void and we can’t do that.61
Along the same line, a member of a non-profit organisation participating in the EU-Central 
America transnational meeting and its EU DAG claims:
The meetings I attended are mostly to ‘tick the box’ on the mechanism of the agreement. They 
have been mostly processes where we focus more on the mechanism itself than on the content 
of discussions.
This is confirmed by a statement of a non-profit organisation member who participates in 
the EU-CARIFORUM Consultative Committee and the EU DAG of the EU-Colombia-Peru 
agreement:
Sometimes, the discussion is more about the governance of the groups and less about the 
implementation of the agreements. After the meeting, there is not really an agenda for joint 
activities for the members of the groups in order to strengthen the exchange and the coopera-
tion among them to monitor the implementation of the agreements. Lack of funding makes it 
sometimes difficult for the members of the groups to attend the relevant meeting and also to 
have the human resources to follow in detail the implementation of the agreements.
A member of another non-profit organisation who has participated in the EU-CARIFORUM 
Consultative Committee several times describes its limitations as follows:
The mechanism in the CARIFORUM EPA has not really been very active; it is rather formal. As there 
is minimal interest on both the Caribbean and the European side in genuinely implementing 
this agreement, and there was very little private sector interest as well, there are few incentives 
to engage and therefore this civil society mechanism is not very active/effective as there is little 
to fight for or against.
Limited interest on both sides of the EPA is also observed by a business representative 
attending the EU-CARIFORUM Consultative Committee:
The follow-up to the meetings is slow and there are no concrete outcomes. There is a lack of 
interest from the EU side and too high expectations from the Cariforum side.
As already touched upon in the previous two quotes, there are also concerns about the 
limited accountability of the governments. Limited interaction between civil society mem-
bers and the Parties to the agreement is further substantiated in the following quotes:
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I have always found that the Sustainable Development Committee members (i.e. the intergov-
ernmental body members) are reluctant to engage in a real discussion with DAG members and 
civil society during joint meetings. Sometimes they do not even accept having a dialogue with 
DAG members.
Like his labour counterpart, an environmental organisation representative to the EU DAG of 
the EU-Korea agreement emphasises the European Commission’s passive role:
The EU Korea DAG allows business, labour and civil society to express their views on certain 
environmental and labour issues related to trade. That is really all it is. The Commission attends, 
listens and does nothing.
In addition, there are comments on the representativeness of the mechanisms, especially 
on the limited presence of trade unions. To illustrate, a member of a non-profit organisation 
who has experience with five types of EU trade agreements’ civil society forums notes the 
following:
The key problem is lack of full involvement of all sectors of civil society (NGOs, trade unions), 
particularly in the EU trading partners’ DAGs. Employers’ federations are always represented.
A labour representative who attends several EU DAGs puts it as follows:
The EU-Korea DAG is the most advanced one (even though problems of representation in the 
composition of the Korea DAG persist). The composition of the Central America DAG is still not 
defined and there is a lack of representation of trade unions in Central American countries.
Thus, the bulk of these comments concern criticism within the system, in line with the ‘inside 
response’ (see supra). This confirms once more that civil society participants have not given 
up on the possibilities that the civil society mechanisms are offering, and that they are intent 
on improving these mechanisms. However, as also stated above, this does not mean that 
these participants are not aware of the potentially legitimising effect of their participation 
in the mechanisms. Therefore, here too it is difficult to conclude that co-optation has taken 
place.
The perspectives of the business sector representatives deserve special mention as they 
diverge from those of the representatives of non-profit organisations. In essence, business 
groups are generally (very) positive about free trade, the EU trade agreement and the civil 
society mechanisms. Compared to the non-profit organisations, they are more positive about 
the impact of free trade on sustainable development (see Figure 1). Although they evaluate 
the impact of EU agreements slightly less favourably than the impact of free trade in general, 
a divergence with the other representatives continues to exist. This may not be surprising 
since it reveals a traditional socio-economic cleavage in European politics between labour 
and capital on the benefits of free trade.62
More surprisingly, business representatives also tend to evaluate the civil society mech-
anisms in terms of legitimising the free trade agreement. They largely agree with those 
statements that we considered to endorse the critical perspective, i.e. that the mechanisms 
serve ‘to guarantee ratification of the agreement’, ‘to reduce opposition to the agreement’ 
and ‘to legitimise the agreement with the larger public’. As such, the polarisation between 
business and the other participants on the merits of free trade for sustainable development 
disappears when it comes to recognising the broader liberal agenda behind the 
mechanisms.
However, one may assume that the motivations behind these assessments are different, 
in line with the above-mentioned divergent assessments of the impact of free trade and EU 
trade agreements on sustainable development. While business representatives are more 
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likely to support the mechanisms’ legitimising role as necessary to guarantee the more 
important objectives of the trade agreement, non-profit organisations tend to view the 
legitimising function from a more critical perspective and are warier about co-optation, as 
illustrated above.
At the same time, business groups recognise the more ‘mainstream’ or ‘free trade oriented’ 
purposes of the mechanisms. The respondents (moderately) agree on all the statements 
that point to purposes and criticisms ‘within the system’. However, a closer look at the data 
reveals subtle differences between business and labour representatives (see Table 2). For 
instance, the former agree more than the latter on the mechanisms’ function ‘to have an 
impact on decision-making’ and ‘to discuss with officials’. Business groups are also much less 
convinced than their labour counterparts that the mechanisms serve ‘to criticise the sus-
tainable development dimension of the agreement’. Business is also much more optimistic 
than labour about the mechanisms’ aim ‘to promote sustainable development’.
In sum, the survey data suggest that business groups recognise that the mechanisms 
play a role in legitimising the EU trade agreements while at the same time providing oppor-
tunities to discuss with officials and impacting on decision-making. This more positive eval-
uation of the civil society mechanisms is in line with their more optimistic assessment of the 
benefits of free trade for sustainable development in general. It also resonates with the dif-
ferent responses of business and non-profit organisations to the question ‘Has your opinion 
about the trade agreement(s) changed as a result of your participation in the meeting(s)?’ 
As can be seen from Figure 3, while most respondents indicate that their opinion has not 
changed, a majority of business representatives indicate that their opinion of the trade 
agreement has become more favourable.
Conclusion
This study aimed to critically reflect on a recent phenomenon in EU trade policy, namely the 
involvement of civil society actors in the EU’s trade-sustainable development nexus. More 
precisely, it discussed how transnational and domestic civil society mechanisms provided 
for in the new generation of EU trade agreements may be a way to legitimise the underlying 
neoliberal orientation of the agreements. Starting from critical perspectives and drawing 
Table 2. Business and labour evaluating the civil society mechanisms (in percentages; business n = 10, 
non-profit: n = 32).
  The meetings that I attended are a mechanism to…
 
Have an impact on 
decision-making Discuss with officials
 Criticise the sustainable 
development dimension 
of the agreement
Promote sustainable 
development
  Business Labour Business Labour Business Labour Business Labour
strongly agree 0 13 0 13 0 25 0 0
agree 60 13 60 38 0 25 30 13
somewhat agree 20 38 10 50 20 25 30 50
neither agree nor 
disagree
10 0 20 0 60 13 30 0
somewhat 
disagree
10 13 10 0 10 0 10 13
disagree 0 25 0 0 10 13 0 25
strongly disagree 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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on evidence from a survey, qualitative interviews and participatory observations, we arrive 
at the balanced conclusion that non-profit civil society actors recognise the pitfalls of par-
ticipatory practices in EU agreements, but also see the opportunities that they may offer for 
the promotion of sustainable development.
Therefore, we conclude that the approach adopted by non-profit actors has been con-
structive. Rather critical views on the impact of free trade and EU trade agreements on 
sustainable development have not prevented them from participating in the mechanisms; 
at the same time, rather critical evaluations of the purposes of the mechanisms have not 
withheld them from acknowledging the opportunities to discuss and monitor sustainable 
development. In short, both the vices and virtues are recognised. However, it is too early to 
evaluate whether this constructive position also entails co-optation. The non-profit actors 
involved seem clearly aware that they are walking a tightrope between legitimising free 
trade and obtaining results for the cause they represent.
Moreover, non-profit organisations, and particularly labour representatives, are rather 
critical about the civil society mechanisms. The large majority indicate that they have not 
become more favourable towards the trade agreement. In addition to criticisms concerning 
the institutional dimension of the meetings (e.g. financial support and representativeness), 
they also point to frustrations with limited impact and lack of substantive dialogue. In the 
absence of tangible progress, these actors’ critical but constructive position may modify into 
a more radical rejection of the trade agreement. Instead of co-optation, one might equally 
expect a radicalisation of the positions on free trade and the EU agreements, especially if 
existing frustrations are not seriously addressed.
While not providing clear evidence of co-optation, the findings did reveal another critical 
issue, namely the discrepancy between business groups and non-profit organisations. 
Business representatives evaluate the civil society mechanisms more positively. For instance, 
they recognise the value of the mechanisms in terms of networking with officials and having 
an impact. Several business representatives also indicate that they have become more favour-
able towards the trade agreement since their participation. Therefore, there is a risk that the 
civil society mechanisms further reinforce the existing asymmetric power relationship 
between business and non-profit organisations when it comes to trade policy influence63, 
rather than balancing them in favour of sustainable development.
This study contributes to extant literature which critiques EU trade governance64 and 
assesses the transformative power of civil society actors in the context of international trade65 
by collating the perspectives of the civil society actors participating in the civil society mech-
anisms established in recent EU trade agreements. While it partly reveals fundamental crit-
icism of these mechanisms, it would probably go too far to describe them as a form of 
‘tyranny’, as suggested by Cooke and Kothari66 on participatory approaches in development 
policy. Nevertheless, they may certainly be regarded as a double-edged sword in the sense 
that they may well entail co-optation in the longer run. The decision of critical groups to 
participate in EU civil society mechanisms undermines the power of their peers who have 
deliberately decided to stay outside the system in order to challenge it. What is more, ‘empty’ 
engagement from within runs the risk of fragmenting a constituency as the ‘outsiders’ might 
feel betrayed by the ‘insiders’. Therefore, civil society actors are well advised to jointly reflect 
on potential negative effects that participation in civil society mechanisms might have on 
their constituency as a whole.
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In order to better understand reservations about civil society mechanisms in EU trade 
agreements, future research would need to assess the rationales of those civil society groups 
and actors who decide to stay outside. It would also be of interest to investigate the percep-
tions of civil society on the other side of the agreements. Given the countries’ different 
cultural and political heritages and, to some extent, the lack of experience with social and 
civil society dialogues, such an assessment is necessary to obtain a complete picture of the 
potential and limits of the civil society mechanisms in EU agreements.
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Abstract: There is a growing concern about the extent to which multi-stakeholder initiatives
(MSIs), designed to improve social and environmental sustainability in global supply chains, give a
meaningful voice to less powerful stakeholders. Trade unions are one particular civil society group
whose participation in MSIs has received little scholarly attention so far. The objective of this paper
is to examine the determinants that enable and constrain trade union participation in MSIs. Based
on interviews, focus groups, observations and document analysis we determine local trade union
participation in three MSIs, operating at company, national and transnational level respectively,
in the Costa Rican pineapple industry. To explain the limited encountered trade union participation,
an analytical framework is developed combining structural and agency dimensions, namely the MSI
design and trade union’s power resources. The findings show shortcomings in the representativeness,
procedural fairness and consensual orientation in the design and implementation of the MSIs. These
are, however, not sufficient to explain weak trade union participation as trade union power resources
also have an influence. Strong network embeddedness and improved infrastructural resources
had a positive effect, whereas the lack of internal solidarity and unfavourable narrative resources
constrained the unions’ participation.
Keywords: multi-stakeholder initiatives; participation; trade unions; power resources; Costa Rica;
pineapple
1. Introduction
Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) aiming at improving environmental and social sustainability
are omnipresent throughout different supply chains, from the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil to
the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety in textiles. This form of governance is supposed to have
greater legitimacy because they involve a diversity of stakeholders, including civil society, public
and private actors [1–4]. Most research on MSIs has examined their functioning and legitimacy [5–7],
whereas only few studies assessed the participatory aspects of MSIs [8–10]. Although MSIs aim to be
inclusive and to reach the deliberative ideal where arguments overcome power dynamics, there is
a considerable risk that existing power asymmetries are reproduced and that only powerful actors
determine the course of action [11]. This point of critique has been raised in several studies concluding
that the voices of less powerful actors, such as small farmers or local communities, are often not heard
in MSIs [1,12].
Trade unions, independent workers’ organisations established through the principles of Freedom
of Association (see ILO Convention No. 87 (1948)), are one particular civil society group whose
involvement in MSIs received little scholarly attention so far. They are, however, relevant and legitimate
participants when social concerns, especially labour rights issues, are considered in the initiatives.
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Studies have demonstrated that certain procedures and mechanisms of MSIs can allow for more equal
participation of all actors, in particular those that are traditionally less powerful [7,13,14]. For example,
an impartial facilitator who keeps dominant participants in check, encourages less vocal actors to
share their opinion and maintains positive group dynamics [15]. Other participatory procedures
include setting clear goals and rules, providing access to information, working in small groups to build
trust, using adequate materials adapted to the educational level and cultural background of (illiterate)
participants, developing the technical capability of participants to meaningfully engage in the process,
covering costs of participation and conducting stakeholder analysis to identify those relevant to the
decision making process concerned.
The objective of this paper is to assess trade union participation in MSIs and explain the factors
that enable and constrain their participation. Our contribution lies in a combination of two explanatory
factors. First, the design and implementation of MSIs is analysed allowing an assessment of their
deliberative potential. Second, the power resources of the relevant trade unions are described as
they clarify the capacity trade unions have to participate in an MSI. By combining the importance of
structure (i.e., MSI design) and agency (i.e., trade union power resources) in our analytical framework,
we aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of the participatory processes of MSIs.
Trade union participation is examined through a within-case analysis of three MSIs existing
in the European Union (EU)–Costa Rica pineapple supply chain. Each MSI operates at a different
governance level, namely at company, national and transnational level. These are respectively the
Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), the National Platform for the responsible production and trade
of pineapples (hereafter Platform) and the Civil Society Meetings (CSMs) organised within the
EU–Central American Association Agreement. Based on this comprehensive overview, we found
that the design and implementation of the MSIs did not enable notable substantial participation and
that the union power resources also played an important role. Here, strong network embeddedness
and better infrastructural resources had a positive impact, whereas fragmented internal solidarity
and unfavourable narrative resources constrained trade union’s participation. As such, the analysis
confirms business domination and weak bargaining power of unions in the MSIs.
The paper is structured as follows. The rise of multi-stakeholderism is defined in the context of
global labour governance and the basic concepts of deliberative governance are explored. Drawing
on existing criteria of input legitimacy and power resource literature, an analytical framework is
developed. Next, the research context, case study approach and methodology are presented before
coming to the empirical findings. Here, trade union participation in the three MSIs is described and the
explanatory factors—MSI design and implementation and trade union power resources—are analysed
for each initiative. In the discussion and conclusion, we interpret the findings, make recommendations
for improving MSIs and suggest avenues for further research.
2. Changing Labour Governance Landscape
Globalisation has brought about two trends worth considering in the light of labour
rights protection.
First, a shift in global labour governance occurred in which labour rights are regulated through
a combination of public (e.g., labour laws, international conventions, soft law initiatives), private
(e.g., voluntary standards, codes of conducts) and hybrid (i.e., combination of both private and
public initiatives) forms of governance. These new forms often seek the inclusion of non-state actors.
Labour rights were historically dealt with at governmental level, as states developed labour law in
the 20th century to secure justice in employment relations [16]. Through domestic labour law and the
participation to dedicated international organisations such as the International Labour Organisation
(ILO), states have traditionally been the drivers of labour regulation.
The expansion of supply chains around the globe beyond one state’s jurisdiction gave rise to a
number of governance deficits, which neither the domestic nor international institutions have been
capable of governing appropriately [17]. Even though Gereffi and Mayer refer to broad societal issues,
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this deficit has also had an impact on the governance of labour rights. As a result, the governance
landscape has been moving away from the traditional regulatory role of the state to the inclusion
of non-state actors in policy processes [4,18–20]. In doing so, non-state actors were involved both
to more effectively address complex cross-border issues and to increase the legitimacy of global
governance. Non-state actors comprise a variety of stakeholders including private entities such as
business actors, multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), trade unions
and academia. The involvement of these actors through hybrid public–private governance is also
termed multi-stakeholder governance [21]. Although there is no internationally agreed definition for
multi-stakeholderism, it has been broadly conceptualised in the field of ‘interactive governance’ as:
“the complex process through which a plurality of actors with diverging interests interact
in order to formulate, promote and achieve common objectives by means of mobilizing,
exchanging and deploying a range of ideas, rules and resources.” [22]
While MSIs bring together multiple actors, they can occur in different forms and sizes such as
multi-stakeholder alliances, partnerships, standards and roundtables [1,4,23]. MSIs can operate at
different scales—from local to transnational—in diverse sectors, regions and topics [24]. They can
follow different procedural approaches, vary in duration and can evolve over time from a dialogue
platform to an independent organisation with a well-established governance structure. There is also
a great diversity in the range of purposes that MSIs seek to fulfil. While some MSIs aim to solve
specific problems and find a common ground, others promote learning and awareness raising, foster
stakeholder dialogue or focus on standard-setting and monitoring [7,25].
Second, although “Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of
his interests” as stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 23, paragraph 4
(1948)), many workers are not allowed to organise themselves in independent organisations, and trade
unionists are persecuted or discriminated against by hostile management [26]. In general, trade union
bargaining power has weakened and trade union density has declined as a result of global pressures,
including increased informality and flexibilisation of labour markets [27,28]. Flexible sourcing practices
of retailers and brands have increased pressures on suppliers across the globe. These demand pressures
are commonly transferred onto the weakest actors at the bottom of the chain, namely the workers,
who need to cope with insecure contracts, low wages and excessive overtime [29,30]. Despite these
challenges to union organisation, integration into global value chains also created new opportunities
for local trade unions to connect and build alliances with NGOs and international trade unions [31–33].
Through these cross-border networks, private standards and brands have been criticised in campaigns
addressing violations of workers’ rights at supplier sites.
These two trends, proliferation of MSIs and weak(ening) of trade unions in producing countries,
are relevant when reflecting on the potential and limits of the prevailing labour governance. However,
before trying to answer questions on the impact or results of MSIs one must understand the
participatory processes existing within them. Therefore, this article focuses on explaining participation.
3. Deliberation and Participation
The concept of deliberative democracy is often put forward as an appropriate approach to assess
new forms of governance, such as MSIs [9,34]. Deliberation—careful consideration or discussion
and thoughtfully weighing options—is a central feature of MSIs since their outcome is the result
of a participatory process [23,35]. Indeed, in his book ‘Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative
Governance’, Dryzek [36] explains how deliberative principles apply to governance networks, such
as MSIs.
A first central aspect of deliberative democracy theory is the idea that deliberation promotes
a kind of collective communicative power which neutralises coercive forms of power such as
domination [37,38]. Common reasoning is essential in deliberative governance and deliberation
is indispensable for collective decision making. Therefore, Hendricks [37] explains that deliberative
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procedures should be designed as such that debates are shaped by the ‘force of the better argument’
and not by the most powerful or dominant actor. This entails that existing power asymmetries are
diminished or even neutralised during the debates and that the outcome of the deliberative process
accommodates or balances the participating interests.
Evaluations on MSIs reaching this deliberative ideal vary. Positive assessments of MSIs demonstrate
how powerless actors can express their voice and successfully manage to influence decision making in
their favour, whereas more critical assessments point to the failure of MSIs to redress existing power
imbalances, leading to uneven participation and outcomes that do not meet the needs of less powerful
actors, such as small farmers and actors from the Global South [1,12,35]. In general, authors are rather
critical of the optimism surrounding MSIs.
A second fundamental element of deliberative governance is participation, as it is the precondition
for any other development in the process. Moreover, the involvement of all affected stakeholders
in the deliberation process is considered a source of legitimacy, assuming actors can equally share
their opinion, concerns, interests and knowledge [8,23]. This source of legitimacy is often referred
to in terms of input legitimacy, which addresses the question of who is entitled to make decisions
and who is to be represented in the decision-making process [39]. Similarly, according to Dryzek [40],
the deliberative quality of MSIs depends on, among others factors, inclusiveness.
Utting [12] found that trade union involvement in MSIs varies considerably from little or no
formal involvement to significant and more extensive participation. Indeed, when delving into the
participation of a stakeholder, it becomes clear that physical participation does not automatically entail
that the participant’s interest will be taken into account or that they can contribute in a meaningful way
to the process and influence the decisions made [14,20,23]. In general, two dimensions of participation
reappear in multiple studies under different labels. Luttrell [41] labelled the dimensions ‘nominal
and meaningful participation’, referring to the fact that ‘physical involvement of marginalised actors
and even verbal participation by them, does not guarantee their concerns will be heard’. Similarly,
Fransen [4] distinguished between ‘surface appearance’ and ‘actual involvement’ of societal interest
groups in decision-making. Brem-Wilson [10] talks about ‘formal and substantive participation’,
Dingwerth [42] refers to the ‘scope and quality of participation’ and Reed [15] discusses different
ladders of participation distinguishing degrees of engagement.
In light of deliberative democracy theory, it is necessary to understand the participatory processes
in order to grasp the outcome of the process. To be able to assess the potential of MSIs for the
improvement of labour rights, it is imperative to understand the participation of trade unions in
these MSIs as they represent the voice of the affected stakeholders, namely the workers. The research
question addressed in this paper is therefore: what shapes the participation of trade unions in MSIs?
Literature on deliberative governance indicates the importance of the design of the participatory
processes. In addition, when discussing the feasibility of deliberative governance, Hendrick’s [37]
recognises the need to look at the capacity of particular groups in civil society, especially powerless
groups, to generate deliberation. Hence, these factors are integrated in the analytical framework
presented in the next section.
4. Analytical Framework
This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the factors that enable or constrain
trade union participation in MSIs. For this purpose, an analytical framework is developed that takes
into account both the structure of the MSI (i.e., its design and implementation) as well as the agency of
the participant (i.e., its power resources) (Figure 1). Building further on the distinctions in participation
introduced above, we contrast ‘procedural participation’ and ‘substantial participation’ to describe the
observed trade union participation. The former refers to the physical attendance and continuity of
participation, whereas the latter specifies the actual contribution in shaping the content of the debate,
such as actors expressing their opinions and negotiating between divergent interests [43].
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4.1. Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Design and Implementation
The design of an MSI and its implementation should be examined as it will clarify whether
participation is possible, desirable and effective from the point of view of the stakeholder. If the MSI
is not designed to reduce power imbalances, the power asymmetry existing outside the MSI will be
reproduced which might in turn influence the possibility, interest and willingness of the weaker actor
to participate and consequently also the achievement of deliberation.
Various studies have shown that the set-up of an MSI has an impact on participation, especially if
it foresees power-neutralising mechanisms [23], or what Luttrell [41] calls mechanisms to ‘level the
playing field’. This includes power-sharing rules that allow for equal input [41], establishment of
working groups and public consultation [6,9], policies to ensure balanced resourcing [44], clear selection
procedures and voting systems avoiding dominance of powerful actors [5,23,41,45], an impartial
facilitator [15] and providing access to information, translation services and technology [23,46].
As we will concentrate on the participatory processes within MSIs, our criteria for analysing an
MSI’s design are derived from existing literature on deliberative democracy and input legitimacy of
transnational governance and more specifically, MSIs [2,7,34,47]. MSI design will be assessed through
three criteria: representativeness, procedural fairness and consensual orientation.
First, representativeness concerns stakeholder selection and processes that guarantee the inclusion
of all relevant stakeholders, namely those affected by the issue addressed by the MSI. To assess this
criterion we should, therefore, look at the stakeholder selection process [44]. In addition, one should
also examine whether certain groups are excluded or if the system favours a special category of
stakeholders [2]. Finally, the categorisation of the stakeholders could also play a role. Bolström and
Tamm Hallström [8] explained how differentiating stakeholders in separate categories could potentially
constitute a principle of exclusion from crucial decision-making arenas.
Second, procedural fairness stands for measures that diminish or neutralise power differences
in decision-making processes by giving each category of stakeholder an equal and valid voice [7].
This does not only involve equal voting rights, equal status as members and access to information
are also part of this criterion. This is assessed by analysing the decision-making procedures, whether
they be explicit formalised rules of procedure or implicit principles. In addition to decision-making,
arrangements guaranteeing the feasibility for all stakeholders to use the MSI’s participation potential
is considered. More concretely, this means funding and capacity building for those groups that cannot
afford to participate in the meetings [1,11,48,49].
Third, a consensual orientation is pursued through a culture of cooperation and reasonable
disagreement [7]. According to the Habermasian ideal [50,51], consensus should be reached through
open discussions, where reasoning trumps bargaining, in a non-coercive environment. However, as
Mena and Palazzo [7] acknowledge, MSIs gather a multitude of actors with different backgrounds
and conflicting objectives. Therefore, these authors deem consensus as highly unlikely and suggest
reasonable disagreement. Similarly, Luttrell [41] suggests to acknowledge disparities of power, address
sensitive issues head-on, and to discuss the extent to which participants can ‘agree to disagree’.
In the context of MSI design, we will look at whether and how mutual agreement is promoted.
In addition, the communication attitude of participants is considered. Are these inclined to be
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constructive towards other participants or rather conflictual? For multi-stakeholder processes to result
in a shared initiative towards joint objectives, a constructive attitude is needed from all participants [25].
Finally, consensual orientation obviously will depend on the trust that exists between the participants.
Brouwer et al. [11] found that for stakeholders to be able to address power dynamics, a basis of trust is
needed. Part of the complex context of MSIs is that the weaker actors can have experienced a long
history of being excluded and treated poorly, and consequently distrust the MSI if it is dominated by
more powerful actors.
4.2. Union Power Resources
An underestimated and often overlooked factor in the research on participation of a weaker
stakeholder in an MSI is this actor’s capacity. To shed light on this aspect we rely on the theoretical
notion of power resources that affect the capacity to effectively participate [8] and use the typology
developed by Lévesque and Murray [27] to analyse union capacity in particular. Four trade union
power resources can be distinguished: internal solidarity, network embeddedness, infrastructural
resources and narrative resources.
First, internal solidarity refers to the relationship between union members, the level of engagement
of members, the strategies to recruit new members, the communication methods used between union
members and leaders, the leadership structure and the level of cohesion and the presence of a collective
identity. Second, network embeddedness, or external solidarity, refers to the degree to which unions
have horizontal and vertical links with other unions and with community groups and social movements.
Trade unions act at different levels from local to global, cross borders and connect with different actors,
providing different opportunities to pursue union objectives. While some unions might be isolated,
others have stronger ties to (inter)national unions or other civil society actors. Such ties can be
supportive [3], however, collaboration between international NGOs and trade unions can also create
tensions [52]. Third, narrative resources refer to the range of values and stories about trade unions
that provide shared understandings and frame the way union members think and act [27]. Brouwer
et al. [11] confirm this power resource which is invisible and difficult to change. In some cases, these
deeply rooted structures, culture, behaviour and norms can lead to conservative, entrenched positions.
Fourth, infrastructural resources refer to the material (money, meeting rooms), human (time, expertise)
and organisational resources (use of technologies, training) [27].
We expect that weak levels of these four resources will negatively affect trade union participation
in MSIs.
5. Research Approach
5.1. Research Context: Labour Rights Issues in Costa Rica and Its Pineapple Industry
Costa Rica is currently the biggest exporter of fresh pineapples, exporting 90% of fresh pineapples
in the world, which represents 8.4% of the country’s total exports [53]. From 2000 onwards the
country’s pineapple industry began to expand rapidly, from 11,000 ha to more than 44,000 ha in
2018 [54]. According to the Costa Rican Chamber of Pineapple Producers (CANAPEP), the pineapple
industry has generated 32,000 jobs directly and over 130,000 jobs indirectly throughout the country.
However, the rapid expansion has had negative environmental and social impacts, including those
upon working conditions and the protection of labour rights.
Concerning labour rights issues, Costa Rica is notorious for its anti-union culture in the private
sector (see infra), where only 2% of the workforce is unionised. Labour struggles were most prevalent
in the banana industry, where the level of unionisation dropped from 90% in 1982 to 5% in 1987 after a
defamation campaign against trade unions [55]. Perhaps the most frequent obstacle to collective labour
rights in this country concerns the promotion of solidarist associations (known as solidarismo) and,
specifically, the extent to which such associations prevent the development and functioning of effective
and independent workers’ organisations such as trade unions [56]. These solidarist associations are
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partly financed by management and do not recognise the right to collective bargaining as formulated
in ILO Convention No. 98 (1949) [57]. While solidarist associations are on the rise, anti-union practices
such as discrimination and dismissal because of trade union membership have been repeatedly
reported to the ILO Committee of Experts and are partly responsible for the weakening of trade
unions across the country [58,59]. In the wake of anti-union campaigns and employers’ preference
for negotiating with solidarist associations, the pineapple industry is characterised by a very low
unionisation rate and accordingly no collective bargaining agreement has been established in any
pineapple plantation [60,61].
5.2. Case Study Selection and Description
The EU-Costa Rica pineapple supply chain is an interesting case because it demonstrates how
the expansion of an export crop has affected local communities and workers and raises the issue of
the effectiveness of current labour governance mechanisms. Moreover, the industry is confronted
with many of the environmental and social challenges that booming export regions face around the
world. During our field research, we came across three MSIs in the pineapple industry, each one
operating at a different governance level (company, national, transnational). Although the MSIs’
objective, scope, duration, origins and functioning differ (see Table 1), they have in common that they
aim at gathering the relevant stakeholders to make businesses and trade more sustainable. Instead of a
comparative case study, we opted for a comprehensive within-case analysis of three key initiatives
allowing for an exhaustive examination of trade union participation in MSIs across the EU-Costa
Rica pineapple supply chain, ranging from their involvement in specific company issues to broader
trade-related discussions in civil society fora. By analysing three initiatives we intend to create an
overall understanding of trade union participation in MSIs throughout one specific supply chain and
to identify which constraining or enabling factors they have in common. In what follows, the general
characteristics of the three initiatives are described.
Table 1. General characteristics of the three MSIs.
Ethical Trading Initiative
(ETI) and Fyffes
National Platform for the
Responsible Production and
Trade of Pineapples
(Platform)
Civil Society Mechanisms
within European–Central
American Association
Agreement (CSMs)
Governance level Company National Transnational
Objective To promote respect forworkers’ rights
To improve social and
environmental performance
To advise and make
recommendations on
implementation trade and
sustainable development
chapter
Scope Global value chains Costa Rica pineappleproduction and trade
Trade-related aspects of
sustainable development
Multi-stakeholder dimension
Business, trade unions,
non-governmental
organization (NGO) members
Business, civil society,
academia, government
Economic, social and
environmental stakeholders
Approach Learning approachStandard setting
Project approach
Formal action plan
Dialogue approach
Monitoring
Duration 1998–ongoing 2011–2017 2013–ongoing
Founders
Select group of UK retailers,
NGOs, trade unions and UK
government
United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) European Union (EU)
Funding Start-up grants UKgovernment, membership fees
UNDP, Dutch NGO, Dutch
public-private partnership
Little EU funding for EU
CSMs, no funding (yet) for
Central American CSMs
5.2.1. The Ethical Trading Initiative and Call for Action against Fyffes
ETI is a membership-based MSI bringing together companies, trade unions and NGOs to improve
working conditions in global value chains. It has been established in 1998 with the support of the
UK government and has developed a Base Code for corporate members to support continuous
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improvement regarding decent work [62]. ETI is governed by a tripartite board (comprising trade
unions, NGOs and corporate members) which reviews the performance of companies, can hold them
accountable in case of complaints following disciplinary procedures, and provides remedies [63].
To examine how unions in suppliers’ sites participate in the work of ETI, we do not evaluate the
general functioning of ETI but single out one corporate member of ETI, namely Fyffes. This company
has recently been accused of labour rights violations in its subsidiaries’ pineapple (ANEXCO) and
melon (Suragroh) plantations in, respectively, Costa Rica and Honduras [64,65]. Fyffes is an Irish
importer and distributor of tropical produce which was sold to the Japanese conglomerate Sumitomo in
2017 [66,67]. It was mentioned in 2016 in the Make Fruit Fair awareness raising and advocacy campaign
calling for “Freedom and fairness for Fyffes workers” [64]. According to the campaign, the violations
concern a disregard of freedom of association, as Fyffes seems not to recognise independent trade
unions. At the time of writing, Fyffes has been suspended from ETI due to a lack of progress on the
accused labour right violations in Honduras [68].
5.2.2. National Platform for Responsible Pineapple Production and Trade in Costa Rica
In 2011, the Platform was established with the support of the United Nations Development
Programme’s (UNDP) Green Commodities Programme and coordinated by the Costa Rican Second
Vice-presidency, Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Energy and Environment. It received
funding from a Dutch NGO, the Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO),
in the first phase (2011–2014) and from the Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH), a Dutch public–private
initiative, in the second phase to ensure the continuity of the process. The UNDP was the driving
force behind the creation of this multi-stakeholder platform and identified a range of environmental
and social challenges that should be dealt with by the Costa Rican government in collaboration with
relevant stakeholders.
Over the entire period, the Platform gathered about 900 participants from more than 50 organisations
from business, NGOs, communities, academia and related national government institutions to improve
the sustainability performance of pineapple production through the development of a national strategy
with concrete actions [69]. The Platform had to develop an action plan determining the responsibilities of
the government and industry players [70]. For this purpose, it organised four annual plenary meetings,
thirty thematic working groups and several panel debates. In 2016, the action plan was finalised and
the Costa Rican government adopted it in decree N◦39462. The Platform mechanism did not put the
social dimension on equal footing with the environmental and economic considerations, nor was it able
to ensure that demands of all parties were equally considered (see infra).
5.2.3. Civil Society Meetings of the European Union–Central America Association Agreement
The new generation EU trade agreements, starting from the EU–Korea trade agreement in
2011, contain chapters on trade and sustainable development. These chapters refer to labour and
environmental standards that should be respected in the framework of the agreement. Civil society
meetings (CSMs) are created to follow up on, advise and monitor the commitments made in these
sustainable development chapters. Even though there is variation in the legal texts establishing these
meetings [71], several foundational features reoccur. First, each party agrees to create or consult an
independent domestic civil society mechanism (often called a Domestic Advisory Group (DAG)).
Second, an annual transnational meeting should be organised. Here, members of the domestic
mechanisms and/or other civil society actors meet. Third, some interaction is foreseen between these
two meetings and the intergovernmental body (officials of the EU and its trading partner(s)) that meets
annually to discuss the implementation of the trade and sustainable development chapter.
The EU and six Central American countries—Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua and Panama—signed the EU–Central American Association Agreement which has been
applied since 2013. Each Central American country (should have) assembled its own DAG. The Costa
Rican DAG, together with that from Guatemala, is functioning relatively well in the sense that an
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independent DAG with civil society members actually exists, as other DAGs are characterised by
governmental presence and/or a general lack of participants. In general, the meetings have, similar to
those organised in the context of other EU trade agreements, experienced a slow start and have had
difficulties generating an internal dynamic [72].
Following discussions on labour issues and corporate social responsibility (CSR) during the
civil society and governmental meetings, two seminars, in Costa Rica (May 2017) and Guatemala
(May 2018), were organised. Both events covered general CSR topics such as responsible value chains,
international CSR instruments and sectoral case studies. In addition, the OECD and the ILO gave a
workshop on a related issue [73,74].
5.3. Data Collection and Methodology
The interdisciplinary research presented in this paper is based on (1) 37 semi-structured interviews
with various actors from different stakeholder categories, (2) three focus groups with trade union
members, (3) eight nonparticipant observations during CSMs in the framework of the Association
Agreement and (4) document analysis. Extensive field research was conducted in Costa Rica (2015–2016)
with Costa Rican representatives and in Belgium (2015–2017) with EU representatives. These two
rounds of data collection were followed-up by interviews in 2018 to collect additional information
on the concerned multi-stakeholder initiatives for this case study (see Table A1 in Appendix A).
To protect the identity of the respondents, we aggregated the respondents per region and type of
actor. The following combination of letters and numbers were used to indicate to which group a
respondent belongs (see Appendix A): Costa Rica is abbreviated by the letters CR, U refers to unions,
G for government officials, and B for business representatives. The letters EU represent European
officials, EUCS stands for European civil society actors and ILO officials carry the letter I.
In Costa Rica we targeted key informants, categorised in the following three groups to get
a comprehensive sample of different stakeholder perspectives: business representatives (such as
CANAPEP), trade unions (at national, sectoral and plantation level) and government officials
(including the Ministry of External Trade, Agriculture and Labour). Through snowball sampling,
we conducted face-to-face expert interviews [75] with representatives of the Costa Rican pineapple
unions (6), government (8), business (5) and ILO officials (3). In addition, three focus groups (with
respectively 6, 14 and 4 trade union members) were organised to become more acquainted with Costa
Rican trade unionism and to gather more factual information. For the perspectives of EU civil society
actors and officials involved in the CSMs, we conducted 15 expert interviews with key informants
identified from the list of CSM participants as well as officials from the European Commission and the
Delegation of the EU to Costa Rica.
An interview guide was developed for each group of respondents covering topics related to the
perception and functioning of trade unions in Costa Rica, the challenges to improve labour rights in
the pineapple industry, the existing governance mechanisms and regulatory framework, and a set of
more specific questions on the MSIs discussed in this study, including the motives for participation,
the design and participatory decision-making process and the results.
The document analysis concerns the content of public video footage, press releases, event
reports, presentations, email correspondence, participant lists and meeting minutes of the three MSIs.
In addition, one of the researchers observed two transnational meetings, two DAG-to-DAG meetings
and four EU DAG meetings where she could listen to the discussions and gain insights on the
participatory dynamics and methods. This qualitative data was triangulated through interviews with
members of the MSIs.
The relevant parts of the interview and observation notes and transcripts were extracted in a
qualitative content analysis [76,77]. A cross table was constructed for each of the three MSIs where the
extracted data was summarised and reformulated in a more general language and structured according
to the analytical framework (see Appendix B). Even though this analytical framework draws heavily
on existing literature, it was fine-tuned in an inductive manner. This analysis was then transformed
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in a thick description of trade union participation and a study of the structural and agency factors
determining trade union participation in MSIs.
Two important limitations of the data collection need to be acknowledged. First, the presence of
the researcher in the room during the CSMs could have potentially influenced the discussions, because
the participants feel they are being “watched” (i.e., observer effect [78]). Second, the subgroup of
business actors was underrepresented in our sample because of the sensitivity of labour issues and
their limited willingness to meet for interviews [79]. Concerning the case of Fyffes, ETI declined our
interview request and only confirmed the latest status update over email to preserve the confidentiality
of their members.
6. Findings
6.1. Procedural and Substantial Participation of Trade Unions
6.1.1. Participation of Trade Unions in ETI–Fyffes
“Six management assistants were assigned as facilitators [for the capacity building event]. This
is worrying because they were exactly the ones behind the anti-union campaign, discrimination,
persecution and dismissals. The initiative was, therefore, practically born dead for the union members.
Following the pressure exercised by our members, they appointed four facilitators of the union but
without adequate material and knowledge to enable facilitation. Their participation was inconstant
and in some activities they could practically not participate at all. [ . . . ] They did not take union
members into account in this capacity-building event, which could have served as a platform for
the establishment of real social dialogue. During the capacity building, management impeded and
threatened normal participation of trade union members.”—Personal communication with CRU2
Procedural Participation
The participation of Costa Rican trade unions to ETI occurred indirectly through the support they
received from the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco
and Allied Workers’ Associations (IUF) and the NGO Bananalink, with whom they had long standing
relationships. Bananalink is also a partner of the Make Fruit Fair campaign. Mediation attempts by
ETI and the Costa Rican Ministry of Labour to bring the trade union SINTRAPEM (Sindicato Nacional
de Trabajadores/as del Sector Privado Empresarial) and management of the subsidiary plantation
ANEXCO together around a negotiation table in 2016 failed [80]. In response to the urgent action
call, ETI conducted a field visit to investigate the allegations and produced an internal report with
recommendations. One of those was a capacity-building session for unions and management which
took place in November 2016 [EUCS7]. ETI financed the event and sent independent consultants to
facilitate a dialogue between local management and trade union representatives to discuss the matter.
The participation of most representatives was cancelled as they did not receive the permission from
the management to be absent to attend the capacity-building session [CRU2].
Substantial Participation
Local unions provided evidence of violations to prepare the campaign and complaint. They
determined the direction and did the legwork for the campaign whereas Bananalink supported them
[EUCS7]. The NGO wrote to Fyffes Chairman in November 2016 asking him to address the issues
without response; later they sent a petition letter signed by more than 40,000 people [81]. The local
union was engaged and communicative, they hosted a visit that helped to gather documentation
for the Fyffes campaign. The mediation by ETI allowed unions to express their concerns about
the willingness of management to have dialogue and the persistent labour rights violations in the
plantations. During the capacity-building event, the trade unionists’ input was limited as they were
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in the minority. Although the local union leader denounced these practices, no further actions were
taken by ETI in Costa Rica because the focus had moved to the complaint in Honduras [EUCS7].
6.1.2. Participation of Trade Unions in the Platform
“They [CANAPEP] never wanted us to be present in the Platform. We went to the launch of the
platform and after a couple of months they proposed to organise working groups on soil and pesticide
application among others, but none of the working groups covered labour issues. We went to the ILO
to suggest a working group for the discussion of labour aspects, but CANAPEP did not want to sit
together with us, they prefer to sit together with the solidarist associations only. The platform is a lie,
they just waste resources.”—CRU1
Procedural Participation
When assessing physical attendance over the entire period of the Platform, producers (27%)
and government actors (36%) dominated the meetings while unions (1%) and NGOs (9%) were
underrepresented [70]. Other smaller categories of stakeholders were buyers, international organisations,
communities and academics. There was resistance from the producers’ side to include trade unions
upon which Bananalink pressured the Dutch NGO ICCO, which co-financed the Platform, to insist on
trade union participation [EUCS7]. However, industry players refused to address any of the trade union
issues and ultimately trade unions decided to withdraw their participation. Consequently, they were not
involved in the final decision-making process of the action plan and were also not part of the follow-up
committee monitoring its implementation [82].
Substantial Participation
Before the Platform, there was hardly space for dialogue between trade unions, business and
government to find solutions for the social and environmental problems of pineapple production.
Problems were mainly discussed through judicial avenues. Trade unions saw the Platform as a
unique opportunity to share their viewpoint with business and government [70,83,84]. A trade union
representative of SITRAP (Sindicato de Trabajadores de Plantaciones Agricolas) attempted to put
freedom of association and collective bargaining on the table during the first annual meeting and
drew a picture of the difficulties that they are facing. However, attempts to facilitate dialogue between
government, employers and trade unions to discuss the working conditions in plantations failed
because of the irreconcilable differences in opinions among the parties.
In a workshop organised to review the proposed action plan in February 2014—where unions
were not present—business representatives requested the modification of the reference to worker’s
organisations in the action line dealing with national dialogue on labour rights [84]. In addition,
CANAPEP put an ultimatum to exclude any reference to freedom of association. Industry players
argued that the issue of trade unions is not unique to pineapple, and should be addressed at national
level through enforcement of existing labour laws. Instead, they suggested to include in the action plan
that the government should promote the international recognition of alternative labour organisations
(i.e., solidarismo) that, according to them, represent pineapple workers in Costa Rica [83]. Consequently,
promoting national dialogue on labour rights was replaced by a more general action for promoting
dialogue spaces on environmental and social responsibility, omitting explicit actions related to freedom
of association [70].
6.1.3. Participation of Trade Unions in Civil Society Meetings in EU–Central America
Trade Agreement
“It’s a new type of meeting that doesn’t exist at national level. The agreement creates a space to
discuss the issue of labour rights violations. But it is still a very limited and superficial dialogue. The
format does not allow for an integral discussion, the debated topics are secondary, not fundamental.
It is nothing more than a dialogue of the deaf. There is no interest in reaching agreement. Everyone
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simply states his position. That’s it. If certain sectors put their veto and don’t want to discuss further,
the dialogue loses its meaning.”—CRU5
Procedural Participation
The official list of the members of the Costa Rican DAG contains seven trade unions.
However, only two of them participate actively, namely Central del Movimiento de Trabajadores
Costarricenses (CMTC) and Bloque Unitario Sindical y Social Costarricense (BUSSCO) [85] [CRU5].
All secretaries-general of the Costa Rican trade union federations were included in the list; however,
most of them are not aware of their membership or even of the existence of the DAG [CRU1,CRU5].
It must be said that limited trade union participation in the DAGs is not specific to Costa Rica; in all
Central American DAGs trade unions are barely represented.
Regarding trade union physical attendance during the CSR seminars, a considerable difference
was noted between both seminars. Whereas this stakeholder category was barely represented during
the first event in Costa Rica, there were significantly more—mainly Guatemalan—trade unionists
present during the second event [EUCS5,EU3].
Substantial Participation
The limited trade union representation in the Costa Rican DAG, and Central American DAGs
in general, has severe consequences on the substantive work done as little or no input is given by
Central American trade unionists in the domestic meetings. During the transnational meetings Central
American (and European) trade unionists have made some denunciations about labour rights violations
such as the limited freedom of association or violations in specific companies (e.g., Fyffes). Nevertheless,
little is done in response to these statements as the documents summarising the discussions of these
meetings, which are presented to the intergovernmental board, remain general, and do not include the
input [EUCS11].
In 2017, the members of the different DAGs agreed to collaborate on four themes: CSR, Decent
Work, Small and Medium Enterprises and Market Access. The objective was to write a commonly
agreed two-pager on each topic and to submit it to the Board at the occasion of the next transnational
meeting. Two rapporteurs were appointed for each paper, an EU and Central American DAG member.
Although there were exchanges of views from both sides, in the end no Central American trade unions
contributed to the content of the documents [EUCS9]. Ultimately, the documents were not presented
during the next meeting with the Board as two Central American business organisations opposed
the content of the documents on Decent Work and CSR shortly before the meeting, even though they
had been agreed upon in principle by the Central American rapporteurs and all EU DAG members
[EUCS6].
Turning to the CSR seminars, we learned that the organisers (i.e., the European Commission,
relevant EU delegations and respectively Costa Rica and Guatemala) had determined not to focus
on labour rights violations as such. Instead, broader and more positive issues were put forward to
address labour rights (e.g., social protection) [I3]. In Guatemala, during the workshop given by the
ILO, participants were divided into small roundtable groups. Each table had governmental, business
and trade union representatives who discussed several case studies [I3]. This resulted in dynamic
dialogues between the participants and was evaluated as a positive experience [EU3,I3,EUCS5].
In sum, we find that local trade unions did not participate consistently or directly and were
sometimes even excluded from meetings in all MSIs (Table A2 in Appendix B). We note that procedural
participation of unions was intermediate in ETI-Fyffes, low in CSMs, and can even be considered
very low in the Platform since unions dropped out. Regarding substantial participation, unions were
somewhat able to provide information and raise concerns, whereas they were still constrained in the
extent to which they could influence decision-making and their concerns were taken into account.
In the case of ETI, intermediate substantial participation was observed as they gave more input
compared to the low substantial participation in the CSMs. Again, this contrasts with the very low
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substantial participation found in the Platform where unions were not at all able to provide input and
consequently were also not considered in the final decision-making of the action plan. In what follows,
we explain what factors led to these low degrees of procedural and substantial participation, based
on an assessment of the MSI design and implementation (structural factors) and trade union capacity
(agency factors).
6.2. MSI Design and Implementation
6.2.1. Representativeness
To evaluate the representativeness in the three MSIs, their selection procedures were analysed
with attention for the exclusion or categorisation of certain stakeholders groups.
First, in the ETI case, ETI members IUF and Bananalink, respectively a global trade union
and an NGO, played the role of bridge builder and gatekeeper as only member organisations can
raise concerns or file a complaint within this MSI. However, during the implementation of ETI’s
recommendations, the participation of the local trade unions was left to the local management of the
plantation. The local union leader complained about the vague communication on the organisation
of the meetings because they received the invitation to join the meeting with ETI only two days in
advance [CRU2]. This resulted in exclusion and thus low representativeness. Second, in the context
of the Platform, unclear selection criteria, active resistance against trade union participation by the
business side and a preference for high-level participants resulted in very low representativeness
of the unions. Third, the EU–Central America trade agreement specifies that members of the DAG
should be independent representative organisations, and that economic, social and environmental
stakeholders should be represented in a balanced way. However, the selection of the participants is left
to the discretion of the governments, with no clarity on the criteria used. In Costa Rica, the invitation
procedure has been faulty as some trade union representatives included in the members’ list were not
aware of their new role. Commercial interests had already been involved during the negotiation of
the trade agreement and businesses had closer ties with the Ministry of External Trade. They were,
therefore, better aware of the creation of the DAG. In addition, Costa Rica decided to subdivide its DAG
in three separate groups, one for each stakeholder category (business, trade union and environment).
This categorisation could potentially isolate less well coordinated actors, such as trade unions, and
impede collaboration between the different interests. Trade unions were implicitly excluded from the
first CSR seminar as the organisers had framed CSR as a business topic. During the preparation of
the second seminar, trade unions were actively invited by the local EU delegations and a Guatemalan
CSR association.
6.2.2. Procedural Fairness
This criterion is assessed through the examination of the way decision-making procedures allow
for equal opportunities between participants to express their voice and be heard as well as funding
and capacity building supporting the participation of weaker actors.
In the ETI case, rules of procedures regarding governance mechanisms and disciplinary
measures are formalised for members and the implementation is strongly monitored by ETI members
representing local trade unions. However, ETI does not cover the translation of relevant documents on
the progress of the case in the language of the affected workers. In order to give the local trade unions
the opportunity to be correctly informed, Bananalink dealt with this costly task [EUCS7]. Trade unions
are exempted from paying ETI membership fees, but other financial support measures for local trade
unions are limited. ETI did fund an ad hoc session to be given by consultants in Costa Rica to trade
unions which was then obstructed by the local management. Since ETI does not actively promote local
trade union participation along with a considerable margin of manoeuvre for local management to
disregard ETI’s efforts, the procedural fairness within ETI is low.
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Even though the Platform was established to design a common action plan through the
involvement of numerous stakeholders, no moderator or agreed decision-making procedure was
foreseen. In the end, the content of the action plan was reached by consensus. However, by that
time, trade unions were no longer involved in the Platform entailing the consensus was agreed upon
by likeminded business actors. The absence of an entire stakeholder category was possible because
the participation of the business side was considered more essential for the existence of the Platform
[CRG4]. Funding of the Platform was used for the organisation of workshops, but the topics did not
cover labour rights nor were transport costs reimbursed for union representatives coming from the
pineapple-producing regions. It can therefore be concluded that no procedural fairness was pursued
vis-a-vis trade unions and that the procedures were in favour of the pineapple producers.
Turning to procedural fairness in the CSMs, it should be noted that the Central American DAGs
have not agreed upon rules of procedures. This entails that there are no clear rules on how decisions
are supposed to be taken. Even though in practice decisions have been taken by consensus (see infra),
business is in the majority to overrule the voice of other interests. During the transnational meetings
all participants can express their concerns by raising their hand and they will be given the floor by the
moderator. Since the outset, funding has been a critical point for the CSMs. Whereas the European
Economic and Social Committee has taken up the role of secretariat in the EU and the European
Commission makes travel funds available for at least one participant per stakeholder category, there
is no funding whatsoever foreseen in Central America. This has been criticised heavily by EU and
Central American civil society, because travel distances are rather important (within the Central
American region or to Brussels) and not-for-profit actors have limited financial resources. To address
these shortcomings, the EU has created a three-year project of three million euros to support civil
society participation in the implementation of EU trade agreements [86]. At the time of writing the
implementation of the project has not yet started. Regarding the CSR seminars, more EU funding was
available for regional participation in the second event, which had a positive impact on local trade
union participation [EU3,I3].
6.2.3. Consensual Orientation
To determine this final criterion, the pursuit of mutual agreement is considered as well as the
communication attitude and trust among the different stakeholders.
Following the allegations against Fyffes, ETI facilitated a meeting between the unions and
the local management. It was, however, not possible to reach a mutual agreement. In general,
the communication attitude of Fyffes was perceived as rather hostile. Due to Fyffes unresponsiveness
to the grievance in its Costa Rican pineapple plantation, Bananalink launched a public campaign
against practices in Honduras. This was not appreciated by Fyffes, who claimed this was against the
code of conduct of ETI members. Fyffes stated that they do not respond to public pressure and they
“dug their heels in” concerning the recognition of trade unions [EUCS7]. Although building trust
relationships is a central element of ETI’s approach, trust has been broken both by Bananalink and
Fyffes through their communication. In sum, even though consensual orientation is an important
objective of ETI, it was impeded by the communication attitude and damaged trust on both sides.
In the Platform, the ILO mediated between trade unions and producers to find mutual agreement
between them. This attempt was unsuccessful and trade unions left the Platform. In addition to
irreconcilable positions, the negative and aggressive communication attitude, considered ‘emotional’
language, of trade unions was also part of the issue as they wanted to make denunciations and
discuss labour rights violations. This stood in the way of dialogue and the evolution of the Platform
as producers claimed this was not the right place for it. Moreover, there was an overall distrust in
the neutrality of the Platform and a deep mutual distrust between the trade unions and producers.
To conclude, even though there had been a mediation attempt by the ILO, consensual orientation could
not be fulfilled due to miscommunication and a lack of trust.
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Finally, there is a consensus-based approach in the CSMs. It is, however, uncertain if this approach
of mutual agreement can be sustained as experience has shown that business interests do not shy
away from vetoing the inclusion of labour proposals in statements from the transnational CSMs
[EUCS10] as well as in joint working documents [EUCS6]. An internal reflection is being conducted,
mainly by the EU side, to assess how collaboration should be continued [EUCS5]. Regarding the
communication attitude, trade unions have made denunciations at several occasions concerning labour
rights violations in specific companies such as Fyffes [EUCS11]. These efforts received little support,
as other participants claimed that denunciations should not be done during the meetings as the DAGs
are not supposed to deal with specific cases. Since the inception of the DAGs, members have been
trying to build trust within and among the DAGs. The recent unexpected last minute veto by Central
American business representatives against the submission of joint working documents to the Board
was a serious blow to this trust. In addition, local trade unions—who have protested against the trade
agreement during the negotiations—remain on their guard for co-optation as the CSMs and their
participation could legitimise the agreement. In sum, the consensual orientation in the CSMs appeared
to be rather vulnerable as mutual agreement is under pressure, there is a mismatch of communication
attitudes, and trust has been damaged. Turning to the CSR seminars, both organisers and participants
agreed that the format of the workshops invited the participants to collaborate constructively instead
of the more traditional conflictive communication [EU3,EUCS5].
In sum, the three criteria explaining trade union participation through the MSI design and
implantation score low to very low in each MSI (Table A3 in Appendix B). To have a more
comprehensive picture on the enabling and constraining factors of this participation, we should
also take more internal aspects of trade unions into account. In the following section the influence of
their power resources on their participation will be examined.
6.3. Union Power Resources
6.3.1. Internal Solidarity
In general, plantation unions suffer from weak levels of member engagement, because not all
members are willing to sacrifice time during weekends or after work for meetings [CRU4]. For example,
in the case of ETI, the local union leader is most engaged in following up on complaints as other
members do not play a prominent role due to their limited experience with and knowledge of legal
procedures. Mobile phones are the main means of communication between members and local leaders,
and not all members are literate. There is not a dense network of union representatives in the workplace
and members are isolated in different teams spread across the plantation fields. At sectoral level,
a major challenge is to foster a collective identity among plantation workers. Although workers’
problems are of the same nature, the majority of plantation workers are Nicaraguan migrants which
impedes their potential participation and membership to unions. They work to earn an income for
their household, do not want to risk losing their job by forming or joining a union to fight their cause
and may only be on the plantation on a temporary basis. Unions experience difficulties to mobilise new
members to join the union and often lack a clear strategy on how to do so. The negative perception
that unions destroy the economy and cause trouble discourages pineapple workers to join unions out
of fear for reprisals [I2].
6.3.2. Network Embeddedness
The fragmentation of trade unions in the Costa Rican private sector can be traced back to
two events affecting the country’s political economy. First, the Communist Party and their labour
confederation, who had succeeded in organising the banana workers, were outlawed shortly after
the civil war ended in 1948 [55]. The loss of legal recognition of the Communist trade union left
banana workers, who had had one of the strongest and most militant unions of Costa Rica, divided.
This represented a first severe blow to trade unionism in the agricultural industry as the corporations
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did their utmost best to maintain the situation and prevented the emergence of another powerful union
among its workers. Second, during the 1980s, an economic crisis and steep rise of foreign debt resulted
in forced neoliberal policies promoting export sectors. This period had detrimental consequences for
Costa Rican trade unions and the current anti-union culture stems from this context of deregulation
and austerity measures in which private employers created evasive structures and adopted a strong
anti-union attitude [87].
In the case of ETI, SINTRAPEM has strong ties with IUF and Bananalink who supported them in
preparing the complaint and campaign against Fyffes. They are also connected to the Coordinating
Body of Latin American Banana and Agro-industrial Unions (COLSIBA) to share experiences and
strengthen their ability to fight violations internationally. In the context of the Platform, local unions did
not leverage their ties with international unions. Moreover, the network of pineapple unions is spread
over different plantations and decentralised without well-established ties to other unions, for example
the stronger public sector unions. Unions act more independently, targeting specific companies with
specific issues or demands in isolation. Costa Rican (and Central American) trade union participation
during the CSMs is stimulated by EU trade unionists who have, on the one hand, together with EU
NGOs, continuously been raising awareness about the CSMs in Central America in order to increase
trade union participation [EUCS9]. On the other hand, they have repeatedly complained to the
European Commission about the lack of Central American trade unions participating in the CSMs,
hoping for EU pressure on the Central American governments to stimulate trade union participation.
However, it should be noted that when Central American trade unions participate in the CSMs, they
are most likely high-level representatives. In Costa Rica, they are representing national federations
and consequently disconnected from the realities in the plantations.
The findings show that it has been difficult to build coalitions between local unions, however,
trade unions were able to connect to international actors (in the case of ETI and CSMs) and to benefit
from capacity-building activities.
6.3.3. Narrative Resources
Given the heritage of labour struggles in the country (see supra), unions follow a defensive
narrative in the way they act and think. For example, they used the Platform as a forum to denounce
anti-union practices by referring to anecdotes of discrimination and persecution, because there was no
direct line of communication between workers and management in the plantations. Unions represent
only a very small share of workers due to the anti-union campaign and management support for
solidarist associations. They have to compete with the discourse of solidarismo which tries to win
members through offering tangible benefits (e.g., credit opportunities or rain jackets) and are more
convincing in the eyes of workers. Yet, solidarist associations do not recognise the right to collective
bargaining since they are not allowed to negotiate collective agreements by law.
The ideological trade union background also informed their actions in MSIs. For example, in the
CSMs, a union decided not to participate in the MSI because it would have interpreted its participation
as approving the agreement and feared being co-opted [CRU5]. Some unions did not perceive MSIs
as valuable channels to achieve their objectives. Unions also questioned the credibility of private
voluntary standards and feared that it is ‘big business’, used as marketing strategy for companies and
not to genuinely improve labour rights [CRU2]. This stock of negative experiences with certification
audits translated into a general mistrust and disinterest towards mediation efforts and dialogue
opportunities foreseen in MSIs.
6.3.4. Infrastructural Resources
Human resources for the daily functioning of unions are limited since offices are often run by one
person and a secretary. The union leader needs to divide his time between representing workers in
court, visiting the Ministry of Labour for mediation in the capital city, attending workers in the field
and organising training sessions and meetings with the members [CRU2].
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In general, being part of an MSI requires time and preparation, while in many cases unions are
not able to send a representative because they have other priorities connected to their grassroots trade
union activities. They may also not be familiar with the professional language (often English) used in
those MSIs and lack the negotiation or communication skills needed to foster consensus. It is also more
interesting for unions to directly negotiate with management than to participate in dialogue platforms
with no immediate, concrete results.
Turning to the material resources, the costs of transport to the place where the MSIs are organised,
often the capital city or abroad, are too high for unions. While some unions benefit from donor funding,
other unions have limited operating resources coming from membership fees. Unions in the field have
also limited organisational resources (such as computers, meeting rooms or cars) to communicate and
interact with members and other actors.
The analysis of power resources of trade unions (Table A4 in Appendix B) in addition to
MSI design and implementation allows for a more complete view of the determinants of trade
union participation.
7. Discussion
Our findings endorse the concern that MSIs are not as inclusive as they aspire or pretend to be.
Physical attendance does not necessarily imply participants will be heard. This confirms the relevance
of distinguishing between procedural and substantial dimensions of participation when assessing how
a (weaker) stakeholder is involved. In what follows, our findings are discussed and used to articulate
practical recommendations, relevant for MSI organisers, participants and decision makers alike.
The three criteria assessed for the design and implementation of the MSIs, show how the
participatory processes remain far from the deliberative ideal of collective communication and
inclusiveness. The three initiatives experience several challenges constraining representativeness,
procedural fairness and consensual orientation which explain in part the overall limited participation
of trade unions. To achieve a better quality of participation and deliberation, power inequalities among
its participants should be addressed by improving MSI design. Recommendations on the design and
implementation of MSIs are deduced from our findings and clustered around each criteria.
First, the selection criteria for participation to the MSI should be clearly predefined and ensure
the representativeness of the participants. Stakeholders should be identified together with a mapping
of potential conflicts, expectations and their power resources [13]. These should then be taken into
account by a neutral facilitator, for example an impartial secretariat, who can support the participation
of a contested stakeholder category.
Second, regarding procedural fairness, clear goals and rules of decision-making should be set
from the start and agreed by all stakeholders, stronger and weaker stakeholders alike [88]. This is a
first exercise in redressing power inequalities and confirmed in other research on MSIs [7,13]. It should
also be possible to reassess these rules at a later stage. Participants should feel that their input is
considered and the use of vetoes that are not open for discussion, especially by powerful actors, should
be refrained from. Practically, as also stated in Brown [14], resources should be made available for
translation services and transport ensuring the participation of less resourceful stakeholders. Finally,
as became clear in the ETI case as well as the CSMs, international actors play an important role as
bridge builders pushing for local trade union participation and making their voice heard. This leverage
effect has been confirmed in other studies [31].
Third, concerning the consensual orientation in MSIs, we see that building trust between actors
with divergent positions is challenging. Therefore, the format of MSIs should recognise existing power
differences and facilitate a rapprochement between business and unions, for example through small
working groups and capacity-building events as suggested by Reed [15]. Yet, reaching a consensual
orientation requires a constructive communication attitude and especially willingness from all parties
to listen to different positions. An impartial moderator can help to preserve positive group dynamics,
control dominant voices and ensure that less powerful actors can give input. If agenda items suggested
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by weaker participants are deliberately ignored, the credibility of the MSI is threatened and these
participants can vote with their feet and withdraw [14]. Finally, the organisation of mediation and
capacity-building events should be left to, or at least involve, a neutral actor to overcome entrenched
positions between conflicting parties such as local management and unions.
In general, MSIs should be interpreted as a learning process and benefit from continuous internal
evaluation and reflection on obstacles that impede the engagement of weaker actors. This need for
iterative learning is also stressed in adaptive management approaches to long-term participatory
processes as suggested by Stringer et al. [89]. In addition, our analysis showed how the local context
often hampers deliberation and the rebalancing of interests. This was particularly the case in the
Platform, where hardly any efforts were made to ensure that weaker actors could give their input
and were listened to. Since every MSI is influenced by the (local) context in which it operates,
it requires a customised and localised strategy that incorporates feedback from participations and is
sensitive to signals showing the need for redesigning participatory procedures or capacity building
adapted to weaker stakeholders. Finally, even though implementing changes is time and resource
consuming, MSIs can benefit from a more bottom-up involvement of workers and unions, contrary to
high-level representation, as has been demonstrated in recent developments in worker-driven social
responsibility [88].
The analysis also indicates that the design of an MSI is not all-decisive as insights on trade
union power resources also helped to explain their participation. We found that strong network
embeddedness and improved infrastructural resources enhanced trade union participation, whereas
the lack of internal solidarity and unfavourable narrative resources had a negative effect on
their participation.
When looking for ways to boost union’s power resources, the most feasible improvements can be
found in network embeddedness and infrastructural resources. Strengthening ties with international
organisations are an important enabling factor for trade union participation to MSIs. They can demand
involvement in MSIs, facilitate meetings, and support local unions’ infrastructural resources. Yet,
dependency on international alliances can also become a pitfall if the need for better internal union
solidarity is neglected and the union relies exclusively on external support.
Even though internal solidarity and narrative resources should not be ignored, changing a highly
fragmented trade union landscape, the negative reputation of trade unions and local norms cannot
happen overnight [27]. Therefore, it is essential that local unions join forces and build alliances or
coalitions at sectoral level to deal with societal and managerial counter pressures and more actively
engage in the dialogue spaces created by MSIs.
When linking the design and implementation of MSIs to the power resources of trade unions, two
relevant interactions, implying practical takeaways, are observed. First, procedural fairness can be
increased through network embeddedness and infrastructural resources. For instance, in the ETI case
the international partners of the local trade unions strived for their involvement by assisting them in
their communication and translating relevant documents. In the CSMs, EU trade unions have been
very insistent upon encouraging the participation of their Central American counterpart. In addition,
funding is being made available to ensure the participation of less affluent participants. Strong network
embeddedness is missing in the Platform, which is also the initiative with the weakest trade union
participation. Second, consensual orientation is very difficult to attain in a context of negative narrative
resources where historical conflicts, conflictual communication and distrust between the stakeholders
impede progress of the MSI. This was obvious in the Platform as well as the CSMs. In general, MSI
design could not compensate for deficits concerning internal solidarity and narrative resources as they
are deeply entrenched in the domestic context.
8. Conclusions
This article shed light on the participation of trade unions in MSIs by analysing three initiatives
in the EU–Costa Rican pineapple supply chain. In line with previous studies on inclusiveness of
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weaker actors in MSIs, the three initiatives confirm that trade unions can be procedurally allowed to
participate but often fail to contribute substantially. While there was no substantial participation of
unions in the case of the Platform, unions could express their position in the ETI-case. The Central
American trade unions’ substantial participation to the CSMs has been very limited, however, their
procedural participation is on the rise in less formalised meetings.
Our main contribution lies in explaining trade union’s participation by combining two dimensions:
MSIs design and trade union power resources. First, the analysis of the MSIs design and implementation
demonstrates that selection procedures can lead to the exclusion of local trade unions (representativeness),
decision making rules to enhance equality and funding to enable participation of unions are rare
(procedural fairness), and conflictual communication and distrust can also obstruct substantial
participation (consensual orientation). Second, the analysis of union power resources highlights, on the
one hand, how strong network embeddedness and better infrastructural resources are complementary
to the design of MSIs for trade union participation. On the other hand, the lack of internal solidarity
and adverse narrative resources of Costa Rican (pineapple) trade unions have a negative effect on their
participation. MSI design could not compensate for these deficits as they are embedded in the local
context and difficult to change.
This implies for practitioners involved in MSIs that improving the design of MSIs is necessary
(see infra for recommendations) but not sufficient to enhance trade union participation. It stands or
falls with the ability of unions to mobilize their resources and the willingness and commitment of
all participants in the MSI to meaningfully engage in deliberation. Our paper calls for a continuous
evaluation of MSI participatory processes (regarding representativeness, procedural fairness and
consensual orientation) and strengthening of union power resources (internal solidarity, network
embeddedness, narrative and infrastructural resources).
This paper has concentrated on the participatory processes in MSIs, however, additional
research on the outcomes of such MSIs, especially concerning the promotion of labour rights, should
be conducted. These outcomes should be scrutinised to know whether the MSI has ultimately
strengthened weaker actors. Another interesting avenue for further research is the role of public
actors in MSIs. Even though MSIs are often considered to be solely private mechanisms, governments
are often involved as a creator or sponsor. Additional research on the (potential) influence of public
actors, both in importing and exporting countries, would be useful in the assessment of power struggles
at play in MSIs. In this light, a cross-country comparison with MSIs operating in labour repressive
states embedded in different political economies can give a fuller account of how the institutional and
political context influences opportunities for trade union participation in MSIs and how unions and
MSIs deal with these context-specific challenges.
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Appendix A
Table A1. List of interviews, focus groups and observations.
Category In-Text Reference Date Place Category In-Text Reference Date Place
Costa Rican unions (6)
CRU1 June 2015 San José
EU officials (3)
EU1 May 2015 San José
CRU2 November 2016 San José EU2 May 2015 San José
CRU3 June 2015 San José EU3 August 2018 Skype
CRU4 June 2015 San José
EU civil society (12)
EUCS1 September 2016 Brussels
CRU5 August 2018 Skype EUCS2 November 2016 Brussels
CRU6 June 2015 San José EUCS3 March 2017 Brussels
Focus groups unions (3)
FG1 May 2015 Sarapiqui EUCS4 October 2017 Brussels
FG2 March 2016 Santa Rita EUCS5 June 2018 Brussels
FG3 June 2015 Limon EUCS6 September 2018 Brussels
Costa Rican government (8)
CRG1 June 2015 San José EUCS7 September 2018 Skype
CRG2 May 2015 San José EUCS8 September 2018 Skype
CRG3 January 2016 San José EUCS9 September 2018 Brussels
CRG4 May 2016 San José EUCS10 July 2015 Brussels
CRG5 June 2015 San José EUCS11 June 2017 Skype
CRG6 June 2016 San José EUCS12 February 2016 Brussels
CRG7 June 2016 San José
Observations CSMs (8)
Transnational June 2016 Tegucigalpa
CRG8 June 2016 San Carlos Transnational June 2018 Brussels
Costa Rican business (5)
CRB1 February 2016 San Rafael DAG to DAG June 2016 Tegucigalpa
CRB2 May 2015 San José DAG to DAG June 2017 Videoconference
CRB3 May 2015 San José EU DAG March 2016 Brussels
CRB4 January 2016 San Carlos EU DAG June 2017 Brussels
CRB5 January 2016 San José EU DAG November 2017 Brussels
International Labour
Organisation (ILO) officials (3)
I1 May 2015 San José EU DAG October 2018 Brussels
I2 May 2016 San José
I3 June 2018 Geneva
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Appendix B
Table A2. Participation of trade unions in MSIs.
ETI Platform CSMs
Procedural
Intermediate participation
- Representation through international ties
with ETI member NGO and union
- Participation of local trade union in capacity
building session cancelled by management
Very low participation
- Unions represented only 1% of
participants initially
- Eventually withdrawal of trade unions
Low participation
- 2 out of 7 trade union Domestic Advisory
Group (DAG) members participate actively
- All trade union federation secretaries listed,
but not aware of membership
- No trade union participation in first
corporate social responsibility (CSR)
seminar, more trade unions involved in
second CSR seminar
Substantial
Intermediate substantial input
- Hosting visit to collect information and
provide evidence
- Express concerns to ETI
- Failed meeting with management during
capacity-building event
Very low substantial input
- Failed attempt to put freedom of
association on the agenda
- Labour rights removed from final
action plan
Low substantial input
- No consideration given to denunciations
about labour rights violations
- No input provided for joint working
document on Decent Work and CSR
- Discussion of decent work issues during
roundtables at second CSR seminar
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Table A3. Criteria for design and implementation of MSIs.
ETI Platform CSMs
Representativeness
Low representativeness
- International union and NGO act as
bridge builders
- Vague communication and late meeting
invitation by management
Very low representativeness
- Unclear selection criteria
- Active resistance against trade union
participation by the producers’ side
- Preference for high-level participants
Low representativeness
- Legal text refers to inclusion of economic, social
and environmental stakeholders in a
balanced way
- Selection left to government, no clear criteria
- Faulty invitation procedure
- Unclear invitation for unions in 1st CSR seminar,
proactive call for union participation in 2nd
CSR seminar
Procedural fairness
Low procedural fairness
- Only ETI members can file complaint
- Dependence on international ties with
ETI members for funding
and monitoring
- Translation not covered by ETI
- ETI funding for capacity
building session
- Unions exempted from fees
Very low procedural fairness
- No moderator
- No agreed decision making procedure
- Voting about final action plan based on
consensus with only business actors in
the room
- No funding for workshop on labour rights
- Travel expenses difficult to overcome
Low procedural fairness
- No clear rules of procedure
- Consensus based decision making but business
in majority
- No funding in Central America
- New funding project for civil society participation
- Funding to cover travel expenses of unions to
CSR seminar
Consensual orientation
Low consensual orientation
- Trust-building at the core of ETI
- Hostile communication attitude
by Fyffes
- Broken trust by call for action and
advocacy campaign
Very low consensual orientation
- Mediation by ILO failed
- Producers veto the inclusion of
labour proposals
Low consensual orientation
- Consensus based approach at the outset
- Veto business side to publish joint
working document
- Denunciations not appreciated
- Unions cautious for co-optation
- Promotion of constructive collaboration in
CSR seminar
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Table A4. Criteria for union power resources.
ETI Platform CSMs
Network embeddedness
- Strong international network
(Coordinating Body of Latin
American Banana and
Agro-industrial Unions
(COLSIBA), Bananalink, IUF)
- Limited ties among unions in the
pineapple sector and
their federations
- No international network involved
- EU trade unions support Central American
trade unions
- Only high level representatives, no direct
linkages with pineapple plantation unions
Internal solidarity
- In general, difficulties mobilizing workers to join union, lack of a collective identity among workers
- No dense network of trade union representatives, weak levels of member engagement, limited knowledge of rights
Narrative resources
- In general, historical heritage of struggle and frustration lie at the basis of the defensive narrative of trade unions
- Competition with solidarist associations and employer repression feed into the conflictual stance of trade unions
- Unions question the credibility of MSIs because of negative experiences and are cautious for co-optation
Infrastructural resources
- Human resources are limited, lack of communication and negotiation skills required in MSIs
- Union leaders have different priorities and need to divide time between core union activities and preparations for MSIs
- Unions depend on membership fees or donors for funding of transport, computers and organisational infrastructure
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3. Conclusions 
 
In this final chapter of the dissertation, we first give an overview of the main findings of each 
article before addressing the sub-questions that underpin the main research question. These 
are answered through the findings presented in the main body of this dissertation, combined 
with complementary data and insights obtained and developed over the course of the doctoral 
research. Subsequently, the conclusions for each sub-questions lead to the formulation of 
general conclusions, addressing our main research question of whether EU trade 
arrangements can improve labour conditions in third countries. Overall, our conclusions aim 
to surpass the contribution of the individual articles by identifying the synergy of our research 
conducted over the last four years.  
Finally, we end this concluding chapter by formulating some overarching reflections. Here, 
the main contributions of the dissertation to the existing literature are formulated, highlighting 
how political science and agricultural economics focusing on rural development can benefit 
from being addressed simultaneously. In addition, our most important learnings on 
conducting interdisciplinary research are given as well as the limitations of the study and 
suggestions for further research. Finally, in collaboration with Annelien Gansemans and based 
on our research findings, we formulate policy recommendations. These aim at improving the 
relevance and potential impact of EU social trade arrangements as well as labour governance 
in supply chains.  
 
 
3.1 Overview findings articles 
1. The EU and Fair Trade: hands-off? 
In this book chapter, a conceptual framework was developed to explain and schematise the 
sometimes opposing ideological and philosophical meanings of Fair Trade. The framework 
consists of two axes: the first axis makes a distinction according to the extent of systemic 
change necessary to achieve Fair Trade, and ranges from a reformist (pragmatic and narrow) 
to a revolutionary (ideological and broad) view. The second axis distinguishes the required 
role of the government or public sector versus the market or private sector. In other words, 
this axis allows to determine whether interventionism or neoliberalism prevails. 
Based on this framework, the EU position concerning Fair Trade was mapped. In essence, even 
though the EU briefly flirted with the revolutionary Fair Trade option through beneficial 
market access, export stabilisation and commodity protocols in the 1970s, the general 
neoliberal shift in Western politics in the 1980s and 1990s was also translated into EU trade 
policy. This neoliberal tendency became radicalised from the mid-2000s until today, resulting 
in an ever-greater emphasis on trade liberalisation and reciprocity. Even though Fair Trade 
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objectives, and especially those related to sustainable development, are still part of the EU’s 
trade agenda, they follow a piecemeal approach: instead of questioning or challenging the 
prevalence of the neoliberal trade system, they tend to reinforce it. 
2. Do labour rights matter for export? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 
pineapple trade to the EU  
This article determined whether exporting countries complying with labour standards are 
rewarded with a larger export share to the European market. Through a Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis, we wanted to explain the relative importance or dependency on the 
EU market for pineapple exporting countries. 
The analysis revealed two different paths, contrasting African and Latin American cases, in 
which the protection of labour standards mattered in a number of cases. However, it does not 
always play a role, and it is never a sufficient condition on its own for determining exports to 
the European market. Moreover, we showed that having a zero tariff is necessary for a large 
share of export to the EU, and labour standards protection can make a difference when the 
institutional quality is weak.  
Accordingly, our findings call into question whether the image of the EU market as being very 
demanding in terms of labour standards coincides with the purchasing realities in the EU. 
Although the EU is explicit in its discourse on promoting labour standards, it appears to miss 
its intended leverage effect on actual export decisions and consequently fails to drive higher 
standards in sourcing sites.  
3. Mapping variation of civil society involvement in EU trade agreements: A CSI Index 
A Civil Society Involvement (CSI) Index was developed inductively in this article to map the 
extent to which civil society is included in the new generation of EU trade agreements.  
This analysis showed that, although some form of template is used, large variation between 
the agreements exists. A distinction was made between three categories of CSI score: high 
(Canada, Korea), medium (Georgia, Moldova, Vietnam, Ukraine), and low (Central America, 
Singapore, Peru-Colombia, Ecuador). The outcome also revealed interesting nuances within 
the categories listed above. 
4. Explaining variation of civil society involvement in EU trade agreements 
This article further explored the variation identified in the previous article. We found that, 
while none of the explanations can fully and exclusively account for CSI variation, the ‘third 
country domestic resonance’ explanation turns out to be most powerful. In other words, the 
more civil society is already involved in the domestic political system of a partner country, the 
more ambitious civil society provisions in the EU trade agreement will be.  
In addition, a more detailed study of the clusters showed that time, the ‘EU experience’ 
explanation, also matters: first, an increase in civil society interaction with governmental actors 
can be observed. Second, civil society provisions in the recent agreement with Vietnam are 
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more ambitious than would be expected from the domestic context, due to learnings from the 
implementation of existing agreements.  
5. Promoting sustainable development or legitimising free trade? Civil society 
mechanisms in EU trade agreements 
In this article, we aimed to assess whether the civil society mechanisms in EU trade agreements 
are used as an instrument to co-opt and silence civil society. A survey conducted with 
members of the European Domestic Advisory Groups, complemented with interviews and 
non-participatory observation, elucidated their experiences in –and perceptions of– the civil 
society mechanisms. 
The analysis of the data revealed two insights: first, there is no clear evidence of co-optation, 
even though non-profit actors have adopted a constructive approach. Although they have 
decided to participate in the mechanisms, they nevertheless remain critical about the impact 
of free trade and free trade agreements on sustainable development. This is especially true for 
trade unions. Hence, they are facing the insider-outsider dilemma, walking on a tightrope 
between legitimising free trade and obtaining results for the cause they represent and are.  
Second, the survey results showed a discrepancy between business actors and non-profit 
organisations. Business groups are generally (very) positive about free trade, the EU trade 
agreement and the civil society mechanisms. They recognise that the mechanisms play a role 
in legitimising the EU trade agreements, while at the same time providing opportunities for 
discussion with officials and impacting on decision-making. Yet, there is a risk that the civil 
society mechanisms further reinforce the existing asymmetric power relationship between 
business and non-profit organisations when it comes to trade policy influence, rather than 
balancing them in favour of sustainable development. 
6. Trade unions in multi-stakeholder initiatives: what shapes their participation? 
The objective of this article was to assess trade union participation in MSIs, while also 
explaining the factors that enable and constrain their participation. We found that the three 
criteria (representativeness, procedural fairness and consensual orientation) analysed for the 
design and implementation of the MSIs, did not enable notable substantial participation. 
Moreover, trade union power resources also played an important role. Here, strong network 
embeddedness and better infrastructural resources had a positive impact, whereas fragmented 
internal solidarity and unfavourable narrative resources constrained trade union’s 
participation. As such, the analysis confirms business domination and weak bargaining power 
of unions in the MSIs. 
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3.2 Findings RQ1: How do EU trade arrangements promote the improvement 
of labour conditions in third countries? 
To answer our first sub-question, we will first describe the different EU social trade 
arrangements we have encountered throughout our research. These also represent the array 
of existing EU initiatives to promote the improvement of labour conditions in third countries. 
Subsequently, their objectives, governance and enforcement will be analysed. Our research 
mainly focused on the EU bilateral trade agreements and their TSD chapter. To put the features 
of this bilateral instrument in perspective and allow a certain degree of comparison, it will be 
contrasted to the EU’s unilateral social trade instrument (GSP+) and hybrid initiatives. The 
difference in the extent to which each instrument was researched is visualised by different 
shades of grey in table 4. 
 
3.2.1 Instruments 
Article 1 contains an overview on what the EU has done and is doing to counter perverse 
effects of trade and how it uses trade as an instrument to foster sustainable development. In 
the EU trade-labour linkage, three instruments of EU social trade arrangements can be 
discerned: the first is a unilateral regulation, namely the GSP+. This special incentive 
arrangement for sustainable development and good governance is part of the broader EU GSP, 
which grants preferential tariff treatment to developing countries. GSP and GSP+ were 
established by means of an EU regulation, which sets the criteria for granting beneficial market 
access. Since the first reference to a possible suspension due to forced labour in the GSP 
regulations of 1994, several subsequent regulations have defined the eligibility criteria for, and 
functioning of, the instrument. Over the years, GSP+ has only been applied for by, and granted 
to, a limited number of countries. 
The second arrangement is a bilateral agreement. The latest generation of EU trade 
agreements, launched in 2011, has introduced a chapter on TSD chapter. Contrary to the 
unilateral regulation determining the GSP(+), the content of this chapter is the result of 
negotiations between the EU and its trade partner (see article 3 & 4). Several former GSP+ 
beneficiaries have now concluded a bilateral trade agreement with the EU. 
The third arrangement is a wider and more diversified type of instrument, in which both 
public (EU or EU Member States) and private actors cooperate in hybrid initiatives to advance 
labour conditions. In our research on the EU-Costa Rican pineapple trade, we have come 
across the following examples: the Ethical Trade Initiative (ETI), the National Platform for the 
responsible production and trade of pineapples (Platform) and workshops on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) (article 6). The CSR workshops have been organised in the context of the 
implementation of the TSD chapter of the EU-CA AA. However, we consider them to be 
hybrid initiatives. This is because they are not a formal part of the TSD chapter and are created 
on an ad hoc basis and in collaboration with both private Central American organisations and 
international institutions. 
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3.2.2 Objectives 
The objective of an arrangement refers to its substantive content concerning the promotion of 
improved labour conditions. The labour provisions in trade agreements with countries that 
have already ratified the ILO CLS, encompass the commitment “to respect, promote and 
realise the ILO CLS as well as the exchange of information on the situation and advancements 
of other ILO Conventions”. However, TSD chapters in EU bilateral agreements with countries 
that have not ratified all the CLS (e.g. Singapore and Vietnam) specify these countries should 
“make continued and sustained efforts towards ratifying”. The ratification of CLS is thus not 
a precondition for the conclusion of an EU FTA. Van den Putte et al. (2013) showed how the 
labour provisions included in the latest generation of EU trade agreements have widened and 
deepened compared to previous generations. The labour provisions in earlier EU agreements, 
such as the EuroMed agreements, refer to social cooperation and dialogue on social matters. 
However these provisions are limited to issues on the social protection system and enhancing 
the health coverage system, and are mainly described in technical terms. 
To be granted beneficial market access under GSP+, countries have to ratify and effectively 
implement the core international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental 
protection and good governance. Before concluding a bilateral trade agreement with the EU, 
the Central American countries were GSP+ beneficiaries. The ILO CLS had already been 
ratified by the Central American countries in the 1950s and 1960s (except for El Salvador, 
which ratified the ILO conventions on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
(FACB) in 2006, mainly due to US pressure in the context of the CAFTA-DR agreement), so 
credit concerning their ratification should not be given to the EU. Nevertheless, it shows that 
the inclusion of the ILO CLS in their trade relations with the EU was not new for the Central 
American countries. Moreover, the EU is said to have tried to include more labour provisions, 
beyond the core labour standards, to the TSD chapter (interview 12). This intention was not 
realised as the final scope of the labour provisions in the TSD chapter is the same as in the 
GSP+. 
The three hybrid initiatives analysed in the EU-Costa Rican pineapple trade (ETI, the Platform 
and CSR workshops) have different labour objectives. ETI has developed its own Base Code. 
It was negotiated and agreed by the founding members (trade unions, NGOs and business) 
and reflects the most relevant ILO conventions, including FACB (ETI, 2019). The Platform, 
which was assembled to develop a national strategy to improve the sustainability performance 
of the Costa Rican pineapple production, does not refer to the ILO CLS (see article 6). On the 
contrary, the national plan, which was negotiated between the participants (including officials 
of the Costa Rican Ministry of Agriculture as well as Energy and Environment; excluding trade 
unions who had left the Platform), contains the commitment to promote the Costa Rican 
alternative to trade unions (namely solidarismo and permanent committees) internationally 
(PNUD Plataforma Piña Costa Rica, 2015, 2016). Finally, the CSR workshops focused on the 
labour aspect of CSR. To that end, the principles and guidelines for responsible value chains 
developed by the ILO (on Decent Work) and OECD (Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises) 
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were put forward. These three examples demonstrate the variety of labour objectives within 
hybrid initiatives. Whereas ETI uses the ILO CLS as a starting point, the Platform wants to 
promote the Costa Rican alternative model of workers representation, which is not recognised 
by the ILO. In addition, the CSR workshops refer to both ILO and OECD principles. 
 
3.2.3 Governance 
Turning to the governance of the EU trade arrangements, This section will describe how the 
objectives are implemented and how this implementation is monitored. The implementation 
of the TSD chapter’s labour provisions relies on the signatory parties. It is up to the public 
actors to “respect, promote and realise the ILO CLS” through their national labour law and 
labour policy, using and creating public tools to implement the CLS.  
The implementation of the labour objectives in EU trade agreements is monitored by two 
institutional mechanisms established in the TSD chapter: the first mechanism is an 
intergovernmental body, namely the Board on Trade and Sustainable Development in the EU-
CA AA, in which high level officials from each party participate. They are obliged to meet 
within the first year that the trade agreement enters into force and after that when necessary. 
During these meetings, which last one to two days in the case of the EU-CA AA, each party 
gives an overview on relevant changes in their legislation. Moreover, country-specific issues 
related to sustainable development (including labour) are discussed (interview 68). Finally, in 
order to report on the implementation of the TSD chapter, a summary of the meetings is shared 
with civil society in the subsequent meeting. 
The second monitoring mechanism involves civil society of all partner countries. Their set-up 
and functioning, and the variation between the different EU trade agreements, is described in 
detail in article 3. The main features are (1) the establishment of a domestic advisory group 
(DAG), in which representatives of three constituencies (labour, environment and business) of 
each party participate; (2) the organisation of yearly transnational meetings, where the 
members of the DAG and/or other actors of both the EU and its trading partner meet annually; 
(3) interaction between these two meetings and the intergovernmental body.  
This civil society mechanism, and its potential in terms of improving labour conditions, will 
be extensively discussed in the subsequent section answering the second research question. 
However, three comments should be made concerning the monitoring role of the civil society 
mechanism. First, there is a lack of clarity concerning the purpose of the mechanism (see Orbie 
et al, 2016 in the annex). Even though it is created under the heading “Institutional and 
Monitoring Mechanism” in the TSD chapter, the DAG’s legal ‘task description’ includes 
“expressing views and making recommendations”, whereas the transnational mechanism 
"shall conduct dialogue” and “express its views and opinions”. However, there are different 
opinions among the participants on how this should be put into practice. Some claim 
denunciations about labour rights violations can and should be made during the meetings 
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(interview 84 & 87), whereas others assert they should focus on making recommendations 
(interview 76). Similarly to the last position, DG Trade also favours a “positive agenda” 
(interview 12, 68, 81; observation 12). Moreover, in addition to these monitoring purposes, the 
creation of these meetings can also be understood as a way to legitimise the contested trade 
agreements (see article 5). Civil society could be co-opted by tempering their critical and 
transformative nature, enticing them to work from within the agreements. 
Second, accountability issues have arisen from the interaction foreseen between civil society 
and the intergovernmental body. In the case of the EU-CA AA, there is no formal feedback 
mechanism in which the intergovernmental body reports on how the civil society’s input has 
been considered or put to use. The civil society’s statement is shared during the last meeting 
of the series in which civil society meets the intergovernmental board. In these meetings, the 
governments take note of the declaration and no substantive follow up has been given so far. 
This has led to demotivation and discontent with the participating civil society actors. To avoid 
the continuation of this dialogue of the deaf, the EU DAG, supported by the Central American 
DAGs, wrote a letter to DG Trade to, among other requests, increase the interaction with the 
intergovernmental board by securing a separate meeting (not foreseen in the TSD chapter) 
gathering the EU and Central American DAGs and the intergovernmental board during the 
next series of meetings in June 2019. In general, differences exist between the various EU free 
trade agreements on this accountability issue. CETA, the EU-Canada trade agreement, for 
instance prescribes that the intergovernmental board “shall report annually on the follow-up 
to those [the transnational meeting’s] communications”. Regarding the EU-Korea agreement, 
the legal text shows limited ambition concerning the interaction between civil society and 
governmental actors (article 3). Yet, in practice the order of the meetings ensures that civil 
society’s input feeds into the discussions of the intergovernmental board. Contrary to the 
Central American agreement, civil society meets before, and not parallel to, the 
intergovernmental meeting, and their report is then integrated in the intergovernmental 
meeting (interview 87).  
Third, it should be emphasised that, while most common definitions distinguish civil society 
from the economic sphere (Spurk, 2010), the EU includes professional associations in its 
interpretation (European Commission, 2001). These associations represent the interests of an 
industry and could therefore also be considered as belonging to the economic sphere. 
Similarly, in the civil society mechanisms established in the EU bilateral trade agreements, 
business organisations and other economic actors are included in the monitoring. Article 5 
shows how this might be problematic due to the discrepancy between the perception of rather 
positive business groups and more critical non-profit organisations in the EU, which could 
reinforce the existing asymmetric power relationship. This risk has been confirmed in article 6 
concerning the power dynamics at play in the Central American civil society mechanisms. 
In contrast to the EU bilateral instrument, which involves civil society in its monitoring and 
therefore showcases hybrid characteristics, GSP+’s governance is focused on public actors. The 
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beneficiary country is responsible for the implementation of the conventions and since the 
2012 GSP reform it also carries burden of proof on beneficiaries to demonstrate compliance 
(European Commission, 2018d). The European Commission in turn keeps a scorecard per 
country, which includes information based on reports of international institutions such as the 
ILO. Interestingly, since the 2012 reform, other reliable sources of information (including civil 
society and social partners) can be consulted. However, Portela (2019) found that the 
establishment of GSP+ did not lead to an intensification of dialogue between civil society and 
the beneficiary government.  
The governance of hybrid instruments shows variation. Whereas ETI used to depend 
considerably on UK government in its early stages (mainly for its endorsement and 
financial/operational facilitation), the UK government’s role is now ‘decentred’ (Knudsen & 
Moon, 2017). ETI is currently implemented and monitored by private actors, even though it 
still lends the public organisational structure of regional and country offices. In addition, the 
UK government still has an observer status in the ETI Board. In contrast, the Platform is 
governed completely differently. Once the action plan was agreed upon, it was 
institutionalised as a national decree. In 2017, a national follow-up committee was established 
with twelve representatives from different ministries, business and civil society organisations 
(except for trade unions) to monitor the implementation of the action plan (National Initiative 
to Pineapple Responsible Production, 2018). The Monitoring Committee has a technical 
secretariat located at the Ministry of Agriculture. Finally, the CSR workshops were 
implemented, or organised, by the relevant EU Delegations, in collaboration with a local 
private organisation specialised in CSR. In Costa Rica, this organisation is also member of the 
national DAG. Due to the nature of the workshops, monitoring is not an issue. Interestingly 
however, participation to the workshops has been monitored by the EU DAG members, as 
barely no trade unions were involved in the first workshop. Due to reiterative pressure by the 
EU DAG, this issue was addressed in the subsequent meeting (see article 6). 
 
3.2.4 Enforcement 
The last aspect of EU trade arrangements to be described an analysed is their enforcement. 
Complaints on labour (or other sustainable development) issues are not covered by the 
bilateral trade agreement’s general dispute settlement mechanism. Instead, TSD chapters have 
their own mechanism, which consists of governmental consultation, and –if no mutually 
satisfactory solution is found– the establishment of a panel of experts. However, there is no 
provision for sanctions if the panel's recommendations are not followed up. Trade preferences 
will not be suspended and no other form of enforceable leverage is foreseen. In sum, this 
enforcement mechanism has no ‘teeth’. The design of this aspect of the EU soft or promotional 
approach, often contrasted to the US hard or conditional approach, has been criticised by 
academics, activists and Members of the European Parliament alike (Cross, 2017; Harrison et 
al., 2018; Marx et al., 2016; Rodríguez-Piñero, 2018). Even though EU trade commissioner 
Malmström has repeatedly assured that the TSD chapter is enforceable, these voices are 
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sceptical about the potential of its dispute settlement mechanism. After a reflection exercise in 
2017-2018, the Commission acknowledged the need to be more assertive concerning the 
enforcement of the TSD chapter (European Commission, 2017a, 2018c). Accordingly, and after 
continuous pressure by European civil society, DG Trade for the first time activated 
government consultations with South Korea over labour rights violations in December 2018 
(European Commission, 2018b). This being said, the EU will keep on favouring its soft 
approach, focusing on dialogue and cooperation to enforce the sustainable development 
commitments in its trade agreements.  
Conversely, the unilateral arrangement GSP(+) employs a hard approach, foreseeing the 
withdrawal of beneficial market access in case of serious and systematic violations of the 
conventions. GSP+ is thus more stringent then EU trade agreements, as market access is 
conditional on ratification and implementation. Nevertheless, this conditionality has rarely 
been put into practice so far. In line with its recent resolution to enforce its social trade 
instruments more assertively, the EU has launched the procedure to temporarily suspend 
Cambodia’s preferential access in February 2019 and has also stepped up its engagement 
with Myanmar, both GSP beneficiaries (European Commission, 2019; Malmström, 2018). In 
general, EU decisions to make use of its enforcement mechanisms are considered to have 
predominantly been driven by political considerations, rather than human and labour right 
violations (interview 87). 
The enforcement of hybrid arrangements varies according to their design. However, they 
typically rely on private actors through third-party auditing, civil society watch dogs and 
ethical consumerism. Overall, governments have been particularly reluctant to employ their 
regulatory capacity to ensure the enforcement of hybrid initiatives (Knudsen & Moon, 2017). 
ETI has developed its own disciplinary procedure to enforce membership obligations (2009). 
As discussed in article 6, the international importer and distributor of tropical products, Fyffes 
has been accused of labour rights violations in its subsidiaries’ pineapple and melon 
plantations in Costa Rica and Honduras. Due to the lack of progress in Honduras, Fyffes has 
been suspended from ETI since May 2017, causing the company reputational damage 
(interview 85; Moyo, 2017). The Platform’s action plan is currently being implemented and 
monitored by a committee comprising public and private actors. However, no concrete 
enforcement mechanism is foreseen in case of non-fulfilment. This being said, since the action 
plan does not mention any reference to Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, this 
has less importance for our research.  
 
3.2.5 Conclusion RQ1 
Concerning the EU social trade instruments, we see an evolution from the use of the unilateral 
regulation GSP+ to bilateral agreements. Technically, this is due to changes in the GSP+’s 
eligibility criteria. However, several authors have criticised the EU for subordinating 
normative goals to its own economic interests (Langan, 2014; Siles-Brügge, 2014). Based on our 
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research, it is difficult to make generalisations concerning hybrid initiatives due to their 
diversity. Some have a permanent structure, while others are temporary or have an undefined 
future. This being said, there is an increased openness from the EU and other state actors to 
collaborate with non-state actors for the advancement of labour conditions. 
 
Table 4: Overview EU social trade arrangements  
(the different shades of grey reflects the extent to which each instrument was empirically researched, dark grey = 
most extensive) 
 EU social trade arrangements 
GSP+ TSD chapter 
ETI, Platform, CSR 
workshops 
Instrument Unilateral regulation Bilateral agreement Hybrid initiatives 
Objective 
 
Ratification & 
implementation ILO 
CLS 
Commitment by 
Signatories to uphold 
ILO CLS 
 
Initiative-specific 
- ETI: ILO CLS used as 
starting point 
- Platform: promotion of 
solidarismo 
- CSR workshop: ILO & 
OECD guidelines 
Governance By public actors 
Pre-reform: limited 
monitoring  
Post-reform 2012: 
increased monitoring 
(+ input civil society 
possible) 
By public & non-state 
actors: 
1. Governmental 
meeting 
2. Civil society 
meetings: domestic & 
transnational 
3. Government & 
transnational civil 
society meeting 
Mainly non-state actors 
- ETI: by private actors  
- Platform: 
implementation decree, 
cooperation public-
private (no trade unions) 
- CSR workshop: by 
public (EU Delegations 
& DG Trade) & private 
(local CSR business 
organisation) 
Enforcement Hard: potential 
withdrawal 
preferential market 
access 
Soft: through dialogue 
Dispute settlement 
mechanism: 
Governmental 
consultation & Panel 
of Experts 
Initiative specific: 
- ETI: hard: own 
disciplinary procedure, 
suspension members 
- Platform: not foreseen 
(labour issues not 
involved) 
- CSR workshop: does 
not apply 
 
The ILO CLS play is central role in the objectives of EU social trade initiatives. Nevertheless 
the case of the pineapple platform shows this privileged place is not always guaranteed. In 
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addition, whereas the ratification of the ILO CLS is a requirement for GSP+ market access, it is 
not for the conclusion of EU bilateral trade agreements. 
We noted considerable distinctions in the governance of the different instruments. In the case 
of GSP+ and the TSD chapter, states are responsible for the implementation of the labour 
commitment. In contrast, non-state actors have the lead in hybrid initiatives. Turning to the 
monitoring, there is a difference between the GSP+, which barely involves civil society, and 
the bilateral trade agreements, in which it is granted a seemingly important role in the 
monitoring of TSD chapter implementation. Hybrid instruments by definition involve civil 
society. However, in the case of the Platform and the first CSR workshop, we noticed that this 
does not guarantee the inclusion of trade unions. 
Finally, the enforceability of the instruments differ in the sense that GSP+ foresees a hard 
enforcement, whereas the bilateral instrument has a softer approach based on dialogue. In 
both cases the EU has acknowledged the need to be more assertive and has started to show 
signs of practicing what they preach. The hybrid instruments discussed represent the two 
extremes in which ETI has set up a hard approach through its own disciplinary procedure, 
whereas the Platform does not envisage any concrete enforcement at all. This being said, all 
enforcement efforts have been criticised as being too politically driven, permissive or slow. 
In sum, no single straight forward evolution can be discerned as the EU trade arrangements 
remain multifaceted. However, it can be said that overall, civil society involvement has gained 
importance and that the implementation of the instruments has become more flexible. With 
flexible we aim to describe the ad hoc initiatives conceived to address the design or 
implementation flaws of the arrangements. 
 
 
3.3 Findings RQ2: How relevant is this approach to the improvement of 
labour conditions in third countries in general? 
Through the second sub-question, we want to analyse the relevance of EU social trade 
arrangements for the improvement of labour conditions in third countries to understand the 
potential impact of these arrangements. A working definition of relevance was developed in 
the introduction of this dissertation:  
For EU social trade instruments to be relevant, they should be appropriate to the needs 
of workers in third countries, as well as an essential element of a plan capable of 
achieving improved labour conditions. 
In what follows, each substantial feature, clustered around ‘workers’ needs’ and ‘essential 
element’, of this working definition will be assessed through the findings presented in the 
articles. These findings will be complemented with additional empirical data or information 
whenever pertinent. 
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3.3.1 Appropriate to the needs of workers 
To assess the extent to which EU social trade agreements enable the empowerment of trade 
unions, and are therefore relevant to the improvement of labour conditions in third countries, 
we have adapted an analytical framework conceived by Alsop et al. (2006) (see Figure 4). This 
framework assesses empowerment by connecting the agency of an individual or group to the 
opportunity structure in which it operates. Agency refers either to an actor’s degree of 
involvement in a course of action or to the scope of actions that a person could be involved in 
bringing about (Drydyk, 2013). It is linked to the ability and capacity of that actor to choose 
and act. Opportunity structure comprises the institutional context within which actors operate, 
which influences their ability to transform agency into action (Alsop et al., 2006). Opportunity 
structures, establishing the ‘rules of the game’, can be either formal (i.e. rules, laws, regulatory 
frameworks) or informal (i.e. unofficial rules, cultural practices, norms and values).  
Together, agency and opportunity structure form a dynamic process in which their interaction 
has the potential to improve the capacity of individuals or groups to act and make effective 
choices. This process thus influences the degree of empowerment. Alsop et al. (2006) identify 
three degrees of empowerment: whether an opportunity to make a choice exists (existence of 
choice), whether a person or group actually uses the opportunity to choose (use of choice) and 
whether the choice brings about the desired result (achievement of choice). The degree of 
empowerment in turn leads to a desired outcome, ideally a transformed power relation. 
Through the use of double arrows, the framework highlights the iterative relationship between 
agency and opportunity structure, as well as between the degrees of empowerment and both 
agency and opportunity structure.  
 
Figure 4: Analytical framework by Alsop et al. (2006): the relationship between outcomes and correlates of 
empowerment  
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In line with the research approach set out in the introduction, the appropriateness of EU social 
trade arrangements to the needs of workers will be assessed through their empowerment of 
trade unions. We therefore want to examine whether the civil society mechanisms established 
in the TSD chapters of the latest generation of EU free trade agreements empower trade 
unions. These findings will then be compared with the unilateral and hybrid EU trade 
arrangements.  
Applying this framework to our research context, the following process is implied (see Figure 
5): Costa Rican trade unions’ agency will be assessed by analysing their asset endowment 
(Alsop et al., 2006) or power resources (Lévesque & Murray, 2010), namely their resources to 
use economic, social, and political opportunities. In addition, the existing opportunity 
structure defining the rules of the game of industrial relations in Costa Rica will be mapped. 
Attention will be paid both to the formal and informal structures. The interaction of trade 
unions’ agency and the opportunity structure can than lead to three degrees of empowerment: 
first, are there opportunities for trade unions’ to make their voice heard? Second, if so, did 
trade unions attempt to participate? Third, did they expressed their concerns and were they 
listened to? Achieving all degrees of empowerment could contribute to changing power 
structures in Central American and Costa Rican industrial relations, which in turn might 
improve worker labour standards, as worker’s interests are well-represented and considered. 
 
Figure 5: Adapted analytical framework by Alsop et al. (2006): the relationship between the improvement of labour 
standards and the correlates of trade union empowerment. 
Based on our findings in the articles and complementary empirical research, the following 
section will discuss the state of the agency and opportunity structure of trade unions in Costa 
Rica. Furthermore, we will also look into the influence of civil society mechanisms in EU 
bilateral trade agreements and whether they have led to empowerment in this regard. 
Agency 
Alsop et al. (2006) define agency according to an actor or group’s psychological, informational, 
organisational, material, social, financial, and human assets. Similarly, Lévesque and Murray 
216 
 
(2010) identify four types of power resources that are important to trade unions: internal 
solidarity, network embeddedness, narrative resources and infrastructural resources. Given 
the substantial overlap between both understandings of assets and resources, and given the 
fact that Lévesque and Murray’s typology was developed to determine trade union capacity, 
their interpretation will be maintained. The power resources of trade unions in the Costa Rican 
pineapple industry are discussed in article 6. In our case study, we found that trade union 
reinforcement through multi-stakeholder initiatives is the most feasible for the resources: 
network embeddedness, which concerns the horizontal and vertical links with other unions, 
community groups and social movements, and infrastructural resources, referring to material 
and human resources and their allocation. 
These two resources have indeed been adressed through the civil society mechanism of the 
EU-CA AA. The network embeddedness has mainly been driven by the EU DAG trade union 
members, who have been clear since the beginning of the meetings that their own participation 
aims at the reinforcement of trade unionism in Central America and the improvement of 
labour conditions in the region. As a consequence, several initiatives are strengthening the 
Central American trade unions’ network embeddness resource. First, the European trade 
unions have been using their existing Central American contacts to continuously stimulate 
their counterpart’s participation in the different civil society meetings, both through informing 
them of upcoming meetings as well as insisting on their attendance. Second, the transnational 
meetings provide a useful occasion to coordinate between the European and Central American 
trade unions on their position on the implementation of the EU-CA AA as well as other matters 
related to their (inter)national activism. The transnational meetings in Central America have 
for example been combined with other regional trade union meetings and fact finding 
missions. Third, the civil society meetings have exposed the weak, nearly non-existent, 
coordination among Central American trade unions. Assisted by European trade unions, the 
Consejo Sindical Unitario, grouping around 30 Central American and Caribbean trade unions, 
federations and confederations, has recently started to address this situation. Its technical 
secretary strives for an increasingly coordinated and harmonised trade union participation in 
the Central American DAGs (interview 78 & 84). These concrete examples demonstrate how 
the existence of the civil society mechanisms has stimulated the improvement of Central 
American trade unions’ network embeddedness. This being said, these efforts still need to be 
consolidated, through time and action, to ensure a durable effect. In addition, we did not see 
a significant trickle-down effect to lower levels of trade union organisation, and certainly not 
to the company or plantation level. 
Concerning the infrastructural resources, travelling costs to attend the meetings have been 
raised as an important barrier, as they impede the participation of less affluent civil society 
participants. Even though there is a near unanimous agreement that this issue should not only 
be addresses by the EU alone and that Central American countries should also make a 
contribution, there are no indications that the latter can or will make budgets available for this 
purpose. In early 2019, the EU launched a three-year project to support the implementation of 
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TSD chapters through consistent, visible and increased participation of civil society (European 
Commission, 2018e). If partner countries accept EU support, the project will help to organise 
two DAG meetings per year in those countries. In addition, the project covers the travel costs 
of three non-EU DAG members for meetings in both their own countries as well as in Brussels. 
However, since the initiation of this project, no EU-Central American transnational meeting 
has taken place. We can therefore not confirm whether this financial support has positively 
affected trade union participation. Even though this initiative might appear of minor 
importance and does not change the Central American trade union’s structural financial 
circumstances, it is considered an attempt to reinforce trade unions’ infrastructural resources, 
as it enables participation to the meetings. 
In general, there are some positive indications for trade union agency. However, only the 
network embeddedness is evolving in a durable manner. This is because ties between 
European and Central American trade unions are growing stronger and Central American 
trade unions are starting to coordinate among themselves. The stimulus by the EU to improve 
the infrastructural resources is limited and it is a short-term initiative. The other two resources, 
internal solidarity (assessing collective cohesion and deliberative vitality within trade unions) 
and narrative resources (values and stories providing shared understandings and frame the 
way union members think and act) are neglected. Not surprisingly, these two resources touch 
upon the very core of trade union organisations and are thus more difficult to change, 
especially by external international actors. Costa Rican trade unions in the private sector, and 
Central American trade unions in general, suffer from structural weaknesses through low 
unionisation rates and an overall anti-union context. This context is described in the 
introduction of the dissertation and, confirming the iterative relationship between agency and 
opportunity structure, will be further addressed in the next section. 
Opportunity structure 
The opportunity structure comprises the institutional context that shapes and constrains 
human interaction and individual choices through establishing formal and informal ‘rules of 
the game’. Applied to our research context, we are mainly interested in how these institutions 
influence trade union existence and activity. As described in the introduction, the formal Costa 
Rican opportunity structure has created a rather constraining environment for the functioning 
of trade unions. The Costa Rican labour code –especially given the recent reforms– could 
provide a more conducive setting for trade union activity. Yet, this is currently still offset by 
legally permitted alternative solidarity associations, solidarismo, and the lack of formal 
institutions that foster (tripartite) social dialogue. The fragmented and weak social dialogue in 
Costa Rica is also the reason why the OECD (2017) has recommended to strengthen tripartite 
bodies and to create an ‘Economic and Social Council’. While trade union discrimination by 
private employers persists in Costa Rica, labour inspection has been inadequate and the 
judicial processes too cumbersome. The latter has been modernised by the recent labour law 
reform, which has become a silver lining for the enforcement of trade union rights.  
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The informal context is also hostile to trade unionism. The practice of solidarismo prevails and 
is actually preferred by workers, which undermines independent trade union efforts. 
Moreover, very negative public opinion concerning trade unions remains in Costa Rica. This 
public opinion is fuelled by employers and an important sector of the Catholic Church. In 
addition, trade union activities from public Costa Rican trade unions, which are much stronger 
than those from the private sector, are often considered as illegitimate by non-affiliated citizens 
and contribute to the poor reputation of trade unions in general. 
These formal and informal structures have had important consequences on trade unionism in 
Costa Rica. A better understanding of these structures clarify the trade unions’ weak power 
resources internal solidarity and narrative resources. It also explains the low number of 
collective agreements in the Costa Rican private sector. 
The TSD chapter of the EU-CA AA is a recent addition to the Costa Rican formal opportunity 
structure. Since we have already discussed the limited challenging exchanges in the 
intergovernmental board, we will focus on the civil society mechanisms established in this 
chapter. Alsop et al. (2006) explain how interactions between formal and informal institutions, 
which might result in tensions, are required for shifting power. In what follows, we will assess 
whether the TSD chapter in the EU-CA AA and its civil society mechanism as a formal 
institution influence the opportunity structure for trade unions. This will be determined 
through the degrees of empowerment and interplay between agency and opportunity 
structure as presented in Alsop et al.’s (2006) analytical framework (see Figure 4 and 5). 
Degree of empowerment 
Empowerment considers a person’s or group’s ability to choose and to act. The first degree of 
empowerment is therefore whether there exists a choice. In the case of the civil society 
mechanism established in the EU-CA AA, this degree of choice corresponds with the existing 
opportunities for trade unions to participate and make their voice heard. The obvious answer 
to this question would be positive, as the civil society mechanisms are of course established as 
a platform for civil society involvement, including trade unions. However, a closer look at the 
legal provisions establishing the mechanisms as well as at their implementation in practice, 
gives a more nuanced answer. Article 3 shows how there is a difference in the level of civil 
society involvement foreseen in the texts of the EU bilateral trade agreements, even though 
the legal provisions establishing the civil society mechanisms are based on the same template. 
In our comparative analysis, Central America, together with the Andean countries and 
Singapore, is featured in the lowest category. In addition, article 4 explains this variation by 
concluding that the level of civil society involvement in an EU trade agreement reflects the 
domestic practice of civil society participation in the trade partner. In other words, if civil 
society participation in a third country is low, civil society involvement in the EU trade 
agreement with that country will also be low. We should however indicate that Costa Rica 
holds a special position in this conclusion, as it does not score low in overall civil society 
participation. On the contrary, the country scores very well on political and social integration 
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in the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (2016) used in article 4 (8,3 out of 10, 10 
being the best score). This is further confirmed by the Civicus Monitor (2018), which evaluated 
the Costa Rican civic space as ‘open’. The low civil society involvement in the EU-CA AA thus 
reflects the lowest common denominator among the Central American countries. This being 
said, for trade union participation the low level of involvement in the civil society mechanism 
is not surprising and reflects the domestic condition of social dialogue. In sum, even though 
the choice exists, the legal provisions of the trade agreement establishing this choice (i.e. the 
civil society mechanisms) affect its existence negatively. 
The second degree determines the use of choice, namely whether the trade unions decided 
and attempted to participate to the civil society meeting. Again, our research draws a mixed 
picture. On the one hand, governmental and business actors informed us that trade unions 
were invited but did not want to participate (interview 12 & 50). On the other hand, trade 
unionists complained they were not invited (interview 23, 51, 63). Concerning trade union 
participation in the domestic mechanism, article 6 explains how the selection procedure to 
become a member of the Costa Rican DAG, or any other Central American DAG, is flawed. In 
addition, there is little awareness of the mechanism’s existence in general. Even for the 
transnational meeting, which is more open –albeit not public– than the domestic mechanism, 
invitations have not been circulated widely. In addition, we observed that a number of 
(Honduran) trade unions attended the transnational meeting (in Honduras) to test the water 
and form a first impression of the civil society meetings. It would therefore be too simplistic 
to state that trade unions do not want to participate.  
However, at the same time, certain trade unions are not interested in participating, while 
others are reluctant to do so. The disinterest stems both from a lack of belief in the idea that 
civil society mechanisms could matter for labour conditions, especially since the TSD chapters 
have no enforcement mechanism (interview 66), and from a lack of awareness on the potential 
harmful consequences of free trade on the Central American and Costa Rican society 
(interview 82). The reluctance to participate relates to the insider-outsider dilemma discussed 
in article 5. Trade unions, along with other civil society actors, hesitate to take part in the 
implementation of a cause they do not support. Article 5 concludes that in the case of the EU 
DAGs there is no evidence of co-optation even though civil society is aware of the risk that 
their participation could serve (solely) to legitimise the trade agreement. The findings also 
warn for the discrepancy in the perception of non-profit and business actors, which appear to 
reinforce an existing power imbalance. Even though the perception of Central American or 
Costa Rican civil society was not assessed in the same systematic matter, our interviews 
indicate an even wider divide between business and non-profit sector and a stronger distrust 
towards the civil society mechanisms.  
Finally, the third degree of empowerment is the achievement of choice. This would entail the 
substantial participation of trade unions. In other words, it implies that they would attend and 
contribute substantially to the civil society mechanism created in the EU-CA AA, and that their 
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input would be considered. In article 6, we explained that this has not yet been the case for 
Central American trade unions. There are failings in the achievement of the first and second 
degree, and given the limited agency and constraining opportunity structure, this last degree 
of empowerment has not been accomplished. Correspondingly, we did not observe changes 
in power structures to the benefit of trade unions and can therefore conclude that the civil 
society mechanisms have not empowered Central American, and in particular Costa Rican, 
trade unions. Therefore, they are not appropriate to workers’ needs at this stage. 
Other EU social trade arrangements 
To complement the analysis on the EU bilateral social trade arrangement, this approach will 
be contrasted to the empowerment potential of the unilateral (GSP+) and hybrid (ETI, the 
Platform and CSR workshops) initiatives, even though these instruments have been analysed 
less thoroughly. 
GSP+ requires the ratification and implementation of the ILO CSL. As such, it focuses solely 
on the formal opportunity structure and does not contribute to the agency of trade unions. If 
closely monitored and consistently enforced, GSP+ could contribute to changes in the formal 
and informal institutions that prevent the implementation of the ILO CLS. The EU funds 
projects to support GSP beneficiary countries to effectively implement the ILO CLS and 
comply with reporting obligations (European Commission, 2015). These are implemented by 
international organisations, mostly the ILO, and focus mainly on the reinforcement of the 
formal governmental institutions. However, we are not aware of such projects existing in 
Costa Rica at the time when it was still a GSP+ beneficiary and, if so, whether they had any 
potential to empower trade unions.  
We have described the diversity in hybrid instruments in the section answering the first 
research question. This is not only obvious in the analysis of their objectives, governance and 
enforcement. The three examples are ‘wired’ entirely differently and also differ in their 
empowering potential. ETI has been supporting Central American trade unions mainly 
through reinforcing their network embeddedness with a strong international network. These 
trade unions have decided to use the choice of complaining about labour rights violations and 
participating to a multi-stakeholder initiative. The last degree of empowerment, achievement 
of choice, has not been reached entirely, as the trade union’s substantial participation was only 
limited. This being said, Fyffes has been, and still is, suspended from ETI. This suspension 
affects the formal institution in the opportunity structure and potentially also the informal one: 
it denounces solidarismo, enables dialogue between plantation management and trade unions 
and sends a strong signal to other ETI members on the protection of trade union rights and the 
promotion of decent work.  
In contrast, the Platform has had a disempowering effect. At first, trade unions and even the 
ILO was not welcome to participate in the Platform, as the organisers preferred to involve 
permanent workers’ committees (interview 85). The Dutch partners, who contributed to the 
funding of the Platform, had to insist on the participation of independent trade unions. 
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However, even when they were allowed and participated (thus achieving the first and second 
empowering degree), the conditions for substantial participation were too adverse and the 
trade unions decided to leave. Moreover, the national action plan composed by the Platform 
intends to promote solidarismo internationally. This event reproduces and reinforces the status 
quo in Costa Rica in general and specifically in its pineapple sector.  
We see a similar dynamic in the first CSR organised in the context of the EU-CA AA. During 
this event, only a limited number of trade unions attended. Accounts vary from only EU trade 
unions to “a few” Central American trade unions, and CSR was framed as a business matter 
(interview 79, 81, 83, 84). However, due to the pressure from EU DAG members and a positive 
response by the EU, more efforts were made to better communicate about the second 
workshop and to invite trade unions proactively. This approach resulted in a high attendance 
of Central American trade unions and thus the achievement of the first and second 
empowerment degree. In addition, the trade unions participated substantially, which should 
pave the way for the third degree of empowerment. However, little can be said about how the 
input given by these trade unions was received by the other participants and organisers. 
Attendees noticed that the smooth and non-conflictual interaction between employers and 
trade unions across sectors was very unusual. Hence, it was considered a positive experience 
for all participants. Even though this event might contribute to a convergence between the 
different actors, it concerns a ‘two-off’ event, with little durable effect on the opportunity 
structure and agency. 
Conclusion  
Even though the status quo of power relations has not been challenged through the civil 
society mechanisms, this does not automatically entail they should be considered useless. Our 
analysis identified how the agency of Central American trade unions has to a certain extent 
been strengthened through the creation of a civil society mechanism. However, this additional 
formal institution did not alter the informal practices that contribute to an obstructive 
opportunity structure for trade union activity.  
At best, civil society mechanism can be evaluated as a recently opened door, through which 
for now, not much substantial change has passed. Interviewees often emphasised how 
unfamiliar Central American governments, including Costa Rica, were with the approach 
introduced by the EU. However, after six years, the time has come to move beyond the 
‘teething pains’ of procedural aspects towards more substantial matters, even though the 
scarce trade union participation is more than a mere procedural issue. The recent kick-off of 
the EU project to support the functioning of the DAGs as well as the experience of the CSR 
workshops might nevertheless be auspicious efforts to address the enduring shortcomings of 
the implementation of the TSD chapter. This being said, the lenient attitude of the EU in the 
intergovernmental board raises questions on its capacity to durably support the 
transformation of an opportunity structure which constrains the empowerment of trade 
unions. 
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In sum, the enhanced agency of trade unions, stimulated by the civil society mechanisms as 
well as the hybrid initiatives ETI and the CSR workshops, risks to be in vain if it is not met 
with complementary developments in the opportunity structure in which they operate. 
Therefore, until the opportunity structure is addressed and challenged, the EU social trade 
arrangements will remain inappropriate to the need of workers. The possibility of the EU 
social trade arrangements being mere drops in the ocean, brings us to the second aspect of 
relevance: can EU social trade arrangements be considered essential elements of a plan capable 
of achieving improved labour conditions? 
 
3.3.2 Essential element 
Whether the EU social trade arrangements are essential to the improvement of labour 
conditions in third countries will be assessed through two criteria: first, the coherence of the 
EU approach with the trade partner’s context and other international labour governance 
initiatives. Second, the indispensability of the EU arrangements both at local, national and 
international level. 
Coherence 
First, we will focus on the coherence of the EU approach with the trade partner’s context. The 
analysis above has indicated a mismatch between the needs of Costa Rican workers, namely 
empowering trade unions, and the achievements of the TSD chapter so far. Concerning the 
intergovernmental meetings, we found that, even though each country presents its progress 
concerning the ratification and implementation of the formal ‘rules of the game’ (namely the 
ILO conventions), there is no thorough differentiated approach of the EU towards the specific 
labour issues within each country. The EU does pay attention to the most pressing issues at 
national policy level, however, we did not find evidence that the EU engages with sectoral 
differences within the countries (European Commission, 2017b, 2018a). The labour rights 
violations in Costa Rica concerning FACB and the prevalence of solidarismo have to our 
knowledge not been discussed during the meetings. Accordingly, the situation in the 
pineapple industry has not been addressed either. Since other Central American countries are 
facing even more serious labour rights issues, one could understand the limited attention 
going to Costa Rica. However, for instance the notorious labour rights violations in the 
Guatemalan sugar industry are not addressed separately either.  
Turning to the design and the implementation of the civil society meetings, there are also no 
indications that the EU has adapted its approach to the context of the trade partner. Regarding 
the design, we found that the legal provisions establishing the meetings reflect the (low) level 
of civil society participation in the trade partner. In addition, the implementation differs across 
Central American countries. The EU has not singled out partner countries that do not comply 
with their obligation to establish a DAG. Panama, for instance, does not have a DAG. Instead, 
the EU has raised collective problematic issues such as the lack of independence in de 
Honduran and Nicaraguan DAGs. In addition, no attention is paid to the representation of the 
trade partner’s most important sectors in the DAG. For instance, CANAPEP, the Costa Rican 
chamber of pineapple producers, is not a member of the Costa Rican DAG.  
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Second, we want to know whether the EU approach is coherent with other labour governance 
initiatives at play. As discussed in the answer to the first research question, the ILO CLS are 
the cornerstone of the TSD chapter’s labour provisions. The commitment of the EU bilateral 
instrument can therefore be considered as coherent with the multilateral labour governance 
instrument. This approach, which builds on the ILO principles, is often reiterated by the EU. 
It does not wish to create parallel labour standards and wants to respect and endorse the ILO 
legitimacy (European Commission, 2018c). Other concrete examples of the coherence of the 
EU approach with the ILO are, first, that cases discussed at the International Labour 
Conference have also raised during the intergovernmental meeting (European Commission, 
2017b). Second, the EU funds ILO projects to support ILO CLS implementation in El Salvador 
and Guatemala (European Commission, 2018a).  
Another important player in Central America is the US, which also links trade and labour 
through the CAFTA-DR trade agreement. This country follows a conditional approach: labour 
right violations in Guatemala and Honduras have led respectively to the first labour dispute 
triggered under a US trade agreement and a formal complaint which is currently being 
addressed through a ‘labour rights monitoring and action plan’. Surprisingly, these 
developments were not discussed during the intergovernmental meetings of the EU-CA AA 
(interview 50). Even though coordinated efforts of different trading partners to improve labour 
conditions could increase their impact, this avenue has not been explored by the EU.  
In sum, we conclude that the EU approach is not sufficiently coherent with its trade partners’ 
context, nor with other initiators of labour governance initiatives expect for the ILO. 
Indispensability  
To assess whether the EU arrangements are indispensable for the improvement of labour 
conditions in Costa Rica, we should know whether the current state of affairs would have been 
the same without the EU’s efforts. Even though the previous analysis showed that there have 
not been any changes on the ground for trade unions, the creation of civil society meetings can 
still bring about prospects for social dialogue. One interviewee explained that, before the 
existence of these meetings, trade unions and employers would only meet for a conflict 
resolutions. This was due to the fact that Costa Rica does not have similar spaces for social 
dialogue at national level (interview 82; see also OECD, 2017). Even though the interviewee 
emphasised that the dialogue was still very limited and flawed, he did acknowledge this 
positive element. Similar evaluations were voiced regarding the CSR workshops (interview 79 
& 84). When asked why they were interested in the civil society meetings organised in the 
context of the EU-CA AA, both EU and Central American civil society generally answered 
“because there is nothing else”. This shows that the EU has filled in a gap in the existing labour 
governance.  
At the same time, our research has demonstrated that the design and implementation of the 
TSD chapter and its civil society mechanisms remain inadequate. In addition, the EU position 
remains soft and cooperative, as the EU reiterates the need to “treat all trade partners as 
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equals” and it remains reluctant to  certainly does not want to act as “a police” (interview 68). 
Moreover, now that civil society mechanisms have been created, the dominant position of both 
the EU and Central American countries is that civil society is responsible to “make it work” 
(interview 50 & 68). However, the previous analysis has shown how decisive the agency of 
civil society in general, and trade unions in particular, together with the influence of the 
opportunity structure, is. In other words, in the current circumstances, civil society is too weak 
and the opportunity structure to adverse to ‘make the civil society mechanisms work’.  
Even though our research did not concretely assess the indispensability of EU labour 
arrangements at the international level, one conclusion on this matter can be deducted 
anyhow. In essence, we believe the EU plays an important role in supporting the multilateral 
labour regime, which should underpin all other labour governance initiatives. The failure of a 
commercial powerhouse like the EU to acknowledge the importance of the ILO and the 
legitimacy and universality of its conventions would deeply affect this international 
organisation’s credibility.  
Conclusion  
The EU social trade arrangements constitute an essential element of the international labour 
regime, especially though their endorsement of the ILO. This despite the EU’s failure to 
coordinate its approach with other key trade partners. However, when looking at the lower 
echelons of labour governance, the EU gradually loses importance. In other words, its scope 
does not reach the workers at the bottom of supply. This is in part because the EU has not 
developed a tailor-made approach to the labour situation within the different trade partners 
and does not prioritise sectors with problematic labour issues. In addition, the flawed design 
and implementation of its instruments and the EU’s lenient attitude towards its trade partners 
also play an important role. We therefore conclude that the EU is an essential element of the 
international ‘plan’, though we cannot state the same for the national and local level. This 
would be an overly optimistic assessment of the EU trade arrangements. 
 
3.3.3 Conclusion RQ2 
The analysis above has drawn a mixed picture of the relevance of EU trade arrangements for 
the improvement of labour conditions in third countries.  
First, even though the agency of trade unions is positively affected, the existing power 
relations or structural status quo has not been challenged. Therefore, we argue that EU trade 
arrangements (and especially the EU bilateral trade instrument) do not empower trade unions 
in the trade partner country and are not appropriate to the workers’ needs. Second, while the 
EU approach is embedded in the ILO labour regime, it does not adjust its approach to the 
domestic context of the trade partner by taking sectoral differences into account, or the efforts 
of other countries. Whereas the civil society mechanisms have been recognised as addressing 
a governance gap, their current design and implementation flaws, as well as the permissive 
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attitude of the EU, have partly curbed their potential. Therefore, they cannot be considered an 
essential element. 
These findings lead to the overall evaluation that EU’s social trade instruments have been 
irrelevant so far. However, at the same time, our analysis has shown several positive 
developments. It would therefore be too short-sighted to dismiss the EU approach as a whole. 
First of all, our working definition of relevance has set a high threshold. Furthermore,  there is 
a great distance between Brussels and the bottom of supply chains. Even though these matters 
take time, the EU social trade agreements will need to be implemented more assertively to 
matter in the long run. In addition, the EU should pay more attention to the context of each 
country, focus on problematic sectors, and contribute to the agency of trade unions. 
  
 
3.4 General conclusions 
The central question addressed in this dissertation is whether EU trade arrangements can 
improve labour conditions in third countries. Our research indicates is that it potentially could, 
but does not do so directly. 
While other existing EU social trade instruments have also been assessed in this dissertation, 
the main focus has been on the EU bilateral trade agreements. More specifically, we focused 
extensively on the trade and sustainable development chapters and the civil society 
mechanisms established in these chapters. Through a case study of the EU-Central American 
Association Agreement, as well as labour conditions in the Costa Rican pineapple sector, we 
have connected the bottom of the supply chain (the workers in pineapple plantations) to an 
important importer of fresh Costa Rican pineapples, being the EU. In this context, we have 
paid particular attention to the existence and functioning of trade unions, as well as their 
participation in EU arrangements, as they can enable better working conditions by 
representing workers through social dialogue. 
We found that civil society mechanisms in the trade agreement have contributed to the agency, 
the ability to act and choose, of trade unions. Yet, this advancement is negated by the 
incapacity of the instrument to deal with the anti-union context in Costa Rica. In other words, 
for EU trade arrangements to be more effective in terms of improving labour conditions in 
third countries, it has to address both the agency of trade unions as well as the opportunity 
structure or institutional context in which they operate, as the latter influences the ability to 
transform agency in action. This transformation is necessary in order to improve the currently 
asymmetrical power relations between business and trade unions, which can in turn positively 
affect labour conditions in the country. 
Our research has identified the remaining great distance that exists between Brussels and the 
bottom of supply chains. Hence, the current EU approach is not able to exert influence across 
the different echelons of vertical labour governance (international, national, sectoral, local). In 
order to do so, the EU should improve the implementation of the existing social trade 
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instruments and become much more assertive towards its trade partners. In addition, the EU 
should diversify its approach and focus on problematic sectors in each trade partner.  
Regarding horizontal labour governance (in which initiatives are driven by public, private 
actors or both), we have noted that the EU and its member states are increasingly interested in 
hybrid initiatives in which public and private actors collaborate. Such initiatives could be 
complementary to the existing state-led social trade arrangements. However, the EU and its 
member states have –so far– preferred to operate in the shadow of these initiatives as mere 
funders. They refrain from using their regulatory capacity to ensure the enforcement of the 
initiative’s objectives.  
In addition to these considerations on the EU social trade arrangements, our research did not 
provide evidence that the reputation of the EU market demanding high labour standards is 
reflected in the purchasing realities within the EU. In sum, workers have not yet reaped the 
benefits of EU social trade arrangements. This is especially the case for the most vulnerable, 
such as illegal migrant workers in plantations. 
At a more abstract level, one could wonder whether free trade agreements, which are 
emblematic for neoliberal free market principles, can be employed as vehicles for social 
change. Whereas it would be too short-sighted to dismiss the EU approach as a whole, 
ideological contradictions occur when realising that, for EU social trade arrangements to be 
more effective, state involvement at EU-level and in the trade partner should be bolstered 
significantly. In Costa Rica, as well as in other parts of the world, trade unionisation decline 
coincided with the rise of neoliberal policies in the 1980s. It enabled the flourishing of an 
alternative type of worker representation, solidarismo, at the detriment of independent trade 
unions. Whether this could actually be reversed by a fierce advocate of free trade remains to 
be confirmed. 
 
 
3.5 Concluding reflections 
In these concluding reflections we will consider our main contributions as well as our most 
important learnings regarding interdisciplinary research and finally, the limitations of this 
study and suggestions for further research. 
 
3.5.1 Main contributions 
We believe the academic contribution of this dissertation to be threefold: First, our research 
offers a substantial contribution to the literature on EU trade governance and the EU trade-
labour linkage. More specifically, no other research has extensively studied the EU-CA AA in 
general and its labour implications in particular. In addition, when our research project was 
initiated, little was known about the civil society mechanisms established in the latest 
generation of EU trade agreements. This dissertation has therefore contributed significantly to 
a deeper understanding of this new phenomenon. 
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Second, our doctoral research has generated a considerable set of empirical data. This was 
collected predominantly by means of interviews and non-participant observations in Costa 
Rica, Honduras and Brussels. The empirical data allowed to address our research questions 
through an inside-out approach as well as an outside-in approach (see Keuleers et al., 2016). 
While the former assesses the content and results of a particular policy from the point of view 
of a foreign policy actor and the implementation objectives it has set, the latter examines 
foreign policy from the perspective of the country or region to which the policy is targeted. 
Our research therefore contributes to a new wave of research which also pays attention to the 
perspectives of local actors in the trade partner. 
Finally, the interdisciplinarity of our research contributes to EU studies, political sciences and 
to agricultural economics and rural development in particular. Whereas EU studies mostly 
investigates the institutional underpinnings and intentions of EU external action, agricultural 
economics focusses mainly on the macro-economic impact of tariffs on the agricultural sector 
or how export opportunities to large markets, such as the EU, enhance social development or 
form a barrier to small farmers through strict standards. Our research managed to surpass the 
limits of each discipline by looking beyond the border, both within the EU and within Central 
America and Costa Rica, connecting workers at the bottom of the supply chain with the EU as 
importing market. In addition, the central role attributed to trade unions is rare, both in EU 
studies (except for Van den Putte (2016)) and even more so in rural development studies, 
where labour is often treated as a passive input factor. 
Given this dissertation’s more obvious contributions to EU studies and political science it 
might be appropriate to elaborate on what our research seeks to add to existing debates in 
agricultural economics and rural development. In this context our first contribution is to the 
general development debate in which we subscribe to a growing awareness of the often 
precarious situation of workers at the bottom of global value chains. In this context, our focus 
has been both on the (potential) importance of importing countries to stimulate a race to the 
top in terms of labour conditions as well as power inequalities between the different actors in 
these value chains and how they can be addressed. Our second contribution relates to the 
current major gap in the literature on labour conditions and collective action of hired workers 
in the agricultural sector. Scanning the publications of major journals in agricultural economics 
and rural development7 as well as the most relevant policy actors such as the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development, a UN agency, illustrates how labour is rarely considered 
in this field. When it does, the focus is on employment or social protection, which were 
described by a respondent as the ‘cara bonita’, or bright side, of labour issues (interview 49). In 
contrast, both hired labour and trade union rights are seldom studied whereas small farmers 
and collective organisation in cooperatives has received considerable attention. Therefore, our 
research tried to counter this blind spot and put landless plantation labour and their collective 
agency on the academic agenda. 
 
                                                     
7 such as the Journal of Peasant Studies, Journal of Rural Studies, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
Agricultural Economics, Journal of Agrarian Change, Journal of Rural Management 
228 
 
3.5.2 Reflections on interdisciplinary research 
As mentioned in the introduction of the dissertation, this doctoral research is part of an 
interdisciplinary project involving two PhD students, Annelien Gansemans and Deborah 
Martens with a background in respectively agricultural economics and political sciences, and 
their supervisors, Marijke D’Haese and Jan Orbie. The aim of the project was to link ‘Brussels’, 
or EU policy, to the ‘field’, in our case Costa Rican pineapple plantations, initially to 
understand the impact of trade on social development. This section will list our most 
important learnings of our research process concerning interdisciplinarity.  
Since interdisciplinary intentions written in (PhD) research proposals are not always 
successfully translated into actual interdisciplinary research, these learnings mentioned below 
can also serve as practical recommendations for other researchers. Even though the issues 
raised are general principles, they might not be applicable to all kinds of interdisciplinary 
research, for instance when disciplines or fields that are fundamentally different to the ones in 
our project are being combined.  
First, our experience has thought us that collaboration and interdisciplinarity should be 
common goals of the researchers from the very beginning. At the outset of the doctoral 
research journey, PhD students are generally still rather flexible about their research questions 
and design. Therefore, the groundwork for interdisciplinary research should be laid early on 
and in this context the researchers should adopt an open and inquisitive attitude. This 
approach enables to incorporate the different disciplines in the project from the start, even if 
the researchers do not yet master the other disciplines. It allows the researchers to learn from 
one another and to define the rough contours of their research jointly. 
More concretely, when considering our research, looking for avenues that would allow us to 
connect the micro to the macro-level, the field to Brussels, we concluded that working 
conditions and consequently trade union rights were the most relevant issue to analyse. This 
realisation was the result of several brainstorm sessions and discussions, involving the PhD 
students and their supervisors, as well as joint exploratory field research to Costa Rica during 
the first year of the PhD. Even though this collaboration might come across as artificial at first, 
we consider this method to be more auspicious than when researchers opt to first concentrate 
on their own discipline before looking for overlaps to accommodate the different disciplines. 
Second, we believe it is beneficial to collaborate at every stage of the research project. This does 
not entail that everything should be done jointly. Rather, it implies that a researcher is involved 
in the process of its colleagues and actively contributes whenever possible. For instance, we 
shared and discussed interesting literature from different strands, collected and analysed data 
together and wrote papers together. Especially, the joint data collection proved to be of major 
importance for the both of us. In addition, we often discussed each other’s ideas (including 
those concerning our unidisciplinary research, see infra), met with peers and attended and 
organised events together. This collaboration was not always intended to be productive, in the 
sense that we were not always working towards a tangible outcome. The interaction 
nevertheless helped significantly to develop a deeper understanding of our research subject.  
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Third, in our case, each researcher also conducted unidisciplinary research. Each of us 
focussed on intriguing issues that were discerned during exploratory empirical research and 
collaborated with other researchers.  Since we had already defined the bigger research puzzle 
we wished to address together, the knowledge created during the unidisciplinary phases fitted 
quite well in this bigger picture and eventually served as stepping stones for joint research 
efforts. In addition, we informed one another of our progress (and stagnation) and kept 
exchanging thoughts on our research. 
Fourth, it is clear from the previous points that the members of our research project interacted 
on a regular basis. Indeed, communication played a crucial role in the realisation of our 
research project. Not only was it important for the demarcation of our research topic and did 
it allow us to learn from each other, deliberation was also key to identify our assumptions and 
biases. More concretely, these included –in very general terms– “trade unions are the holy 
grail and are the right answer to every labour issue”, “it is the EU’s responsibility to find 
solutions for all domestic issues of its trade partner” and “business interest are always 
opposed to civil society or worker’s interests”. Not only did removing these blinkers 
encouraged us to conduct better and more nuanced research, it also helped to distinguish the 
diverse starting points of the disciplines and therefore to better understand the often invisible 
divide between researchers coming from distinct disciplines. 
Fifth, interdisciplinary research is often associated with synergy. Different disciplines are 
combined and integrated to address a question that cannot be answered by one discipline 
alone and the effect of this synthesis is considered to be greater than the sum of what each 
discipline would do separately. However, to realise such synergies, one needs to be willing to 
compromise and to be flexible. Whereas synergy is often described as 1 + 1 = 3, in the context 
of interdisciplinary research, it would be more realistic to illustrate it as 1 + 1 – 1 = 3. For 
instance, I conducted empirical research in Honduras on the civil society meetings organised 
in the capital as well as on trade unionism in the agricultural sector. However, given the 
specificities of Annelien’s research approach (e.g. extended stay in the countryside, 
respondents are mainly plantation workers), time and safety issues impeded us to include 
Honduras as a case in our joint research. Another example is my interest in CSR. Even though 
I wanted to focus my final paper on different CSR instruments existing in the EU-Costa Rican 
pineapple trade, it was more important for us to work together and therefore to focus on trade 
unions which resulted in article 6 of this dissertation. In sum, interdisciplinary research can be 
frustrating at times and even require you to “kill your darlings”, nevertheless we mainly 
experienced it as a rewarding process. 
3.5.3 Limitations and avenues for further research 
First, even though violations of the labour rights Freedom of Association and Collective 
Bargaining are a major issue in all Central American countries, the existence of solidarimso is 
rather unique to Costa Rica. Whereas it exists in other countries too, it is not as widespread 
and undermining to independent trade unionism as in Costa Rica. Since the opportunity 
structure differs across the Central American countries, there might be different factors at play 
to explain the overall weakness of trade unions in the region. To increase the generalisability 
of this research, it would therefore benefit from a complementary similar study of an 
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agricultural sector in another Central American country (e.g. melons in Honduras or sugar in 
Guatemala).  
Second, while two field visits were conducted in Central America (Costa Rica in 2015, 
Honduras in 2016), the remaining of the data was collected through Skype interviews and 
accounts given by EU civil society. Even though we have monitored the labour rights 
developments in the region and the dynamism in the civil society mechanisms very closely 
through frequent follow-up meetings with EU civil society, we would have preferred to 
triangulate our data with additional empirical research on the ground. In addition, due to the 
timing of our research project, the civil society mechanisms were still very much at the 
embryonic stage. While this has undoubtedly provided interesting insights, it would be 
relevant to assess the situation once the EU-CA AA has been implemented for a larger number 
of years. We therefore suggest to conduct a longitudinal research in in few years’ time, that 
investigates the evolution of the civil society mechanism and their (potential) consequences 
for trade union rights. 
Our third limitation has already been raised above and concerns the meetings of the 
intergovernmental body. Since they are taking place behind closed doors, we don’t have 
primary data on the course and content of the meetings. This was therefore approximated 
through information given by EU and Honduran officials that participated to the meetings 
and official reports written on the matter. Given the importance of the intergovernmental 
meeting for the implementation of the TSD chapter, we believe a better understanding of their 
functioning would be beneficial. In this context it would be particularly interesting to research 
the attitude of all trade partners when discussing labour rights violations in their country and 
the approach of the EU. 
Finally, we identified a fifth limitation of our research, namely the exclusion of private 
initiatives, such as standards and certification, in our analysis. This was decided because 
private initiatives do not belong to the range of EU social trade arrangements. However, such 
initiatives play an important role in the labour governance of agricultural supply chains. In 
addition, the most recent EU trade agreement texts, such as the EU-Japan agreement or the 
tabled text of the agreement with MERCOSUR, refer increasingly to CSR, labelling schemes 
and voluntary initiatives in general. Our research could thus be complemented with a study 
of private initiatives relevant to the Costa Rican pineapple sector and discern whether there 
are interesting avenues for synergies between the public and private approaches. 
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3.6 Recommendations 
The following recommendations were written in collaboration with Annelien Gansemans. 
They are derived from our doctoral research and contain both long-term structural and short-
term practical suggestions. They are directed to EU policymakers, EU & Central American 
civil society, EU buyers, Costa Rican policymakers, Costa Rican (pineapple) trade unions and 
designers of multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) and private standards in general. 
Corresponding to the conclusion of our research, the recommendations aim at reshaping the 
currently adverse opportunity structure, together with strengthening trade union agency in 
Costa Rica in particular and in Central America in general. 
 
Directed to EU policymakers 
We have structured these recommendations along two topics: the EU bilateral trade 
agreements and the EU’s role in promoting Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). We believe 
these recommendations are necessary for increasing the EU’s relevance in the improvement of 
labour conditions in third countries, especially in the agricultural sector.  
The two recommendations set forward are broad long-term objectives, leading to enhanced 
labour governance. They are therefore directed to all EU institutions. Wherever our research 
allowed us to do so, we have translated these into more manageable and concretely 
implementable suggestions addressed to the relevant EU institutions.  
 
1. Achieve full potential of the EU trade agreements to promote decent work 
• Bolster the institutional monitoring mechanisms established in the trade and 
sustainable development chapter (the intergovernmental body and civil society 
mechanisms) 
• Adopt an integrated supply chain approach to address the most problematic sectors in 
terms of labour rights violations 
• Replace Free Trade Agreements by Sustainable Development Agreements 
 
2. Integrate Responsible Business Conduct in EU trade policy 
• Consolidate Member State and EU Corporate Social Responsibility efforts in one EU 
mandatory approach 
• Improve cooperation within the EU Commission’s DGs and across EU institutions  
• Stimulate ethical consumerism 
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1. Achieve full potential of the EU bilateral social trade arrangement  
a. Bolster the institutional monitoring mechanisms established in the trade 
and sustainable development (TSD) chapter 
i. Intergovernmental body 
Our research showed that in general the European Commission’s attitude is too lenient 
towards trade partners that do not meet their obligations under the TSD chapter. More 
specifically it should ensure at least the yearly organisation of the intergovernmental board 
meeting, together with the corresponding transnational civil society meetings, as prescribed 
in the agreement. During the intergovernmental debates, the Commission should not shy 
away from being more assertive, similarly to its attitude concerning commercial issues, in 
criticising labour right violations. In addition, to address the entire opportunity structure in 
which trade unions operate, adverse informal practices, such as solidarismo, should be 
identified and addressed. If preferred, additional bilateral meetings with the partner countries 
can be envisaged to discuss the situation more thoroughly. 
The functioning of each Domestic Advisory Group (DAG) should be evaluated during the 
intergovernmental meeting. The EU should demand transparency from all trade partners on 
the composition, meeting frequency and agenda of their DAGs. In between the yearly 
meetings, ad hoc meetings via videoconference should be organised when there are signs that 
the labour right situation in a country is not being addressed properly or that the organisation 
of the DAGs is stalling. A close contact with the EU DAG can provide valuable insights on this 
matter. 
To increase the effectivity and efficiency of the meetings, each trade partner should circulate 
the information they want to present on the respective implementation of labour standards 
before the meeting, in order to avoid a long series of presentations and to allow more time for 
debate. 
Finally, concrete measures should be taken to ensure the accountability of the 
intergovernmental body and that civil society input is considered. The two main aspects are: 
first, to report back to civil society on what has been done regarding their contributions. This 
can be done at the occasion of the yearly intergovernmental meetings. However, this does not 
imply that civil society’s concerns should only be considered once a year. On the contrary, the 
intergovernmental body should follow-up more frequently on the issues raised, for instance 
through videoconferences. Similarly to the practice in the EU, Central American government 
representatives could update their DAG members during the DAG meetings. Second, the 
order of the meetings should be altered as to allow the civil society input to feed into the 
discussions of the intergovernmental body. 
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ii. Civil Society Mechanisms  
The recently launched project to support the implementation of the TSD chapter through the 
strengthening of civil society participation can only be welcomed. However this does not mean 
the Commission can rest on its laurels.  
Continued attention should be given to the functioning of the DAGs in all its trade partners 
and to means that can improve trade union agency. In addition, the representativeness of the 
DAG members should be monitored. Moreover, it is still necessary to raise more awareness 
on the existence of the civil society mechanism both in the EU and in Central America. Ad hoc 
meetings such as those organised on CSR in collaboration with local partners, are interesting 
stepping stones for the civil society mechanisms. 
b. Adopt an integrated supply chain approach 
The local context of each of the trade partners should be examined to identify the supply chains 
with the most problematic labour issues. These should then be prioritised in the 
implementation of the TSD chapter. In addition, the different stakeholders active along this 
supply chain should be involved in the approach. This should be done in a comprehensive 
manner and include workers, ideally represented by trade unions, business actors at company 
and sectoral level, third party auditors, representatives of certifications used in the sector, 
Ministry of Labour officials, exporters, importers, retailers and if applicable other initiatives at 
play in the sector. 
c. Replace Free Trade Agreements by Sustainable Development Agreements  
This recommendation makes the previous ones redundant, as it suggest a whole new approach 
to bilateral arrangements.  
We described in the dissertation how the EU has been pursuing a neoliberal trade agenda since 
the 1980s, which was been explicitly stepped-up with the Global Europe trade strategy in 2006. 
Because the EU also concludes free trade agreements with countries that have lower 
sustainable development standards, this approach risks to reinforce or worsen existing socially 
and environmentally unsustainable practices. The TSD chapter created in the last generation 
of EU trade agreements aims at offsetting negative consequences of the trade agreement. 
However, in this dissertation we have seen that the current approach is flawed as the 
sustainability provisions are subordinate to the commercial ones and their governance and 
enforcement is too weak.  
We therefore suggest to replace the current bilateral approach by sustainable development 
agreements, structured along the three P’s, often set forward to define sustainable 
development, namely People, Planet and Profit. These agreements contain social, 
environmental and commercial provisions which are all equally important and enforceable. In 
addition, their content ensures that the EU trade partner preserves sufficient policy space for 
its economic and sustainable development.  
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Labour right issues are monitored by an active, specialised and adequate labour rights 
committee in which the ILO is also represented and issues of both the EU and trade partner 
are discussed. If persisting labour right violations occur and the consistently and assertively 
applied consultation mechanisms have failed, it is possible to sanction the trade partner. The 
sanctions consist of three components. The first component stems from the idea of community 
service. The trade partner would have to send a tripartite delegation of officials, employers 
and trade unions to the ILO to attend trainings and experience best practices on the ILO 
Conventions that are being violated. This initiative will be funded by the trade partner’s 
revenues of trade with the EU. Second, if the violations persist, the tariff rate of the goods 
produced in the sectors dealing with the labour rights violations will gradually increase. 
Finally, the last component is the nuclear option through which, if none of the other steps have 
led to an amelioration of the labour conditions, the sustainable development agreement can 
and will be suspended. 
This approach will need to reshuffle the current structure of the Commission’s administrative 
structure. The creation of a DG Sustainable Development, grouping the relevant units of the 
existing DGs, could be considered. 
 
2. Recognise Corporate Social Responsibility as the missing link in EU trade-labour 
linkage  
There is a burgeoning awareness that the respect for labour rights should be promoted and 
enforced through a combination of complementary public and private efforts. It is however 
crucial that public actors do not stay in the back seat when it comes to private or hybrid 
initiatives. They should not shy away from effectively using the soft and hard instruments in 
their toolbox. This recommendation aims therefore at integrating Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), increasingly referred to as Responsible Business Conduct, more 
appropriately in EU policy. Above all, the international aspect of CSR, acknowledging the 
responsibilities of parent companies, buyers and importers for practices and consequences in 
their supply chains should be more emphasised. In addition, ethical consumerism should be 
stimulated. This should not only become more obvious and addressed more concretely in EU 
trade arrangements, it should also be addressed more seriously at EU-level.  
a. Consolidate Member State and EU CSR efforts in one EU mandatory 
approach 
Several EU member states are reinforcing their CSR policies. This entails they are moving 
beyond a soft and voluntary approach and increase the regulatory strength of their 
instruments. In 2015 the UK Modern Slavery Act came into force. The Act focusses on the 
prevention and prosecution of modern slavery, the protection of victims and includes a 
provision on transparency in supply chains. It makes UK companies accountable for slavery 
and labour abuses occurring along their whole chain of operations. In 2017, the French Duty 
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of Vigilance law came into force. Companies subject to the law must establish mechanisms to 
prevent human rights violations and environmental impacts throughout their chain of 
production, including for their subsidiaries and companies under their control. Finally, the 
Dutch Parliament adopted the Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Bill. Once into force, it 
would require companies to conduct due diligence as to whether child labour is occurring in 
their own operations or in their supply chains. In addition to these mandatory human rights 
due diligence laws there are also softer supply chain specific initiatives such as the Dutch 
Agreement on Sustainable Textile and Garment, the German Partnership for Sustainable 
Textiles as well as the Dutch Sustainable Initiative Fruit and Vegetables.  
To increase the clout of the above mentioned laws and initiatives, the EU could play an 
important role in coordinating these efforts and lifting them to EU level. For this purpose the 
current (too) soft CSR strategy should be thoroughly revised. Member states should realise 
this approach would also reinforce existing EU-instruments such as it non-financial reporting 
directive and EU Conflict Minerals Regulation by embedding them in a comprehensive and 
enforceable CSR policy. In addition, the EU approach would bolster existing multilateral 
instruments such as the UN Guiding Principles on business and human rights and the OECD 
Guidelines for multinational enterprises by making adherence to their principles more 
binding. It should also contribute to the development of the UN ‘Zero Draft’ Treaty on 
Business & Human Rights. 
b. Cooperation within the Commission and across institutions  
The horizontal cooperation between the relevant European Commission DGs should be 
enforced. CSR is currently a DG Grow competence, which is responsible for the internal 
market, industry, entrepreneurship and small and medium enterprises. To improve labour 
conditions across supply chains, reaching the most vulnerable workers at the bottom of those 
chains, structural cooperation should be created between DG Grow, DG Employ, DG Trade, 
DG Devco and DG Justice. Moreover, DG Envi should also be involved for environmental 
aspects of business conduct, whereas DG Agri should participate when agricultural supply 
chains are discussed.  
There is consultation and cooperation between DG Trade and DG Employ concerning the 
implementation of TSD chapter. However, this collaboration remains rather shallow as the 
respective units do not have enough resources to ensure a thorough follow-up on the labour 
situation in all trade partners. In addition, a working group on CSR would exist within the 
Commission, however no public information on this formation was found. In the 1990s a 
group of dedicated Commission officials created an informal working group on Fair Trade. It 
faded away as the initiative never formalised. This example shows how (sincere) policy 
priorities should be implemented through an adapted and adept institutional environment. 
Interestingly, a number of Members of the European Parliament created a working group on  
Responsible Business Conduct in 2018. This exist alongside the Parliament’s Fair Trade 
Working Group, which has been created years ago and focusses more on the developmental 
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aspect of trade. These working groups would be interesting interlocutors for similar structures 
in the Commission. 
c. Stimulate ethical consumerism 
Our research showed how the discourse of the EU and its consumers on their preference for 
goods produced in sustainable conditions is not translated in significant import and purchase 
practices. Focussing on EU consumers, there is a discrepancy between what they deem 
important and what products they buy in the end. We believe this should be addressed in two 
ways: 
- Transparency and accountability in supply chains: engaged consumers should be able 
to easily request and find information on the products and brands they buy. The due 
diligence initiatives described above are good starting points, however these are not 
tailored to customer needs. The EU should enable the development of a framework in 
which actors in the supply chain contribute to answering the questions “Who made 
my clothes?” and “Who picked my food?”. It is important not to fixate solely on 
certified products. Even though certain labels have a more positive and durable impact 
than others, they are an ‘interim solution’ as market instruments that do not carry much 
structural transformative potential. 
- Awareness raising among policy makers and consumers: even though EU consumers 
are said to be more demanding, much remains to be done to increase awareness among 
the 500 million EU citizens. In essence, the link between what consumers buy, the price 
they pay for it and the way it was produced should become more visible. Make Fruit 
Fair is a good example of an effective advocacy EU funded campaign. Such campaigns 
should be repeated, conducted for other products and communicated more widely. In 
addition, this topic should also be consider in educational programs.  
 
Directed to EU & Central American civil society 
• Ensure continuity of the DAGs through committed members and the consolidation of 
the DAG activities 
• Enabling deliberation through the acknowledging and addressing of power 
inequalities between the members and finding a balance between being constructive 
and critical 
• Improve the collaboration among the Central American DAGs as well as with the EU 
DAG 
 
It is crucial for the functioning of the DAGs that they have active and committed members, 
dedicated to the advancement of not only their own sustainability interest, but also the 
progress of the civil society mechanisms. This does not entail they should support the 
liberalisation objective of the trade agreement, rather, it suggests a constructive attitude within 
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the DAG. In addition, the DAG should reflect the society they represent, in the sense that all 
relevant stakeholders should be represented. DAG members should evaluate whether other 
organisations should join and reach out to these potential members.  
The continuity of the DAGs depends currently mostly on the commitment of their members, 
and especially their presidency. Members should be aware of this weakness and try to 
consolidate the functioning of the DAG into a more mature practice. On a practical note, the 
DAGs should meet regularly, for instance four times a year. They should follow a work 
program, discussing substantial aspects of sustainable development. The secretariat and 
presidency (comprising of one representative of the employers, employees and environmental 
constituency) of the DAG would then ensure the continuity in between the meetings.  
Moreover, in order to allow the DAGs to be fora of proper deliberation, power imbalances 
between the members should be acknowledged and addressed, if necessary by an impartial 
moderator. It is therefore important for the DAG to function as one group, not divided into 
subgroups per constituency. Civil society has to find a balance between being constructive and 
critical. On the one hand DAG members should be able to maintain an open and constructive 
dialogue among each other and with the governmental actors. On the other hand they should 
also preserve their role as a watchdog and monitor the implementation of the TSD chapter. In 
addition, civil society actors that are critical to free trade should continue to conceptualise an 
alternative trading system. 
Finally, there should be better collaboration among the Central American DAGs as well as 
with the EU DAG. Since the functioning of the Central American DAGs is still suboptimal, 
coordination between all DAG has proven to be difficult. The practice of convening a DAG-
to-DAG meeting (which is not foreseen in the agreement) during the series of transnational 
meetings, should be maintained. In addition, the requested meeting gathering all the DAGs 
and the intergovernmental body should also become a common practice. This meeting will 
partly allow to address the accountability issue mentioned above. Our research has shown that 
EU DAG members have helped to increase the agency of Central American trade unions. 
These efforts are lauded and should certainly be sustained. 
 
Directed to EU buyers 
• Adjust sourcing practices to provide more secure orders and build long-term 
relationship with preferred suppliers 
• Invest in long-term relationship and collaborative approach with suppliers to find 
solutions 
• Consider besides price also good working conditions as a pre-condition for purchasing  
• Promote enabling rights and social dialogue and provide the support needed to 
improve working conditions 
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EU buyers should take their responsibility and prevent that their sourcing practices translate 
into increased levels of job insecurity to the extent that plantation workers are refrained from 
using their voice. Rather than adopting codes of conduct and monitoring compliance through 
checklist audits, a shift is recommended toward a collaborative approach and direct 
interaction with suppliers. Working with preferred suppliers offering secure orders, better 
planning and prices can provide the necessary incentives to change their relationship with 
workers and unions.  
Enabling rights such as social dialogue and consultation with independent workers’ 
representatives should be prioritised in order to build a positive attitude towards unions and 
social dialogue. The buyer can facilitate change by stressing the importance of respect for 
labour rights as basic requirement for buying products, including respect for trade unions and 
collective bargaining. Yet, the ultimate responsibility lies on the local actors involved in 
dialogue. Buyers can also support investments in capacity-building and organise follow-up 
visits to persuade suppliers and develop a more union-friendly culture. However, if the main 
criteria in decision-making of the buyer is to hold the price as low as possible, there will be 
little room for the improvement of employment quality in the field. 
 
Directed to Costa Rican policymakers 
• Strengthen labour law enforcement by investing in labour inspectorate 
• Keep better track of the registration of plantations and the labour market statistics 
• Ensure that subcontracted workers are granted the same level of protection as formal 
plantation workers 
• Improve registration procedures for migrant workers (e.g. costs, time, access) and more 
actively engage with companies to grant working permits  
• Review the obstacles in current labour law that impede plantation unions to initiate 
collective bargaining and allow migrant workers in leadership positions of trade 
unions 
• Establish a tripartite body for the agricultural sector and organise a public debate about 
social dialogue 
• Publicly differ between the functions of solidarist associations, permanent committees 
and independent trade unions 
• Stimulate the participation of employers and trade unions representing the country’s 
most important export sectors to the Costa Rican DAG 
 
The Costa Rican government has a prominent role to play in shaping the institutional 
environment to enable worker empowerment. The state has to guarantee that all workers have 
the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining so that unions can flourish. The 
dissertation illustrates that there is a gap between the de jure labour code and de facto 
implementation of the laws. This leaves room for improvement in the enforcement and 
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requires investment in the resources available to the labour inspectorate and their ability to 
immediately fine violators. Nevertheless, strengthening government capacity to enforce 
labour law is necessary but not sufficient to improve working conditions given that much of 
the labour violations are provoked by flexible purchasing practices of international buyers. 
A clarification of national legislation is also required regarding the responsibilities of 
subcontractors to ensure that workers are granted equal rights. Although the labour reform 
has reduced the barriers to strike, obstacles remain for unions to achieve the threshold of 33% 
unionisation before they can negotiate a Collective Bargaining Agreement. Moreover, workers 
with a foreign nationality are not permitted to take up leadership positions in trade unions. 
Another burden for (irregular) migrant workers are the procedures to obtain a working 
permit. Legal barriers for migrant workers to access formal employment need to be removed 
and procedures should be streamlined so to reduce informal irregular work in plantations. 
This would allow these workers to benefit from the same level of protection, working 
conditions and rights as native workers. The registration of plantations should be better 
tracked in an accessible public database as well as the number of plantation workers employed 
per plantation as workers often move, because their contract does not exceed three months, 
and plantations change names.  
The government should facilitate consultation and dialogue with agricultural workers at 
sectoral and national level. Currently, social dialogue efforts are focussed on company specific 
issues at plantation level, whereas social dialogue at sector level is absent. Therefore, the 
establishment of tripartite structures for social dialogue in the agricultural sector and a 
national tripartite economic and social council could overcome the weak tradition in social 
dialogue. This can provide a platform to organise a public debate about the difference between 
unions and solidarist associations in order to shift the negative public perception. Moreover, 
given the significant undermining effect of solidsarismo on trade unionism, Costa Rican 
government should reconsider their implicit support to alternative workers’ organisation. In 
addition, they should create awareness on the different functions of the organisations. 
Finally, to fully meet its obligations of the TSD chapter, Costa Rica should stimulate the 
participation of the employers and trade unions representing the country’s most important 
export sectors to the Costa Rican DAG. 
 
Directed to Costa Rican (pineapple) trade unions 
The recommendations are directed to trade unions in the pineapple sector, however most 
suggestions are relevant for other trade unions too. 
Practical short-term measures: 
• Reach out to temporary and migrant workers in a proactive way 
• Raise awareness on workers’ rights in public spaces and invite all community 
members 
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• Improve the internal culture and functioning of unions 
Structural long-term measures: 
• Build alliances for external support while maintaining local ownership  
• Coordinate at sectoral and national level through an umbrella federation 
• Adjust communication strategies to have constructive dialogue with management  
 
Local trade unions should focus on strengthening worker’s agency. However, this requires 
infrastructural, human and financial resources which are often limited because membership 
fees are not sufficient to fund union activities. The available funds should be optimally 
invested to improve union functioning and meet worker’s needs. Given the hostile 
environment, unions should strategically look for allies, new members and resources to 
increase union bargaining power.  
Temporary and migrant workers are a relevant target group for union organisation, because 
they comprise a large share of the agricultural workforce and are the most vulnerable to poor 
working conditions. Unions usually do not consider temporary workers because they have 
few incentives to represent these workers. Temporary workers are mobile as they frequently 
relocate from plantation to plantation and are not tied to one location. The fear of losing their 
job may impede them from reaching out to unions. The cost of union membership and unfair 
competition with the alternative solidarist association, which serves a saving fund for workers, 
can also prevent workers from becoming a union member.  
At the same time, workers’ knowledge of the existence and role of unions is very limited. 
Therefore, unions are encouraged to organise more capacity building and awareness raising 
sessions in the communities to convince workers to join their ranks and develop the necessary 
capabilities for social dialogue. Building internal cohesion between union members is also 
necessary to strengthen the union from within. Yet, connections with external actors remain 
essential for funding, support and advice. Although there is a trend in increased reliance on 
international support from NGOs and global unions, this should not divert their local 
strategies from the crucial need to mobilise workers from bottom-up, strengthen their 
representative legitimacy and make the union more appealing.  
Regarding the internal culture and traditions, trade unions are often built around one strong, 
experienced leader who has an exemplary function and takes up all the union duties. Yet, 
training and forming a new generation of trade unionists is also important to have a competent 
base to take over the leadership roles. To revitalise union strategies, new members that are 
willing to engage should receive the necessary support to develop their leadership skills and 
move up hierarchical ranks. Leaders that are close to the workers are more aware of what lives 
in the plantation and can meet the needs of workers and younger generations more 
appropriately.  
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At sectoral level, there is limited coordination between unions in different plantations. The 
fragmentation of unions implies that they operate in isolation and focus on specific issues at 
company level. Unions should join forces to develop a long-term strategy to overcome 
structural challenges in the agricultural sector and learn from each other. They can share 
experiences, information and guide new embryonic unions to become stronger. Sectoral 
federations can help to build alliances between unions and to coordinate workers’ 
representation in dialogue platforms with employers at national level. A stronger, 
institutionalised federation at national level is also better armed to reduce the negative 
perception and competition with solidarist associations. In addition, sectoral trade unions can 
represent the industry’s workers in national and international platforms (e.g. the Piñera 
National Initiative for Sustainability and the civil society meetings organised in the context of 
the trade agreements with the EU). 
Union leaders should be more open to collaboration. Collaboration should be pursued, not 
only among unions, but also with their employers. This implies to move away from traditional 
strategies rooted in capital-labour confrontation towards constructive dialogue. In other 
words, they need to find a balance between a constructive watchdog function and militant 
behaviour with complaints and strikes being instruments of last resort. Although they hold 
diverging interests, the opposing parties should try to convene at the bargaining table and find 
a consensus in the interest of both. Finding common interests is likely to contribute to the 
legitimacy of unions, because they will be more likely to demonstrate achievements in the 
benefit of workers. In plantations with trade union activity, regular communication channels 
with management and supervisors should be established.  Unions should make full use of 
those channels and prepare the agendas to optimise effective meetings.  
 
Directed to designers of multi-stakeholder initiatives and private standards 
1. Follow an inclusive approach and give more attention to the vulnerable segments of 
workers in the content and implementation of standards and MSIs 
• Enhance the process through which workers can claim their rights 
• Check the prevalence of subcontracting and interview workers outside plantations in 
the community 
• Use participatory tools to stimulate participation of all workers 
2. Adjust the design of MSIs to ensure that all stakeholders are equally involved in the 
implementation 
• Make sure that all stakeholders have the opportunity to participate or be represented 
• Make sure that the rules of procedure enable all stakeholders to participate, express their 
opinion and be heard 
• Build trust and facilitate discussions in a constructive atmosphere through an impartial 
moderator 
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Worker empowerment often remains a blind spot in private standards and. Instead of 
addressing outcomes such as wages, working time and occupational health and safety, 
standards should also enhance the process through which workers can claim their rights. If 
workers are more aware of their rights, they can challenge unequal labour-management 
relations and provide pressure from bottom up.  
The lack of job security and prevalence of unstable employment relations, such as 
subcontracting, need to be addressed in criteria of standards and more thoroughly checked in 
audits. The standards generally remain vague in the interpretation of temporary contracts and 
fail to acknowledge the impeding effect of job insecurity on the voice of vulnerable workers 
such as migrants. More attention should be given to the most vulnerable segments in the 
implementation of standards and MSIs, such as irregular migrant workers, to ensure that they 
also have a voice.  
Participatory tools can be used to encourage workers and unions to give their opinion, share 
information and develop solutions to address the worker’s needs. Our research also calls for a 
continuous evaluation of MSI participatory processes (regarding representativeness, 
procedural fairness and consensual orientation) and strengthening of union power resources 
(internal solidarity, network embeddedness, narrative and infrastructural resources). Most 
importantly, existing power imbalances should be acknowledged and addressed in the MSIs. 
The study of the MSIs demonstrates that trade union participation is not enough. Substantial 
consultation requires willingness to listen and commitment from the parties involved in 
finding solutions together with workers and their unions.  
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A. Data collection 
Interviews 
 Date Place Organisation EU trade 
Fair 
Trade Labour 
Costa 
Rica 
Hondura
s CSMs Agriculture 
1 18/02/2015 Ghent City of Ghent  x    
 
 
2 26/02/2015 Brussels Fair Trade Advocacy Office x x    
 
 
3 10/04/2015 Ghent Justice & Peace x x    
 
 
4 14/04/2015 
Sint-
Katelijne-
Waver  Univeg    x  
 
x 
5 22/04/2015 Brussels DG Devco, European Commission  x      
6 28/04/2015 Brussels DG Trade, European Commission x   x    
7 5/05/2015 Brussels DG Trade, European Commission x x    x  
8 21/05/2015 San José Journalist Tico Times x   x    
9 22/05/2015 San José Costa Rica Fair Trade NGO  x  x    
10 25/05/2015 San José Costa Rica Fair Trade NGO  x  x    
11 26/05/2015 San José Dutch Embassy x   x    
12 26/05/2015 San José EU Delegation to Costa Rica x x  x  x  
13 27/05/2015 San José Private sector 1, Costa Rica DAG x   x   x 
14 27/05/2015 San José CANAPEP x   x   x 
15 27/05/2015 San José Private sector 2, Costa Rica DAG x x  x  x  
16 28/05/2015 San José Vice Minister of Labour  x  x    
17 28/05/2015 San José PROCOMER x   x   x 
18 29/05/2015 San José ILO San José office x  x x    
19 29/05/2015 San José German Chamber of Trade x   x    
20 30/05/2015 Boca Arenal Agrofair/Agronorte x x  x    
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21 1/06/2015 San José 
Former Member of Costa Rican 
Parliament x x x x    
22 2/06/2015 San José Trade union SITRACOBAL x  x x  x x 
23 2/06/2015 San José Trade union SITRAP x x x x   x 
24 2/06/2015 San José Plataforma piña en Costa Rica x x x x   x 
25 5/06/2015 San José Private sector 3, Costa Rica DAG x   x    
26 5/06/2015 San José Trade union ICAES x  x x  x  
27 6/06/2015 Limon Centro de Solidaridad   x x    
28 7/06/2015 Limon Trade union SITRACHIRI   x x   x 
29 8/06/2015 Limon Labour inspection  x x x   x 
30 9/06/2015 San José Trade union CMTC & COSIBA x x x x   x 
31 9/06/2015 San José Trad union ANEP x  x x    
32 10/06/2015 San José Ministry of External Trade x  x x    
33 11/06/2015 San José Trade union ICAES x  x x  x  
34 3/07/2015 Leuven Vredeseilanden x x     x 
35 8/07/2015 Brussels DG Trade, European Commission x  x   x  
36 9/07/2015 Brussels Trade union 1, EU DAG x  x   x  
37 1/09/2015 Brussels Fair Trade Advocacy Office x x    x x 
38 11/09/2015 Skype Fair Trade Consultant x x  x   x 
39 17/02/2016 Brussels EESC x     x  
40 3/06/2016 Brussels DG Devco, European Commission x  x  x x x 
41 13/06/2016 Tegucigalpa Consulate of Belgium in Honduras     x   
42 13/06/2016 Tegucigalpa EU Delegation to Honduras x  x  x x x 
43 14/06/2016 Tegucigalpa Associacion Solidaridad  x   x  x 
44 19/06/2016 Tegucigalpa Trade union 2, EU DAG x  x  x x x 
45 20/06/2016 Tegucigalpa CHAAC x    x   
46 20/06/2016 Tegucigalpa CIFCA x    x x  
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47 21/06/2016 Tegucigalpa Via Campesina  x   x x x 
48 21/06/2016 Tegucigalpa Ministry of Labour  x  x  x x  
49 22/06/2016 Tegucigalpa Ministry of Labour    x  x  x 
50 22/06/2016 Tegucigalpa Ministry of Economic Development x    x x x 
51 23/06/2016 Tegucigalpa Trade union CUTH & CGT   x  x   
52 23/06/2016 Skype Trade union AFL-CIO- US    x  x   
53 23/06/2016 Tegucigalpa FOSDEH x    x   
54 24/06/2016 Tegucigalpa ILO office Tegucigalpa   x  x   
55 24/06/2016 Tegucigalpa UNITEC x  x  x   
56 27/06/2016 Choluteca Labour inspection   x  x  x 
57 27/06/2016 Choluteca Trade union STAS   x  x  x 
58 28/06/2016 Tegucigalpa Constitutional lawyer     x   
59 29/06/2016 Tegucigalpa Ministry of Economic Development x    x   
60 30/06/2016 Tegucigalpa UNAH   x  x   
61 30/06/2016 Tegucigalpa US embassy x  x  x   
62 4/07/2016 La Entrada Fair Trade cooperation  x     x 
63 6/07/2016 San Pedro Trade union FOS x  x  x x  
64 6/07/2016 San Pedro Mayacert  x   x  x 
65 6/07/2016 San Pedro 
Trade unions STIBYS, Solidarity 
Center, FESTAGRO   x  x x x 
66 7/07/2016 La Lima STAS/FESTAGRO x    x x x 
67 7/07/2016 El Progresso Labour inspection   x  x  x 
68 4/08/2016 Brussels DG Trade, European Commission x  x   x  
69 8/09/2016 Brussels NGO, EU DAG  x     x  
70 27/09/2016 Brussels Honduran Activist     x   
71 11/10/2016 Antwerp FOS x  x x x  x 
72 9/11/2016 Brussels EESC x     x  
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73 15/11/2016 Brussels NGO, EU DAG  x   x  x  
74 21/03/2017 Brussels NGO, EU DAG   x     x  
75 9/06/2017 Skype Trade union 2, EU DAG x  x x x x x 
76 13/09/2017 Brussels NGO, EU DAG  x     x  
77 12/10/2017 Brussels NGO, EU DAG  x     x  
78 1/11/2017 Mail CSU   x x  x  
79 13/06/2018 Brussels NGO, EU DAG   x     x  
80 30/07/2018 Phone Trade union 2, EU DAG x  x x x x x 
81 2/08/2018 Phone DG Trade, European Commission x  x   x  
82 3/08/2018 Skype Trade union, Costa Rica DAG x  x x  x x 
83 10/08/2018 Mail EU delegation Costa Rica x  x   x  
84 25/09/2018 Brussels Trade union 1, EU DAG x  x   x  
85 27/09/2018 Skype Bananalink x x x x x  x 
86 28/09/2018 Skype Oxfam Germany - Make Fruit Fair x x x x   x 
87 14/12/2018 Brussels ITUC x     x  
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Farm visits 
 Date Place Farm type 
1 1/06/2015 
Pital,  
Costa Rica Small fair trade producer pineapple 
2 4/06/2015 
Pavon,  
Costa Rica Pineapple plantation owned by multination  
3 8/06/2015 
Zurqui,  
Costa Rica Banana plantation owned by multinational 
4 4/07/2016  
La Entrada, 
Honduras  Fair Trade cacao plantation 
 
Non-participant observation 
 Date Place Meeting 
1 1/03/2016 Brussels EU-CA AA: EU DAG meeting 
2 12/04/2016 Brussels CIFCA General Assemblee 
3 15/06/2016 Tegucigalpa Foro de moviemientos sociales 
4 16/06/2016 Tegucigalpa EU-CA AA: Workshop 
5 17/06/2016 Tegucigalpa EU-CA AA: DAG to DAG meeting 
6 18/06/2016 Tegucigalpa EU-CA AA: transnational meeting, only civil society 
7 20/06/2016 Tegucigalpa Dinner civil society & EU officials 
8 21/06/2016 Tegucigalpa EU-CA AA: transnational meeting, with intergovernmental board 
9 8/12/2016 Brussels 
EU-Peru-Colombia-Ecuador FTA: transnational meeting, with intergovernmental 
board 
10 13/06/2017 Brussels EU-CA AA: DAG to DAG videoconference 
11 19/06/2017 Brussels EU-CA AA: EU DAG meeting 
12 13/06/2018 Brussels EU-CA AA: transnational meeting, with intergovernmental board 
13 4/10/2018 Brussels EU-CA AA: EU DAG meeting 
14 14/01/2019 Brussels EU-CA AA: EU DAG meeting 
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Focus groups  
(I assisted during these focus groups, I was not leading them) 
 Date Place Content Participants 
1 24/05/2015 
Sarapiqui, 
Costa Rica 
Main labour issues, achievements of 
the union, challenges/difficulties they 
experience, role government, business, 
private standards, NGOs, EU, 
solidarismo 
Union leader & 13 Union members 
COSIBA-CR, SITAGAH SITRAPEM 
2 8/06/2015 
Zurqui, 
Costa Rica Problem tree most pressing labour issues 
5 union members of multinational banana 
and pineapple plantation 
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B. Personal contribution co-authored articles
All articles in this dissertation are the product of intense collaboration between different 
researchers and are by consequence co-authored. As the faculty regulations concerning co-
authored articles require, I will describe my personal contribution to each article here below, 
even though I believe the final result has benefitted from synergies between the authors. 
• Article 1: The EU and Fair Trade: hands-off?
Deborah Martens & Jan Orbie
Prof. Orbie took the lead concerning the conceptual framework and wrote the first version
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DVDZKROH:KHQDYLRODWLRQRIODERXURUHQYLURQPHQWDOSURYLVLRQVDULVHVWKH
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HJZLWK(FXDGRUSDUWRI
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WKHOLPLWHG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0RUHRYHUWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQKDVLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKHVHWXSDQGIXQFWLRQ
LQJRIWKH&60VFRXOGEHIXUWKHULPSURYHG,QJHQHUDORXWFRPHVRIWKLVUHVHDUFK
FDQFRQWULEXWHWRWKHDFDGHPLFDQGSROLF\GHEDWHRQWKH(8DVDµQRUPDWLYH
SRZHU¶DQGRUµPDUNHWSRZHU¶
7KHVWUXFWXUHRIWKHSDSHULVLQOLQHZLWKWKHWKUHHUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQV,WDOVR
IROORZVDQLQFUHDVLQJOHYHORIDEVWUDFWLRQZH¿UVWQHHGWRNQRZKRZWKHPHHWLQJV
IXQFWLRQIHDWXUHVDQGZKDWWKH\DUHLQWHQGHGWRGRSXUSRVHVLQRUGHUWR
HYHQWXDOO\DVVHVVWKHPHYDOXDWLRQ6HFWLRQ,OLVWVWKHGLVWLQFWLYHIHDWXUHVRIWKH
&60VUHIHUULQJWRERWKGHMXUHDQGGHIDFWRFKDUDFWHULVWLFV7KLVSDUWFRQVHFX
WLYHO\HODERUDWHVRQWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOVHWXSFRPSRVLWLRQRUJDQLVDWLRQDQGRXW
FRPHRIWKH&60V,WSURYLGHVWKHEXLOGLQJEORFNVIRUDFRPSDUDWLYHDQDO\VLV
6HFWLRQ,,GLVVHFWVWKHGLIIHUHQWSXUSRVHVWKDWFDQEHDQGKDYHEHHQDVFULEHG
WRWKH&60V:HZLOOVKRZWKDWWKHVHPHHWLQJVFDQVHUYHIRXUDQDO\WLFDOO\GLVWLQFW
SXUSRVHV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JDWKHULQJVXSSRUWIRU)7$IXQFWLRQDOPRQLWRULQJDQG
LQIRUPDWLRQJDWKHULQJRQWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ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SURPRWLQJGHPR
FUDWLFJRYHUQDQFHDQGSROLF\SXUSRVHVDGYLVLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQWV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EXLOGVRQWKHSUHYLRXVSDUWVE\RXWOLQLQJDQHYDOXDWLYHIUDPHZRUNIRUDVVHVVLQJ
WKHVXFFHVVRIWKHPHHWLQJV7KHREMHFWLYHRIWKLVIUDPHZRUNLVQRWWRSURYLGHD
GH¿QLWHHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHFXUUHQWIXQFWLRQLQJRIWKH&60VEXWUDWKHUWRVLWXDWH
GLIIHUHQWDVVHVVPHQWVZLWKLQZLGHUGHEDWHVLQRUGHUWRWUDQVFHQGXQTXDOL¿HG
MXGJHPHQWV7KHFRQFOXVLRQVXPPDULVHVWKHPDLQ¿QGLQJVDQGH[SUHVVHVVRPH
FULWLFDOFRQFHUQVRQWKHVRIDUOLPLWHGUROHRIWKH&60VHYHQLILWZRXOGEHWRR
HDUO\WRGLVPLVVWKHLUSRWHQWLDOIXWXUHUHOHYDQFH
, )($785(6:+$7'27+(</22./,.("
7KHLQVWLWXWLRQDOVHWWLQJDQGVSHFL¿FIHDWXUHVRIWKH&60VYDU\DFURVVWKHH[LVW
LQJDJUHHPHQWV,QWKLVVHFWLRQZHZLOOGLVVHFWDQGGHVFULEHIRXUGHMXUHDQGGH
IDFWRIHDWXUHVVHH)LJXUH7KHVHKDYHEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGµDEGXFWLYHO\¶PHDQ
LQJWKDWWKH\VWHPIURPWKHLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHRUHWLFDOLQVLJKWVVHFRQGDU\
OLWHUDWXUHRQWUDGHSROLF\LQWHUHVWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQFLYLOVRFLHW\SDUWLFLSDWLRQDQG
PHHWLQJPDQDJHPHQWDQGHPSLULFDOGDWDLQWHUYLHZVDQG¿HOGUHVHDUFKRQWKH
(8.RUHD(8&HQWUDO$PHULFDDQG(83HUX&RORPELDDJUHHPHQWV,WLVLP
SRUWDQWWRV\VWHPDWLFDOO\HODERUDWHWKHVHIHDWXUHVIRUWZRUHDVRQV)LUVWWKLV
HVWDEOLVKHVDIUDPHZRUNIRUPRUHV\VWHPDWLFFRPSDUDWLYHDQDO\VLVRIH[LVWLQJ
DJUHHPHQWVLQIXWXUHUHVHDUFK6HFRQGDQ\HYDOXDWLRQRIWKHVXFFHVVRUIDLOXUH
RIWKH&60VQHHGVWRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKHVSHFL¿FLWLHVRIWKHH[LVWLQJDUUDQJH
PHQWV,QZKDWIROORZVZHZLOOVHWRXWWKHVSHFL¿FIHDWXUHVLGHQWL¿HG:KLOHWKH
QRUPDWLYHHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHVHIHDWXUHVLVSDUWRIWKHHYDOXDWLYHIUDPHZRUNSUR
ZZZHWXLRUJ3XEOLFDWLRQV3ROLF\%ULHIV(XURSHDQ(FRQRPLF(PSOR\PHQWDQG6RFLDO3ROLF\
:KDWVRFLDOIDFHRIWKHQHZ(8WUDGHDJUHHPHQWV%H\RQGWKHVRIWDSSURDFK!
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK(8RI¿FLDO%UXVVHOV0D\
 ,0DQQHUV µ7KHQRUPDWLYHHWKLFVRI WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO$IIDLUV

 &'DPURµ0DUNHWSRZHU(XURSH¶-RXUQDORI(XURSHDQ3XEOLF3ROLF\
 -)ULHGULFKVDQG).UDWRFKZLOµ2Q$FWLQJDQG.QRZLQJ+RZ3UDJPDWLVP&DQ$GYDQFH,Q
WHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQV5HVHDUFKDQG0HWKRGRORJ\¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO2UJDQL]DWLRQ

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YLGHGIRULQVHFWLRQ,,,ZHDOUHDG\SURYLGHVRPHVSHFL¿FLQVLJKWVLQWRKRZWKHVH
FDQEHDVVHVVHG
,QVWLWXWLRQDOVHWXS
7KH¿UVWIHDWXUHLVWKHPRVWRYHUDUFKLQJRQHDVLWFRQFHUQVWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDO
IUDPHZRUNZLWKLQZKLFKWKH&60VWDNHSODFH7KHWKUHHIHDWXUHVVHWRXWKHUH
DIWHUFRPSRVLWLRQRUJDQLVDWLRQLQWHUDFWLRQJRYHUQPHQWVKRXOGEHUHJDUGHGLQ
OLJKWRIWKLVRYHUDUFKLQJLQVWLWXWLRQDOVHWXS7KHLQVWLWXWLRQDOVHWXSFRQVLVWVRI
GLIIHUHQWERGLHVWKDWDUHFUHDWHGLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIWKHDJUHHPHQW,QDGGLWLRQ
WRWKHGHMXUHIRUPDWLRQVLWLVSRVVLEOHWKDWRWKHUERGLHVDUHGHIDFWRLQYROYHG
,PSRUWDQWWRQRWLFHLVWKDWDORQJVLGHWKHVHQRQJRYHUQPHQWDOERGLHVDWWKH
GRPHVWLFDQGWKHWUDQVQDWLRQDOOHYHOHYHU\DJUHHPHQWDOVRVHWVXSDQLQWHUJRY
HUQPHQWDOERG\WKDWPHHWVDQQXDOO\LQRUGHUWRPRQLWRUWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI
WUDGHUHODWHGDVSHFWVRIVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW7KLVERG\FRPSULVHVRIKLJK
OHYHOVHQLRURI¿FLDOVRIHDFK3DUW\
$VLOOXVWUDWHGLQ)LJXUHDWOHDVW¿YHGLIIHUHQWFRQVWHOODWLRQVIRU&60VFXU
UHQWO\H[LVW
 $'RPHVWLF$GYLVRU\*URXS'$*LQZKLFKFLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVDWLRQVRIRQH
3DUW\PHHW
 $MRLQWPHHWLQJRIWKHGRPHVWLFDGYLVRU\JURXSV'$*WR'$*PHHWLQJRI
WKH3DUWLHV
 ,QWKH(8.RUHD)7$WKLVERG\LVQDPHGµ&RPPLWWHHRQ7UDGHDQG6XVWDLQDEOH'HYHORS
PHQW¶DQGLQWKH3HUX&RORPELDDJUHHPHQWµ6XEFRPPLWWHHRQ7UDGHDQG6XVWDLQDEOH'HYHORS
PHQW¶DQG¿QDOO\LQWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQµ%RDUGRQ7UDGHDQG6XVWDLQDEOH'HYHORSPHQW¶
)LJXUH &RPSDUDWLYHIUDPHZRUNIHDWXUHV

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 ,QWKLVFRQVWHOODWLRQWKH'$*WR'$*PHHWLQJFRPHVWRJHWKHUZLWKWKHLQWHU
JRYHUQPHQWDOERG\
 $QRSHQFLYLOVRFLHW\PHHWLQJZKHUHFLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVDWLRQVRIWKH3DUWLHV
PHHWZLWKRXWWKHSUHVHQFHRIWKHLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOERG\
 &LYLOVRFLHW\IURPGLIIHUHQWFRXQWULHVPHHWVZLWKWKHLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOERG\
7KXVWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOIUDPHZRUNFDQGLIIHUIURPDJUHHPHQWWRDJUHHPHQW)LUVW
GLIIHUHQFHVH[LVWEHWZHHQWKHGHMXUHDQGGHIDFWRVHWXSRIWKHPHFKDQLVPV
)RULQVWDQFH
x 7KH(8.RUHD)7$IRUPDOO\FUHDWHV'$*VDQGD'$*WR'$*PHHW
LQJZKLFKLVFDOOHGWKHµ&LYLO6RFLHW\)RUXP¶ZKLOHGHIDFWRDQRSHQEL
UHJLRQDOFLYLOVRFLHW\PHHWLQJLVRUJDQLVHGLQDGGLWLRQWRWKH&LYLO6RFLHW\
)RUXP$OWKRXJKRQO\DOLPLWHGQXPEHURILQWHUHVWVVKRXOGEHFRQVXOWHGDF
FRUGLQJWRWKHDJUHHPHQWLQSUDFWLFHDZLGHUUDQJHRILQWHUHVWVFDQSDUWLFLSDWH
LQDGHVLJQDWHGPHHWLQJx ,QFRQWUDVWWKH(8&HQWUDO$PHULFDDQGWKH(83HUX&RORPELDDJUHHPHQWV
GRQRWUHTXLUHWKHFUHDWLRQRIQHZ'$*V3DUWLHVFDQDOVRUHO\RQH[LVWLQJ
JURXSVRUFRPPLWWHHV7KHVHDJUHHPHQWVDOVRHVWDEOLVKDELUHJLRQDO&60
0RUHRYHULQSUDFWLFHWKH(8&HQWUDO$PHULFDDJUHHPHQWDOVRFUHDWHVD
'$*WR'$*PHHWLQJDVZHOODVDQRSHQELUHJLRQDOFLYLOVRFLHW\PHHWLQJ
ZLWKWKHLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOERG\x 7KH&$5,)2580DJUHHPHQWDVZHOODVWKH(FRQRPLF3DUWQHUVKLS$JUHH
PHQWV(3$VZLWK:HVW$IULFDDQG(DVW$IULFDZKLFKKDYHQRW\HWHQWHUHG
LQWRIRUFHRQO\IRUHVHHD&RQVXOWDWLYH&RPPLWWHHZKLFKLVDFORVHGPHHWLQJ
RI&62VRIDOOWKH3DUWLHVZKHUHWKHLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOERG\LVDOVRSUHVHQW
FRPSDUDEOHWRD'$*WR'$*PHHWLQJZLWKWKHLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOERG\
6HFRQGWKHUHLVYDULDWLRQLQWKHDJUHHPHQWVRQZKHWKHUDQHZ'$*VKRXOG
EHHVWDEOLVKHGRUDQH[LVWLQJJURXSFDQEHFRQVXOWHG
x 7KH(8.RUHD)7$UHTXLUHVWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDQHZ'$*$OO)7$VFRQ
FOXGHGWKHUHDIWHUH[SOLFLWO\PHQWLRQWKHSRVVLELOLW\WRHLWKHUFRQYHQHDQHZ
'$*RUFRQVXOWH[LVWLQJJURXSV7KHIRUPXODWLRQYDULHVWKH3HUX&RORPELD
DJUHHPHQWVWLSXODWHVWKDWµ(DFK3DUW\VKDOOFRQVXOWGRPHVWLFODERXUDQGHQ
YLURQPHQWRUVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWFRPPLWWHHVRUJURXSVRUFUHDWHVXFK
FRPPLWWHHVRU JURXSVZKHQ WKH\GRQRW H[LVW¶ $UWLFOH ZKHUHDV WKH
&HQWUDO$PHULFDQDJUHHPHQWVSHOORXWWKDWµ(DFK3DUW\VKDOOFRQYHQHQHZRU
FRQVXOW H[LVWLQJ$GYLVRU\*URXSV RQ WUDGH DQG VXVWDLQDEOH GHYHORSPHQW¶
$UWLFOH,QWHUHVWLQJO\WKHODWWHUJRHVDELWIXUWKHUE\VWLSXODWLQJLQD
IRRWQRWHWKDWLIH[LVWLQJJURXSVDUHXVHGWKHVHVKRXOGEHRIIHUHGµWKHRS
SRUWXQLW\WRUHLQIRUFHDQGGHYHORSWKHLUDFWLYLWLHVZLWKWKHQHZSHUVSHFWLYHV
DQGDUHDVRIZRUN¶SURYLGHGLQWKH6'FKDSWHU
 +HUHWRRWKHQDPHVRIWKLVFRQVWHOODWLRQYDU\EHWZHHQWKH)7$VWKH3HUX&RORPELDRSHQ
&60LVFDOOHGµ'LDORJXHZLWK&LYLO6RFLHW\¶LQWKHFDVHRI&HQWUDO$PHULFDLWLVFDOOHGµ&LYLO6RFLHW\
'LDORJXH)RUXP¶ZKLOHLQWKHFDVHRI9LHWQDPWKHDJUHHPHQWPHQWLRQVDµ-RLQW)RUXP¶
 7KHQXPEHUVEHWZHHQEUDFNHWVUHIHUWRWKHFRQVWHOODWLRQRIWKH&60VGHVFULEHGDERYH

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x ,QSUDFWLFHQHZ'$*VKDYHEHHQFUHDWHGRUDUH LQ WKHSURFHVVRIEHLQJ
FUHDWHGXQGHUWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQDJUHHPHQWVSHFL¿FDOO\ZLWKLQHDFKRI
WKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ FRXQWULHV ,Q FRQWUDVW WKH3HUXYLDQDQG&RORPELDQ
JRYHUQPHQWKDYHGHVLJQDWHGDOUHDG\H[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPV,QWKHFDVHRI
3HUXWKHJRYHUQPHQWRSWHGWRXVHIRXUDOUHDG\H[LVWLQJERGLHVWRPRQLWRU
ODERXUSURYLVLRQVDQGWRXVHH[LVWLQJQDWLRQDOWHFKQLFDOZRUNLQJJURXSVRU
FRPPLVVLRQVIRUHQYLURQPHQWDOSURYLVLRQV,QWKHFDVHRI&RORPELDWKHJRY
HUQPHQW GHFLGHG WR XVH WKH PDOIXQFWLRQLQJ3HUPDQHQW&RPPLVVLRQ RQ
6DODULHVDQG/DERXUWRGHDOZLWKODERXULVVXHVDQGWRXVHWKH1DWLRQDO&RXQ
FLOLQ(QYLURQPHQWWRGHDOZLWKHQYLURQPHQWDOLVVXHV,WLVQRWDOZD\VFOHDUIRU
SDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHVHDOUHDG\H[LVWLQJQDWLRQDOPHFKDQLVPVWKDWLQWKLVFRQWH[W
WKH\DUHDOVRWDVNHGZLWKGLVFXVVLQJWKHVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWDVSHFWVRI
WKH(8WUDGHDJUHHPHQWx 7KH(8HVWDEOLVKHVDQHZ(8ZLGH'$*IRUHYHU\DJUHHPHQW
7KLUGZKHQWKHDJUHHPHQWLQFOXGHVPRUHWKDQRQH(8WUDGHSDUWQHULHLQWHU
UHJLRQDODJUHHPHQWVWKHUHDUHGLIIHUHQFHVLQKRZWKH'$*VZLWKLQDQG
DPRQJWKHVHFRXQWULHVDUHRUJDQLVHG
x 2IDOOWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ'$*V&RVWD5LFDLVWKHRQO\FRXQWU\WKDWKDV
GLYLGHGLWV'$*LQWRWKUHHVHSDUDWHPHHWLQJVIRUWKHODERXUHQYLURQPHQWDQG
EXVLQHVVJURXSVZLWKDSSDUHQWO\QRLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHP(DFKRIWKH
VXE'$*VLVWKHQFKDUDFWHULVHGE\PRUHVLPLODULQWHUHVWVx :KLOH WKH(8FUHDWHVDQ(8ZLGH'$*IRUHYHU\DJUHHPHQWVHHDERYH
VXFKUHJLRQDOFRQ¿JXUDWLRQVKDYHQRWEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGE\LWVWUDGLQJSDUWQHUV
DQGLQWHUDFWLRQVEHWZHHQWKH'$*VRI(8WUDGLQJSDUWQHUVVHHPTXDVLDEVHQW
)RULQVWDQFHQRPHHWLQJVKDYHWDNHQSODFHEHWZHHQWKH3HUXYLDQDQG&R
ORPELDQ'$*6LPLODUO\LWDSSHDUVWKDWWKHUHKDYHEHHQQRPHHWLQJVDPRQJ
WKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ'$*VWRSUHSDUH'$*WR'$*PHHWLQJV
)RXUWKWKHUHLVYDULDWLRQLQWKHGHMXUHDQGGHIDFWRSDUWLFLSDWLRQWRWKHRSHQ
ELUHJLRQDO&60DV&62VSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQWKH'$*VGRQRWQHFHVVDULO\
SDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHVHPHHWLQJV
 7KH1DWLRQDO&RXQFLORQ:RUNDQG(PSOR\PHQWWKH1DWLRQDO&RXQFLORQ+HDOWKDQG6DIHW\
DW:RUNDQGWKH1DWLRQDO&RPPLVVLRQRQ)RUFHG/DERXUDQG1DWLRQDO&RPPLWWHHRQ&KLOG/D
ERXU
 7KHIDFWWKDWERWKJRYHUQPHQWVXVHDOUHDG\H[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVLVGHSORUHGE\FLYLOVR
FLHW\LQERWKFRXQWULHV7KH\SUHIHUWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDQDGKRFPHFKDQLVPWRGHDOZLWKWKHVH
LVVXHV2YHUDOOWKHSURYLVLRQVIRU&60VLQWKH(83HUX&RORPELDDJUHHPHQWDUHPRUHUHVWULFWLYH
WKDQLQPRVWRWKHUDJUHHPHQWV,WVHHPVWKDWWKH3HUXYLDQDQG&RORPELDQJRYHUQPHQWQHJRWL
DWHGWKHVHSURYLVLRQVZLWKDQH\HWRWKHLUH[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPV)RUH[DPSOHDVRSSRVHGWRPDQ\
RWKHUDJUHHPHQWVLWLVQRWVWDWHGWKDWWKHPHPEHUVRIWKHVHPHFKDQLVPVVKRXOGEHµLQGHSHQG
HQW¶7KLVFRPHVDVQRVXUSULVHJLYHQWKDWWKHPDLQPHFKDQLVPIRUVRFLDOGLDORJXHLQ3HUXWKH
1DWLRQDO&RXQFLORQ:RUNDQG(PSOR\PHQWLVFKDLUHGE\WKH0LQLVWHURI/DERXU)XUWKHUPRUHLWLV
H[SOLFLWO\PHQWLRQHGWKDWµWKHSURFHGXUHVIRUWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDQGFRQVXOWDWLRQRIVXFKFRPPLWWHHV
RUJURXSV>«@VKDOOEHLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKGRPHVWLFODZ¶$UW

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x 2QO\ WKH WUDGHDJUHHPHQWVZLWK8NUDLQH*HRUJLD0ROGRYD&DQDGDDQG
9LHWQDPH[SOLFLWO\PHQWLRQWKDWPHPEHUVRIWKHGLIIHUHQW'$*VZLOOSDUWLFLSDWH
LQDQRSHQELUHJLRQDOFLYLOVRFLHW\PHHWLQJx 1HLWKHUWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQQRUWKH3HUX&RORPELDDJUHHPHQWVSHOOVRXW
WKLVQHFHVVLW\+RZHYHUWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQPHPEHUVZLOOGHIDFWRDWWHQG
WKHVHPHHWLQJVZKLOHWKH3HUXYLDQDQG&RORPELDQ'$*PHPEHUVKDYHQRW
EHHQDEOHWRGRVRLQWHUDOLDEHFDXVHWKH'$*VGRQRWUHDOO\H[LVWLQWKHVH
FRXQWULHVDQGEHFDXVHRIEXGJHWDU\FRQVWUDLQWVVHHEHORZ
&RPSRVLWLRQ
7KHVHFRQGIHDWXUHFRQFHUQVWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRIWKH&60VHQFRPSDVVLQJL
WKHTXDQWLW\RISDUWLFLSDQWVLLWKHGLYHUVLW\DPRQJVWWKHPDQGWKHLLLVHOHFWLRQ
SURFHGXUHVIRUWKHLUSDUWLFLSDWLRQ
7KHTXDQWLW\LRUWKHQXPEHURISDUWLFLSDQWVYDULHVDFURVVWKHDJUHHPHQWV
,QVRPHFDVHVLWLVQRWVSHFL¿HGIRUH[DPSOHLQWKH(83HUX&RORPELD)7$DQG
LQWKH(8&HQWUDO$PHULFDDJUHHPHQWLQRWKHUVWKHPD[LPXPQXPEHURISDU
WLFLSDQWVLVGHWHUPLQHGLQWKHUXOHVRISURFHGXUHIRULQVWDQFHWKHUXOHVRISURFH
GXUHRI.RUHDDVZHOODVWKH(8'$*IRUWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ)7$VSHFLI\WKDW
HDFK'$*FRQVLVWVRIDPD[LPXPRISHUVRQV:KLOHWKH(8'$*VDOZD\V
KDYHDFLUFXPVFULEHGDQG¿[HGQXPEHURISDUWLFLSDQWVWKHRSHQ&60VRUJDQ
LVHGIRUH[DPSOHLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIWKH(8&HQWUDO$PHULFDDJUHHPHQWKDYH
DKLJKQXPEHURISDUWLFLSDQWV)RUQRZLWLVGLI¿FXOWWRDVVHVVWKHQXPEHURI
SDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKH&60VLQWKHSDUWQHUFRXQWULHVDVOLVWVRISDUWLFLSDWLRQDUHQRW
SXEOLFO\DYDLODEOHDQGLQVRPHFDVHVHJ3HUXGRXEWVKDYHHYHQEHHQUDLVHG
DERXWZKHWKHUWKH\HIIHFWLYHO\FRQYHQHLQRUGHUWRIXO¿OWKHLUUROHVXQGHUWKH6'
FKDSWHU
(TXDOO\LPSRUWDQWLVWKHGLYHUVLW\RIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWVLL$GLVWLQFWLRQFDQEH
PDGHEHWZHHQVXEVWDQWLDOGLYHUVLW\JHRJUDSKLFDOGLYHUVLW\DQGGLYHUVLW\RYHU
WLPH)LUVWDVIRUVXEVWDQWLDOGLYHUVLW\DOOWKHOHJDOWH[WVVWLSXODWHWKDW&60V
HQFRPSDVVODERXUEXVLQHVVDQGHQYLURQPHQWDOLQWHUHVWV,QSUDFWLFHKRZ
HYHUWKHJURXSVSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQWKH&60VFDQYDU\IURPEHLQJUDWKHUQDUURZWR
YHU\EURDG$VPHQWLRQHGHDUOLHUWKH&RVWD5LFDQ'$*LVGLYLGHGLQWRWKUHH
VHSDUDWHJURXSVZLWKVLPLODULQWHUHVWVZLWKYLUWXDOO\QRLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH
WKUHH'$*VDQGOLWWOHNQRZOHGJHRIWKHPHPEHUVRIWKHRWKHUJURXSV0RUHGL
YHUVHLQWHUHVWVFDQEHIRXQGIRUH[DPSOHLQWKH(XURSHDQ'$*IRUWKH(83HUX
&RORPELD WUDGH DJUHHPHQW ZKLFK LQFOXGHV JURXSV OLNH WKH (XURSHDQ
7HOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV1HWZRUN2SHUDWRUV¶$VVRFLDWLRQWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RQIHG
HUDWLRQRI(XURSHDQ%HHW*URZHUVDQGWKH:RUOG:LGH)XQGIRU1DWXUH$Q
HYHQKLJKHUOHYHORIVXEVWDQWLDOGLYHUVLW\WDNHVSODFHZKHQREVHUYHUVFDQEH
DGPLWWHGWRDWWHQGWKHPHHWLQJZLWKRXWDFWLYHO\FRQWULEXWLQJ7KLVLVWKHFDVHLQ
WKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ&LYLO6RFLHW\'LDORJXH)RUXP)LJQRDQGWKH(8
.RUHD'$*WR'$*PHHWLQJ)LJQR:HKDYHQRLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKH
 7KLVLVWKHFDVHIRUDOODJUHHPHQWVVLQFH.RUHDH[FHSWIRUWKH(88NUDLQHDJUHHPHQWLQ
ZKLFKQRH[SOLFLWUHIHUHQFHWRHQYLURQPHQWDOLQWHUHVWVLVPDGH$UWDQGWKH3HUX&RORPELD
DJUHHPHQWZKLFKGRHVQRWUHIHUH[SOLFLWO\WRHFRQRPLFRUEXVLQHVVVWDNHKROGHUV$UW

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H[WHQWWRZKLFKREVHUYHUVDUHLQYLWHG,WVKRXOGDOVREHQRWHGWKDWHYHQWKRXJK
HQYLURQPHQWDOLQWHUHVWVDUHGHMXUHLQFOXGHGLQWKH&60VLQSUDFWLFHWKHVHJURXSV
DUHUDUHO\SDUWRIWKH'$*V)RULQVWDQFH&RORPELDQHQYLURQPHQWDOJURXSVGR
QRWVHHPWREHVWURQJO\UHSUHVHQWHGLQWKH(83HUX&RORPELD&60VDQGWKH
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIHQYLURQPHQWDOJURXSVLQWKH(XURSHDQ'$*VLVOLPLWHG)LJ
QR7KH\DUHDOVRQRWZLGHO\UHSUHVHQWHGDWWKHRSHQFLYLOVRFLHW\PHHWLQJV
)LJQR
6HFRQGLQWHUPVRIJHRJUDSKLFDOVFRSHWKHPHHWLQJVDUHPRUHRUOHVVGLYHUVH
GHSHQGLQJRQWKHQXPEHURIFRXQWULHVLQYROYHG:KLOHWKH&60VIRUWKH.RUHD
DJUHHPHQWRQO\FRQWDLQ&62VIURPWKH(8DQG.RUHDWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ
PHFKDQLVPVFRQVLVWRI&62VIURPWKH(8DQGVL[&HQWUDO$PHULFDQFRXQWULHV
UHVXOWLQJLQVHYHQVHSDUDWH'$*V,QWKHFDVHRI3HUX&RORPELDWKLVUHVXOWVLQ
WKUHHVHSDUDWH'$*V7KLUGWKHUHLVGLYHUVLW\RYHUWLPH3DUWLFLSDWLRQRI&62V
DQGWKHLUUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVFDQEH¿[HGRUYDULDEOH7KLVGHWHUPLQHVZKHWKHUWKH
VDPHSHRSOHDUHSUHVHQWWKURXJKWKHVHULHVRIPHHWLQJV,QWKH(8.RUHD'$*
FDVHWKHVDPHSHRSOHKDYHEHHQPHHWLQJHYHU\\HDUVLQFHXQWLOWKHUH
FRPSRVLWLRQLQ'HFHPEHU,QWKHFDVHRIWKH(83HUX&RORPELDDQG(8
&HQWUDO$PHULFDPHHWLQJVSDUWLFLSDWLQJRUJDQLVDWLRQVKDYHEHHQFKDQJLQJ7KH
GUDIWUXOHVRISURFHGXUHRIWKH(8'$*IRUWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQDJUHHPHQW
VSHOORXWWKDWµ>W@KHPHPEHUVRIWKH(8$*VKDOOEHDSSRLQWHGIRUDWZRDQGD
KDOI\HDUWHUPDOLJQHGZLWKWKH((6&PDQGDWHZLWKWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIUHQHZDO
IRULQGLYLGXDOPHPEHUV¶,QWKH(8'$*PHHWLQJIRU3HUX&RORPELDLWVHHPVWKDW
PHPEHUVKLSLVTXLWHÀH[LEOH,QWKHODVWPHHWLQJ$SULOWKHPHPEHUV
SUHVHQWDJUHHGWKDWWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RQIHGHUDWLRQRI(XURSHDQ%HHW*URZHUV
DQGWKH(XURJURXSIRU$QLPDOVZRXOGQRORQJHUEHPHPEHUDQGWKDWWKH(XUR
SHDQ)UXLWDQG9HJHWDEOHV7UDGH$VVRFLDWLRQZRXOGEHDGGHG
$OVRWKHVHOHFWLRQSURFHGXUHLLLYDULHVDFURVVWKH&60VWKHUHLVQRVHW
SURFHGXUHQHLWKHUIRUWKHGRPHVWLFQRUIRUWKHWUDQVQDWLRQDOPHHWLQJV7KHPDLQ
LVVXHLQWKLVFRQWH[WLVZKHWKHURUJDQLVDWLRQVDUHLQYLWHGE\WKHLUJRYHUQPHQWWR
SDUWLFLSDWHRUZKHWKHUWKH\FDQWDNHWKHLQLWLDWLYHWRSDUWLFLSDWHWKHPVHOYHV7KHUH
LVDOVRDFRQFHUQWKDW*RYHUQPHQW2UJDQLVHG1RQJRYHUQPHQWDO2UJDQLVDWLRQV
*21*2VZRXOGEHDSSRLQWHG7KH(83HUX&RORPELDDJUHHPHQWVWLSXODWHV
WKDWµ7KHSURFHGXUHVIRUWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDQGFRQVXOWDWLRQRIVXFKFRPPLWWHHVRU
JURXSVWKH&60VDXWKRUV>«@VKDOOEHLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKGRPHVWLFODZ¶$U
WLFOHWKHDJUHHPHQWZLWK9LHWQDPVSHOOVRXWWKDWHDFK3DUW\VKDOODSSRLQW
WKHPHPEHUVRIWKH'$*$UWLFOHDQGWKH&$5,)2580(3$$UWLFOH
($&$UWLFOHDQG(&2:$6(3$VVSHFLI\WKDWµSDUWLFLSDWLRQVKDOOEHGH
FLGHGE\WKH(3$&RXQFLO>LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOERG\@¶0RUHEURDGO\WKLVLVVXH
UHODWHVWRTXHVWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJLQGHSHQGHQFHIURPWKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGH[LVW
LQJWLHVZLWKJRYHUQPHQW2YHUDOOWKHWUDGHDJUHHPHQWVDUHQRWYHU\GHWDLOHGRQ
WKHVHOHFWLRQSURFHGXUHDQGWKHSURFHGXUHVIRUWKHVHOHFWLRQRIPHPEHUVGRQRW
VHHPWUDQVSDUHQW
,QWKH(8LWVHHPVWKDWIRUHDFKDJUHHPHQWWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQLV
VHQGLQJRXWDFDOOIRULQWHUHVWDPRQJWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQVWDNLQJSDUWLQWKH&LYLO
6RFLHW\'LDORJXHRQWUDGHSROLF\7KHUHDIWHULWLVXQFOHDUKRZVSHFL¿FRUJDQLVD
WLRQVDUHVHOHFWHG,QRUGHUWRKDYHUHOHYDQW&62VSDUWLFLSDWLQJLWVHHPVWKDW
VRPH(XURSHDQRUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGWKH&RPPLVVLRQLWVHOIZRXOGOLNHWRVHOHFW

&LYLO6RFLHW\0HHWLQJVLQ(XURSHDQ8QLRQ7UDGH$JUHHPHQWV
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SDUWLFXODUPHPEHUVPRUHGLUHFWO\7KHUXOHVRISURFHGXUHRIWKH(8'$*RI
WKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQDJUHHPHQWVSHFLI\WKDWµ>L@IDVHDWRFFXSLHGE\DQRQ((6&
PHPEHUEHFRPHVYDFDQWDQHZPHPEHUVKDOOEHDSSRLQWHGE\WKH(8'$*
EDVHGRQSURSRVDOPDGHE\WKH&KDLUWDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWWKHQHHGIRUEDODQFHG
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQZLWKLQWKH(8$*¶([FHSWIRUWKHUHTXLUHPHQWRIµEDODQFHG
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶LWLVXQFOHDURQZKDWEDVLVWKH&KDLUZRXOGSURSRVHDSRWHQWLDO
PHPEHU
,QWKH(8¶VWUDGHSDUWQHUFRXQWULHVWKHVHOHFWLRQSURFHGXUHVHHPVHYHQOHVV
WUDQVSDUHQW,Q.RUHDWKHJRYHUQPHQWDW¿UVWLQVWDQFHGLGQRWDSSRLQWWKH.R
UHDQ&RQIHGHUDWLRQRI7UDGH8QLRQVRQHRIWKHPDLQODERXUIHGHUDWLRQVLQWKH
FRXQWU\DQGRQO\GLGVRDIWHUVWURQJSURWHVWE\WKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQDQG
WKH(8'$*,Q3HUX&RORPELDWKHVHOHFWLRQSURFHGXUHLVOHVVUHOHYDQWJLYHQ
WKDWDOUHDG\H[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVDUHXVHG7KLVVLWXDWLRQLPSOLHVWKDW&62VWKDW
DUHQRWDOUHDG\SDUWRIWKHVHH[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVGRQRWKDYHWKHRSSRUWXQLW\
WRGLVFXVVWKHVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWFKDSWHUZLWKLQWKHGRPHVWLFLQVWLWXWLRQV
7KHRQO\RSSRUWXQLW\ZRXOGEHWKURXJKWKHDQQXDORSHQELUHJLRQDOFLYLOVRFLHW\
PHHWLQJV,Q&RVWD5LFDWKHJRYHUQPHQWFRPSRVHGWKHOLVWRISDUWLFLSDQWVRIWKH
'$*V(YHQWKRXJKWKHSDUWLFLSDQWVDUHDZDUHRIWKHLUPHPEHUVKLSPDQ\RU
JDQLVDWLRQVDUHQRWDFWLYHO\LQYROYHGDQGEDVLFDOO\ZDLWIRULQVWUXFWLRQV2WKHUV
DUHPRUHSURDFWLYHWZREXVLQHVV1RQ*RYHUQPHQWDO2UJDQLVDWLRQV1*2V
UHTXHVWHGWREHSDUWRIWKHODERXUJURXSRIWKH&RVWD5LFDQ'$*DQGZHUHDOVR
DOORZHGWRGRVR,QJHQHUDOOLWWOHLVNQRZQDERXWWKHVHOHFWLRQSURFHGXUHLQWKH
&HQWUDO$PHULFDQFRXQWULHVH[FHSWWKDWIRUVRPHRIWKHVHJRYHUQPHQWVVXFK
DV+RQGXUDVLWKDVEHHQGLI¿FXOWWRSXWIRUZDUGLQGHSHQGHQW&62VWRSDUWLFL
SDWH$VIRU&$5,)2580WKHVHOHFWLRQRISDUWLFLSDQWVZDVWKHSULQFLSDOKXUGOH
WKDWFDXVHGDGHOD\RIVL[\HDUVLQWKHIRUPDWLRQLWV-RLQW&RQVXOWDWLYH&RPPLWWHH
)LJQR7KHPDLQUHDVRQZDVWKDWDOOWKH3DUWLHVKDGWRDJUHHRQWKH
FRPSRVLWLRQRIWKLV&RPPLWWHH
,QWHUHVWLQJO\WKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VKDQGVRIIDSSURDFKWRZDUGVWKH
FRPSRVLWLRQRI&60VLQWKLUGFRXQWULHVLVDWRGGVZLWKWKHRIWKHDUGFULWLFLVP
DERXWWKH(8¶VH[FOXVLRQRIFULWLFDORUJDQLVDWLRQVRUHJUHOLJLRXVRUJDQLVDWLRQV
LQLWVFLYLOVRFLHW\FRQVXOWDWLRQVZLWKWKLUGFRXQWULHV(YHQWKRXJKWKH&RPPLVVLRQ
KDVH[SUHVVHGLWVFRQFHUQUHJDUGLQJWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRIWKH'$*VRIVRPHWUDGH
SDUWQHUVLWH[HUWVOLWWOHRUQRSUHVVXUHRQWKHUHVSHFWLYHJRYHUQPHQWVWRDGGUHVV
WKHVHLVVXHV7KH&RPPLVVLRQSODFHVPRVWRIWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\ZLWKWKHWUDGH
SDUWQHUHPSKDVL]LQJLWVVRYHUHLJQW\WRHVWDEOLVKLWVRZQGRPHVWLFPHFKDQLVPV
DQGVD\LQJWKDWWKHTXDOLW\RIWKH&60VµLVKRVWDJHRIWKHWKLUGFRXQWU\¶
 6HHDXWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZVXSUDQRWH
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK(81*2%UXVVHOV-XO\
 ((6&µ5XOHVRISURFHGXUHRIWKH(8$GYLVRU\*URXSFUHDWHGSXUVXDQWWR7LWOH9,,,$UWLFOH
RIWKH(8&HQWUDO$PHULFD$VVRFLDWLRQ$JUHHPHQW¶%UXVVHOV
 6HHDXWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZVXSUDQRWH
 3DUWLFLSDQWZRUNVKRS µ+RZ WR LPSOHPHQW WKHPRQLWRULQJ RI WKH(3$V"¶ KRVWHG E\0(3
-RDFKLP6FKXVWHU%UXVVHOV$SULO
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK(8RI¿FLDO%UXVVHOV$SULO

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2UJDQLVDWLRQ
7KHWKLUGIHDWXUHLVRUJDQLVDWLRQZKLFKFRYHUVLPHHWLQJPDQDJHPHQWDORQJVLGH
TXHVWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJLLDVHFUHWDULDWLLLWKHIUHTXHQF\RIPHHWLQJVDQGLY
DYDLODEOHUHVRXUFHV
7KHOLWHUDWXUHRQPHHWLQJPDQDJHPHQWLLGHQWL¿HVVHYHUDOUXOHVRIWKXPEV
DGGUHVVLQJWKHFRQGXFWRIWKHGLIIHUHQWSKDVHVRIDPHHWLQJQDPHO\LWVSUHSDUD
WLRQIDFLOLWDWLRQDQGIROORZXS7KHVHDUHWUDQVIHUDEOHWRWKHFRQWH[WRI&60V
)LUVWSUHSDUDWLRQVSUHFHGLQJWKHPHHWLQJVLQFOXGHDWLPHO\GHFLVLRQRIDWLPH
DQGSODFHDFOHDUREMHFWLYHDWLPHO\FRPPXQLFDWHGDQGDSSURYHGDJHQGDD
UHYLHZRIWKHDWWHQGHHVDQGDFNQRZOHGJHGUXOHVRISURFHGXUH+RQGXUDVKRVW
LQJWKH&60VRIWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ$$LQZDLWHGXQWLORQHPRQWKEHIRUH
WKHDFWXDOPHHWLQJVWRFRQ¿UPWKHZHHNQRW\HWWKHGDWHVLQZKLFKWKHPHHWLQJV
ZRXOGWDNHSODFH7KLVDOORZHGOLWWOHSUHSDUDWLRQWLPHIRUWKH&62V&RQFHUQLQJ
WKHDJHQGDWKHUXOHVRISURFHGXUHRIWKH(8'$*RIWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ$$
VSHOORXWWKDWLWµVKDOOEHVHQWRXWWRWKH(8'$*PHPEHUVDWOHDVWWKUHHZHHNV
EHIRUHWKH(8'$*PHHWLQJ¶:KHUHDVWKHUXOHVRISURFHGXUHRIWKH'$*WR
'$*PHHWLQJVRIWKH(8.RUHDDJUHHPHQWVWLSXODWHWKDWWKHDJHQGDVKDOOEH
VHQWWRWKHPHPEHUVQRODWHUWKDQWKUHHPRQWKVSULRUWRWKHPHHWLQJ&RQFHUQLQJ
WKHDWWHQGHHVRIWKH&RVWD5LFDQ'$*0D\LQIRUPDOWHOHSKRQHFDOOVZHUH
PDGHIURPWKH(8GHOHJDWLRQWRPHPEHUVRIWKH'$*WKHGD\SULRUWRWKHPHHW
LQJWRLQTXLUHLQWHQGHGSDUWLFLSDWLRQ7KLVHIIRUWZDVKRZHYHUDQDGKRFLQLWLDWLYH
DQGQRWSDUWRIDVWDQGDUGL]HGDSSURDFK3UHSDUDWLRQVIRUWKH&60RIWKH3HUX
&RORPELDDJUHHPHQWHVSHFLDOO\IRUWKH¿UVWHGLWLRQLQ)HEUXDU\LQ/LPD
ZHUHIDUIURPRSWLPDO6RPHRUJDQLVDWLRQVUHSRUWHGWKDWRQO\YHU\IHZSHRSOH
ZHUHLQYLWHGDQGWKDWWKRVHWKDWZHUHLQYLWHGRQO\KHDUGDERXWLWDIHZGD\V
EHIRUHZKLFKKLQGHUHGHIIHFWLYHSUHSDUDWLRQDQGSDUWLFLSDWLRQ
6HFRQGIDFLOLWDWLRQGXULQJWKHPHHWLQJLVHQKDQFHGE\DFKDLUDQGE\WKH
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURFHGXUHV$QLPSDUWLDOFKDLUKDVDQLPSRUWDQWUROHDVDID
FLOLWDWRUWRNHHSWKHPHHWLQJRQWUDFNLQOLQHZLWKWKHDJHQGDLWHPVDQGWKHWLPH
DQGPDQDJHWKHFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV7KH(8'$*VDQG'$*WR'$*
PHHWLQJVWKDWWDNHSODFHLQ%UXVVHOVDUHFKDLUHGE\WKH((6&DVZHOODVDFR
FKDLUIURPWKHSDUWQHUFRXQWU\7KHDGYDQWDJHRIKDYLQJDPHHWLQJOHGE\WKH
((6&PD\EHWKDWWKDWWKLVLQVWLWXWLRQKDVPRUHH[SHULHQFHZLWKWKLVIRUPDWWKDQ
IRUH[DPSOHWKHLU&HQWUDO$PHULFDQFRXQWHUSDUW7KH'$*WR'$*PHHWLQJV
WDNLQJSODFHLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH(8.RUHD)7$KDYHWZRFRFKDLUVHDFKFRQ
GXFWLQJSDUWVRIDPHHWLQJZLWKWKHKRVWLQJ3DUW\SOD\LQJDOHDGLQJUROH7KH
UXOHVRISURFHGXUHVWLSXODWHWKDWWKHFRFKDLUVVKDOOEHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHSUHS
DUDWLRQFRRUGLQDWLRQDQGRUJDQLVDWLRQRIWKH'$*WR'$*PHHWLQJ¶VZRUN7KH
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURFHGXUHVDOVRKDYHDQLQHYLWDEOHLPSDFWRQWKHPHHWLQJV¶
RXWFRPHDQGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶HQJDJHPHQW$JDLQLQWKHFDVHRIWKH.RUHD'$*
 3$QGHUVRQ  µ+RZ WR UXQHIIHFWLYHPHHWLQJV¶ -XQHDYDLDEOHDWKWWS
ZZZSXEOLF¿QDQFHFRXNKRZUXQHIIHFWLYHPHHWLQJV!0'R\OH DQG'6WUDXVV+RZ
WRPDNHPHHWLQJVZRUN&KLFDJR3OD\ER\3UHVV*3DUNHU	5+RIIPDQ0HHWLQJ([FHO
OHQFH6DQ)UDQFLVFR-RVVH\%DVV
 6HH((6&VXSUDQRWH
 6HHDXWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZVXSUDQRWH

&LYLO6RFLHW\0HHWLQJVLQ(XURSHDQ8QLRQ7UDGH$JUHHPHQWV
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WR'$*PHHWLQJ)LJQRWKHUXOHVRISURFHGXUHPHQWLRQWKDWLWVPHPEHUV
µVKDOOPDNHHYHU\HIIRUWWRWDNHGHFLVLRQVE\FRQVHQVXV¶,QFDVHRIGLVDJUHH
PHQWEHWZHHQWKHWZR'$*VWKHFRQFOXVLRQVDQGWKHPLQXWHVRIWKHPHHWLQJ
VKRXOGUHÀHFWWKDWGLVDJUHHPHQW%RWKWKHGUDIWUXOHVRISURFHGXUHRIWKH(8
'$*IRUWKH3HUX&RORPELDDJUHHPHQWDQGWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ$$PHQWLRQ
WKDWLWVKDOOVWULYHWRWDNHGHFLVLRQVE\FRQVHQVXV,QFDVHDYRWHLVFDOOHGIRU
GHFLVLRQVZLOOEHWDNHQE\DVLPSOHPDMRULW\,QWKHHYHQWRIDWLHWKH&KDLUVKDOO
KDYHDFDVWLQJYRWH)LJQR
7KLUGIROORZLQJXSRQWKHPHHWLQJPLQXWHVRUPHHWLQJQRWHVFDQEHGUDIWHG
FLUFXODWHGDQGDSSURYHG$OVRH[WHUQDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQWRSROLF\PDNHUVDQG
WKHEURDGHUSXEOLFFDQEHWDNHQFDUHRI3XEOLFDWLRQRIWKHPHHWLQJGRFXPHQWV
FDQPDNHLWHDVLHUIRUVWDNHKROGHUVWREHLQIRUPHGDERXWWKHSURFHHGLQJV7KLV
DOVRPDNHVLWHDVLHUWRKROGWKH3DUWLHVDFFRXQWDEOHIRUKRZWKH\DGGUHVVWKH
LQSXWUHFHLYHGIURPWKHPHHWLQJV%RWKWKHVHWDVNVDUHPDLQO\FDUULHGRXWE\WKH
((6&ZKLFKGUDIWVDQGFLUFXODWHVWKHPLQXWHVZKLFKDSSHDUVWREHDOHQJWK\
SURFHVVDQGKDVDGHGLFDWHGSXEOLFZHESDJHWRUHSRUWRQWKHVHPHHWLQJV
8QIRUWXQDWHO\WKHLQIRUPDWLRQDYDLODEOHRQWKLVZHEVLWHLVYHU\OLPLWHG)LQDOO\
WKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIGHFLVLRQVVKRXOGEHPRQLWRUHGDQGWKHSDUWLFLSDQWVVKRXOG
EHDEOHWRHYDOXDWHWKHPHHWLQJLQRUGHUWRLPSURYHIXWXUHPHHWLQJV,QWKLVUHJDUG
WKH(8'$*IRU3HUX&RORPELDWRRNWKHLQLWLDWLYHWRLGHQWLI\SULRULW\WKHPHVIRU
WKH'$*PHHWLQJVVRWKDWWKHQH[WPHHWLQJZRXOGEHPRUHIRFXVHG$SULO
7KH&RPPLVVLRQVXJJHVWHGDOLJQLQJWKHVHSULRULWLHVZLWKWKRVHRIWKHLQWHUJRY
HUQPHQWDOERG\WRLPSURYHWKHFRKHUHQFHEHWZHHQERWKJURXSV7KHJURXSRI
YDULRXVLQWHUHVWVRIWKH(8'$*IRU&HQWUDO$PHULFDZURWHDOHWWHUWRLWVSUHVLGHQW
ZLWKVXJJHVWLRQVRQKRZWRG\QDPLVHWKHJURXSLQRUGHUWROHDGWRPRUHFRQFUHWH
UHVXOWV7KH\VXJJHVWPDNLQJDQDQQXDOSURJUDPPHZLWKSUHFLVHREMHFWLYHV
PRUHFRPPXQLFDWLRQZLWKWKHLU&HQWUDO$PHULFDQFRXQWHUSDUWVSHUPDQHQWFRQ
WDFWZLWK(XURSHDQDQG&HQWUDO$PHULFDQDXWKRULWLHVDQGLQGHSHQGHQWPRQLWRU
LQJWRROV
$VHFUHWDULDWLLRUFHQWUDOFRQWDFWSRLQWFDQSOD\DFUXFLDOUROHLQJXDUDQWHH
LQJWKHWKUHHDERYHPHQWLRQHGDVSHFWVRIVXFFHVVIXOPHHWLQJPDQDJHPHQW,Q
RXUFDVHWKH((6&LVDQLPSRUWDQWDFWRULQWKLVUHJDUG7KH((6&5DSSRUWHXU
RQ6XVWDLQDEOH,PSDFW$VVHVVPHQWVDQG(87UDGH3ROLF\(3LFKHQRWH[SUHVVHG
WKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKH((6&EHFDXVHLW
µSURYLGHVDORJLVWLFDOVXSSRUWWRWKHDFWLYLWLHVRIWKH'RPHVWLF$GYLVRU\*URXSDQG
WKH&LYLO6RFLHW\)RUXP7KH((6&DOVRHQVXUHVWKHORQJHYLW\RIWKHVHPHFKDQLVPV
VLQFH LW LVDQ(8LQVWLWXWLRQZHOODQFKRUHG LQ WKH7UHDWLHVDQG LV WKHUHIRUHDYHU\
VWDEOHSDUWQHURIWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQDQGWKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW¶
 &LYLO6RFLHW\)RUXPXQGHUWKH(8.RUHD)7$µ5XOHVRISURFHGXUHRIWKH&LYLO6RFLHW\)R
UXPXQGHUWKH(8.RUHD)7$¶6HRXO6HSWHPEHU
 KWWSZZZHHVFHXURSDHX"L SRUWDOHQH[WHUQDOUHODWLRQVHXURSHLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGH
PRQLWRULQJ!
 *URXS,,,(8'$*RIWKH(8&HQWUDO$PHULFD$VVRFLDWLRQ$JUHHPHQWµ/HWWHUWRWKHSUHVL
GHQWRIWKH(8'$*RIWKH(8&HQWUDO$PHULFD$VVRFLDWLRQ$JUHHPHQW¶%UXVVHOV)HEUXDU\

 ((6&µ&LYLOVRFLHW\LQDFWLRQ±PRQLWRULQJVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWDQGZLGHU)7$LPSOH
PHQWDWLRQOHVVRQVWREHGUDZQIURPWKH(8H[SHULHQFH¶%UXVVHOV

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+RZHYHUVRPHKDYHGHSORUHGWKDWWKH((6&WKHVHFUHWDULDWRIDOO&60VXQGHU
(8)7$VZRXOGEHWRREXUHDXFUDWLFDQGWKHUHIRUHODFNVÀH[LELOLW\
7KHUHLVQRHTXLYDOHQWERG\DWWKHVLGHRIWKH(8¶VWUDGHSDUWQHUV,QWKHFDVH
RI&HQWUDO$PHULFDWKHUHJLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQµ&RPLWp&RQVXOWLYRGHO6LVWHPDGH
OD,QWHJUDFLyQ&HQWURDPHULFDQD¶&&6,&$FRXOGWDNHXSWKLVUROHEXWLWLVXQ
FOHDULILWZRXOGKDYHWKHPDQGDWHDQGWKHFDSDFLW\,QWKHFDVHRI3HUXDQG
&RORPELDWKHUHVHHPVWREHQRLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHGFRRUGLQDWLRQEHWZHHQFLYLOVR
FLHWLHVRIERWKFRXQWULHV,QWKHFDVHRI&$5,)2580WKHVHFUHWDULDWRI&$5,&20
WKH&DULEEHDQ&RPPXQLW\ZKLFKKDVDVWURQJRUJDQLVDWLRQDOFDSDFLW\FRXOG
SOD\WKLVUROH
$OVRWKHIUHTXHQF\LLLRIPHHWLQJVYDULHVFRQVLGHUDEO\:KHUHDVWKH6'
FKDSWHUVRIWKHGLVFXVVHG)7$VDOOFRQWDLQWKHREOLJDWLRQWRRUJDQLVHD\HDUO\
ELUHJLRQDO&60WKHUHLVQRVXFKSUHVFULSWLRQFRQFHUQLQJWKH'$*V7KH(8
'$*VWHQGWRPHHWPRUHUHJXODUO\WKH(8'$*IURPWKH(8.RUHD)7$KDV
FRQYHQHGWHQWLPHVVLQFHLWV¿UVWPHHWLQJLQ0D\WKHRQHIURPWKH&HQWUDO
$PHULFDQ$$PHWVL[WLPHVVLQFHLWVHVWDEOLVKPHQWLQ2FWREHUDQGWKH
3HUX&RORPELD'$*KDVPHWWKUHHWLPHVVLQFHLWV¿UVWFRQYRFDWLRQLQ)HEUXDU\

$VIRUUHVRXUFHVLYQRWDOO&62VKDYHWKH¿QDQFLDORUSHUVRQDOFDSDFLWLHV
WRWUDYHOLQRUGHUWRDWWHQGWKHVHPHHWLQJVOHWDORQHWREHSUHSDUHGDGHTXDWHO\
)RUWKH(8.RUHD'$*WR'$*PHHWLQJZKLFKDOWHUQDWHO\WDNHVSODFHLQ6HRXO
DQG%UXVVHOIXQGLQJFDQEHSURYLGHGIRURQHVLGHWRWUDYHOWRWKHSDUWQHUFRXQ
WU\6XFKIXQGLQJLVQRWSURYLGHGIRUWKHPHHWLQJVXQGHUWKHRWKHUDJUHHPHQWV
HYHQWKRXJKLWLVEHLQJFRQVLGHUHGWRXVH(8GHYHORSPHQWEXGJHWIRUWKLV
$VDUHVXOW3HUXYLDQFLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVDWLRQVKDYHQRWEHHQDEOHWRDWWHQGWKH
PHHWLQJVLQ&RORPELDDQGYLFHYHUVD$OWHUQDWLYHVDUHDYDLODEOHHYHQWKRXJK
WKHVHDUHSUREDEO\QRWRSWLPDO)RUH[DPSOHIRUWKHELUHJLRQDO&60WKDWWRRN
SODFHLQ&RORPELDLQ-XQH3HUXYLDQ&62VVHQWLVVXHVWREHDGGUHVVHG
GXULQJWKHPHHWLQJRIWKH&RPPLWWHHRQ7UDGHDQG6XVWDLQDEOH'HYHORSPHQW
LHWKHLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOERG\EHIRUHKDQGWRWKHDPEDVVDGRURIWKH(8GHO
HJDWLRQWR3HUXDVZHOODVWRWKH3HUXYLDQ0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ7UDGH+RZHYHU
WKHUHDUHQRLQGLFDWLRQVWKDWWKHLVVXHVUDLVHGLQWKLVOHWWHUKDYHEHHQGLVFXVVHG
LQWKHLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOPHHWLQJV,QWKHFDVHRIWKH(8&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ&60
LQ0D\WKHDOWHUQDWLYHRIDYLGHRFRQIHUHQFHZDVSURYLGHGLQDOO(8'HOHJD
WLRQVDWWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQVLGH7KLVLQLWLDWLYHRQO\KDGOLPLWHGVXFFHVVDV
RQO\DIHZRUJDQLVDWLRQVPDGHXVHRIWKLVSRVVLELOLW\
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK(81*2%UXVVHOV$SULO
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK(8RI¿FLDO6DQ-RVH&RVWD5LFD0D\
 $0RQWRXWHµ&LYLOVRFLHW\SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQ(3$LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ+RZWRPDNHWKH(3$-RLQW
&$5,)2580±(&&RQVXOWDWLYH&RPPLWWHH:RUN(IIHFWLYHO\"¶(XURSHDQ&HQWUH IRU'HYHORS
PHQW3ROLF\0DQDJHPHQW(&'30'LVFXVVLRQ3DSHUDYDLODEOHDWKWWSHFGSPRUJ
SXEOLFDWLRQVFLYLOVRFLHW\SDUWLFLSDWLRQHSDLPSOHPHQWDWLRQFDULIRUXPHF!
 6HHDXWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZVXSUDQRWH
 ,QWKHFDVHRI&RORPELDLWZDVPHQWLRQHGWKDWHQYLURQPHQWDOJURXSVGRQRWKDYHWKHFD
SDFLW\WRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHGRPHVWLFGLVFXVVLRQV
 5HG3HUXDQDSRUXQD*OREDOL]DFLRQFRQ(TXLGDG µ&DUWDD OD6HQRUD(PEDMDGRUD,UHQH
+RUHMVGHOD8QLRQ(XURSHDHQHO3HUX¶

&LYLO6RFLHW\0HHWLQJVLQ(XURSHDQ8QLRQ7UDGH$JUHHPHQWV
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,QVXPWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQRI&60VKDVKDGDURXJKVWDUW7KH¿UVWPHHWLQJV
XQGHUWKH3HUX&RORPELDDQG&HQWUDO$PHULFDQDJUHHPHQWVZHUHHYDOXDWHGDV
DIDLOXUHDGKRFDQGFOXPV\E\ERWKFLYLOVRFLHW\DQG(8RI¿FLDOV$WWKHVDPH
WLPHVWDNHKROGHUVPHQWLRQWKDWWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQRIWKHVHPHHWLQJVLVVWLOOLQDQ
HDUO\SKDVHDQGWKDWWKH\DUHVWLOOORRNLQJIRUWKHEHVWDSSURDFK:KLOHVRPH
PHHWLQJVKDYHEHHQGHDOLQJZLWKSURFHGXUDOLVVXHVIRUDORQJWLPHHJWKH
&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ(8'$*PHHWLQJV)LJQRRWKHUVHJWKH3HUX&R
ORPELDQ(8'$*PHHWLQJVKDYHVWDUWHGWRGLVFXVVPRUHVXEVWDQWLDOLVVXHV
,QWHUDFWLRQZLWK*RYHUQPHQWV
7KHIRXUWKIHDWXUHFRQFHUQVWKHLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH&60VDQGWKH3DUWLHV
RUJRYHUQPHQWV:HPDNHDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQLWKHQDWXUHRIWKHLQWHUDFWLRQ
LLWKHJRYHUQPHQWV¶DFFRXQWDELOLW\WRWKHRXWFRPHVRIWKHPHHWLQJVDQGLLLWKH
LQYROYHPHQWRYHU&62VLQWKHGLVSXWHVHWWOHPHQWPHFKDQLVP
$VIRUWKHQDWXUHRIWKHLQWHUDFWLRQLWKHUHDUHWZRSRVVLELOLWLHV)LUVWJRY
HUQPHQWDODFWRUVPD\SDUWLFLSDWHLQWKH&60V$OWHUQDWLYHO\FLYLOVRFLHW\FDQ
PHHWERWKZLWKDQGZLWKRXWJRYHUQPHQWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV)RULQVWDQFHWKH(8
'$*PHHWLQJRIWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ$$WDNHVSODFHZLWK(8RI¿FLDOVLQWKH
PRUQLQJDQGZLWKRXWWKHPLQWKHDIWHUQRRQ$FFRUGLQJO\WKHELUHJLRQDORSHQ
&60LQ-XQHLQ+RQGXUDVLQFOXGHWZRVHVVLRQWRRWKH¿UVWWRRNSODFH
ZLWKRXWJRYHUQPHQWDODFWRUV)LJQRZKHUHDVWKH\ZHUHEHSUHVHQWRQ
WKHVHFRQGGD\)LJQR,QWHUHVWLQJO\WKHSUHVHQFHRIRI¿FLDOVLVHYDOX
DWHGLQGLIIHULQJZD\V,QWKH$SULO(8'$*IRUWKH3HUX&RORPELDDJUHH
PHQWRI¿FLDOVIURPWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQDQGWKH(XURSHDQ([WHUQDO$FWLRQ
6HUYLFH(($6ZHUHSUHVHQWGXULQJWKHZKROHPHHWLQJ7KHLUSUHVHQFHZDV
VHHQDVEHQH¿FLDODVLWVKRZVWKDW&62VDQGRI¿FLDOVVKDUHVLPLODUFRQFHUQV
DQGEHFDXVHLWPDNHVLWSRVVLEOHIRU&62VWRWDONWRWKHRI¿FLDOVWKDWGLUHFWO\
VSHDNWRWKHLUFRXQWHUSDUWVLQWKHWKLUGFRXQWULHV,Q3HUXDQG&RORPELDKRZ
HYHU&62VODPHQWHGWKDWWKH\QHYHUKDYHPHHWLQJVZLWKRXWRI¿FLDOVSUHVHQW
)URPRXUREVHUYDWLRQLWVHHPVWKDWLQWKH&$5,)2580&RQVXOWDWLYH&RPPLWWHH
WKHSUHVHQFHRIWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKH&$5,&20VHFUHWDULDWLVQRWQHFHVVDU
LO\FRQGXFLYHIRUDQRSHQGLVFXVVLRQ7KXVDOWKRXJKLQYROYHPHQWRIJRYHUQPHQW
RI¿FLDOVPD\EHEHQH¿FLDOLQWHUPVRISURYLGLQJDQRSSRUWXQLW\IRUFLYLOVRFLHW\WR
YRLFHWKHLUFRQFHUQVDQGHQKDQFHWKHLUOHYHUDJHLWPD\DOVRLPSHGHDQDGHTXDWH
PRQLWRULQJDQGDQRSHQGHOLEHUDWLRQVHHVHFWLRQ,,,6HFRQGWKHRXWFRPHVRI
WKH&60VFDQEHIRUPDOO\FRPPXQLFDWHGWRWKHJRYHUQPHQWV)RUH[DPSOHWKH
WZRFRFKDLUVRIWKH(86RXWK.RUHD&LYLO6RFLHW\)RUXPSUHVHQWWKHRSLQLRQV
RIWKHPHHWLQJWRWKHLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOERG\
 6HHDXWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZVXSUDQRWH
 6HHDXWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZVXSUDQRWH
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK(XURSHDQ1*26N\SH0DUFK
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK(XURSHDQODERXUUHSUHVHQWDWLYH%UXVVHOV-XO\
 5HODWHG WR WKLVSRLQW WKH LVVXHRI¿[HGYHUVXVYDULDEOHSDUWLFLSDWLRQ VHHVXSUD LVDOVR
UHOHYDQW&RVWD5LFDQFLYLOVRFLHW\PHPEHUVH[SODLQHG WKHLU IUXVWUDWLRQDERXWPHHWLQJGLIIHUHQW
JRYHUQPHQW UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDWGLIIHUHQWPHHWLQJV WKDWZHUHQRWDZDUHRI WKH WRSLFVGLVFXVVHG

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7KHJRYHUQPHQWV¶DFFRXQWDELOLW\LLFRQFHUQLQJWKHRXWFRPHRIWKH&60V
FRQFHUQVWKHTXHVWLRQLIDIHHGEDFNORRSLVFUHDWHGEHWZHHQWKHJRYHUQPHQWDO
DQGFLYLOVRFLHW\DFWRUV$FFRXQWDELOLW\PD\EHHQKDQFHGLIWKHUHLVDIRUPDO
IHHGEDFNPHFKDQLVPE\ZKLFKWKH3DUWLHVUHPLWLQIRUPDWLRQRQKRZWKHRXWFRPHV
RIWKHPHFKDQLVPVKDYHEHHQXVHGRUQRW,QRUGHUWRLQÀXHQFHWKHSROLF\
SURFHVVWUDQVSDUHQWDQGDFFRXQWDEOHVWUXFWXUHVWRFKDQQHOLQSXWDQGUHFHLYH
IHHGEDFNKDYHWREHSXWLQSODFH,ISDUWLFLSDQWVIHHOWKDWWKHLUYLHZVDUHQRW
WDNHQLQWRDFFRXQWE\WKHUHVSHFWLYHJRYHUQPHQWVVDWLVIDFWLRQPLJKWEHORZ
DPRQJSDUWLFLSDQWVDVLVWKHFDVHIRUVRPHSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKH&LYLO6RFLHW\'LD
ORJXHRUJDQLVHGE\'*7UDGHLQWKH(8ZKLFKPLJKWLQWXUQOHDGWRµFRQVXOWD
WLRQIDWLJXH¶'LIIHUHQWGHJUHHVRIUHVSRQVLYHQHVVDUHSRVVLEOHDQGFDQEHSXW
RQDFRQWLQXXPJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVFDQLPDNHDVWDWHPHQWZLWKRXWOLVWHQLQJ
WRWKH&62VRQHZD\FRPPXQLFDWLRQQRUHVSRQVLYHQHVVLL OLVWHQWRFLYLO
VRFLHW\DQGYLFHYHUVDWZRZD\FRPPXQLFDWLRQORZUHVSRQVLYHQHVVLLLWDNH
WKHLQSXWRIFLYLOVRFLHW\LQWRDFFRXQWKLJKUHVSRQVLYHQHVVDQGLYLPSOHPHQW
WKHDGYLFHE\WKHPHFKDQLVPLQFRQFUHWHSROLF\IXOOUHVSRQVLYHQHVV
)RUH[DPSOHWKHUXOHVRI3URFHGXUHRIWKH(86RXWK.RUHD&RPPLWWHHRQ
7UDGHDQG6XVWDLQDEOH'HYHORSPHQWLHWKHHTXLYDOHQWRIWKHLQWHUJRYHUQPHQ
WDOERG\VWLSXODWHWKDWWKH&RPPLWWHHZLOOFRQVLGHUWKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVLWUHFHLYHV
IURPWKH'$*VDQGWKH'$*WR'$*PHHWLQJVDQGWKDWLWZLOOPDNHWKHRSHUDW
LQJFRQFOXVLRQVLWPD\DGRSWLQUHVSHFWRIVXFKFRPPXQLFDWLRQVDYDLODEOHWRERWK
'$*V,QWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDDJUHHPHQWLWLVPHQWLRQHGWKDWµHDFKPHHWLQJRI
WKH%RDUGZLOOLQFOXGHDVHVVLRQLQZKLFKLWVPHPEHUVVKDOOUHSRUWRQWKHLPSOH
PHQWDWLRQRIWKLV7LWOHWRWKH&LYLO6RFLHW\'LDORJXH)RUXP,QWXUQWKH&LYLO6R
FLHW\'LDORJXH)RUXPPD\H[SUHVVLWVYLHZVDQGRSLQLRQVLQRUGHUWRSURPRWH
GLDORJXHRQKRZWREHWWHUDFKLHYHWKHREMHFWLYHVRIWKLV7LWOH¶$UWLFOH7KH
(83HUX&RORPELDDJUHHPHQWPHQWLRQVWKDWWKH%RDUGVKDOODQQXDOO\FRQYHQH
DQRSHQVHVVLRQZLWKFLYLOVRFLHW\µLQRUGHUWRFDUU\RXWDGLDORJXHRQPDWWHUV
UHODWHGWRWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKLV7LWOH¶$UWLFOH
$OVRFRQFHUQLQJWKHLQYROYHPHQWRIWKH&60VLQWKHGLVSXWHVHWWOHPHQWLLL
RIWKH6'FKDSWHUVHH)LJXUHDQGLQIUDDVLJQL¿FDQWYDULDWLRQEHWZHHQWKH
DJUHHPHQWVFDQEHQRWLFHG7KH.RUHDDJUHHPHQWPHQWLRQVWKDWWKHSDQHORI
H[SHUWVVKRXOGVHHNLQIRUPDWLRQDQGDGYLFHIURPHLWKHU3DUW\WKH'$*VRU
LQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQV$UWLFOH,QDGGLWLRQLWPHQWLRQVWKDWWKHUHSRUW
RIWKHSDQHORIH[SHUWVVKDOOEHPDGHDYDLODEOHWRWKH'$*V$UWLFOH
)XUWKHUPRUHLWLVPHQWLRQHGWKDWDPRQJRWKHUVRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHFRPPXQLFD
WLRQVRIWKH'$*VJRYHUQPHQWFRQVXOWDWLRQVFDQEHUHTXHVWHG$UWLFOH
,QWKLVZD\WKH'$*VKDYHDGLUHFWUROHLQWKHLQVWLJDWLRQRIGLVSXWHV1HLWKHU
SUHYLRXVO\KHUHE\ LPSHOOLQJ WKHGLVFXVVLRQVEDFN WRVTXDUHRQH$XWKRU¶V LQWHUYLHZZLWK&RVWD
5LFDQ1*26DQ-RVH&RVWD5LFD0D\
 0 ,0XJXUX]D µ&LYLO6RFLHW\DQG7UDGH'LSORPDF\ LQ WKH ³*OREDO$JH´7KH(XURSHDQ
&DVH7UDGH3ROLF\'LDORJXHEHWZHHQ&LYLO6RFLHW\DQGWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶'RFXPHQW¶
,QWHU$PHULFDQ'HYHORSPHQW%DQN'RFXPHQWIRUWKH)RXUWK0HHWLQJRIWKH7UDGHDQG,QWHJUD
WLRQ1HWZRUNDYDLODEOHDWKWWSVSXEOLFDWLRQVLDGERUJKDQGOH"ORFDOHDWWULEXWH HQ!
 6HH$0RQWRXWHVXSUDQRWH
 &RIIH\µ(YDOXDWLRQRI'*75$'(¶V&LYLO6RFLHW\'LDORJXHLQRUGHUWRDVVHVVLWVHIIHFWLYH
QHVVHI¿FLHQF\DQGUHOHYDQFH¶/X[HPERXUJ(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ
 6HH0,0XJXUX]DVXSUDQRWH

&LYLO6RFLHW\0HHWLQJVLQ(XURSHDQ8QLRQ7UDGH$JUHHPHQWV
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LQWKH3HUX&RORPELDDJUHHPHQWQRULQWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDDJUHHPHQWDQ\WKLQJ
LVVDLGRQWKHLQYROYHPHQWRIWKH&60VLQWKHGLVSXWHVHWWOHPHQW%\FRQWUDVW
&(7$FRQWDLQVPXFKPRUHH[SOLFLWDQGDPELWLRXVSURYLVLRQVLQWKLVUHJDUG
&RQFOXVLRQ
7KUHHJHQHUDOFRQFOXVLRQVFDQEHGUDZQIURPWKLVRYHUYLHZRIWKHIHDWXUHVRI
WKH&60V
x 7KHUHLVDVLJQL¿FDQWGHMXUHDQGGHIDFWRGLYHUVLW\EHWZHHQWKH&60VXQGHU
WKH(8.RUHD(8&HQWUDO$PHULFDDQG(83HUX&RORPELDDJUHHPHQWV7KH
&60VZLWK.RUHDVHHPWKHPRVWHODERUDWHDVIRUH[DPSOHWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQW
RIQHZFRPPLWWHHVLVUHTXLUHGDQGIXQGLQJIRUWUDYHOLVSURYLGHGx 7KHVHPHHWLQJVDUHVWLOOLQWKHHDUO\SKDVHZKHUHE\QRUPVDQGSUDFWLFHVRQ
VHOHFWLRQRISDUWLFLSDQWVIUHTXHQF\RIPHHWLQJVDFFRXQWDELOLW\PHFKDQLVPV
HWF KDYH FOHDUO\ QRW \HW EHHQ IXOO\ HODERUDWHG:KLOH VRPH IHDWXUHV DUH
SHUPDQHQWDVWKH\DSSHDULQWKHWH[WRIWKHDJUHHPHQWPDQ\RWKHUVDUHMXVW
µVQDSVKRWV¶RIDPRYLQJWDUJHWx +RZHYHUDWWKLVVWDJHZHFDQVWLOOQRWVD\PXFKDERXWZKHWKHUWKHPHHWLQJV
VKRXOGEHDVVHVVHGSRVLWLYHO\RUQHJDWLYHO\EDVHGRQWKHLULQVWLWXWLRQDOVHWXS
FRPSRVLWLRQRUJDQLVDWLRQPDQDJHPHQWDQGHYHQJRYHUQPHQWLQWHUDFWLRQV
,QGHHGZKLOHWKHVHREVHUYDWLRQVSURYLGHVRPHEXLOGLQJEORFNVWRHYDOXDWHWKH
VXFFHVVRUIDLOXUHRIWKH&60VZHQHHGWRDGGUHVVDVZHOOPRUHIXQGDPHQWDO
TXHVWLRQVRQWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKHVHPHHWLQJVDQGRQWKHUROHRIFLYLOVRFLHW\LQ
WUDGHGHYHORSPHQWDQGGHPRFUDF\7KHVHZLOOEHDGGUHVVHGLQUHVSHFWLYHO\
VHFWLRQ,,DQGVHFWLRQ,,,
,, 385326(6:+$7$5(7+(<)25"
:KHUHDVWKHUHLVDYDJXHEXWFRPPRQXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDWWKH\VKRXOGJLYHD
KXPDQIDFHWRIUHHWUDGHFRUUHFWWKHQHJDWLYHLPSDFWRIOLEHUDOLVDWLRQFRQWULEXWH
WRVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWDQGLQYROYH&62VLQGHFLVLRQPDNLQJRQWKLVWRSLF
LWUHPDLQVDPELJXRXVZKDWH[DFWO\LVDUHWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKHPHHWLQJV$UH
WKH\VXSSRVHGWRSURYLGHELQGLQJ"UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVIRUWKHJRYHUQPHQWV"2U
DUHWKHPHHWLQJVLQWHQGHGWRIRVWHUDGLDORJXHEHWZHHQFLYLOVRFLHW\PHPEHUV
VRPHRIZKRPPD\QRWKDYHDYRLFHZLWKLQWKHGRPHVWLFSROLWLFDOODQGVFDSH"2U
VKRXOGWKH\IRFXVSULPDULO\RQWKHVKRUWFRPLQJVLQWKH3DUWLHV¶FRPSOLDQFHZLWK
WKHDJUHHPHQW")LQDOO\ZRXOGZHGDUHWRVD\WKDWWKHPHHWLQJVHVVHQWLDOO\VHUYH
WREX\RIISXEOLFVXSSRUWIRUWKHWUDGHDJUHHPHQW"
,QWKLVVHFWLRQZHZLOOVKRZWKDWWKH&60VFDQVHUYHIRXUDQDO\WLFDOO\GLVWLQFW
SXUSRVHV3DUWO\GUDZLQJRQ)ULHGULFKZHPDNHDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQLQVWUX
 ')ULHGULFKµ'HPRFUDWLF$VSLUDWLRQ0HHWV3ROLWLFDO5HDOLW\3DUWLFLSDWLRQRI2UJDQL]HG&LYLO
6RFLHW\LQ6HOHFWHG(XURSHDQ3ROLF\3URFHVVHV¶LQ-6WHIIHNHWDOHGV&LYLO6RFLHW\3DUWLFL
SDWLRQ LQ(XURSHDQDQG*OREDO*RYHUQDQFH$&XUH IRU WKH'HPRFUDWLF'H¿FLW" %DVLQJVWRNH
3DOJUDYH0DFPLOODQ

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PHQWDOIXQFWLRQDOGHOLEHUDWLYHDQGSROLF\LQÀXHQFHSXUSRVHV+HUHDIWHUZHVHW
RXWHDFKSXUSRVHLOOXVWUDWLQJLWZLWKTXRWHVIURPWKHDJUHHPHQWVDQGIURPDZLGH
YDULHW\RIDFWRUVLQYROYHGLQWKHPHHWLQJV$JDLQDVLQVHFWLRQ,ZHORRNDWERWK
WKHOHJDODQGSUDFWLFDOFRPSRQHQWV,WVKRXOGEHQRWLFHGIURPWKHEHJLQQLQJWKDW
WKHGLIIHUHQWSXUSRVHVDUHQRWDOZD\VPXWXDOO\H[FOXVLYHDQGWKDWWKH\FDQFR
H[LVW+RZHYHULWUHPDLQVXVHIXOWRPDNHWKLVDQDO\WLFDOGLVWLQFWLRQQRWWKHOHDVW
EHFDXVHWHQVLRQVPD\HPHUJHEHWZHHQWKHP7KHVHDOVRKHOSWREHWWHUXQGHU
VWDQGGLYHUJLQJHYDOXDWLRQVRIWKHVXFFHVVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\PHHWLQJVDVZLOOEH
H[SODLQHGLQVHFWLRQ,,,
,QVWUXPHQWDO3XUSRVH6XSSRUWLQJWKH)UHH7UDGH$JUHHPHQW
)LUVWWKH&60VKDYHDUJXDEO\EHHQHVWDEOLVKHGLQRUGHUWRJXDUDQWHHSROLWLFDO
VXSSRUWIRU(8)7$V6LQFHWKH*OREDO(XURSHWUDGHFRPPXQLFDWLRQLQWKH
(8KDVEHHQQHJRWLDWLQJ)7$VDWDWUHPHQGRXVSDFH,QGHHGWKH(8LVDVWURQJ
SURSRQHQWRIWKHYLHZWKDWWUDGHOLEHUDOLVDWLRQLVQHFHVVDU\IRUHFRQRPLFJURZWK
HVSHFLDOO\VLQFHWKHFULVLV7KLVQHZJHQHUDWLRQRI)7$VVWUXJJOHVZLWKDWHQ
VLRQEHWZHHQWKHFUHDWLRQRIDQHFRQRPLFSURMHFWWKDWIRFXVVHVJOREDOO\RQH[
SDQVLRQDQGFRPSHWLWLRQDQGDSROLWLFDOSURMHFWWKDWSD\VDWWHQWLRQWRFRQFHUQV
VXFKDVVRFLDOMXVWLFHDQGVXVWDLQDELOLW\,WLVWKHUHIRUHQRWVXUSULVLQJWKDW)7$V
KDYHEHFRPHLQFUHDVLQJO\FRQWHVWHGE\&62V2YHUDOOWKHUHLVDPLVWUXVWDQG
RSSRVLWLRQRIODERXUKXPDQULJKWVDQGHQYLURQPHQWDOJURXSVDJDLQVWWUDGHOLE
HUDOLVDWLRQ7KHJURZLQJSROLWLFLVDWLRQRIWUDGHDJUHHPHQWVDOUHDG\EHFDPH
FOHDUZLWKWKHSURWHVWVLQ6HDWWOHDJDLQVWWKHODXQFKRIDQHZURXQGRI
WUDGHQHJRWLDWLRQVLQWKH:RUOG7UDGH2UJDQLVDWLRQ:72DVPHQWLRQHGDERYH
DQGZLWKWKHµ6WRS(3$&DPSDLJQ¶DJDLQVWWKH(3$VEHWZHHQWKH(8DQG
WKHFRXQWULHVIURP$IULFDWKH&DULEEHDQDQGWKH3DFL¿F$&3$SDUWIURPFLYLO
VRFLHW\PRYHPHQWVERWKLQWKH(8DVZHOODVLQWUDGHSDUWQHUFRXQWULHVPHP
EHUVRIWKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW(3KDYHYRLFHGFULWLFDOFRQFHUQV7KH/LVERQ
WUHDW\ZKLFKHQWHUHGLQWRIRUFHLQODWHLQFUHDVHGWKHFRPSHWHQFHVRIWKH
(3'XHWRLWVHQKDQFHGIRUPDOUROHWKH(3VKRXOGEHUHJXODUO\XSGDWHGRQZKHUH
QHJRWLDWLRQVDUHJRLQJDQGLVUHTXLUHGWRJLYHLWVFRQVHQWWRDQ\WUDGHDJUHHPHQW
7KHUHMHFWLRQRIWKH$QWL&RXQWHUIHLWLQJ7UDGH$JUHHPHQW$&7$VHQWDFOHDU
PHVVDJHWKDWWKH(3LVDEOHDQGZLOOLQJWRXVHLWVDGGLWLRQDOSRZHU,QWKLV
FDSDFLW\WKH(3KDVUHSHDWHGO\HPSKDVLVHGKHUUHTXLUHPHQWVFRQFHUQLQJWKH
 (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ µ*OREDO(XURSH&RPSHWLQJ LQ WKHZRUOG¶&20(XUR
SHDQ&RPPLVVLRQµ7UDGH*URZWKDQG:RUOG$IIDLUV¶&206HH(XURSHDQ&RPPLV
VLRQVXSUDQRWH*6LOHV%UJJHµ5HVLVWLQJ3URWHFWLRQLVPDIWHUWKH&ULVLV6WUDWHJLF(FRQRPLF
'LVFRXUVHDQGWKH(8±.RUHD)UHH7UDGH$JUHHPHQW¶1HZ3ROLWLFDO(FRQRP\
 /)RUGµ(87UDGH*RYHUQDQFHDQG3ROLF\$FULWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYH¶-RXUQDORI&RQWHPSR
UDU\(XURSHDQ5HVHDUFK.8OPHUµ7UDGHHPEHGGHGGHYHORSPHQWPRGHOV¶
7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO-RXUQDORI&RPSDUDWLYH/DERXU/DZDQG,QGXVWULDO5HODWLRQV
 6HH((6&VXSUDQRWH
 /9DQGHQ3XWWHHWDO µ7KH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW¶V1HZ5ROH LQ7UDGH3ROLF\7XUQLQJ
SRZHULQWRLPSDFW¶&HQWUHIRU(XURSHDQ3ROLF\6WXGLHV&(36DYDLODEOHDWKWWSVZZZ
FHSVHXSXEOLFDWLRQVHXURSHDQSDUOLDPHQW(VQHZUROHWUDGHSROLF\WXUQLQJSRZHU
LPSDFW!
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LQFOXVLRQRIKXPDQDQGODERXUULJKWVDQGFLYLOVRFLHW\LQYROYHPHQWLQWUDGHDJUHH
PHQWVWKURXJKUHVROXWLRQVDVZHOODVRUDODQGZULWWHQTXHVWLRQV
,QWKHUXQXSWRWKH(83HUX&RORPELD)7$WKH(3FRQFHUQHGDERXWWKHKX
PDQULJKWVVLWXDWLRQLQWKRVHFRXQWULHVH[SOLFLWO\DGYRFDWHGRQVHYHUDORFFDVLRQV
DµVWUHQJWKHQLQJRIWKHPRQLWRULQJDQGGLVSXWHVHWWOHPHQWPHFKDQLVPVIRUEUHDFK
HVRIKXPDQULJKWVDQGVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWDQGWKHLQYROYHPHQWRIFLYLO
VRFLHW\LQWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQSURFHVV¶,QUHVSRQVHWRWKLV(8RI¿FLDOVDQG
WUDGHFRPPLVVLRQHUVLQVSHHFKHVRIWHQVWUHVVWKHLQFOXVLRQRIVXFKPHFKDQLVPV
'XULQJWKHGHEDWHLQWKH(3RQWKHVDPHDJUHHPHQWWKHWKHQWUDGHFRPPLV
VLRQHU.'H*XFKWKDGWRUHSO\WRUHTXLUHPHQWVVXFKDV
µ$JDLQVWWKLVEDFNJURXQG3DUOLDPHQWLVRIFRXUVHLQYHVWLJDWLQJYHU\FDUHIXOO\>«@
ZKHWKHUWKLVWUDGHDJUHHPHQWZLWK&RORPELDDQG3HUXPHHWVWKHVHUHTXLUHPHQWV
>«@7KHLVVXHVLQFOXGHWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKFLYLOVRFLHW\LVLQFOXGHGLQWKHSURFHVV
RILPSOHPHQWLQJWKHWUDGHDJUHHPHQWWKHLQGHSHQGHQFHRILWVLQYROYHPHQWDQGWKH
RSWLRQVIRULQVWLJDWLQJFRPSODLQWSURFHGXUHV¶
$QGDORQJWKHVDPHOLQH
µ:HDOVRZDQWWRVHHERWKLQ3HUXDQG&RORPELDWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRISHUPDQHQW
LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHGPHFKDQLVPVWKDWJXDUDQWHHWKHUROHRIFLYLOVRFLHW\¶
3URWHVWVDJDLQVW(8WUDGHSROLF\KDYHUHDFKHGXQSUHFHGHQWHGKLJKVZLWKQHJR
WLDWLRQVRQD7UDQVDWODQWLF7UDGHDQG,QYHVWPHQW3DUWQHUVKLS77,3EHWZHHQWKH
(8DQGWKH866LQFHWKHVWDUWRIWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVLQSXEOLFVFUXWLQ\RI(8
WUDGHQHJRWLDWLRQVKDVRQO\LQFUHDVHG:KLOHVRPHRSSRVHµQHROLEHUDO¶IUHH
WUDGHSHUVHRWKHUVZDUQDJDLQVWWKHSRVVLEOHQHJDWLYHVRFLDOLPSDFWRIIUHH
WUDGHLIQRWZHOOPDQDJHG
&UHDWLQJ&60VLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH6'FKDSWHULQGLFDWHVQRWRQO\WKDWWKH
)7$VKDYHDVRFLDODQGHQYLURQPHQWDOIDFHEXWDOVRWKDWWKHSDUWLHVLQWHQGWR
LQYROYHFLYLOVRFLHW\DFWRUVLQSROLF\PDNLQJRQWKHVHLVVXHV,WVROLGL¿HVWKH
EHOLHIWKDWWKH(8DQGWKHWKLUGFRXQWU\JRYHUQPHQWDUHQRWRQO\LQWHUHVWHGLQ
IUHHWUDGHEXWDOVRLQDJHQXLQHSDUWQHUVKLSWKDWSURPRWHVVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORS
PHQW$WOHDVWLWVLJQDOVWKH3DUWLHV¶LQWHQWLRQWREDODQFHWKHVHPDUNHWHQKDQFLQJ
SURYLVLRQVZLWKPRUHLQWHUYHQWLRQLVWSROLFLHV2UWRSXWLWLQ'H*XFKW¶VZRUGV
 6XFK DV (XURSHDQ 3DUOLDPHQW µ5HSRUW RQ KXPDQ ULJKWV DQG VRFLDO DQG HQYLURQPHQWDO
VWDQGDUGVLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGHDJUHHPHQWV¶,1,(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWµ5HSRUWRQ
(8¶VWUDGHUHODWLRQVZLWK/DWLQ$PHULFD¶,1,
 &RXQFLORIWKH(8µ6XPPDU\UHFRUGRIWKHPHHWLQJRIWKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW¶V&RPPLW
WHHRQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDGH,17$¶%UXVVHOV$SULO
 (XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW µ'HEDWHRQ(8WUDGHDJUHHPHQWZLWK&RORPELDDQG3HUX¶6WUDV
ERXUJ0D\
 )'H9LOOHDQG*6LOHV%UXJJH77,37KH7UXWKDERXW WKH7UDQVDWODQWLF7UDGHDQG ,Q
YHVWPHQW3DUWQHUVKLS +RERNHQ:LOH\ 6HHDOVR'H9LOOH )2UELH -9DQGHQ3XWWH
/µ77,3DQG/DERXU6WDQGDUGV¶(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW6WXG\IRUWKH(03/&RPPLWWHH
 -XQH $YDLODEOH DW KWWSZZZHXURSDUOHXURSDHX5HJ'DWDHWXGHV678'
,32/B678B(1SGI

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µ:LWKDOORI WKHVHVDIHJXDUGV ,KRSH\RXZLOODJUHHWKDW WKHDJUHHPHQW LVVWURQJ
HQRXJKWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHSDUWLHV¶FRPPLWPHQWVRQODERXUKXPDQULJKWVDQGWKH
HQYLURQPHQWDUHFRQVLVWHQWO\XSKHOG¶
$WPRVWLWVXJJHVWVWKDWWUDGHDQGQRQWUDGHREMHFWLYHVDUHFRPSDWLEOHDQG
PXWXDOO\UHLQIRUFLQJ,QWKLVYLHZWUDGHOLEHUDOLVDWLRQZLOOEHEHQH¿FLDOIRUVXVWDLQ
DEOHGHYHORSPHQWDQGWKH&60VSOD\DUROHLQWKLVDFKLHYHPHQW$VLVVWDWHGLQ
WKH(83HUX&RORPELDWUDGHDJUHHPHQW
µ7KH3DUWLHVUHFRJQLVHLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGHSURGXFWLYHHPSOR\PHQWDQGGHFHQWZRUN
IRUDOODVNH\HOHPHQWVIRUPDQDJLQJWKHSURFHVVRIJOREDOLVDWLRQDQGUHDIILUPWKHLU
FRPPLWPHQWVWRSURPRWHWKHGHYHORSPHQWRILQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGHLQDZD\WKDWFRQ
WULEXWHVWRSURGXFWLYHHPSOR\PHQWDQGGHFHQWZRUNIRUDOO¶$UWLFOH
7KHOLWHUDWXUHRQJOREDOJRYHUQDQFHKDVORQJUHFRJQLVHGWKDWLQYROYLQJSXEOLF
SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQJOREDOJRYHUQDQFHDUUDQJHPHQWVVXFKDVDWUDGHDJUHHPHQW
KHOSVWRLPSURYHWKHGHPRFUDWLFOHJLWLPDF\RIVXFKDUUDQJHPHQWV
1RWVXUSULVLQJO\KRZHYHUWKLVSXUSRVHFDQDOVREHLQWHUSUHWHGLQDOHVVRS
WLPLVWLFPDQQHU6RPHREVHUYHUVKDYHODPHQWHGWKH6'FKDSWHUDQGWKH&60V
DVDµ¿JOHDI¶7KHFULWLFLVPUHDGVWKDWWKHVHRVWHQVLEO\SURJUHVVLYHHOHPHQWV
HIIHFWLYHO\KLGHWKHUHDOREMHFWLYHVRIWKHDJUHHPHQWZKLFKDUHWRFUHDWHIUHH
WUDGHLQOLQHZLWKWKHHFRQRPLFSULRULWLHVRIWKH3DUWLHV±DQGSDUWLFXODUO\RIWKH
(8ZKLFKLVXVXDOO\WKHVWURQJHUSDUWQHU%\IRUJLQJDEURDGHUVXSSRUWIRUWKH
DSSURYDORIWKHDJUHHPHQWLQFOXGLQJLWVOLEHUDOLVDWLRQVFKHGXOHVDQGUHJXODWRU\
FRPPLWPHQWVWKH6'FKDSWHUDQGLWV&06VDUHKHOSLQJWKH3DUWLHVWRµVHOO¶WKH
DJUHHPHQWWRWKHLUFRQVWLWXHQFLHVDQGFDQWKXVEHUHGXFHGWRDSXEOLFUHODWLRQV
VWXQWWRLPSURYHWKHUHSXWDWLRQRIWKHWUDGLQJSDUWQHUV,WLVDV\PEROLFDFWWR
LQFUHDVHWKHVXSSRUWIRU)7$VZLWKRXWH[SHFWDWLRQVWKDWWKH\ZRXOGEHHIIHFWLYH
DQDIWHUWKRXJKW ODFNLQJVHULRXVDPELWLRQV4XHVWLRQVFDQEHUDLVHGDERXW
ZKHWKHUWKH\ZLOOHIIHFWLYHO\EHLPSOHPHQWHGRQFHWKHUDWL¿FDWLRQKDVEHHQVH
FXUHG,QWKLVUHJDUGRQH3HUXYLDQ1*2UHSUHVHQWDWLYHUHPDUNHGWKDWWKH(8
&60VDUHQRWGHVLJQHGIRUFLYLOVRFLHW\WRPRQLWRUWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIODERXU
QRUPVVHHQH[WSXUSRVHLQIUDEXWUDWKHUDVDJRRGQHZVVKRZIRUJRYHUQPHQWV
WRVKRZFLYLOVRFLHW\ZKLFKDFWLRQVWKH\KDYHXQGHUWDNHQLQWKHSDVWPRQWKV
0RUHRYHUDSHUYHUVHHIIHFWIURPWKH&60VPD\EHWKDWFULWLFDOFLYLOVRFLHW\
DFWRUVDUHEHLQJFRRSWHGDQGWKHLURSSRVLWLRQLVEHLQJQHXWUDOLVHG%\EHFRP
LQJDPHPEHURIWKHLQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWVHUYHWRLPSOHPHQWWKHDJUHHPHQWHJ
PRQLWRULQJODERXUULJKWVDQGHQYLURQPHQWDOSULQFLSOHVLWEHFRPHVPRUHGLI¿FXOW
WRRSSRVHWKHIXQGDPHQWDOVRIWKHDJUHHPHQWHJRSSRVLWLRQDJDLQVWWKHSULQ
 .'H*XFKW µ3XEOLF+HDULQJRI WKH&RPPLWWHHRQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDGHDW WKH(XURSHDQ
3DUOLDPHQW(8&ROXPELDDQG3HUX7UDGH$JUHHPHQW¶63((&+
 60HXQLHUµ7UDGH3ROLF\DQG3ROLWLFDO/HJLWLPDF\LQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶&RPSDUDWLYH
(XURSHDQ3ROLWLFV-$6FKROWHµ&LYLO6RFLHW\DQG'HPRFUDWLFDOO\$FFRXQWDEOH*OR
EDO*RYHUQDQFH¶*RYHUQPHQWDQG2SSRVLWLRQ
 *YDQ5RR]HQGDDOµ/DERXUVWDQGDUGVDVDQµDIWHUWKRXJKW¶LQWUDGHDJUHHPHQWVWKH6RXWK
.RUHDFDVH¶&RQIHUHQFH3DSHU(8,$9%UXVVHOV
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK3HUXYLDQ1*2/LPD'HFHPEHU
 )RUDFULWLFDODQDO\VLVRIWKHµUKHWRULFRISDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶LQGHYHORSPHQWVHH%&RRNHDQG8
.RWKDUL3DUWLFLSDWLRQWKHQHZW\UDQQ\"/RQGRQ=HGERRNV
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FLSOHRIIUHHWUDGH6RPH&62VZRXOGSUHIHUQRWWRKDYHDWUDGHDJUHHPHQW
EXWRQFHLWKDVEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGWKH\FRQVLGHUPDNLQJXVHRIWKHRSSRUWXQLWLHV
SURYLGHGE\WKHDJUHHPHQWLQRUGHUWRPD[LPLVHWKHLULPSDFWRQWKHLPSOHPHQWD
WLRQSURFHVV2QHRSSRQHQWRIWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ$$GHFLGHGDIWHURSSRVLQJ
WKHDJUHHPHQWDVDZKROHWRMRLQWKH(8'$*EHFDXVHWKHQDWOHDVWWKH\ZRXOG
VWLOOKDYHDSODWIRUPDYDLODEOHWR¿JKWSRVVLEOHQHJDWLYHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKH
DJUHHPHQW)RUWKHVDPHUHDVRQWKRVH&62VWKDWPRVWVWURQJO\RSSRVHGWKH
(3$VDUHPRVW LQWHUHVWHG LQEHLQJ LQYROYHGLQWKHPRQLWRULQJPHFKDQLVPV
ZKHUHDVWKHOHVVFULWLFDORUJDQLVDWLRQVDUHRIWHQQRWLQWHUHVWHG7KHUHLVDFOHDU
UHFRJQLWLRQWKDWWKH&60VSUHVHQWRSSRUWXQLWLHVWRXQGRWKHSRVVLEOHKDUPV
FDXVHGE\WKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHWUDGHDJUHHPHQWV+RZHYHUWKHUHLVDULVN
WKDWWKURXJKWKHSURFHVVRSSRVLWLRQLVEHLQJVLOHQFHGDQGRUFLYLOVRFLHW\PHPEHUV
EHFRPHOHVVFULWLFDODQGPRUHµFRQVWUXFWLYH¶
,QWKHOLWHUDWXUHWKLVKDVEHHQFDOOHGWKHLQVLGHUYHUVXVRXWVLGHUGLOHPPD
7KLVGLOHPPDKDVEHHQFOHDUO\UHFRJQLVHGE\VHYHUDOFLYLOVRFLHW\DFWRUVWKDWZH
LQWHUYLHZHG(QJDJLQJLQVRPHVHOIUHÀHFWLRQDERXWKLVUROHLQWKH(8'$*XQGHU
WKH3HUX&RORPELDDJUHHPHQWRQHPHPEHUVWDWHGWKDWµEHIRUHZHZHUHVKRXW
LQJDJDLQVWWKHDJUHHPHQWRQWKHVWUHHWVWRGD\ZHDUHKHOSLQJWRLPSOHPHQWLW
LQVLGHWKLVEXLOGLQJ¶7ZR\HDUVEHIRUHDQRWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWRIWKHVH&60VKDG
H[SUHVVHGLWDVIROORZV
µ<RXVHHWKLVLVDJRYHUQPHQWDOSURFHVVDQGWKHQZH¶UHDVNHGWRFRPHLQDOUHDG\
WREDVLFDOO\GHIHQGWKHVHIUHHWUDGHDJUHHPHQWV1RZPDQ\RIXV>«@KDYHVXEVWDQ
WLDOFRQIOLFWVDQGLVVXHVZLWKWKHNLQGRIIUHHWUDGHDJUHHPHQWVDQGWKHHFRQRPLF
DJHQGDEHKLQGLW$QGIRUWKH&RPPLVVLRQIRUWKHJRYHUQPHQWWKLVLVDZD\WRVD\
ZH¶UHVPRRWKLQJZLWKWKHHGJHVDQGZHJHWFLYLOVRFLHW\LQWKHUHDQGWKH\FDQKHOS
XVWRDGGUHVVWKHZRUVWLVVXHV%XWWKHIXQGDPHQWDOGULYHUVDQGWKHZD\ZHGHVLJQ
WUDGHUHODWLRQVUHPDLQFRQWHQWLRXV$WOHDVWIRUXV>«@,W¶VDZD\WRLQYLWHWKHSURWHVW
RQWKHVWUHHWLQWRWKHDJUHHPHQW¶
$OVRZLWKLQWKHWKLUGFRXQWULHVVRPH&62VDUHVWUXJJOLQJZLWKWKHLQVLGHURXW
VLGHUGLOHPPD2WKHUVDUHUHOXFWDQWWRHQJDJHLQWKH(8WUDGHDJUHHPHQWDVD
ZKROHIRUSUDJPDWLFUHDVRQVVLQFHWKH\DVVXPHWKDWWKH(8WUDGHDJUHHPHQWV¶
PHFKDQLVPVZLOOEHOHVVHIIHFWLYHWKDQWKRVHXQGHUWKH86DJUHHPHQWV)L
QDOO\VRPH&62VLQFOXGLQJWUDGHXQLRQLVWVZRXOGOLNHWREHLQYROYHGLQWKH
&60VEXWWKLVGRHVQRWKDSSHQEHFDXVHWKHLUJRYHUQPHQWGRHVQRWIDFLOLWDWH
WKHLUSDUWLFLSDWLRQDQGRUEHFDXVHRIDODFNRIIXQGLQJDQGFDSDFLWLHV
7KHSXUSRVHWRJXDUDQWHHVXSSRUWIRUWUDGHDJUHHPHQWVLVPRVWO\µH[DQWH¶
LWLVPRVWUHOHYDQWGXULQJWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVDQGEHFRPHVOHVVSHUWLQHQWRQFHWKH
3DUWLHVKDYHUDWL¿HGWKHDJUHHPHQW,IWKHODWWHULVWKHFDVHWKHSXUSRVHKDV
PRVWO\EHHQDFKLHYHG$OWKRXJKLWLVDOVRLPSRUWDQWIRUWKH3DUWLHVWRHQVXUHWKDW
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK(XURSHDQ1*2%UXVVHOV0DUFK
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK(XURSHDQ1*2%UXVVHOV-XQH
 5-6SDOGLQJµ&LYLO6RFLHW\(QJDJHPHQWLQ7UDGH1HJRWLDWLRQV&$)7$2SSRVLWLRQ0RYH
PHQWVLQ(O6DOYDGRU¶/DWLQ$PHULFDQ3ROLWLFVDQG6RFLHW\
 3DUWLFLSDQW(8'$*RIWKH(83HUX&RORPELDDJUHHPHQW%UXVVHOV$SULO
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK(XURSHDQ1*2%UXVVHOV-XQH
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK3HUXYLDQ1*2/LPD0DUFK

&/((53$3(56 2UELHHWDO
DJUHHPHQWVGRQRWIDFHWRRPXFKRSSRVLWLRQZKLOHWKH\DUHLQSUDFWLFHWKLVLV
OHVVRIDQLVVXHVLQFHLWLVPRUHGLI¿FXOWWRZLWKGUDZDQH[LVWLQJDJUHHPHQWWKDQ
WRSUHYHQWWKHUDWL¿FDWLRQRIDQHZRQH1RQHWKHOHVVLWVHHPVWKDWRQFHRU
JDQLVDWLRQVWDNHSDUWLQWKH&60VWKH\WU\WRSOD\DFRQVWUXFWLYHUROHDQGHQFRXU
DJHHDFKRWKHUQRWWRUHPDLQVWXFNLQSURWHVWDJDLQVWWKH)7$,QWKLVUHJDUG
&RORPELDQ&62VLQDPHHWLQJZLWKWKH(8GHOHJDWLRQLQ%RJRWiXUJHGDIHOORZ
&RORPELDQDQWL)7$RUJDQLVDWLRQWRSOD\DPRUHFRQVWUXFWLYHUROH,QVKRUWWKH
PHVVDJHZDVWKDWVXFKPHHWLQJVVKRXOGQRWEHXVHGWRGLVFXVVWKHEHQH¿WVDQG
GLVDGYDQWDJHRIIUHHWUDGHEXWUDWKHUWRPDNHFRQFUHWHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV7KXV
DOVRDIWHUDQDJUHHPHQWHQWHUHGLQWRIRUFHWKH&60VFDQVHUYHWKHSXUSRVHRI
PDUJLQDOLVLQJRSSRVLWLRQWR)7$V
$FFRUGLQJWRWKLVSXUSRVHWKHRXWFRPHRIWKHPHHWLQJVLVQRWWKDWLPSRUWDQW
ZKDWFRXQWVLVPHUHO\WKHIDFWWKDWFLYLOVRFLHW\LVLQYROYHGLQWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
+RZHYHURWKHUSXUSRVHVFRPHWRWKHIRUHRQFHDQDJUHHPHQWKDVEHHQUDWL¿HG
DVZLOOEHH[SODLQHGEHORZ
)XQFWLRQDO3XUSRVH0RQLWRULQJDQG,QIRUPDWLRQ
6HFRQGWKH&60VZHUHHVWDEOLVKHGWRPRQLWRUWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH6'
FKDSWHUUHSRUWRQWKHDGYDQFHPHQWVDQGVLJQDOSRVVLEOHGHIDXOWV7KLVPRQLWRU
LQJDQGJDWKHULQJRILQIRUPDWLRQLVVHHQDVDPDMRUSXUSRVHLQWKHWH[WVRIWKH
DJUHHPHQWVDQGLQ(8GLVFRXUVH)RUH[DPSOHIRUPHU7UDGH&RPPLVVLRQHU.
'H*XFKWVWDWHGWKDWWKHJRDOLVWRUDLVHFRQFHUQV
µ$VJRYHUQPHQWVZHZLOOGHSHQGRQWKHLUDFWLYHVXSSRUWLQEULQJLQJWKHLUFRQFHUQV
RQODERXURUHQYLURQPHQWDOPDWWHUVWRRXUDWWHQWLRQ¶
7KHFXUUHQW7UDGH&RPPLVVLRQHUWKH6ZHGH&0DOPVWU|PSXWVLWOLNHWKLV
µ:HDOVRQHHGWRPDNHVXUHWKDWFLYLOVRFLHW\DQGEXVLQHVVRUJDQLVDWLRQVDUHSURS
HUO\FRQVXOWHGDQGLQWHJUDWHGLQRXUZRUNVRZHKDYHWKHULJKWLQIRUPDWLRQ¶
,QYROYHGFLYLOVRFLHW\DFWRUVDOVRFRQ¿UPWKLVUROHDVLOOXVWUDWHGLQWKHPLQXWHVRI
D(8&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ&60
µ7KRVHSUHVHQWUHLWHUDWHGWKHLUFRPPLWPHQWWRIXOILOOLQJWKHUROHODLGGRZQLQWKH7UDGH
DQG6XVWDLQDEOH'HYHORSPHQW7LWOHRIWKH$VVRFLDWLRQ$JUHHPHQWQDPHO\WRPRQLWRU
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH7LWOHDQGWRSURYLGHDGYLFHWRWKH3DUWLHVWRWKH$JUHHPHQW¶
IRUWKHµDGYLFH¶SXUSRVHVHHLQIUD
 6HH.'H*XFKWVXSUDQRWH
 &0DOPVWU|P µ7KHZD\DKHDGIRU WKH(8&DULIRUXP(FRQRPLF3DUWQHUVKLS$JUHHPHQW¶
%UXVVHOV-XO\
 ((6&µ6XPPDU\RIWKHGLVFXVVLRQKHOGGXULQJWKHMRLQWPHHWLQJRIWKH(XURSHDQDQG&HQ
WUDO$PHULFDQFLYLOVRFLHW\DGYLVRU\JURXSV¶%UXVVHOV0D\

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2QHRIWKHHLJKWHOHPHQWVRIWKH(89LHWQDPWUDGHGHDODFFRUGLQJWRWKH7UDGH
(8IDFWVKHHWE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQLVµFLYLOVRFLHW\PRQLWRULQJRIFRPPLWPHQWV
RQODERXULQOLQHZLWK,/2VWDQGDUGV¶>EROGLQRULJLQDO@
$FFRUGLQJWRWKLVORJLF&62VDUHUHJDUGHGDVH[SHUWVRQWKHJURXQGWKDW
EULQJWRJHWKHULQIRUPDWLRQDQGFDQGHWHFWDQGWKHQVLJQDOSUREOHPVZLWKLPSOH
PHQWDWLRQ3XWWLQJLWPRUHVWURQJO\WKLVFDQDOVREHVHHQDVWKHµZDWFKGRJ¶UROH
RIWKH&60V7ZRLVVXHVDUHZRUWKQRWLFLQJZLWKUHJDUGWRWKLVSXUSRVH)LUVW
WKLVLPSOLHVWKDWWKH(8DQGWKHSDUWQHUFRXQWU\GHOHJDWHWKHPRQLWRULQJRIWKH
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWFRPPLWPHQWVSDUWO\WRWKH
FLYLOVRFLHW\ERGLHV7KHRUHWLFDOO\WKLVFDQEHFDSWXUHGLQWHUPVRIWKHSULQFLSDO
DJHQWIUDPHZRUN$OWKRXJKSULQFLSDODJHQWWKHRU\KDVEHHQXVHGH[WHQVLYHO\WR
DQDO\VH(8WUDGHSROLF\QHJRWLDWLRQVWKH&60VKDYHQRW\HWEHHQH[DPLQHG
LQWKLVIUDPHZRUN6SHFL¿FDOO\DSULQFLSDODJHQWWKHRU\ZRXOGDQDO\VHKRZWKH
3DUWLHVWRWKHDJUHHPHQWLHWKHSULQFLSDOVFUHDWHDQH[WHUQDOERG\LHWKH
DJHQWLQRUGHUWRPRQLWRUWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHDJUHHPHQW7KLVGHOHJDWLRQ
WDNHVSODFHEHFDXVHRIWZRUHDVRQVWRLQFUHDVHHI¿FLHQF\DQGWRFLUFXPYHQW
WKHFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQSUREOHP
'HOHJDWLQJWKLVPRQLWRULQJWDVNWRFLYLOVRFLHW\PLJKWEHPRUHHI¿FLHQWJLYHQ
WKDWWKHVHRIWHQKDYHPRUHH[SHUWLVHRQWKHJURXQGWKDQWKH3DUWLHVGR)RU
H[DPSOHWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQDQGLWV'*7UDGHKDYHEHHQFULWLFL]HGIRU
QRWKDYLQJVXI¿FLHQWH[SHUWLVHLQPRQLWRULQJWKHVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWDQG
KXPDQULJKWVFRQYHQWLRQVRIWKH*HQHUDOLVHG6\VWHPRI3UHIHUHQFHV*63SOXV
V\VWHPZKLOVWUHO\LQJPRVWO\RQDVXSHU¿FLDODVVHVVPHQWRIWKHUHSRUWVRILQWHU
QDWLRQDOPRQLWRULQJERGLHVVXFKDVWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DERXU2UJDQLVDWLRQ,/2
,QDGGLWLRQWKHVHLQVWLWXWLRQVKDYHEHHQFULWLFLVHGIRUWKHODWHDQGRUOLPLWHG7UDGH
6XVWDLQDELOLW\,PSDFW$VVHVVPHQWV76,$UHODWLQJWRELODWHUDOWUDGHDJUHHPHQWV
WKDWVKRXOGEHXQGHUWDNHQGXULQJWUDGHQHJRWLDWLRQVWRDVVHVVWKHLPSDFWRQ
VXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW6HFRQGDQRWKHUDGYDQWDJHRIFUHDWLQJDQµDJHQW¶LQ
WKHIRUPRI&60VLVWKDWDFULWLFDOERG\LVEHLQJFUHDWHGZKLFKFDQDOHUWZKHQ
GH¿FLHQFLHVRFFXU7KLVGHOHJDWLRQFRQVWLWXWHVDVROXWLRQWRWKHFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQ
SUREOHPZKHUHE\ERWK3DUWLHVGHOHJDWHWKHFRQWURORYHUWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI
DQDJUHHPHQWWRDWKLUGSDUW\7KLVPD\EHSDUWLFXODUO\UHOHYDQWZKHQWKLUGSDUW\
JRYHUQPHQWVDUHQRWDEOHRUZLOOLQJWRSURYLGHWKHQHFHVVDU\LQIRUPDWLRQRQWKH
 &'DPUR µ(8'HOHJDWLRQDQG$JHQF\LQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDGH1HJRWLDWLRQV$&DXWLRQDU\
&RPSDULVRQ¶-RXUQDORI&RPPRQ0DUNHW6WXGLHV7'HOUHX[DQG%.HUUH
PDQVµ+RZ$JHQWV:HDNHQWKHLU3ULQFLSDOV¶,QFHQWLYHVWR&RQWURO7KH&DVHRI(81HJRWLDWRUV
DQG(80HPEHU6WDWHV LQ0XOWLODWHUDO1HJRWLDWLRQV¶-RXUQDORI(XURSHDQ,QWHJUDWLRQ

 03ROODFNµ'HOHJDWLRQDJHQF\DQGDJHQGDVHWWLQJLQWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\¶,QWHU
QDWLRQDO2UJDQL]DWLRQ
 -2UELHDQG/7RUWHOOµ7KH1HZ*63%HQH¿FLDULHV7LFNLQJWKH%R[RU7UXO\&RQVLVWHQW
ZLWK,/2)LQGLQJV"¶(XURSHDQ)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV5HYLHZ69HOOXWLµ+XPDQULJKWV
FRQGLWLRQDOLW\LQWKH(8*63VFKHPHDIRFXVRQWKRVHLQQHHGRUDQHHGWRUHIRFXV"¶LQ1)HU
UHLUDDQG'.RVWDNRSRXORXHGV7KHKXPDQIDFHRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQLV(8ODZDQGSROLF\
KXPDQHHQRXJK"&DPEULGJH&DPEULGJH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVIRUWKFRPLQJ
 66WHSKDQ µ:KDWGRHVFLYLOVRFLHW\H[SHFW IURP76,$"¶0DFURHFRQRPLF3ROLF\ ,QVWLWXWH
,0.SUHVHQWHGDW WUDGHFRQIHUHQFH µ(87UDGH3ROLF\DW WKH&URVVURDGV¶ 9LHQQD)HEUXDU\
DYDLODEOHDWKWWSZZZRHIVHDW¿OHDGPLQFRQWHQW'RZQORDGVWUDGHFRQIHUHQFH6WHSKDQB
:LHQBB¿QDOSGI!
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LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHFRPPLWPHQWVPDGHLQWKH6'FKDSWHU)RUH[DPSOH&60V
FRXOGUHYHDOWKHLQIRUPDWLRQWKDWRQHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWVLVORZHULQJODERXU
SURWHFWLRQLQRUGHUWRDWWUDFWLQYHVWPHQW,QEULHIWKLVV\VWHPOHVVHQVWKHFRVWV
IRUWKHJRYHUQPHQWVWKHPVHOYHVWRFORVHO\PRQLWRUWKHVLWXDWLRQRQWKHJURXQG
DQGLWHQDEOHVWKHPWRFRQWUROHDFKRWKHU¶VLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
7KLVDOVRLPSOLHVWKDWFUHDWLQJDPRQLWRULQJDJHQWPD\DFWXDOO\VWUHQJWKHQWKH
SRZHURIWKHJRYHUQPHQWVSULQFLSDOV&60VGRQRWQHFHVVDULO\WDNHSRZHU
DZD\IURPWKHJRYHUQPHQWV2QWKHFRQWUDU\WKH\VHUYHWRVXSSRUWWKHJRDOVRI
WKHµSULQFLSDOV¶7KHODWWHUUHPDLQWKHSRZHUIXODFWRULQWKHSULQFLSDODJHQWUHOD
WLRQVKLS7KH\GHWHUPLQHWKHFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFKWKH&60VFDQZRUNDQG
ZKDWLVGRQHZLWKWKHLQIRUPDWLRQSURYLGHG$OWKRXJKSROLF\DGYLFHPD\EHWKH
XOWLPDWHJRDOVHH LQIUDWKLVSXUSRVHLVDQDO\WLFDOO\GLVWLQFW7RVRPHH[WHQW
&62VDUHWKHHDUVDQGH\HVRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQDQGLWVWUDGLQJSDUWQHU
RQWKHJURXQGDQGLWLVXSWRWKH3DUWLHVWKHµSULQFLSDOV¶WRGHFLGHKRZWKHLQ
IRUPDWLRQZLOOEHIROORZHGXS7KDWWKH\VKRXOGQRWEHLQYROYHGLQSROLF\PDNLQJ
ZDVPDGHYHU\H[SOLFLWLQWKH(8±&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ$VVRFLDWLRQ$JUHHPHQW
µ)RUJUHDWHUFHUWDLQW\SROLF\PDNLQJDQGRWKHUVXFKW\SLFDOJRYHUQPHQWIXQFWLRQV
VKDOOQRWEHGHOHJDWHGWRWKH&LYLO6RFLHW\'LDORJXH)RUXP¶$UWLFOH
'HOLEHUDWLYH3XUSRVH'LDORJXHDQG'HOLEHUDWLRQ
7KLUGWKHFLYLOVRFLHW\PHHWLQJVDLPWRSURYLGHDIRUXPIRUGLDORJXHDQGGHOLE
HUDWLRQWKHUHE\FRQWULEXWLQJWRWKHPRUHJHQHUDOSXUSRVHRIGHPRFUDWLFJRYHU
QDQFH,QVWHDGRIHPSKDVLVLQJHIIHFWLYHPRQLWRULQJRXWFRPHRULHQWHGJRDOWKLV
SXUSRVHHPSKDVLVHVPRUHWKHLQWULQVLFGHPRFUDWLFDQGHPSRZHULQJSRWHQWLDORI
WKHGLVFXVVLRQVZLWKLQFLYLOVRFLHW\SURFHVVRULHQWHGSXUSRVH,QRWKHUZRUGV
RUJDQLVLQJDVWUXFWXUHGGLDORJXHEHWZHHQPHPEHUVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\DQGZLWKWKH
JRYHUQPHQWVLVVHHQWRFRQWULEXWHWRWKHGHPRFUDWLFTXDOLW\RIWKHDJUHHPHQW
7KLVLVQRWVRPXFKDERXWWKHVXEVWDQFHRIWKHGLVFXVVLRQVVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHO
RSPHQWLQDWUDGHFRQWH[WEXWPRVWRIDOODERXWWKHGHOLEHUDWLYHSURFHVVLQ
ZKLFKWKLVLVDGGUHVVHG'LDORJXHFDQEHDSXUSRVHLQLWVHOI1RWRQO\LVLWLPSRU
WDQWWRHQJDJHLQDVHFWRULDOGLDORJXHEHWZHHQWKHJRYHUQPHQWDOSDUWLHVWRWKH
DJUHHPHQWHJRQLVVXHVOLNHFXVWRPVDJULFXOWXUHLQYHVWPHQWDQGLQGHHG
DOVRODERXUDQGHQYLURQPHQWEXWDOVRPHPEHUVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\VKRXOGEHLQYROYHG
LQRSHQDQGWUDQVSDUHQWGLVFXVVLRQVRQWKHWUDGHDJUHHPHQW7KHXQGHUO\LQJ
DVVXPSWLRQRIVXFKDµJRYHUQDQFH¶DSSURDFKLVWKDWLWPDNHVWKHSROLWLFDOGHFLVLRQ
PDNLQJV\VWHPPRUHGHPRFUDWLF
7KHRUHWLFDOO\WKLVUHDVRQLQJGUDZVRQWKH+DEHUPDVLDQLGHDOW\SLFDOFRQFHSW
RIµSXEOLFVSKHUH¶3XEOLFVSKHUHGHQRWHVDVSDFHZKHUHFLWL]HQVFDQGHOLEHUDWH
EDVHGRQUDWLRQDODUJXPHQWV'HOLEHUDWLRQHVVHQWLDOO\PHDQVWKDWGLVFXVVLRQV
DUHEDVHGQRWRQSRZHUUHODWLRQVDQGVHOILQWHUHVWEXWRQFULWLFDODQGUDWLRQDO
 6HH03ROODFNVXSUDQRWH
 -$6FKROWHµ&LYLO6RFLHW\DQG'HPRFUDF\LQ*OREDO*RYHUQDQFH¶&HQWUHIRUWKH6WXG\RI
*OREDOLVDWLRQDQG5HJLRQDOLVDWLRQ&6*5:RUNLQJ3DSHU1R-DQXDU\DYDLODEOHDW
KWWSZUDSZDUZLFNDFXN:5$3B6FKROWHBZSSGI!

&LYLO6RFLHW\0HHWLQJVLQ(XURSHDQ8QLRQ7UDGH$JUHHPHQWV
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DUJXPHQWVRQLVVXHVRIFRPPRQFRQFHUQ(YHQLIWKH&60VRUJDQLVHGLQWKH
IUDPHZRUNRI(8WUDGHDJUHHPHQWVZLWKWKLUGFRXQWULHVDUHIDUUHPRYHGIURPWKH
+DEHUPDVLDQLGHDOW\SHRIWKH)UHQFKVDORQVRUWKH%ULWLVKFRIIHHKRXVHVLQWKH
WKFHQWXU\DQXQGHUO\LQJSXUSRVHRIGHOLEHUDWLYHGLDORJXHFDQDOVREHGLV
FHUQHG7KHUHDUHDOVRFOHDUOLQNVZLWKWKH(8¶VDSSURDFKWRµGHPRFUDWLFJRYHU
QDQFH¶µ*RYHUQDQFH¶KDVIHDWXUHGDVDQREMHFWLYHRIWKH(8VLQFHWKHHDUO\
V:KHUHDVLQLWVH[WHUQDOUHODWLRQVWKH(8RULJLQDOO\SURPRWHGWKHHIIHF
WLYHQHVVGLPHQVLRQRIµJRRGJRYHUQDQFH¶VLQFHWKHPLGVLWVWDUWHGWRHP
SKDVL]H µGHPRFUDWLFJRYHUQDQFH¶PRUHDVDFHQWUDOREMHFWLYH$JDLQVW WKLV
EDFNJURXQGWKHSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIFLYLOVRFLHW\RUµQRQVWDWHDFWRUV¶KDVEHFRPH
DQLQFUHDVLQJO\LPSRUWDQWIHDWXUH'HPRFUDWLFJRYHUQDQFHDOVRLPSOLHVDVWURQ
JHUHPSKDVLVRQWUDQVQDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQDWWKHVHFWRULDOOHYHO
$FFRUGLQJWRVXJJHVWLRQVE\VRPHDFWRUVWKH&60VVKRXOGRSHQXSVSDFH
IRUDQRSHQDQGFULWLFDOGLDORJXHEH\RQGWKHJRYHUQPHQWDO3DUWLHVRIWKHDJUHH
PHQW7KHLUPDLQDGGHGYDOXHDFFRUGLQJWRWKLVSHUVSHFWLYHOLHVQRWVRPXFK
LQWKHPRQLWRULQJRIFRPSOLDQFHZLWKODERXUVWDQGDUGVSUHYLRXVSXUSRVHEXW
PRUHIXQGDPHQWDOO\LQWKHLUSRWHQWLDOWRIRVWHUDEHWWHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIFRPPRQ
FRQFHUQV)RUH[DPSOHWKHGRFXPHQWRQWKH(8'$*IRUWKH.RUHDDJUHHPHQW
VWDWHV
µ,QVSLWHRIWKHGLIIHUHQFHVLQWHUPVRIFXOWXUHDQGDSSURDFKHVERWKSDUWLHVVKRZHG
DVWURQJZLOOLQJQHVVWRKDYHDGLDORJXHDQGUHDFKUHFLSURFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶
7KHUXOHVRISURFHGXUHRIWKH(8.RUHD&LYLO6RFLHW\)RUXP'$*WR'$*PHHW
LQJ)LJXUHQRVWLSXODWH
µ7KH&LYLO6RFLHW\)RUXPLVDSODWIRUPLQZKLFKWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\LQ
.RUHDDQGLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQFDQH[FKDQJHYLHZVDQGGLVFXVVPDWWHUVUHODWHG
WRWKHVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWDVSHFWVRIWKHWUDGHUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHSDUWLHV¶
)RUJLQJGLDORJXHDQGFRPPRQXQGHUVWDQGLQJLVDOOWKHPRUHLPSRUWDQWZKHQLW
FRPHVWRVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWJLYHQWKHVHQVLWLYLW\RIWKHGHEDWHZLWKVRPH
RIWKH(8¶VWUDGLQJSDUWQHUV(VSHFLDOO\UHJDUGLQJODERXUULJKWVWKHUHDUHVWLOO
FRQFHUQVDERXWDOOHJHG(8QHRFRORQLDOLQWHUIHUHQFHLQWKLUGFRXQWULHV¶GRPHV
WLFVRYHUHLJQW\DQGDERXWWKH(8¶VPLVXVHRIHWKLFDOFRQFHUQVIRUSURWHFWLRQLVW
LQWHUHVWV:KHUHDVWKHVHIHDUVPD\QRWEHHQWLUHO\MXVWL¿HGVRYHUHLJQW\LVDS
SDUHQWO\OHVVSUREOHPDWLFLQRWKHUFKDSWHUVRIWKHDJUHHPHQWZKHUHHQIRUFHPHQW
LVPXFKVWURQJHUDQGWKH(8¶VVRIWDSSURDFKEDUHO\DOORZVIRUSURWHFWLRQLVW
DEXVHDQGPD\LQIDFWEHXVHGDVDQH[FXVHIRUODFNRISURJUHVVLQFRPSOLDQFH
ZLWKODERXUULJKWVFRPPLWPHQWVLWLVRIXWPRVWLPSRUWDQFHWRGLVFXVVGLIIHUHQW
 -+DEHUPDV7KHVWUXFWXUDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIWKHSXEOLFVSKHUH$QLQTXLU\LQWRDFDWHJRU\
RIERXUJHRLVVRFLHW\&DPEULGJH0,73UHVV
 (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQµ(XURSHDQ*RYHUQDQFHDZKLWHSDSHU¶&20
 $:HW]HO µ*RYHUQDQFH3HUVSHFWLYH'HPRFUDWLF*RYHUQDQFHSURPRWLRQ7KURXJK)XQF
WLRQDO&RRSHUDWLRQ¶LQ$:HW]HODQG-2UELHHGV7KHVXEVWDQFHRI(8'HPRFUDF\3URPRWLRQ
&RQFHSWVDQG&DVHV%DVLQJVWRNH3DOJUDYH
 (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQµ0HHWLQJZLWKWKH(8'RPHVWLF$GYLVRU\*URXS'$*XQGHUWKH
(8.RUHD)UHH7UDGH$JUHHPHQW¶%UXVVHOV
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YLHZVRIKRZWUDGHDQGODERXUULJKWVDUHLQWHUOLQNHGDQGKRZSUREOHPVFDQEH
DGGUHVVHGHI¿FLHQWO\DQGOHJLWLPDWHO\$UJXDEO\WKLVZRXOGLGHDOO\KDSSHQLQDQ
HYHQZLGHUFRQWH[WWKDWDOVRLQYROYHVRWKHULQWHUQDWLRQDODFWRUVVXFKDVWKH,/2
ZKLFKKDVWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJLWLPDF\RQIXQGDPHQWDOODERXUULJKWVDQGH[SHUWLVH
WKURXJKLWVVXSHUYLVRU\ERGLHV7KHWUDGHODERXUOLQNDJHUHPDLQVDQH[WUHPHO\
FRPSOLFDWHGFRQXQGUXPWKDWEHJVIRUDQRSHQDQGUDWLRQDOGLDORJXHEHWZHHQDOO
SDUWQHUVLQYROYHGDQGLQWKHRU\WKLVLVZKDWWKH&60VFRXOGSURYLGHIRU
3HUKDSVHYHQPRUHLPSRUWDQWO\WKHVHGLDORJXHVPD\HPSRZHUFHUWDLQFLYLO
VRFLHW\DFWRUVWKDWDUHFXUUHQWO\PDUJLQDOLVHGZLWKLQWKHGRPHVWLFFRQWH[W:KLOH
WKHSURFHVVRIHPSRZHUPHQWLVW\SLFDOO\DSURFHVVWKDWVKRXOGRULJLQDWHIURP
WKHLQVLGHDFWRUVOLNHWKH(8FDQIDFLOLWDWHLWE\SURPRWLQJVRFLDOGLDORJXHRU
HVWDEOLVKYHQXHVIRUSDUWLFLSDWLRQ7KH\FRXOGPDNHLWSRVVLEOHIRUPDUJLQDOLVHG
DFWRUVWRWUDQVFHQGWKHGRPHVWLFSROLWLFDODUHQDDQGKDYHWKHLUYRLFHKHDUG
ZLWKLQDZLGHUWUDQVQDWLRQDOVHWWLQJ,QSROLWLFDOVFLHQFHWHUPVWKH\FUHDWHDQHZ
µRSSRUWXQLW\VWUXFWXUH¶IRUDFWRUVWRUDLVHWKHLUFRQFHUQVDQGXQGHUVWDQGWKH
SRZHUVWUXFWXUHVWKH\DUHDSDUWRI
7KHIRUPHU+HDGRIWKH8QLWRQWKH*63DQG6XVWDLQDEOH'HYHORSPHQWSXWV
LWOLNHWKLV
µ%XWZHGRWKLQNWKDWWKLVLVDYHU\LPSRUWDQWHOHPHQWDQGLWLVWKDQNVWRRXU)7$WKDW
ZHKDYHJLYHQDYRLFHWRWKRVHWUDGHXQLRQVLQWKHWUDGHFRQWH[WRQODERXUULJKWV¶
&RPPLVVLRQHU0DOPVWU|P¶VVSRNHVSHUVRQPHQWLRQHGWKHVDPHSRWHQWLDOUHJDUG
LQJWKHFLYLOVRFLHW\LQYROYHPHQWLQDQHQYLVDJHG)7$ZLWK0DOD\VLD
µ$VLQRWKHU)7$VWKH&RPPLVVLRQZLOOSXUVXHDPELWLRXVSURYLVLRQVDLPLQJDWIRVWHU
LQJ JRYHUQPHQWV¶ DFFRXQWDELOLW\ DQG FLYLO VRFLHW\ HPSRZHUPHQW ± DQG WKHUHE\
VWUHQJWKHQLQJDVXSSRUWLYHHQYLURQPHQWIRUKXPDQULJKWV7KLVLVWKHFDVHIRULQ
VWDQFHIRUUXOHVRQWUDQVSDUHQF\DQGRQWKHGLUHFWLQYROYHPHQWRIFLYLOVRFLHW\LQWKH
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRISURYLVLRQVRQWUDGHDQGVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW¶
(PSRZHUPHQWFDQEHVWUHQJWKHQHGWKURXJKWKHIRUJLQJRIDOOLDQFHVZLWKRWKHU
GRPHVWLFDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDODFWRUVZKLFKFRXOGEHFUHDWHGWKURXJKWKH&60V
$VVXFKWKH&60VFRXOGIRVWHUWKHFUHDWLRQRIµWUDQVQDWLRQDODGYRFDF\JURXSV¶
RUIDFLOLWDWHWKHIXQFWLRQLQJRIH[LVWLQJWUDQVQDWLRQDOQHWZRUNV,QWKHSDVWWUDGH
DJUHHPHQWVKDYHOHGWRWUDQVQDWLRQDOFROODERUDWLRQEHWZHHQ&62VRIIRUH[
 &RPPLVVLRQRQ/HJDO(PSRZHUPHQWRIWKH3RRUµ7RZDUGVD*OREDO6RFLDO&RQWUDFW/D
ERXU5LJKWVIRU/HJDO(PSRZHUPHQWRI7KH3RRU¶LQ&RPPLVVLRQRQ/HJDO(PSRZHUPHQWRIWKH
3RRU	81'3HGV0DNLQJWKH/DZ:RUNIRU(YHU\RQH:RUNLQJ*URXS5HSRUWV9RO1HZ
<RUN&(UQVWHWDOµ'HFHQWZRUNDQGHPSRZHUPHQWIRUSURSRRUJURZWK¶2UJDQLVDWLRQIRU
(FRQRPLF&RRSHUDWLRQDQG'HYHORSPHQW2(&'DYDLODEOHDWKWWSZZZRHFGRUJGDF
SRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQSGI!
 /9DQGHQ3XWWHµ:KDWVRFLDOIDFHRIWKHQHZ(XURSHDQ8QLRQWUDGHDJUHHPHQWV"¶WUDQ
VFULSWVHYHQW-XQH%UXVVHOV
 07HPSHVW µ5LJKWVDEXVHVUHYHDOHG LQ(8IUHHWUDGHFDQGLGDWH0DOD\VLD¶(XUDFWLY
2FWREHU  DYDLODEOH DW KWWSZZZHXUDFWLYFRPVHFWLRQVJOREDOHXURSHULJKWVDEXVHVUH
YHDOHGHXIUHHWUDGHFDQGLGDWHPDOD\VLD!
 0(.HFNDQG.6LNNLQNµ7UDQVQDWLRQDODGYRFDF\QHWZRUNVLQLQWHUQDWLRQDODQGUHJLRQDO
SROLWLFV¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO6RFLDO6FLHQFH-RXUQDO

&LYLO6RFLHW\0HHWLQJVLQ(XURSHDQ8QLRQ7UDGH$JUHHPHQWV
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DPSOHWKH86DQG0H[LFR)RUQRZWKH&60VKDYHQRWUHVXOWHGLQDVLJQL¿FDQW
LQFUHDVHRIFRRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQ&62VIURPWKH(8DQGWUDGHSDUWQHUFRXQWULHV
+RZHYHULWVHHPVWKDWWKHLQLWLDWLYHIRUWKHOHWWHUVHQWE\5HG*HLQRULJL
QDWHGIURPD(XURSHDQRUJDQLVDWLRQWDNLQJSDUWLQWKH(8'$*IRUWKH3HUX
&RORPELDDJUHHPHQW,QDGGLWLRQODERXUJURXSVIURPWKH(8DQG.RUHD
ORRVHO\FRRUGLQDWHEHIRUHD&60WDNHVSODFH
3ROLF\,QÀXHQFH$GYLVLQJWKH*RYHUQPHQWV
)RXUWKE\SURYLGLQJUHOHYDQWLQIRUPDWLRQSXUSRVHDQGRUHQJDJLQJLQDGH
OLEHUDWLYHGHEDWHSXUSRVH&60VFDQDOVROHDGWRWDLORUPDGHMRLQWUHFRP
PHQGDWLRQVRQKRZWKH(8DQGLWVWUDGHSDUWQHUVKRXOGLPSOHPHQWWKHWUDGH
DJUHHPHQWLQDVXVWDLQDEOHZD\:KHUHDVWKLVSXUSRVHEXLOGVRQWKHSUHYLRXV
RQHVLWGLVWLQJXLVKHVLWVHOIE\LWVH[SOLFLWDPELWLRQWRIRUPXODWHSROLF\DGYLFH
$FFRUGLQJWRWKLVYLHZWKH&60VVHUYHDVDGYLVRU\ERDUGVIRUWKHJRYHUQ
PHQWV7KH\VKRXOGFRPHIRUZDUGZLWKFRQFUHWHVXJJHVWLRQVIRUWKH3DUWLHVDV
WRKRZWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIODERXUDQGHQYLURQPHQWDOSURYLVLRQVVKRXOGEH
LPSURYHG7KHGLIIHUHQFHZLWKWKHSUHYLRXVSXUSRVHRIµPRQLWRULQJ¶OLHVLQWKH
SRVLWLYHUROHIRUFLYLOVRFLHW\WKHJRDOLVQRWRQO\WRKLJKOLJKWVKRUWFRPLQJVLQ
WKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHDJUHHPHQWSXUSRVHDQGRUWRHQJDJHLQDGHOLE
HUDWLYHGLDORJXHRQWKHVHLVVXHVSXUSRVHEXWDOVRWRFRPHXSZLWKVXJJHVWLRQV
IRULPSURYLQJWKLV7KHXOWLPDWHJRDOZRXOGEHWKDWVXFKPHHWLQJVSURYLGHWKH
JRYHUQPHQWVZLWKDFOHDUPDQGDWHWRDFWZLWKWKHLUVXSSRUW
7KH(8&HQWUDO$PHULFD$$IRUH[DPSOHVHWVRXWWKDW
µ7KHVHJURXSVVKDOOEHWDVNHGZLWKH[SUHVVLQJYLHZVDQGPDNLQJUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV
RQWUDGHUHODWHGDVSHFWVRIVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWDQGDGYLVLQJWKH3DUWLHVRQ
KRZWREHWWHUDFKLHYHWKHREMHFWLYHVRIWKLV7LWOH¶$UWLFOH
7KHIRUPXODWLRQYDULHVDPRQJWKHDJUHHPHQWVZKLOHVRPHVXFKDVWKH&HQWUDO
$PHULFDQ$$VSHOORXWWKDWWKH'$*VKDYHDVSHFL¿FµWDVN¶(8&HQWUDO$PHUL
FD.RUHD8NUDLQH*HRUJLD0ROGRYDDQG9LHWQDPRWKHUDJUHHPHQWVPHQWLRQ
WKHJURXSVµPD\VXEPLWYLHZVDQGUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV¶3HUX&RORPELDDQG&(7$
)LQDOO\VRPHDJUHHPHQWVLQFOXGHWKHIRUPDOSRVVLELOLW\WRVXEPLWWKHVHYLHZV
DQGUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVµRQWKHLURZQLQLWLDWLYH¶(83HUX&RORPELD&(7$0RO
GRYD*HRUJLD6LQJDSRUH9LHWQDP
$FFRUGLQJWRDXQLRQUHSUHVHQWDWLYHIURPWKH(8VLGHFRPLQJIRUZDUGZLWK
UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVLVWKHXOWLPDWHJRDORIVXFKPHHWLQJV
 / &RPSD µ1$)7$¶V /DERXU 6LGH$JUHHPHQW DQG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DERXU 6ROLGDULW\¶ LQ 3
:DWHUPDQDQG-:LOOVHGV3ODFH6SDFHDQGWKH1HZ/DERXU,QWHUQDWLRQDOLVPV+RERNHQ
%ODFNZHOO3XEOLVKHUV
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK3HUXYLDQ1*2HPDLO$SULO
 6HHDXWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZVXSUDQRWH
 6HHDXWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZVXSUDQRWH

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µ0RUHRYHUWKHPRQLWRULQJPHFKDQLVP¶VPDQGDWHSURYLGHVIRUVSHFLILFUHFRPPHQGD
WLRQVDQGPDNLQJSROLF\LQWHUYHQWLRQVRQSDUWLFXODUPDWWHUV¶
7KH5XOHVRI3URFHGXUHRIWKH(8.RUHD&LYLO6RFLHW\)RUXP'$*WR'$*
PHHWLQJ)LJXUHQRVHWRXW
µ:LWKLQWKLVDUHDRIFRPSHWHQFHWKH&LYLO6RFLHW\)RUXPPD\H[SUHVVLWVYLHZVLQ
WKHIRUPRIRSLQLRQVUHSRUWVRUFRQFOXVLRQVRUWKURXJKDQ\RWKHUDSSURSULDWHDFWLRQ¶
7KH(8.RUHD&LYLO6RFLHW\)RUXPDOUHDG\SXEOLVKHGFRQFUHWHMRLQWUHFRPPHQ
GDWLRQVUHODWHGWRODERXUDQGHQYLURQPHQWDOLVVXHVIRUH[DPSOHWKHVXJJHVWLRQ
WKDW.RUHDQFRPSDQLHVDFWLYHLQ%DQJODGHVKFRXOGMRLQWKH$FFRUGRQ)LUHDQG
%XLOGLQJ6DIHW\:HDUHQRWDZDUHRIDQ\RWKHUVSHFL¿FUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV
SXWIRUZDUGE\WUDQVQDWLRQDO&60VZKLFKLVSUREDEO\UHODWHGWRWKHLUPRUHUHFHQW
HVWDEOLVKPHQW
,QDGGLWLRQDVPHQWLRQHGLQVHFWLRQ,LQVRPHFDVHVWKHDJUHHPHQWVIRUHVHH
WKDWWKH&60VFDQSURYLGHDGYLFHZKHQDGLVSXWHDULVHVEHWZHHQWKHSDUWLHVRQ
ODERXURUHQYLURQPHQWDOLVVXHV(8.RUHD0ROGRYD*HRUJLDDQG&DQDGD+HUH
WRRLWUHPDLQVWREHVHHQZKHWKHUDQGWRZKDWH[WHQWDWKH&60VHIIHFWLYHO\
PDQDJHWRSURGXFHSROLF\UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVEZKDWWKHLUTXDOLW\LVLQWHUPVRI
VHWWLQJRXWJHQHUDOSROLF\RULHQWDWLRQVDQGPDNLQJVSHFL¿FVXJJHVWLRQVIRULP
SURYHPHQWFWRZKDWH[WHQWWKH\DUHDQGVKRXOGEHSLFNHGXSE\WKHJRYHUQ
PHQWV
&RQFOXVLRQ
7KLVVHFWLRQKDVVKRZQWKDWDWOHDVWIRXUDQDO\WLFDOO\GLVWLQFWSXUSRVHVFDQEH
LGHQWL¿HGIURPWKHDJUHHPHQWVDQGWKHGLVFRXUVHVRIDFWRUVLQYROYHG7KHVH
FRUUHVSRQGWRGLIIHUHQWUROHVWKDWKDYHEHHQKHDUGLQWKHGHEDWHRQWKHFLYLO
VRFLHW\PHHWLQJVZKHWKHUWKH\VKRXOGFRQVWLWXWHUHVSHFWLYHO\D¿JOHDIDQ
DODUPEHOORUZDWFKGRJDQHPSRZHUPHQWGHYLFHRUSROLF\WRRO,QFRQFOXVLRQ
WKUHHIXUWKHUREVHUYDWLRQVVKRXOGEHPHQWLRQHG
)LUVWWKHVHSXUSRVHVDUHQRWPXWXDOO\H[FOXVLYHDQGVRPHDFWRUVH[SHFWWKH
&60VWRIXO¿OVHYHUDOSXUSRVHV)RUH[DPSOH((6&PHPEHU(3LFKHQRWVXJ
JHVWHGGXULQJDZRUNVKRSRQFLYLOVRFLHW\LQYROYHPHQWLQ(8)7$VWKDW
 <$OWLQW]LVµ&LYLO6RFLHW\(QJDJHPHQWDQG/LQNDJHVLQ(87UDGH3ROLF\¶LQ77DNiFV$
2WWDQG$'LPRSRXORVHGV/LQNLQJWUDGHDQGQRQFRPPHUFLDOLQWHUHVWVWKH(8DVDJOREDOUROH
PRGHO"9RO&HQWUHIRUWKH/DZRI(8([WHUQDO5HODWLRQV&/((5:RUNLQJ3DSHU
 :KLOHWKLVFDQEHUHJDUGHGDVDUHPDUNDEOHGHYHORSPHQWLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWD(XUR
SHDQODERXUUHSUHVHQWDWLYHODPHQWHGWKDWWKHRULJLQDORSLQLRQRIWKH(8'$*RQODERXULVVXHVLQ
.RUHDZDVVHYHUHO\ZDWHUHGGRZQE\WKH.RUHDQ'$*PHPEHUVDQGPDQ\UHIHUHQFHVWRWKH,/2
ZHUHWDNHQRXWLQWKH¿QDOFRQFOXVLRQV
'RPHVWLF$GYLVRU\*URXSXQGHU WKH(8.RUHD)7$ µ2SLQLRQRQ WKH IXQGDPHQWDO ULJKWVDW
ZRUNLQWKH5HSXEOLFRI.RUHDLGHQWL¿FDWLRQRIDUHDVIRUDFWLRQ¶
 ((6&µ0LQXWHVRIWKHPHHWLQJRIWKH(8.RUHD&LYLO6RFLHW\)RUXPXQGHUWKH(8.RUHD
)UHH7UDGH$JUHHPHQW¶%UXVVHOV((6&µ&LYLO6RFLHW\)RUXPXQGHUWKH(8.RUHD)UHH
7UDGH$JUHHPHQWFRQFOXVLRQV¶%UXVVHOV((6&µ&RQFOXVLRQVRIWKH&LYLO6RFLHW\)RUXP
XQGHUWKH(8.RUHD)UHH7UDGH$JUHHPHQW¶%UXVVHOV((6& µ&RQFOXVLRQVRI WKH&LYLO
6RFLHW\)RUXPXQGHUWKH(8.RUHD)UHH7UDGH$JUHHPHQW¶%UXVVHOV

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µWKHNH\REMHFWLYHRIWKHVHPRQLWRULQJPHFKDQLVPVEHVLGHVHQVXULQJLPSOHPHQWD
WLRQZDVWRVWUHQJWKHQFLYLOVRFLHW\LQ(8SDUWQHUFRXQWULHVDVZHOODVWRFRQVROLGDWH
WKHVXSSRUWRISXEOLFRSLQLRQRIWUDGHOLEHUDOL]DWLRQ¶
6HFRQGKRZHYHUGLIIHUHQWDFWRUVXVXDOO\GRHPSKDVL]HGLIIHUHQWSXUSRVHV)URP
RXUSUHOLPLQDU\REVHUYDWLRQVLWVHHPVWKDW(8WUDGHRI¿FLDOVVHHPWRSXWPRUH
HPSKDVLVRQWKHLQVWUXPHQWDODQGIXQFWLRQDOSXUSRVHVPHPEHUVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\
VHHPPRUHNHHQRQWKHQRUPDWLYHDQGSROLF\DGYLVLQJSRWHQWLDORIWKH&60V
7KHTXHVWLRQZKRZDQWVZKDWDQGZK\QHHGVWREHUHVHDUFKHGPRUHV\VWHP
DWLFDOO\
7KLUGZKDWPDNHVLWHYHQPRUHFRPSOLFDWHGLVWKDWLQWHQGHGSXUSRVHVFDQ
KDYHXQLQWHQGHGFRQVHTXHQFHV:KHUHDVWKH&60VPD\EHRULJLQDOO\VHWXS
IRUWKHSXUSRVHRIOHJLWLPLVLQJWKH)7$VDQGVLOHQFLQJFLYLOVRFLHW\RSSRVLWLRQ
DQGSHUKDSVDOVRWRSURYLGHWKHQHFHVVDU\LQSXWWRWKHJRYHUQPHQWVLQWHUPVRI
PRQLWRULQJ3DUWLHV¶FRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWFRPPLWPHQWV
RYHUWLPHWKHPHHWLQJVPLJKWVWDUWIRVWHULQJWKHHPSRZHUPHQWRISUHYLRXVO\
PDUJLQDOLVHGDFWRUVDQGPDNLQJFLYLOVRFLHW\DFWRUVLQGLVSHQVDEOHPHPEHUVRI
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJZLWKJRYHUQPHQWV,QGHHGIROORZLQJKLVWRULFDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVW
UHDVRQLQJWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDQµDJHQW¶LQWKHIRUPRI&60VPD\VHWRIID
SURFHVVRILQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHGFRRSHUDWLRQZKHUHE\HYHQWXDOO\WKHDJHQWHQGVXS
SHUIRUPLQJGLIIHUHQWWDVNVWKDQWKHFUHDWRUVRULJLQDOO\HQYLVDJHG0RUHRYHU
DJHQWVPLJKWVXFFHVVIXOO\PDQDJHWRFURVVWKHERXQGDULHVRIWKHLUPDQGDWHDQG
DFTXLUHPRUHSRZHUWKDQZDVRULJLQDOO\IRUHVHHQDJHQWµVKLUNLQJ¶RUµVOLSSDJH¶
LQSULQFLSDODJHQWWHUPLQRORJ\'LIIHUHQWIDFWRUV±VXFKDVFKDQJLQJSROLWLFDO
SUHIHUHQFHVXQH[SHFWHGFLUFXPVWDQFHVERWKQDWLRQDOO\DQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\DV
ZHOODVDPELJXLWLHVRQWKHRULJLQDOPDQGDWHDQGRIFRXUVHWKHVNLOIXOQHVVRI
DFWRUVLQYROYHG±PD\FDXVHWKH&60VWREHFRPHPRUHDPELWLRXV
'HVSLWHWKHVHFRPSOH[LWLHVRXUDQDO\WLFDOGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHGLIIHUHQW
SXUSRVHVGRHVPDNHLWSRVVLEOHWRJHWDEHWWHUYLHZRIKRZWKH&60VFDQEH
HYDOXDWHGDVZLOOEHH[SODLQHGLQWKHQH[WVHFWLRQ
,,, $66(660(17+2:72(9$/8$7(7+(0"
6RIDUZHKDYHUHIUDLQHGIURPHYDOXDWLQJFHUWDLQSXUSRVHVRUIHDWXUHVDVµVXSH
ULRU¶IURPDQRUPDWLYHSHUVSHFWLYH+RZHYHUWKHTXHVWLRQLQHYLWDEO\ULVHVZKHWK
HU WKH&60VKDYHEHHQVXFFHVVIXO7KLVVHFWLRQSURYLGHVD IUDPHZRUN IRU
DQDO\VLQJWKH&60V7KXVZHGRQRWDLPWRPDNHDGH¿QLWHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKH
IXQFWLRQLQJRI&60VOHWDORQHWKHLUWDQJLEOHRULQWDQJLEOHLPSDFWRQVXVWDLQDEOH
GHYHORSPHQW2QHSUDFWLFDOUHDVRQLVWKDWLWZRXOGEHWRRHDUO\IRUWKLV$QRWKHU
UHDVRQKRZHYHULVWKDWZHODFNWKHHYDOXDWLYHWRROVIRUDWKRURXJKHYDOXDWLRQ
7KHUHIRUHZHPDLQO\DLPWRSURYLGHDQHYDOXDWLYHIUDPHZRUNWKDWJRHVEH\RQG
HDV\DQGXQTXDOL¿HGMXGJPHQWVDQGWKDWDOORZVRQHWRVLWXDWHGLIIHUHQWDVVHVV
PHQWVZLWKLQZLGHUGHEDWHV7KURXJKRXWWKHHODERUDWLRQRIWKLVIUDPHZRUNZH
 6HH((6&VXSUDQRWH
 33LHUVRQ¶7KH3DWKWR(XURSHDQ,QWHJUDWLRQ$+LVWRULFDO,QVWLWXWLRQDOLVW$QDO\VLV¶&RP
SDUDWLYH3ROLWLFDO6WXGLHV

&/((53$3(56 2UELHHWDO
GRSURYLGHDQXPEHURIWHQWDWLYHHPSLULFDOLOOXVWUDWLRQVIURPRXUUHVHDUFKRQWKH
(8.RUHD(83HUX&RORPELDDQG(8&HQWUDO$PHULFDDJUHHPHQWV
7KLVHYDOXDWLYHIUDPHZRUNLVVXPPDULVHGLQ)LJXUH,WEXLOGVRQWKHSUHYLRXV
VHFWLRQVLQRUGHUWRHYDOXDWHWKHVXFFHVVRUIDLOXUHRIWKHPHHWLQJVLWLVLP
SRUWDQWQRWRQO\WRFRQVLGHUWKHLUGLIIHUHQWIHDWXUHVEXWDOVRWRHQJDJHLQDGHHS
HU DVVHVVPHQW RI ZKLFK XQGHUO\LQJ SXUSRVHV DUHPRUH RU OHVV UHOHYDQW
8OWLPDWHO\WKLVOLQNVWKHDVVHVVPHQWWRPRUHIXQGDPHQWDOGLIIHUHQFHVLQSHUVSHF
WLYHVRQWKHUROHRIFLYLOVRFLHW\LQWKHFRQWH[WRIWUDGHGHPRFUDF\DQGGHYHORS
PHQW
7KHIUDPHZRUNLVVWUXFWXUHGDURXQGWZREDVLFTXHVWLRQV)LUVWVKRXOGFLYLO
VRFLHW\EHLQYROYHG"6HFRQGLIWKHDQVZHULVSRVLWLYHIRUZKLFKSXUSRVHVKRXOG
WKLVEH"(YDOXDWLRQVRIWKH&60VEDVLFDOO\UHVROYHRQDFWRUV¶SHUVSHFWLYHVRQ
ERWKTXHVWLRQVDVZHZLOOVKRZEHORZ
:K\QRWLQYROYLQJFLYLOVRFLHW\"
1RWHYHU\RQHZRXOGDJUHHWKDW&62VVKRXOGEHLQYROYHGLQWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
RIWUDGHDJUHHPHQWV(YHQZLWKLQ(XURSHWKHUHDUHGLIIHUHQWYLHZVRQWKHH[WHQW
WRZKLFKWKLVVKRXOGEHWKHFDVH7KLUGSDUW\JRYHUQPHQWVWHQGWREHHYHQPRUH
FDXWLRXVDERXWJUDQWLQJFLYLOVRFLHW\DUROHLQUHDFKLQJWKHVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORS
PHQWREMHFWLYHVRIWKHWUDGHDJUHHPHQW7KLVKHVLWDQFHGRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\
PHDQWKDWVXVWDLQDEOHREMHFWLYHVDUHFRQVLGHUHGXQLPSRUWDQWLWFDQDOVRUHODWH
WRGLIIHUHQWYLHZVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\DQGGHPRFUDF\LQWKHFRQWH[WRIWUDGHDJUHH
PHQWV6SHFL¿FDOO\WKHLQFOLQDWLRQQRWWRJLYHFLYLOVRFLHW\DUROHLQWKHPRQLWRULQJ
RIVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWFDQÀRZIURPDXWKRULWDULDQLVPGHYHORSPHQWDOLVP
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHGHPRFUDF\DQGQHROLEHUDOLVP
)LUVWDXWKRULWDULDQJRYHUQPHQWVDUHREYLRXVO\KHVLWDQWWRJUDQWFLYLOVRFLHW\
PHPEHUVDUROHLQWKHIROORZXSRIDWUDGHDJUHHPHQWDQGLWV6'FKDSWHU7KLV
UHODWHVWRWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWFLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVDWLRQVZRXOGKROORZRXWWKH
JRYHUQPHQW¶VSRZHU&LYLOVRFLHW\KDVORQJEHHQUHFRJQL]HGDVDPDMRUIHDWXUH
RIDQµHPEHGGHG¶GHPRFUDF\RUYLFHYHUVDDVDSRWHQWLDOWKUHDWIRUDXWKRULWDULDQ
JRYHUQPHQWV,QWHUIHUHQFHIURPIRUHLJQVWDWHVDQGRUJDQLVDWLRQVLQWRGRPHVWLF
SROLWLFVLVHYHQPRUHVHQVLWLYHIURPWKLVSHUVSHFWLYH2IFRXUVHWKHUHDUHGLIIHU
HQFHVLQWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKJRYHUQPHQWVDUHPRUHRUOHVVDXWKRULWDULDQRU
GHPRFUDWLFZKLFKWKHQDOVRUHÀHFWVRQWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKFLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVD
WLRQVDUHEHLQJLQYROYHG$XWKRULWDULDQJRYHUQPHQWVPLJKWDOVREHPRUHZLOOLQJ
WRDFFHSWFLYLOVRFLHW\LQYROYHPHQWLIWKH\KDYHDQLPSDFWRQZKLFKPHPEHUV
SDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHPHHWLQJVDQGLIWKHLQÀXHQFHRIWKHVHPHHWLQJVUHPDLQVOLP
LWHG
7KLVSHUVSHFWLYHLQWHUPVRIPRUHRUOHVVDXWKRULWDULDQFDQH[SODLQZK\VRPH
WKLUGFRXQWU\JRYHUQPHQWVKDYHQHJRWLDWHGOHVVIDUUHDFKLQJSURYLVLRQVRQFLYLO
VRFLHW\LQYROYHPHQWLQWKHWUDGHDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKH(8)RUH[DPSOHLQWKH
DJUHHPHQWVZLWK6LQJDSRUHDQG9LHWQDPµFLYLOVRFLHW\¶ LVQRWHYHQH[SOLFLWO\
PHQWLRQHG$QRWKHULVVXHWKDWPLJKWEHH[SODLQHGIURPWKLVSHUVSHFWLYHLVWKH
 :0HUNHOµ(PEHGGHGDQGGHIHFWLYHGHPRFUDFLHV¶'HPRFUDWL]DWLRQ

&LYLO6RFLHW\0HHWLQJVLQ(XURSHDQ8QLRQ7UDGH$JUHHPHQWV
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DWWHPSWVE\VRPHWKLUGSDUW\JRYHUQPHQWWRLQWHUIHUHLQWKHVHOHFWLRQSURFHVVRI
WKHFLYLOVRFLHW\PHPEHUV
6HFRQGLWVKRXOGEHQRWLFHGWKDWDOVROLEHUDOWKLQNHUVPLJKWVXSSRUWWKHWKHVLV
WKDWDXWKRULWDULDQOHDGHUVKLSLVLPSRUWDQWLQRUGHUWRUHDFKVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORS
PHQWREMHFWLYHV$FFRUGLQJWRGHYHORSPHQWDOLVPGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQLQYROYLQJD
PRUHSOXUDOLVWLFFLYLOVRFLHW\PD\HPHUJHRQFHDFHUWDLQOHYHORIHFRQRPLFGH
YHORSPHQWKDVEHHQUHDFKHG7KHUHIRUHWKHHODERUDWLRQDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI
HIIHFWLYHGHYHORSPHQWVWUDWHJLHVPD\UHTXLUHDVWURQJJRYHUQPHQW±HYHQLILQ
WKHVKRUWUXQWKLVLPSOLHVWKDWGHPRFUDWLFVWDQGDUGVDUHEHLQJVDFUL¿FHG'HYHO
RSPHQWDOLVWWKLQNLQJWHQGVWREHZLGHVSUHDGZLWKVRPHZHVWHUQGRQRUVDQGQRW
WKHOHDVWZLWKLQWKH(83DUWLFLSDWRU\V\VWHPVLQYROYLQJFLYLOVRFLHW\PD\VHHP
OLNHDGHPRFUDWLFLPSURYHPHQWEXWWKH\DOVRULVNXQGHUPLQLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
FDSDFLW\WRSOD\DJXLGLQJUROHLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQW7KHSRLQWKHUHLV
QRWSULPDULO\WKDWFLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVDWLRQVXQGHUPLQHWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSRZHU
DXWKRULWDULDQLVPRUWKDWWKH\DUHOHVVOHJLWLPDWHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVUHSUHVHQWDWLYH
GHPRFUDF\EXWPRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\WKDWH[WHQVLYHGHPRFUDWLFVWUXFWXUHVZRXOG
MHRSDUGLVHHIIHFWLYHGHYHORSPHQWVWUDWHJLHV
7KLVSHUVSHFWLYHLQWHUPVRIGHYHORSPHQWDOLVWWKLQNLQJFDQH[SODLQZK\WKH
SURPRWLRQRIFLYLOVRFLHW\DQGGHPRFUDWLFJRYHUQDQFHLQJHQHUDOKDYHQRWEHHQ
RQWRSRIWKHDJHQGDRI'*7UDGHDQG'*'HYFR7KHIRUPHUW\SLFDOO\IRFXVHV
RQWUDGHLQWHUHVWVDQGOLEHUDOLVDWLRQZKHUHDVWKHODWWHUSULRULWL]HVHFRQRPLF
GHYHORSPHQWRYHUGHPRFUDF\SURPRWLRQFIGHYHORSPHQWDOLVP0RUHRYHULWLV
'*7UDGHWKDWLVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQDQGIROORZXSRIWKH&60V'*
 7&DURWKHUVµ'HPRFUDF\$VVLVWDQFH3ROLWLFDOYV'HYHORSPHQWDO"¶-RXUQDORI'HPRF
UDF\
.'HO%LRQGRDQG-2UELHµ7KH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIEXGJHWVXSSRUW
DQGWKH*RYHUQDQFH,QFHQWLYH7UDQFKHLQ(WKLRSLDGHPRFUDF\SURPRWHURUGHYHORSPHQWDOGR
QRU"¶7KLUG:RUOG4XDUWHUO\
)LJXUH (YDOXDWLYHIUDPHZRUNDVVHVVPHQW

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'HYFRKDVQRWEHHQLQYROYHGLQWKHSURFHVVDQGFRKHUHQFHEHWZHHQ(8GHYHO
RSPHQWSROLF\DQGWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQRI&60VKDVRIWHQEHHQODFNLQJ(YHQWKRXJK
DWWHPSWVDUHEHLQJPDGHIRU'*7UDGHDQG'*'HYFRWRVSHDNWKHVDPHODQ
JXDJHDQGWRFROODERUDWHVRIDUERWKKDYHEHHQRSHUDWLQJVHSDUDWHO\DQGEDUH
O\FRRUGLQDWHWKHLUHIIRUWV$VVXFKWKHSURPRWLRQRIFLYLOVRFLHW\WKURXJKWUDGH
DJUHHPHQWVVHHPVWRIDOOLQEHWZHHQWKHFUDFNVRIWKH(8¶VFRPSDUWPHQWDOLVHG
LQVWLWXWLRQDOVWUXFWXUH$OVRLQWKLUGFRXQWULHVVXFKDV3HUXZHQRWLFHGDGHYHO
RSPHQWDOLVWSHUVSHFWLYHZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGVRPHEXVLQHVVDVVRFLDWLRQV
DVDUHDVRQIRUVLGHOLQLQJVRFLDOGLDORJXH
7KLUGWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIUHSUHVHQWDWLYHGHPRFUDF\DOVRVXSSRUWVWKHQRQ
LQYROYHPHQWRIFLYLOVRFLHW\$FFRUGLQJWRWKLVYLHZWKHHOHFWHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV
DQGWKHLUJRYHUQPHQWVDUHWKHPDLQDFWRUVZLWKLQDQ\GHPRFUDWLFV\VWHP$V
VXFKPHPEHUVRISDUOLDPHQWDQGJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVDUHFRQVLGHUHGWKHPRVW
OHJLWLPDWHSROLWLFDODFWRUV7KH\VKRXOGEHSULPDULO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHPRQLWRU
LQJLPSOHPHQWDWLRQDQGHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHDJUHHPHQWVFRQFOXGHGEHWZHHQWKH
3DUWLHVLQFOXGLQJWKH6'FKDSWHU$OWKRXJKWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIFLYLOVRFLHW\IRU
GHPRFUDWLFV\VWHPVKDVORQJEHHQUHFRJQL]HGZLWKLQGHPRFUDF\VWXGLHVJRLQJ
EDFNWR$GH7RFTXHYLOOHWKHWUDGLWLRQDOYLHZRQGHPRFUDF\FRQWLQXHVWRJUDQW
DSULPRUGLDOUROHWRUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVWKDWDUHHOHFWHGE\WKHSHRSOH&RQWUDU\WR
YLHZVRIGHOLEHUDWLYHRUSDUWLFLSDWRU\GHPRFUDF\WKH\WHQGWRTXHVWLRQWKHOH
JLWLPDF\RIFLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVDWLRQVZKRVHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDUHQRWHOHFWHGE\
WKHSHRSOHDQGSXUVXHWKHLURZQSDUWLFXODULVWLFLQWHUHVWV
7KLVFULWLFLVPLVHYHQVWURQJHUZKHQZHPRYHIURPWKHGRPHVWLFUHDOPLQWR
WKHWUDQVQDWLRQDOFLYLOVRFLHW\,WPD\EHDUJXHGWKDWLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFVVWDWHV
VWLOOFRQVWLWXWHWKHPRVWOHJLWLPDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDODFWRUVSHUKDSVLQDGGLWLRQWR
LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOUHJLPHVDQGRUJDQLVDWLRQVWKDWKDYHEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGE\WKH
VWDWHV7KHOHJLWLPDF\RIWUDQVQDWLRQDO&62VLQFRQWUDVWKDVEHHQTXHVWLRQHG
7UDQVQDWLRQDO1*2VKDYHEHHQFULWLFLVHGIRUEHLQJQRWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHDQGUHÀHFW
LQJJOREDOGLVSDULWLHVRILQÀXHQFH,QDGGLWLRQLWKDVEHHQDUJXHGWKDWWKH\
PLJKWRYHUWXUQPRUHOHJLWLPDWHSROLWLFDOVSDFHV
7KLVSHUVSHFWLYHPD\DOVRH[SODLQWKLUGFRXQWU\JRYHUQPHQWV¶KHVLWDQFHWR
LQYROYH&62VDVWKH\ZRXOGTXHVWLRQWKHLUUHSUHVHQWDWLYHQHVV)RUH[DPSOH
WKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHWUDGHXQLRQPRYHPHQWKDVEHHQFULWLFLVHGE\WKH3HUXYLDQ
JRYHUQPHQWDQGEXVLQHVVDVLWLVVPDOOLQWHUPVRIQXPEHUVDQGDOOHJHGO\DQ
FKRUHGLQYLROHQWKLVWRULFDOFRQÀLFWV0RUHRYHUWKHVDPHDFWRUVKDYHIUHTXHQWO\
DUJXHGWKDWVRPH&62VGRQRWUHSUHVHQW3HUXYLDQLQWHUHVWVEXWUDWKHULQWHUHVWV
RIWKHIRUHLJQVWDWHVDQG1*2VWKDWDUHIXQGLQJWKHP)URPWKH(8VLGHKRZ
HYHUFRQFHUQVRIUHSUHVHQWDWLYHGHPRFUDF\VHHPWREHOHVVSUHVHQW(YHQLI
WKHJHQHUDOLPSDFWRIWKH&60VLVOLPLWHGHVSHFLDOO\LQWKHVKRUWUXQWKH(XUR
SHDQ&RPPLVVLRQDQGLWVPHPEHUVKDYHJHQHUDOO\IDYRXUHGWKH&60V7KH(3
KDVHYHQEHHQDVWURQJSURSRQHQWRIWKH&60V
 6HHDXWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZVXSUDQRWH$XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK(8RI¿FLDO0D\
 6.KDJUDPHWDO5HVWUXFWXULQJZRUOGSROLWLFVWUDQVQDWLRQDOVRFLDOPRYHPHQWVQHWZRUNV
DQGQRUPV0LQQHDSROLV8QLYHUVLW\RI0LQQHVRWD3UHVV
 5 3ULFH µ7UDQVQDWLRQDO FLYLO VRFLHW\ DQG DGYRFDF\ LQZRUOG SROLWLFV¶ :RUOG 3ROLWLFV


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)RXUWKQHROLEHUDOHFRQRPLFWKLQNHUVPD\EHHYHQPRUHH[SOLFLWO\RSSRVHG
7KLVSDUWO\UHODWHVWRWKHJHQHUDOYLHZRIDµPLQLPDOVWDWH¶LQZKLFKWKHLQVWLWXWLRQ
DOLVHGSRZHURIOREE\JURXSVVKRXOGEHDYRLGHG7UDGHXQLRQVIRUH[DPSOH
W\SLFDOO\WHQGWRIDYRXUDPRUHLQWHUYHQWLRQLVWVWDWH7KHQHROLEHUDOSHUVSHFWLYH
HPSKDVLVHVWKHUROHRILQGLYLGXDOVLQVWHDGRIFROOHFWLYHRUJDQLVDWLRQV6SHFL¿
FDOO\UHODWHGWRWUDGHSROLF\WKHUHOXFWDQFHWRLQYROYHFLYLOVRFLHW\VWHPVIURPWKH
DVVXPSWLRQWKDWIUHHWUDGHVKRXOGEHPLQLPDOO\GLVWRUWHGE\VRFDOOHGµQRQWUDGH¶
LVVXHV7KLVVWUDQGRIWKLQNLQJGRHVQRWQHFHVVDU\GLVPLVVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRI
VXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW+RZHYHULWIROORZVWKHµWULFNOHGRZQ¶WKHRU\LQWKDWWKLV
REMHFWLYHFDQEHEHWWHUUHDFKHGWKURXJKIUHHWUDGH:KHQIUHHWUDGHLQDFFRUGDQFH
ZLWKFRPSDUDWLYHDGYDQWDJHVOHDGVWRHFRQRPLFJURZWKGHPRFUDWLFDQGKXPDQ
ULJKWVVWDQGDUGVZLOOHTXDOO\VWDUWWRLPSURYH(YHQLILWPLJKWEHLQWHUHVWLQJWR
VWUHQJWKHQFLYLOVRFLHW\IRUWKHSXUSRVHRIVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWSRVVLEO\
WKURXJKGHYHORSPHQWFRRSHUDWLRQLWZRXOGEHGDQJHURXVWRRUJDQLVHWKLVZLWKLQ
WKHFRQWH[WRIDWUDGHDJUHHPHQW7KHXQGHUO\LQJIHDULVWKDWWKLVZRXOGRSHQWKH
GRRUIRUSURWHFWLRQLVWPLVXVHVRU±WRSXWLWHYHQVWURQJHU±WKDWWKHPRUDOIDFH
RIIDLUWUDGHRUVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWZRXOGEHXVHGDVDMXVWL¿FDWLRQWRUHVWULFW
WUDGH
1HROLEHUDORUWKRGR[\PD\H[SODLQZK\VRPHDFWRUVIDYRXUDµVRIW¶DSSURDFK
WRWKH6'FKDSWHUZKLFKSURYLGHVQRVDQFWLRQVZLWKRXWDVWURQJUROHIRUFLYLO
VRFLHW\ZKLFKKDVQRGLUHFWLPSDFWRQWUDGHÀRZV7KLVPD\EHWKHFDVHIRU
VRPHWKLUGFRXQWU\JRYHUQPHQWVVRPHEXVLQHVVDFWRUVDQGWKH(XURSHDQ&RP
PLVVLRQ7KHLGHDWKDWVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWSURYLVLRQVRFFXS\DQDZNZDUG
SRVLWLRQLQ(8WUDGHDJUHHPHQWVUHPDLQVVWURQJZLWKLQWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLV
VLRQ¶V'*7UDGHDVZHOODVLQWKHWUDGHVHFWLRQVRIVRPH(8'HOHJDWLRQV,QWKLV
UHJDUGLQWKH(8'HOHJDWLRQLQ3HUXLWZDVPHQWLRQHGWKDWWKHFKDSWHURQVXV
WDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWLVSHFXOLDULQOLJKWRIWKHWUDGHDJUHHPHQWDVDZKROHDVLW
LVQRWUHDOO\GHDOLQJZLWKWUDGHLVVXHV:KLOHHDFKFKDSWHURIDWUDGHDJUHHPHQW
KDVWKHJHQHUDOLQWHQWLRQWRH[SDQGWUDGHDQGLQYHVWPHQWWKLVFKDSWHUKDVDQ
LQYHUWHGREMHFWLYHDQGJRHVWKHRWKHUZD\¶,QDIROORZXSLQWHUYLHZLWZDV
HPSKDVLVHGWKDWµLW¶VDWUDGHDJUHHPHQW¶
,QFRQFOXVLRQRIWKLVSDUWWKUHH¿QDOUHPDUNVVKRXOGEHPDGH)LUVWRYHUODSV
EHWZHHQWKHVHSHUVSHFWLYHVDUHWKLQNDEOH)RULQVWDQFHDXWKRULWDULDQLVPDQG
QHROLEHUDOLVPFDQJRKDQGLQKDQG$OVRGHYHORSPHQWDOLVWWKLQNLQJFDQEHFRP
SDWLEOHWRQHROLEHUDOGHYHORSPHQWVWUDWHJLHVDQGRUWRIDYRXULQJDXWKRULWDULDQ
SROLFLHV,QWXUQQHROLEHUDOLVPDQGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHGHPRFUDF\FRXOGKDYHDQDU
URZYLHZRQZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVµGHPRFUDF\¶LQFRPPRQ+RZHYHUWKHVHDUHVWLOO
DQDO\WLFDOO\GLVWLQFWLYHDSSURDFKHVWRWKLQNLQJDERXWWKHUROHRIFLYLOVRFLHW\GH
PRFUDF\DQGGHYHORSPHQWLQWKHFRQWH[WRILQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGH
6HFRQGWKLVLVQRWDQH[KDXVWLYHRYHUYLHZ0RUHSHUVSHFWLYHVFRXOGEHFRQ
VLGHUHGVXFKDVDSHUVSHFWLYHEDVHGRQQDWLRQDOVRYHUHLJQW\FRQFHUQVDQGRU
QDWLRQDOSROLF\VSDFH%RWKSHUVSHFWLYHZRXOGEHKHVLWDQWWRZDUGV)7$VEXW
ZKHWKHURUQRWFLYLOVRFLHW\LQYROYHPHQWLVIDYRXUHGZRXOGGHSHQGRQWKHDS
 -%KDJZDWLµ7UDGH/LEHUDOLVDWLRQDQG³)DLU7UDGH´'HPDQGV$GGUHVVLQJWKH(QYLURQPHQ
WDODQG/DERXU6WDQGDUGV,VVXHV¶7KH:RUOG(FRQRP\
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK(8GHOHJDWLRQLQ3HUX/LPD0DUFK
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK(8GHOHJDWLRQLQ3HUX/LPD)HEUXDU\

&/((53$3(56 2UELHHWDO
SURDFKWRWKHLQVLGHURXWVLGHUGLOHPPDDVH[SODLQHGLQWKHSUHYLRXVVHFWLRQ
&60VFDQEHVHHQDVDZD\WROHJLWLPLVHWKHEURDGHUIUHHWUDGHSULQFLSOHVWKDW
FRQVWUDLQQDWLRQDOVRYHUHLJQW\DQGRUSROLF\VSDFHEXWWKH\FRXOGDOVREHVHHQ
DVDQRSSRUWXQLW\WRPLQLPLVHQHJDWLYHHIIHFWVDQGHYHQDFWIRULPSURYHPHQW
7KLUGWKHVHSHUVSHFWLYHVGRQRWQHFHVVDULO\IDYRXUDFRPSOHWHUHMHFWLRQRI
&60V$OLPLWHGLQYROYHPHQWWKURXJKVRIWPHFKDQLVPVZLWKPXFKURRPRIPD
QRHXYUHIRUWKHJRYHUQPHQWVPD\VWLOOEHDFFHSWHGDVORQJDVLW LVVHHQWR
JXDUDQWHHWKHVXSSRUWIRUWKHRYHUULGLQJREMHFWLYHRIKDYLQJDQ)7$ZLWKWKH(8
7KLVZRXOGEHPRVWFOHDUO\WKHFDVHIRUWKHQHROLEHUDODQGWRDOHVVHUH[WHQWIRU
WKHDXWKRULWDULDQSHUVSHFWLYH)URPWKHVHSHUVSHFWLYHV&60VDUHHYDOXDWHG
SRVLWLYHO\RQFRQGLWLRQWKDWDWKH)7$JHWVDSSURYHGERSSRVLWLRQWRWKH
DJUHHPHQWKDVHIIHFWLYHO\EHHQGDPSHQHGDQGFFLYLOVRFLHW\LVEHLQJFR
RSWHGDQGVLOHQFHGWKURXJKWKLVSURFHVV7KLVPDNHVLWFOHDUWKDWWKHHYDOXDWLRQ
RIWKHVXFFHVVRI&60VLVFORVHO\OLQNHGWRWKHGLIIHUHQWSXUSRVHV±LQWKLVFDVH
WKHLQVWUXPHQWDOSXUSRVH7KLVZLOOEHIXUWKHUHODERUDWHGEHORZ
:K\LQYROYLQJFLYLOVRFLHW\±DQGIRUZKDW"
7KRVHZKRGRIDYRXUWKH&60VDVSDUWRIWKHWUDGHDJUHHPHQWV¶6'FKDSWHUV
DOVRGRVRIRUGLYHUJLQJUHDVRQV%DVHGRQWKHDQDO\VLVDERYHZHFDQDVVXPH
WKDWSHUVSHFWLYHVIDYRXULQJFLYLOVRFLHW\LQYROYHPHQWZLOOKROGDEURDGHUFRQFHS
WLRQRIGHPRFUDF\HJHPEHGGHGOLEHUDOLVPRUSDUWLFLSDWRU\JRYHUQDQFHLQ
ZKLFKGHPRFUDWLFSULQFLSOHVDUHQRWVXERUGLQDWHGWRHFRQRPLFRUGHYHORSPHQWDO
FRQFHUQVDQGLQZKLFKWKHQHROLEHUDOGRFWULQHLVQRWGRPLQDQW6WLOOZKHQZH
]RRPLQWRWKHDUJXPHQWVLQIDYRXURI&60VWKHUHLVFRQVLGHUDEOHGLYHUVLW\:H
FDQGLVFHUQWKUHHGLIIHUHQWSHUVSHFWLYHVWKDWFORVHO\UHODWHWRWKHDERYHPHQWLRQHG
SXUSRVHVQDPHO\LQSXWWKURXJKSXWDQGRXWSXWGHPRFUDF\
,IWKHPDLQSXUSRVHLVWRFROOHFWLQIRUPDWLRQDQGPRQLWRUWKHVXVWDLQDEOHGH
YHORSPHQWFRPPLWPHQWVWKH&60VVKRXOG¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWJDWKHUWKHQHFHV
VDU\GDWDRQWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHUHOHYDQWFRQYHQWLRQV,QRUGHUWREHDEOH
WRGRWKLVLWLVLPSRUWDQWWKDWWKHPHHWLQJVFDQGUDZRQRIWKHH[LVWLQJH[SHUWLVH
LQYDULRXVVHFWRUVUHODWHGWRVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW7KHVHFRXOGUDQJHIURP
KXPDQDQGODERXUULJKWVWRHQYLURQPHQWDOLVVXHVFRQVXPHUDIIDLUVDQGDQLPDO
ZHOIDUH7KHRUJDQLVDWLRQVLQYROYHGVKRXOGEHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHIRUWKHYDULRXV
REMHFWLYHVWKDWDUHSXUVXHGLQWKH6'FKDSWHU,WLVWKXVLPSRUWDQWWKDWUHOHYDQW
RUJDQLVDWLRQVDUHQRWH[FOXGHGLHDEURDGVXEVWDQWLDOGLYHUVLW\VHHVXSUD
7KLVFRUUHVSRQGVWRZKDWKDVEHHQFDOOHGµLQSXWGHPRFUDF\¶ZKHUHE\GHPR
FUDWLFOHJLWLPDF\KLQJHVRQWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHDFWRUVKDYHEHHQLQYROYHGLQ
WKHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURFHVV$OWKRXJKWKHFRQFHSWRILQSXWGHPRFUDF\RULJL
QDOO\DSSOLHGWRWKHSROLWLFDOLQYROYHPHQWRIWKHSXEOLFLQWKHFRQWH[WRIQDWLRQDO
GHPRFUDFLHVWKURXJKHOHFWLRQVRUUHIHUHQGDLWFRXOGDOVREHXVHGLQWKLVFRQ
WH[WRI&60V,QGHHGWKHVXFFHVVIXOIROORZXSRIWKH6'FKDSWHUPD\GHSHQG
RQWKHDPRXQWRILQSXWWKDWLVJLYHQGXULQJDQGFDQEHFROOHFWHGIURPWKHPHHW
LQJV:LWKRXWVXI¿FLHQWDQGUHOLDEOHLQSXWIURP&62VWKHPHHWLQJVFDQQRWEH
VXFFHVVIXO6SHFL¿FDOO\&60VZRXOGIDLOLIRQO\DOLPLWHGQXPEHURISDUWLFLSDQWV
DUHHIIHFWLYHO\LQYROYHG/LPLWHGLQYROYHPHQWFRXOGEHWKHUHVXOWRIDELDVHG
VHOHFWLRQSURFHGXUHVHHVXSUDRUVLPSO\EHFDXVHRIDODFNRILQIRUPDWLRQ

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,QWKLVUHJDUGWKHOLPLWHGWUDQVSDUHQF\RIVHOHFWLRQSURFHGXUHVIRU'$*PHP
EHUVPD\EHSUREOHPDWLF$SUHUHTXLVLWHIRULQSXWGHPRFUDF\LVRIFRXUVHWKDW
&62VDUHDZDUHRIWKHSRVVLELOLW\WRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHVHPHHWLQJV)RUH[DPSOH
D+RQGXUDQQDWLRQDOWUDGHXQLRQLVWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHH[SODLQHGWKDWVKHZDVQRW
DZDUHRIWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKHVHPHHWLQJV6KHVWDWHGWKDWKHURUJDQLVDWLRQGH
SHQGVRQWKHUHJLRQDOPHHWLQJVRIWKHLUXPEUHOODDVVRFLDWLRQWREHLQIRUPHGRQ
VXFKKLJKOHYHODFWLYLWLHV,Q3HUXDQG&RORPELD&62VDUHODUJHO\XQDZDUHRI
WKHIDFWWKDWDOUHDG\H[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVKDYHEHHQVHOHFWHGE\WKHJRYHUQ
PHQWVWRVHUYHDVWKHGRPHVWLFPRQLWRULQJPHFKDQLVPIRUWKH(86'FKDSWHU
$SDUWIURPWKDWLQWHUYLHZHHVLQWKHVHFRXQWULHVRIWHQFRPSODLQHGWKH\ZHUHQRW
WLPHO\LQIRUPHGDERXWZKHQWKHWUDQVQDWLRQDO&60ZRXOGWDNHSODFH,QDGGL
WLRQWKH(8¶VDELOLW\DQGRUZLOOLQJQHVVWREHLQYROYHGLQWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRILWV
WUDGLQJSDUWQHUV¶'$*VDOVRVHHPVOLPLWHGVHHVHFWLRQ,2QWKHVLGHRIWKH(8
'$*WKH3UHVLGHQWRIWKH((6&UHFHQWO\ODPHQWHGWKDWWKHJURXSVWKDWGRSDU
WLFLSDWHLQWKH&60VDUHQRWQHFHVVDULO\UHSUHVHQWLQJ(XURSHDQHFRQRPLFVRFLDO
RU HPSOR\PHQW LQWHUHVWV DQG DUH UDWKHU SXUHO\ VHFWRUDO QDWLRQDO RU HYHQ
LQWHUQDWLRQDO
+RZHYHUWKLVPD\FROOLGHZLWKWKHSXUSRVHRIGHPRFUDWLFJRYHUQDQFHZKLFK
VRPHFRQVLGHUPRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDQWKHFROOHFWLRQRIUHOHYDQWGDWD$FFRUGLQJWR
WKLVSHUVSHFWLYH&60VZLOOEHVXFFHVVIXOLIWKH\DOORZIRUDGHPRFUDWLFGLDORJXH
EHWZHHQ&62VDQGIRUWKHHPSRZHUPHQWRISUHYLRXVO\PDUJLQDOLVHGDFWRUV7KLV
FRUUHVSRQGVWRZKDWKDVEHHQFDOOHGµWKURXJKSXWGHPRFUDF\¶DFFRUGLQJWRZKLFK
LQVWLWXWLRQVDUHOHJLWLPDWHLIWKHLUGHFLVLRQVDUHZHOOLQIRUPHGDQGIROORZWKHORJ
LFRIDUJXPHQWUDWKHUWKDQEDUJDLQLQJ
$FFRUGLQJWRWKLVSHUVSHFWLYHWKH&60VVKRXOGPDNHLWSRVVLEOHIRUWKHSDU
WLFLSDQWVWRHQJDJHLQDQRSHQGHEDWHWKDWLVEDVHGQRWRQSRZHUG\QDPLFVEXW
RQFULWLFDODQGUDWLRQDODUJXPHQWV$OWKRXJKWKH+DEHUPDVLDQLGHDOW\SHZLOO
QHYHUEHUHDFKHGWKHPHHWLQJVPLJKWFUHDWHPRUHIDYRXUDEOHFRQGLWLRQVIRU
GHOLEHUDWLRQWKDQWKHDOWHUQDWLYHGRPHVWLFRULQWHUQDWLRQDOYHQXHVWKDWDUHDYDLO
DEOH7KXVHYDOXDWLRQVZLOOGHSHQGRQWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKVXFKDFXOWXUHRIGLD
ORJXHKDV LQGHHGEHHQFUHDWHGDQGHYHQWXDOO\RQ WKHH[WHQW WRZKLFK WKLV
IDFLOLWDWHVWKHHPSRZHUPHQWRIPDUJLQDOLVHGDFWRUV$OWKRXJKDUHOHYDQWQXPEHU
RIRUJDQLVDWLRQVVKRXOGEHLQYROYHGFI LQSXWGHPRFUDF\ZKDWLVRIXWPRVW
LPSRUWDQFHLVWKDWWKHFRQGLWLRQVIRUGHOLEHUDWLYHGLDORJXHDUHSUHVHQW)RUH[
DPSOHPHPEHUVRIWKHPHHWLQJVVKRXOGKDYHWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WREHFRPHIDPLO
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK+RQGXUDQODERXUUHSUHVHQWDWLYH%UXVVHOV1RYHPEHU
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK3HUXYLDQODERXUUHSUHVHQWDWLYH/LPD0DUFKDXWKRU¶VLQWHU
YLHZZLWK3HUXYLDQIDUPHUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQ/LPD0DUFK
 3UHVLGHQWRIWKH((6&µ$VVHVVPHQWRIDQGUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVIRUWKHFRPSRVLWLRQUHPLW
DQGZRUNLQJVRI(XURSHDQFLYLOVRFLHW\'$*VXQGHUWKHIUHHWUDGHDJUHHPHQWVFRQFOXGHGE\WKH
(8¶%UXVVHOV
 6RPHWUDGHXQLRQVRQERWKWKH(8DQGWKLUGFRXQWU\VLGHVKDYHFRPSODLQHGWKDWWKH\DUH
PRUHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHWKDQ1*2V6HHDXWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZVXSUDQRWH6HH$XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZ
VXSUDQRWH
 75LVVH µ*OREDO*RYHUQDQFHDQG&RPPXQLFDWLYH$FWLRQ¶*RYHUQPHQWDQG2SSRVL
WLRQ96FKPLGW µ'HPRFUDF\DQG/HJLWLPDF\ LQ WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ5HYLVLWHG
,QSXW2XWSXWDQG³7KURXJKSXW´¶3ROLWLFDO6WXGLHV0=UQµ'HPRFUDWLFJRYHUQ
DQFHEH\RQGWKHQDWLRQVWDWH7KH(8DQGRWKHULQWHUQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQV¶(XURSHDQ-RXUQDORI
,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQV

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LDUZLWKHDFKRWKHU¶VDUJXPHQWV7KLVUHODWHVWRWKHTXHVWLRQRI¿[HGYHUVXV
YDULDEOHSDUWLFLSDWLRQVHHVXSUDDQGWRWKHIUHTXHQF\RIWKHPHHWLQJVVHH
VXSUD&60SDUWLFLSDQWVKDYHH[SOLFLWO\VWDWHGWKDWWKH\VKRXOGEHDEOHWREHLQ
FRQWDFWPRUHUHJXODUO\IRULQVWDQFHE\HPDLORUYLGHRFRQIHUHQFH,QPRVW
FDVHVWKLVKDVQRWEHHQDFKLHYHGVHHVXSUD)RUQRZLWVHHPVWKDWPDQ\RI
WKHFXUUHQW&60VDUHDIRUXPIRUWKHH[FKDQJHRILQIRUPDWLRQUDWKHUWKDQD
YHQXHIRUWUXHGHOLEHUDWLRQRQVXEVWDQWLDOLVVXHV$SDUWIURPWKDWWKHPRVWUHFHQW
&60VPRVWO\GHDOZLWKSURFHGXUDOLVVXHVDQGGRQRW\HWDUULYHDWVXEVWDQWLYH
GLVFXVVLRQVRQODERXUDQGHQYLURQPHQWDOLVVXHVLQWKH(8DQGWKLUGFRXQWULHV
+RZHYHUPXFKGHSHQGVRQWKHGRPHVWLFFRQWH[W,QVRPHLQVWDQFHVFHUWDLQ
DFWRUVZRXOGEHEHWWHUH[FOXGHGDQGRULQYROYHGLQVHSDUDWHPHHWLQJV)RUH[
DPSOH&RORPELDQFLYLOVRFLHW\UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVPHQWLRQHGWKDWWKH\ZRXOGSUHIHU
PHHWLQJVZLWKRXWSUHVHQFHRIWKHDXWKRULWLHVVRWKDWWKH\FDQVSHDNRXWIUHHO\
,QVRPHFDVHVLWZDVPHQWLRQHGWKDWQRUHDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQWRRNSODFHEHWZHHQ
FLYLOVRFLHW\DQGWKHJRYHUQPHQWDODFWRUV7KLVZDVIRUH[DPSOHWKHFDVHLQWKH
¿UVW(8&HQWUDO$PHULFDFLYLOVRFLHW\PHHWLQJLQ1LFDUDJXDLQ7KHRI¿FLDOV
MXVWUHDGWKHLUVWDWHPHQWVDQGWKHQOHIWWKHURRP:KHQWKHUHLVDGRPHVWLF
FRQWH[WRIVRFLDOGLDORJXHEHWZHHQHPSOR\HUVWUDGHXQLRQVJRYHUQPHQWVDQG
RWKHUVWDNHKROGHUVLWZRXOGRIFRXUVHEHSUHIHUDEOHWRRUJDQLVHMRLQWPHHWLQJV
+RZHYHUWKLVLVYHU\RIWHQQRWWKHFDVH$OVRZKHQODERXUDQGHQYLURQPHQWDO
JURXSVZLWKGLIIHUHQWEDFNJURXQGVDQGLQWHUHVWVDUHVXGGHQO\VXSSRVHGWRFR
RSHUDWHLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH6'FKDSWHULWZLOOEHGLI¿FXOWWRDFKLHYHDJRRG
FRQWH[WIRUGHOLEHUDWLRQ3DUWLFLSDQWVQHHGWRJHWDFTXDLQWHGZLWKHDFKRWKHUVR
WKDWDFRPPRQSXUSRVHFDQEHFUHDWHG:KLOHVRFLDOLVDWLRQPD\QRWEHIHDVLEOH
DQGHYHQQRWGHVLUDEOHDFRPPRQVHQVHRIWKHPDLQREMHFWLYHVZRXOGEHLP
SRUWDQW
7KHQDJDLQVRPHPD\HPSKDVLVHWKDWWKHVXFFHVVIXOQHVVRIWKH&60VFDQ
RQO\EHPHDVXUHGLQUHODWLRQWRZKDWWKH\HIIHFWLYHO\SURGXFHLQWHUPVRISROLF\
UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV7KLVFRQFHUQVERWKWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHSROLF\UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV
WKDWDUHDGYDQFHGE\WKH&60VDQGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKH3DUWLHVWRWKHDJUHH
PHQWWDNHWKHPLQWRDFFRXQW7KHIRUPHUGHSHQGVRQWKHFODULW\RIWKHUHFRP
PHQGDWLRQVRQKRZFRQVLVWHQWWKH\DUHLQWHUPVRIDUJXPHQWDWLRQDQGRQKRZ
GHWDLOHGWKH\DUH7KHKLJKHUWKHVXEVWDQWLDODQGJHRJUDSKLFDOGLYHUVLW\VHH
IHDWXUHVVXSUDWKHPRUHGLI¿FXOWLWZLOOEHWRPDNHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV(VSH
FLDOO\LQWKHFDVHRIRSHQPHHWLQJVZKHUHPDQ\&62VDUHSUHVHQWLWKDVEHHQ
GLI¿FXOWWRFRQYH\FOHDUPHVVDJHV7KHODWWHUFRQFHUQVLVVXHVRIDFFRXQWDELOLW\
QDPHO\WKHUHVSRQVLYHQHVVRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWVWRZDUGVWKHRXWFRPHVRIWKH
 ((6& µ'UDIW0LQXWHVRI WKHVHFRQG MRLQWPHHWLQJRI WKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRI WKH(8DQG
&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ$GYLVRU\*URXSVXQGHU WKH7UDGHDQG6XVWDLQDEOH'HYHORSPHQW7LWOHRI WKH
(8&HQWUDO$PHULFD$VVRFLDWLRQ$JUHHPHQW¶ %UXVVHOV0D\6HHDXWKRU¶V LQWHUYLHZ
VXSUDQRWH
 1%UDQGRHWDOµ$VVHVVLQJWKHLPSDFWRI(8WUDGHDQGGHYHORSPHQWSROLFLHVRQKXPDQ
ULJKWV¶)RVWHULQJ+XPDQ5LJKWVDPRQJ(XURSHDQ3ROLFLHV)5$0(:RUN3DFNDJH1R±'HOLY
HUDEOH1RDWDYDLODEOHDWKWWSZZZISIUDPHHXZSFRQWHQWXSORDGV
)5$0('HOLYHUDEOH6XEPLWWHG-XQHSGI!
 $'UDQG''H%LqYUHµ,QFOXVLRQZLWKRXW,QÀXHQFH"1*2VLQ(XURSHDQ7UDGH3ROLF\¶
-RXUQDORI3XEOLF3ROLF\6+L[DQG%+R\ODQG7KHSROLWLFDOV\VWHPRIWKH(X
URSHDQ8QLRQ%DVLQJVWRNH3DOJUDYH0DFPLOODQ

&LYLO6RFLHW\0HHWLQJVLQ(XURSHDQ8QLRQ7UDGH$JUHHPHQWV
&/((53$3(56
PHFKDQLVP'LIIHUHQWGHJUHHVRIUHVSRQVLYHQHVVDUHSRVVLEOHDQGFDQEHSXW
RQDFRQWLQXXPDVH[SODLQHGLQVHFWLRQ,
7KLVLVSHUKDSVWKHPRVWFRPPRQO\XVHGDOEHLWRIWHQLPSOLFLWEHQFKPDUN
ZKDWGRWKHPHHWLQJVDFWXDOO\DFKLHYHDQGGRWKHJRYHUQPHQWVWDNHWKHPVHUL
RXVO\"7KHRUHWLFDOO\LWUHIHUVWRWKHFRQFHSWRIµRXWSXWGHPRFUDF\¶DFFRUGLQJWR
ZKLFKGHPRFUDWLFOHJLWLPDF\LVGHWHUPLQHGQRWVRPXFKE\WKHLQYROYHPHQWRI
UHOHYDQWDFWRUVLQSXWRUE\WKHGHPRFUDWLFTXDOLW\RIWKHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURFHVV
WKURXJKSXWEXWSULPDULO\E\ZKDWLVDFKLHYHVLQWHUPVRIWDQJLEOHRXWFRPHV,Q
RWKHUZRUGVH[SORULQJWKHFRQWULEXWLRQRIFLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVDWLRQVWRHIIHFWLYH
SROLWLFDOSUREOHPVROYLQJ7KLVFODVVL¿FDWLRQLQLQSXWRXWSXWDQGWKURXJKSXW
GHPRFUDF\DOVRPDNHVLWFOHDUWKDWWHQVLRQVEHWZHHQWKHPPD\RFFXU±VRPH
WKLQJWKDWZLOOEHHODERUDWHGLQWKHQH[WVHFWLRQ
&RQFOXVLRQ
7KHTXHVWLRQZKHWKHU&60VDUHVXFFHVVIXOLVGLI¿FXOWWRDQVZHUQRWRQO\EHFDXVH
ZHGRQRWKDYHPXFKHPSLULFDOLQIRUPDWLRQRQWKLVQHZSKHQRPHQRQEXWPRVW
RIDOOEHFDXVHLWGHSHQGVRQZKLFKSHUVSHFWLYHRQHWDNHVLQWKHHYDOXDWLYH
IUDPHZRUN)LJXUH2QWKHRQHKDQGOLPLWHG&60VFDQEHFRQVLGHUHGDVXF
FHVVIURPDQDXWKRULWDULDQGHYHORSPHQWDOLVWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHGHPRFUDF\RUQHR
OLEHUDOSHUVSHFWLYH2QWKHRWKHUKDQGSHUVSHFWLYHVWKDWSURYLGHDUROHIRUFLYLO
VRFLHW\LQIRVWHULQJLQSXWRXWSXWRUWKURXJKSXWGHPRFUDF\ZLOOIDYRXUPRUHFLYLO
VRFLHW\LQYROYHPHQW+RZHYHUWKHODWWHUZLOOQRWDXWRPDWLFDOO\HYDOXDWHHDFKIRUP
RIFLYLOVRFLHW\LQYROYHPHQWSRVLWLYHO\7KHLUHYDOXDWLRQZLOOGHSHQGRQWKHQDWXUH
RILQYROYHPHQWQDPHO\ZKHWKHULW¿WVZLWKWKHIXQFWLRQDOGHOLEHUDWLYHRUSROLF\
WRROSXUSRVH'HSHQGLQJRQWKHSXUSRVHRQHHQYLVDJHVWKHHYDOXDWLRQRID
FHUWDLQ&60ZLOOEHPRUHRUOHVVSRVLWLYHRUQHJDWLYH
7KLVGLVWLQFWLRQLVLPSRUWDQWEHFDXVHWHQVLRQVEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWSXUSRVHV
PD\RFFXU±PRVWFOHDUO\EHWZHHQLQSXWDQGRXWSXW±WKHUHE\GHWHUPLQLQJHYDO
XDWLRQVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\LQYROYHPHQW)RUH[DPSOHZKLOHLWPD\EHQHFHVVDU\
WRLQYROYHYDULRXV&62VIURPDQµLQSXW¶SHUVSHFWLYHWKLVPDNHVLWGLI¿FXOWWRGUDZ
FOHDUDQGFRQVLVWHQWSROLF\UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV7KHUHFHQWRSHQPHHWLQJRI(8
DQG&HQWUDO$PHULFDQFLYLOVRFLHW\LQ%UXVVHOV0D\IRUH[DPSOHKDGD
ZLGHUDQJHRISDUWLFLSDWLQJRUJDQLVDWLRQVUDQJLQJIURPLQGLJHQRXV&HQWUDO$PHU
LFDQRUJDQLVDWLRQVRYHUD7XUNLVKEXVLQHVVDVVRFLDWLRQWR+HLQHNHQ:KLOHPRVW
GLVFXVVLRQVZHUHUHODWHGWRKRZVXFKPHHWLQJVVKRXOGIXQFWLRQVXEVWDQWLDOLV
VXHVZHUHGLVFXVVHGWRDOLPLWHGH[WHQWRQO\2QHSURSRVDOZDVWKHUHIRUHWR
RUJDQLVHPRUHWKHPDWLFPHHWLQJVWRGLVFXVVVRPHWRSLFVPRUHSURIRXQGO\'XU
LQJWKHPHHWLQJZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQWDOUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVWKHODWWHUVWUHVVHGWKH\
QHHGPRUHVSHFL¿FLQSXWWRVHWXSFRQFUHWHSURMHFWV$PHPEHURIWKH(8'$*
FRQ¿UPHGKHSUHIHUVWRPHHWLQDFORVHGPHHWLQJZLWKOHVVSDUWLFLSDQWVEHFDXVH
WKHGLVFXVVLRQVDUHEHWWHU/LPLWLQJWKHQXPEHUVRILQWHUHVWVDQGSDUWLFLSDQWV
ZRXOGKRZHYHUDIIHFWWKHOHYHORISXUVXHGLQSXWGHPRFUDF\
 % )LQNH µ&LYLO VRFLHW\ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ(8 JRYHUQDQFH¶ /LYLQJ5HYLHZV LQ(XURSHDQ
*RYHUQDQFHDYDLODEOHDWKWWSZZZOLYLQJUHYLHZVRUJOUHJ!
 6HH%)LQNHVXSUDQRWH
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$OVRWHQVLRQVEHWZHHQWKURXJKSXWDQGRXWSXWGHPRFUDF\FDQDULVH2QWKH
RQHKDQGEULQJLQJWRJHWKHUFLYLOVRFLHW\DFWRUVIURPYDULRXVEDFNJURXQGVLQFOXG
LQJEXVLQHVVLQWKH(8¶VGH¿QLWLRQPLJKWKLQGHUWKHGHOLEHUDWLYHTXDOLW\RIGLV
FXVVLRQVDQGWKHRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUHPSRZHUPHQW6HSDUDWHPHHWLQJVRIODERXU
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVZLWKLQDQGRUEHWZHHQWKH(8DQGWKLUGFRXQWULHVPD\EHIDFLOL
WDWLQJLQWKLVUHJDUGKRZHYHUWKHLQFOXVLRQRIHQYLURQPHQWDOJURXSVDQGEXVLQHVV
DVVRFLDWLRQVXQGHUWKHEURDGEDQQHURIµVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW¶FRXOGKLQGHU
GHOLEHUDWLRQDQGHPSRZHUPHQWHVSHFLDOO\LISRZHUDV\PPHWULHVFRPHWRHPHUJH
$PHPEHURIWKH(8'$*RIWKH&HQWUDO$PHULFDQ$$GHSORUHGWKDWVRPHDFWRUV
DUHPRUHYRFDODQGLPSRVLQJWKHLUZLOORQWKHRWKHU'$*PHPEHUVZKHQFRP
SRVLQJWKHLUMRLQWUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVFUHDWLQJIUXVWUDWLRQLQWKHJURXS2QWKH
RWKHUKDQGIURPDGHOLEHUDWLYHSHUVSHFWLYHLWPLJKWEHDJRRGLGHDWRJHWRU
JDQLVDWLRQVWKDWGRQRWPHHWHDFKRWKHULQRWKHUSODWIRUPVWRVLWWRJHWKHUDWRQH
WDEOHWRGLVFXVVWUDGHDQGVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW5HSUHVHQWDWLYHVFDQJHWWR
NQRZHDFKRWKHUDQGJHWWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHSRVLWLRQRIWKHRWKHUDFWRUV:HGR
QRWKDYHLQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHDFWXDOPRGHUDWLRQRIWKHPHHWLQJVDQGZKHWKHU
RSHQFRPPXQLFDWLRQZKHUHE\HDFKSDUWLFLSDQWFDQH[SUHVVLWVRSLQLRQZLWKRXW
PRQRSROLVLQJWKHPHHWLQJRUEHLQJDWWDFNHGE\RWKHUVLQWKHRUHWLFDOWHUPV
ZKHWKHUWKHFRQGLWLRQVIRU+DEHUPDVLDQGHOLEHUDWLRQDUHIXO¿OOHG:KDWVHHPV
FOHDUKRZHYHULVWKDWWKLVKDVQRWEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGLQWKH¿UVWPHHWLQJVRIWKH
&60VDQGWKDWLWZLOOWDNHPXFKORQJHUWRHVWDEOLVKWKHQHFHVVDU\FRQGLWLRQVIRU
GHOLEHUDWLRQ
&RQÀLFWLQJYLHZVRQWKURXJKSXWYHUVXVRXWSXWGHPRFUDF\EHFRPHFOHDULQ
HYDOXDWLRQVRIWKHPHHWLQJVRIWKH(8'$*DQGWKH.RUHD'$*,QWKHYLHZRI
WKH(8'$*WKHVHOHGWRDZDWHULQJGRZQRIMRLQWUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVRQODERXU
LVVXHVLQ.RUHD+RZHYHUIURPDGHOLEHUDWLYHSHUVSHFWLYHWKHIDFWWKDWXQLRQV
EXVLQHVVHVDQGHQYLURQPHQWDORUJDQLVDWLRQVGLVFXVVODERXULVVXHVWRJHWKHU
PLJKWEHUHJDUGHGDVDVXFFHVV$JDLQPXFKGHSHQGVRQZKHWKHULQWKHFRP
LQJ\HDUVWKHFRQGLWLRQVIRUDGHOLEHUDWLYHGLDORJXHFDQEHHVWDEOLVKHG
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:HKDYHDGGUHVVHGWKUHHEDVLFTXHVWLRQVKRZDUH&60VLQWKHFRQWH[WRI(8
WUDGHDJUHHPHQWVRUJDQLVHGIHDWXUHVZKDWDUHWKH\IRUSXUSRVHVDQGKRZ
FDQZHHYDOXDWHWKHPDVVHVVPHQW,QGRLQJVRZHKDYHWDNHQVWRFNRIFXUUHQW
GHYHORSPHQWVHPSLULFDOFRQWULEXWLRQDQGSURSRVHGIUDPHZRUNVIRUIXUWKHUH[
DPLQDWLRQDQDO\WLFDOFRQWULEXWLRQVHH)LJXUHVDQG:KLOHLWLVWRRHDUO\WR
PDNHDV\VWHPDWLFDQGFRPSDUDWLYHDQDO\VLVRIWKH&60VVRPHRIZKLFKKDYH
RQO\FRQYHQHGDIHZWLPHVDWWKHWLPHRIZULWLQJZHKDYHPDGHD¿UVWDWWHPSW
WRXQGHUVWDQGWKHP
,WKDVLQGHHGEHFRPHFOHDUWKDWHYDOXDWLQJWKHVXFFHVVRI&60VLVKDUGHU
WKDQPLJKWEHWKRXJKWDW¿UVWVLJKW2QHPLJKWHDVLO\GLVPLVVWKHPDVEHLQJLU
UHOHYDQWµWDONLQJVKRSV¶2URQHFRXOGKHUDOGWKHPDVLQQRYDWLYHPHFKDQLVPV
ZLWKWKHSRWHQWLDOWRIXUWKHUGHPRFUDWLFJRYHUQDQFHDQGHPSRZHUPHQW2QH
PLJKWDOVRREVHUYHWKDWWKHPHHWLQJVKDYHEHHQXVHIXOµ¿JOHDIV¶EHFDXVHWKH\
 6HHDXWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZVXSUDQRWH
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&LYLO6RFLHW\0HHWLQJVLQ(XURSHDQ8QLRQ7UDGH$JUHHPHQWV
&/((53$3(56
KDYHVHFXUHGWKHWUDGHDJUHHPHQWV$OWHUQDWLYHO\RQHPD\DSSUHFLDWHWKHLU
UHOHYDQFHDVDVRUWRIµVWXG\JURXS¶µDODUPEHOO¶RUµZDWFKGRJ¶QDPHO\WKHH[WHQW
WRZKLFKVKRUWFRPLQJVLQFRPSOLDQFHZLWKVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWVWDQGDUGV
DUHEURXJKWWRWKHDWWHQWLRQ
:KHQHYDOXDWLQJWKHPHHWLQJVLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRFRQVLGHURUJDQLVDWLRQDOLV
VXHV$VVHFWLRQ,GHPRQVWUDWHGWKHUHDUHDQXPEHURIVKRUWFRPLQJVLQWKH
HDUO\VWDJHVRIWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQRIWKH&60VDQGDOVRWKHDFFRXQWDELOLW\PHFK
DQLVPVFRXOGEHLPSURYHG,QOLJKWRIWKHLQFUHDVLQJDPRXQWRI(8WUDGHDJUHH
PHQWVDQGWKHDFFRPSDQ\LQJ&60VRQHFDQDOVRZRQGHUZKHWKHUWKH(8DQG
LWV&62VFDQNHHSXSZLWKWKHSUDFWLFHRIHVWDEOLVKLQJRQHVSHFL¿F'$*IRU
HDFKDJUHHPHQW(VSHFLDOO\IRU(XURSHDQODERXUUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVLWVHHPVWKDW
QRWHQRXJKUHVRXUFHVDUHDYDLODEOHWRWDNHXSPDQ\PRUHUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVLQWKLV
UHJDUG7KLVSUREOHPVHHPVOHVVVHYHUHIRURWKHU1*2VDVWKHUHDUHPDQ\RI
WKHP2QHLGHDWKDWFRXOGEHH[SORUHGLVWREXQGOHWKH(8'$*VLQRQHRUPRUH
PHFKDQLVPVIRUH[DPSOHGHSHQGLQJRQWKHJHRJUDSKLFDODUHD7KH861$&
1DWLRQDO$GYLVRU\&RPPLWWHHIRU/DERXU3URYLVLRQVRI86)UHH7UDGH$JUHH
PHQWVFRXOGSURYLGHVRPHLQVSLUDWLRQLQWKLVUHJDUG:KLOHUHVRXUFHVZRXOGEH
XVHGLQDPRUHIRFXVHGZD\RQHFDQZRQGHUZKHWKHUODERXUDQGHQYLURQPHQ
WDOSUREOHPVLQµOHVVSUREOHPDWLF¶FRXQWULHVZRXOGJHWVXI¿FLHQWDWWHQWLRQ
+RZHYHUZHKDYHDOVRVKRZQWKDWHYDOXDWLRQVRIWKHPHHWLQJVVKRXOGJR
EH\RQGSUDFWLFDOLVVXHV)XQGDPHQWDOO\PXFKGHSHQGVRQRQH¶VYLHZRQGH
PRFUDF\DQGFLYLOVRFLHW\LQWKHFRQWH[WRILQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGH2QWKHRQHKDQG
ZHLGHQWL¿HGGLIIHUHQWSHUVSHFWLYHV±DXWKRULWDULDQLVPGHYHORSPHQWDOLVPUHS
UHVHQWDWLYHGHPRFUDF\DQGQHROLEHUDOLVP±IRUZKLFKOLPLWHG&60VHTXDOVVXF
FHVV2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHUHDUHGLIIHUHQWSHUVSHFWLYHVWKDWSRVLWLYHO\DVVHVV
HODERUDWHFLYLOVRFLHW\LQYROYHPHQWDOWKRXJKWKLVGHSHQGVRQWKHQDWXUHRILQ
YROYHPHQW$FFRUGLQJWRWKHYLHZRQµRXWSXWGHPRFUDF\¶WKHWDQJLEOHRXWFRPHV
DUHPRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDQWKHLQYROYHPHQWRIUHOHYDQWDFWRUVµLQSXWGHPRFUDF\¶
RUWKHGHPRFUDWLFTXDOLW\RIWKHPHHWLQJVµWKURXJKSXWGHPRFUDF\¶7KHUHPD\
DOVREHLQKHUHQWWHQVLRQVEHWZHHQWKHVHGLIIHUHQWYLHZVDVZHKDYHLOOXVWUDWHG
0RUHRYHUWKHGRPHVWLFFRQWH[WLQZKLFKWKHVH&60VWDNHSODFHVKRXOGEH
WDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW)LUVWWKHYDULDWLRQRIIHDWXUHVLQWKHGLIIHUHQWDJUHHPHQWV
PD\EHH[SODLQHGE\GLIIHUHQWGRPHVWLFIDFWRUVZLWKLQWKHWKLUGFRXQWU\6HFRQG
HYDOXDWLRQVVKRXOGDOVRWDNHWKHGRPHVWLFFRQWH[WLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQ,QVRPH
FRXQWULHVZKHUHXQLRQVGRQRWRIWHQVLWWRJHWKHUZLWKJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVDV
LVWKHFDVHLQ.RUHDWKHPHUHIDFWWKDWWKH\SURYLGHDSODWIRUPIRULQWHUDFWLRQ
FDQEHVHHQDVSRVLWLYH,WDOVREHFDPHFOHDUWKDWGHSHQGLQJRQWKHGRPHVWLF
FRQWH[WWKHSUHVHQFHRIJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVLQWKHPHHWLQJVKDVEHHQHYDOX
DWHGGLIIHUHQWO\7KLUGLWZRXOGEHLPSRUWDQWWRNQRZPRUHDERXWWKHEDFNJURXQG
DQGSUHIHUHQFHVRIWKHFLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVDWLRQVWKDWDUHLQYROYHGDERXWWKHLU
H[SHFWDWLRQVYLVjYLVWKH(8DQGWKHLUOHJLWLPDF\LQWKHGRPHVWLFFRQWH[W
,PSRUWDQWO\&60VDUHQRWVWDWLFHYHQWV(YROXWLRQVWDNHSODFHIURPDJUHHPHQW
WRDJUHHPHQWDVZHOODVZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIRQHDJUHHPHQW$OVRWKH(X
URSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQDUJXHVWKDWWKHPHHWLQJVDUHVWLOOLQDQH[SHULPHQWDOSKDVH
DQGWKDWWKHLUIXQFWLRQLQJFRXOGEHPRGL¿HGDQGLPSURYHG7KHGHVLJQDQGHYR
OXWLRQRIWKH&60VGRHVLQGHHGUHVHPEOHWRZKDWDFDGHPLFVKDYHFDOOHGµH[

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SHULPHQWDOLVWJRYHUQDQFH¶LQ(8H[WHUQDOUHODWLRQV)RUH[DPSOHWKH.RUHDQ
'$*ZDVQRWVHHQDVUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIFLYLOVRFLHW\7KH(XURSHDQ'$*DQG
WKH&RPPLVVLRQUHDOLVHGWKDWDQRSHQPHHWLQJLVDOVRQHHGHGWRPDNHVXUHWKDW
UHOHYDQWRUJDQLVDWLRQVFDQSDUWLFLSDWH7KHUHIRUHWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ
WKHUHDIWHULQWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWK&HQWUDO$PHULFDDQG3HUX&RORPELDSURSRVHG
DPRUHRSHQPHHWLQJLQVWHDGRI¿[HGPHHWLQJVEHWZHHQWKHGLIIHUHQW'$*V7KH
&60VZKLFKWDNHSODFHLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH(8&HQWUDO$PHULFDDJUHHPHQWDOVR
LOOXVWUDWHWKLVH[SHULPHQWDODSSURDFKIRUH[DPSOHWKURXJKWKHJUDGXDODQGFKDO
OHQJLQJIRUPDWLRQRIWKHGLIIHUHQW'$*VDQGH[SORUDWLRQRISRVVLELOLWLHVWRLQFUHDVH
WKHQXPEHURISDUWLFLSDQWVVXFKDVWKHXVHRIYLGHRFRQIHUHQFH7KXVWKHVH
PHFKDQLVPVQHHGVRPHWLPHWRGHYHORS
7KHUHIRUHLWZRXOGEHH[WUHPHO\SUHPDWXUHWRDUJXHWKDWWKHFLYLOVRFLHW\
PHHWLQJVLQ(8WUDGHDJUHHPHQWVDUHRQO\UHOHYDQWLQWHUPVRIOHJLWLPLVLQJIUHH
WUDGH,WVHHPVWHPSWLQJWRFRQFOXGHWKDWWKHLQVWUXPHQWDOSXUSRVHKDVEHHQ
GRPLQDQWJLYHQWKHOLPLWHGYLVLEOHRXWSXWRIWKH&60VVRIDUWKHSUREOHPVFRQ
FHUQLQJEXGJHWDU\DQGRUJDQLVDWLRQDOVXSSRUWWKHLQFRPSOHWHDFFRXQWDELOLW\
PHFKDQLVPVWKHSUREOHPVZLWKWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRIWKHGRPHVWLFJURXSVLQWKLUG
FRXQWULHVDVZHOODVWKHRYHUULGLQJHFRQRPLFREMHFWLYHVEHKLQGWKH(8¶VWUDGH
DJHQGD$FFRUGLQJWRRXUHYDOXDWLYHIUDPHZRUNWKLVZRXOGLPSO\WKDWQHROLEHUDO
DQGSHUKDSVDXWKRULWDULDQSHUVSHFWLYHVFDQFODLPVXFFHVV
+RZHYHULWPD\EHWRRHDUO\WRWHOO,QDQH[SHULPHQWDOLVWIDVKLRQWKH&60V
VHHPWREHJUDGXDOO\HYROYLQJWRZDUGVPRUHVXEVWDQWLDOGLVFXVVLRQV$PELJXLWLHV
RQWKHSXUSRVHVDOVRSURYLGHRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUFLYLOVRFLHW\DFWRUVWRPRXOGWKH
PHHWLQJVWRWKHLUDGYDQWDJH7KH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQGRHVQRWVWURQJO\LQ
WHUIHUHLQWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRIWKHPHHWLQJVDQGWKHUHLVVFRSHIRUGLVFXVVLRQVRQ
YDULRXVFRQFHUQVYRLFHGE\FLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVDWLRQV±HYHQRQLVVXHVWKDWDUH
RQO\LQGLUHFWO\UHODWHGWRWUDGH:KHWKHUWKHPHHWLQJVZLOOHYHQWXDOO\JREH\RQG
WKHLQVWUXPHQWDOSXUSRVHDVLWZDVSHUKDSVRULJLQDOO\GHVLJQHGE\WKH3DUWLHV
GHSHQGVRQKRZWKH(8LWVWUDGLQJSDUWQHUVWKH&62VLQYROYHGDQGWKHZLGHU
SXEOLFPDNHXVHRIWKHQHZPHFKDQLVPVLQWKHFRPLQJ\HDUV
 -=HLWOLQHG([WHQGLQJ([SHULPHQWDOLVW*RYHUQDQFH"7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDQG7UDQ
VQDWLRQDO5HJXODWLRQ2[IRUG2[IRUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV
EU trade 
agreements 
increasingly involve 
civil society to 
discuss and monitor 
sustainable 
development. 
 
The new EPAs have 
weak or no 
provisions on civil 
society involvement 
and should be 
strengthened in this 
regard. 
In order to 
maximise the full 
potential of these 
meetings, 
lessons can be 
drawn from the 
existing 
mechanisms. 
Evaluations of these 
civil society 
meetings vary 
widely from being 
mere talking shops 
to empowering 
platforms.  
 
No. 93 – September 2016 
Civil society meetings 
in EU trade agreements 
Recommendations and lessons for EPAs 
Deborah Martens, Jan Orbie, Lore Van den Putte and Yentyl Williams1 
Key messages 
Introduction 
The conclusion, signing and ratification process of three new Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
between the European Union (EU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the 
Eastern African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), has 
reopened the debate on EPAs, including in the European Parliament.  
Within the EU, it has increasingly been recognised that civil society should be involved in the discussion 
and monitoring of trade agreements, in particular when it comes to the sustainable development 
dimension. However, civil society provisions in the EPAs differ significantly from those in other recent trade 
agreements concluded by the EU, and in the case of the EU-SADC EPA they are non-existent. This is 
surprising since the EU-CARIFORUM EPA does have experience with civil society meetings and civil 
society organisations (CSOs) have strongly contested the African EPAs.  
1 Prof Dr Jan Orbie is Director of the Centre for EU Studies (CEUS) at Ghent University. All other authors are CEUS 
researchers working on the trade related and developmental aspects of EU external relations. For more information 
please visit www.eu-sdg.ugent.be. We are grateful to Dr San Bilal for useful comments on an earlier version. All 
remaining errors are our own. 
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This raises the important question of whether and how civil society could be involved more in the 
new African EPAs? 
 
This Briefing Note addresses this question by (1) providing a background on civil society meetings in recent 
EU trade agreements, (2) exploring the relevant content of the three African EPAs that are tabled for 
ratification, and (3) putting forward ten recommendations based on experiences with existing agreements. 
 
 
 
Civil society meetings in EU trade agreements2 
Since the EU-Korea trade agreement, the first new generation agreement that the EU has negotiated since 
the ‘Global Europe’ strategy3, dedicated chapters on trade and sustainable development have become a 
standard feature of EU trade agreements. These include references to labour and environmental standards 
that should be respected in the framework of the agreement as a whole. They also establish civil society 
meetings which grant an, apparently, important role to CSOs in the follow up and monitoring of these 
sustainable development commitments. These meetings are part of the EU’s cooperative approach that 
shies away from sanctions and instead emphasises cooperation and dialogue.4 
  
Even though there is some variation in the legal texts establishing these meetings, there are three 
recurrent features: 
 
• They refer to domestic civil society meetings in which representatives of three constituencies 
(labour, environment and business) of each Party (both within the EU and within its trading 
partner(s)) participate. This is often called the Domestic Advisory Group (DAG).  
• They also establish a transnational civil society meeting where the members of the domestic 
meetings and/or other actors of both the EU and its trading partner(s) meet annually.  
• They foresee some interaction between these two meetings and the intergovernmental body 
(between the EU and its trading partner(s), the so-called Parties) that meets annually in relation to 
the implementation of the sustainable development chapter.  
 
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA with the Caribbean group was the first concluded EPA, implementing the trade 
commitments of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement and was negotiated between 2004 and 2007. This EPA also 
includes commitments on labour and environmental standards and establishes a transnational civil society 
meeting, called the Consultative Committee. There are three relevant differences with the subsequent 
agreements. However, the differences could also be put into perspective:  
• First, the EU-CARIFORUM EPA does not legally foresee a domestic meeting. Nonetheless, in practice 
Caribbean and EU representatives have met separately in preparation of the transnational meeting.  
• Second, the EU-CARIFORUM EPA does not have a separate chapter on sustainable development. In 
practice, however, discussions in the transnational meeting do largely concern sustainable 
development issues.  
• Third, the organisational provisions in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA are less elaborated than those in the 
new generation trade agreements. For instance, there are no provisions setting out when the first 
meeting should take place, the frequency of these meetings and whether they depend on the 
governments to be convened. In practice, however, Rules of Procedure have been elaborated for the 
transnational meeting.  
 
Currently, civil society meetings have been set up in the framework of the EU trade agreements with 
Korea, Peru-Colombia, Central America, Moldova, Georgia, and the CARIFORUM. In the near future such 
meetings will also be created for the agreements with Ukraine and Vietnam. The civil society meetings are 
thus proliferating rapidly. They increasingly require resources from CSOs, the European Commission and 
third country governments. However, despite their growing prominence, there is much confusion on the 
exact purposes served by these meetings. At least four distinct purposes can be identified:  
                                                       
2 The insights provided hereafter draw from previous research at CEUS, based on participant observation and more 
than 55 interviews with participants of such meetings (mainly in the EU and in Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras and 
Peru). See Orbie & Van den Putte (2016) and Orbie, Martens & Van den Putte (2016). 
3 See European Commission, 2006.  
4 See Campling et al. (2014), International Institute for Labour Studies (2016), Oehri (2015), Postnikov & Bastiaens 
(2014). 
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• instrumental: gathering support for the trade agreement by giving the agreement a ‘human’ face; 
• functional: monitoring the chapter on sustainable development, gathering information on its 
implementation, and signalling possible defaults; 
• deliberative: providing a forum for dialogue and deliberation thereby contributing to democratic 
governance and empowerment of CSOs; 
• policy: advising governments and stakeholders on how the EU and its trade partner should 
approach sustainable development issues by providing tailor-made recommendations on labour and 
environmental issues. 
 
This poses a paradox: while the civil society meetings are an increasingly significant part of the EU’s 
cooperative approach, there is much ambiguity about their purposes and much uncertainty about their 
effective functioning. This is reflected in the widely diverging evaluations of the meetings – ranging from 
‘talking shops’ to ‘empowering’ marginalised groups.5 In any case, it is obviously important that the 
meetings go beyond the ‘instrumental’ purpose and are not merely a ‘talking shop’. This is already 
challenging for the meetings that are currently being organised under the existing agreements. For the 
African EPAs, it will be even more difficult given that civil society meetings are less elaborated in these 
agreements – as will be outlined below. 
 
 
 
Maximising the potential of civil society in EPAs 
 
The EU-EAC and the EU-ECOWAS EPA contain provisions similar to the EU-CARIFORUM EPA. Both of 
these African EPAs establish a transnational meeting (also called Consultative Committee). Provisions on 
the scope and composition of these meetings are quasi-identical to the EU-CARIFORUM EPA. Hence, 
compared to the ‘new generation’ of EU trade agreements, there are no provisions for domestic meeting, 
the scope is broader than ‘sustainable development’6, and there is no obligation regarding the frequency of 
the meetings.  
 
Whereas the EU-SADC EPA contains a dedicated chapter on trade and sustainable development, similar 
to the respective chapters in the ‘Global Europe’ agreements discussed above, this agreement does not 
refer to any civil society involvement whatsoever. The agreement with the Southern African states only 
contains an article7 referring to monitoring through the ‘respective participative processes and institutions’ 
of the Parties (Article 4). The absence of civil society involvement in this EPA has also been an issue of 
concern for the European Parliament.8 
 
Thus, the EU-SADC EPA is clearly less ambitious than the other EPAs when it comes to civil society 
involvement. In turn, the role of civil society in the EU-ECOWAS and EU-EAC EPAs, as in the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA, is more limited than in the new generation agreements. The legal differences should be 
put into perspective, as mentioned in the previous section. However, the absence of a formal domestic 
meeting, that is legally required to meet on a regular basis, makes the EU-CARIFORUM, EU-ECOWAS 
and EU-EAC agreements less far-reaching than the recent ‘Global Europe’ agreements. Legally required 
domestic meetings, in addition to transnational meetings enhance the opportunities for continuity, elaborate 
monitoring and discussion of sustainable development issues, because they would more strongly 
institutionalise the civil society involvement. They can also provide input to the transnational meeting, 
involve local stakeholders that are not willing or able to be attend the international meetings, and last but 
not least, they enhance the possibilities for strengthening democratic governance at the local and national 
level.  
 
                                                       
5 See Ulmer, 2013 and Orbie, Martens and Van den Putte, 2016. 
6 While the EU-CARIFORUM and EU-ECOWAS EPAs specify that the meetings encompass ‘all economic, social 
and environmental aspects’ that ‘arise in the context of the implementation of this Agreement.’ (Article 232.1 EU-
CARIFORUM; Article 97.1 EU-ECOWAS), the EU-EAC EPA states that it encompasses ‘all matters covered under 
this Agreement as they arise in the context of the implementation this Agreement’ (Article 108.1). 
7 A similar provision on ‘monitoring’ through domestic institutions is included in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA (not in the 
EU-AEC or EU-ECOWAS EPA).  
8 See European Parliament, 2016 and oral question by Bernd Lange, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, on behalf of the 
INTA Committee, 2016.  
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The more limited institutionalisation of civil society meetings, and particularly the absence of such meetings 
in the EU-SADC EPA, is surprising for a number of reasons. First, the involvement of civil society is a 
commitment enshrined in the overarching Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) group. Since the EPAs are arguably one of the most important elements of the Cotonou 
Agreement, it is surprising that a separate civil society mechanism is not established in the case of the EU-
SADC EPA or is not more elaborated and dedicated to the issue of sustainable development in the case of 
the EU-EAC and EU-ECOWAS EPA. Second, the EPAs have been heavily contested by CSOs in the 
North and the South, and the mobilisation against an EU trade agreement with Canada and the United 
States suggests that this politicisation of EU trade agreements is not going to decrease. Therefore, again, 
one would expect the level of ambition on civil society to be high in the new EPAs, or at least equivalent to 
other recently negotiated trade agreements, thus establishing domestic and transnational meetings on 
sustainable development. 
 
However, this should not prevent domestic and transnational civil society meetings to take place 
on issues related to sustainable development in the context of the African EPAs. Given the far-
reaching impact of trade liberalisation for sustainable development9, it would be desirable to maximise the 
potential of civil society involvement. In this regard, several alternative approaches could be envisaged.  
 
Concerning the EU-SADC EPA:  
• A protocol could be added to the agreement during the consent phase. Such protocols would 
reiterate the importance of civil society meetings to the respective agreements and spell out how 
these should be established to ensure a smooth functioning. A light version of this approach would 
be to agree on a Roadmap with commitments on civil society involvement, similar to the Roadmap 
that was agreed for the ratification of the EU-Peru-Colombia agreement at the insistence of the 
European Parliament. This Roadmap would have to include specific guidelines on the functioning of 
these meetings.  
• Informal civil society meetings on the sustainable development provisions of the EPAs could 
still be organised. For this purpose, the ACP Civil Society Forum, which was established in 2001 and 
is not very active, together with the informal meetings of civil society in the context of the ACP-EU 
Joint Parliamentary Assembly meetings, could be used as building blocks.10 Again, the success of 
this option hinges on a strong political commitment from the Parties, not least the EU institutions. By 
setting up such meetings at its own initiative, the EU would initiate a practice that could eventually be 
formalised.  
• Include civil society meetings in the legal text through the use of the revision clause five years 
After the EPA entered into force (see below). 
 
Concerning the EU-EAC and EU-ECOWAS EPAs: 
• Optimal use can be made of the existing provisions on civil society currently included in these 
two agreements. This requires a strong commitment from the EU, or ideally all the Parties, to make 
all necessary efforts to facilitate meaningful civil society meetings. Again, informal meetings on 
both sides could compensate for the absence of formal domestic civil society meetings. In addition, 
ambitious and clear ‘Rules of Procedure’ could be negotiated between the members of the 
meetings. Experience with the EU-Korea agreement for instance show that Rules of Procedure are 
indeed important for the practical functioning of the meetings. In this context, there should be 
guarantees that the broad scope of the transnational meeting (covering all the dimensions of the 
agreement, not only sustainable development) leaves specific opportunity for focused discussion 
on specific (and perhaps sensitive) issues such as labour rights violations. While the broad scope 
may offer opportunities for dialogue on various matters, there is also a danger that politically 
sensitive debates will be overshadowed because of an overcrowded agenda, especially if meetings 
only take place on an annual basis (see below, recommendation 1). 
• As a last resort, the rendez-vous clauses in the EU-EAC and EU-ECOWAS EPAs leave the door 
open for discussions on sustainable development. These clauses are very brief11 and it is unclear 
whether they intend to create more elaborated civil society meetings. Similarly, the EU-SADC and 
EU-ECOWAS EPA revision clauses and the EU-EAC EPA review clause could also provide scope 
                                                       
9 See for example Langan & Price, 2015.  
10 For more information see ECDPM, 2013.  
11 The EU-ECOWAS EPA states that ‘the Parties mutually undertake to enter into discussions concerning (…) 
sustainable development’ (Article 3). The EU-EAC EPA states that ‘The Parties undertake to conclude the 
negotiations in the subject matters listed below (…) Trade, environment and sustainable development’ (Article 
106.2). 
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for the inclusion of civil society at a later date (even though these clauses do not mention sustainable 
development or civil society involvement specifically). 
 
The civil society meetings would ideally be based on ambitious legal provisions. However, lacking 
strong legal commitments in the EPAs, these practical alternatives could be considered as a second best 
option.  
 
Specifically, for these meetings to materialise their full potential, the next section will outline ten 
recommendations. 
 
 
 
Recommendations  
 
Although the civil society meetings are still in an embryonic phase (several have met only two or three 
times), we can formulate a number of recommendations. Some relate to the legal design in the 
agreements, while others concern the implementation in practice. Finally, the last two recommendations 
discuss issues for further reflection on civil society meetings in general. The recommendations draw from 
research on the new generation agreements, but could also be relevant for the forthcoming African EPAs.  
 
1. DISENTANGLE ‘SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT’   
In order to give sufficient and appropriate attention to the three pillars of sustainable development - 
people, planet and profit - the agreement should allow for the creation of sub-groups dedicated to 
these three topics.  
In the current agreements, labour, environmental and business issues are always holistically 
discussed in the same meeting. Sensitive issues, such as labour rights, can be easily overshadowed 
by less controversial issues, such as environmental issues, as in the context of EU-Korea, or 
business issues, as in the context of EU-Moldova. The wider the scope of topics that can be 
discussed at the table, the more likely that sensitive but important issues are not seriously 
addressed.  
The establishment of separate meetings to deal with labour and environmental issues, as is foreseen 
in the EU-Canada trade agreement, could be considered. In June 2016 in Colombia, CSOs and 
government representatives agreed to create sub-groups (for, respectively, labour and environment) 
within the existing domestic meetings. Trade unions and an environmental organisation are currently 
tasked to elaborate proposals for the composition and working methods of those sub-groups. 
Another example is Costa Rica, which is the only Central American country that organises separate 
meetings. However, this example also illustrates that the separation of the three topics is not a 
guarantee for more focused and substantial discussions, as in practice business groups dominate 
the labour meetings and labour unions rarely participate. Holding separate meetings would 
nevertheless be part of a strategy to avoid the watering down of discussions and hence the ‘talking 
shop’ nature of the meetings. Another possibility would be to set up (in)formal sub groups where 
rapporteurs can be responsible for the communication on a very specific topic. For example, in the 
EU domestic mechanism for the EU-Korea agreement a civil society member from the International 
Trade Union Confederation was the rapporteur for an opinion on the status of labour rights in Korea.  
 
2. FORESEE DETAILED ROLE, ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONING  
The agreements should include key organisational elements concerning the selection and 
membership of these meetings.  
Existing trade agreements contain several ambiguities and uncertainties on the role and functioning 
of these meetings, which has hindered their implementation. Because of this lack of clarity several 
civil society meetings have so far been limited to lengthy discussions on procedural issues, without 
touching on substantial debates on sustainable development. This has frustrated and discouraged a 
number of members about the relevance of the meetings. In this regard several questions have also 
been raised about the selection and independence of civil society members from the 
government. In most cases, the procedure for CSOs to participate to the meetings is neither clear 
nor transparent. In other cases the independence of members is not mentioned (e.g. EU-Peru-
Colombia agreement) or not respected (e.g. Honduras in the EU-Central America agreement). In the 
case of Korea, one of the main union federations was originally not included in the domestic civil 
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society meeting, and the independence of several academic experts was doubtful. Disagreements 
on the selection of the Caribbean members in the EU-CARIFORUM Consultative Committee also 
contributed to the long delays in organising the first meeting.  
The new EPAs contain the same flaws as existing agreements. These problems could be overcome 
if the legal and/or procedural texts would contain provisions on the selection procedure, the 
institutional set-up and independent and balanced membership. Of course these provisions 
should take into account the specific context of the trade partner at hand and should leave enough 
room for CSOs to implement the provisions in the most suitable way. For example, more detailed 
provisions in the initial EU-CARIFORUM EPA could have spared additional delay and provided 
greater clarity to establish the first Consultative Committee meeting. 
 
3. INCREASE AWARENESS WITH CIVIL SOCIETY 
There is a need for better understanding by civil society of the trade agreement, its sustainable 
development provisions, and the potential role of the civil society meetings in this regard. 
In the EU’s partner countries in particular, there is a lack of awareness and knowledge on these 
issues among CSOs. This not only concerns the labour and environmental organisations, but also 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). In addition, the EU has often been hesitant to interfere in 
domestic politics of third countries by directly promoting the domestic civil society meetings. For 
example, Central American CSOs have very little knowledge on the existence and potential 
opportunities of these meetings generating little interest to participate. In Peru and Colombia 
several civil society representatives, including even participants of the transnational meeting, are not 
aware of the fact that there is a certain domestic mechanism to discuss the sustainable development 
aspects of the EU trade agreement. This fundamentally hinders the effective functioning of the 
domestic meetings and interaction with the transnational meetings. Indeed, this is no different from 
the case of CARIFORUM, where limited awareness delayed the organisation of the first meeting for 
several years. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), supported by the European 
Parliament, was the driving force behind raising awareness amongst CSOs in the CARIFORUM 
countries of the existence of the structure and the opportunities it created. 
The EU, and in particular its Delegations, could more proactively inform civil society in partner 
countries. Inspiration could be drawn from the initiative of the EU Delegation in Colombia that 
organised a meeting with local CSOs on the trade agreement, the civil society meetings included in it 
and how its functioning could be improved. Such meetings could also be linked to the Roadmaps of 
the EU Delegations, which aim to set out specific ways in which to deal with local civil society (as is 
happening in Peru).   
A novel way to increase awareness would also be to allow CSOs to observe negotiations ex ante, 
and not only ex post. In the case of the EU-EAC EPA, Kenyan civil society successfully took the 
government to court in order to gain access to the information of the negotiations, in line with the 
spirit of the Cotonou Agreement (Article 4).12 Indeed, the heavily contested nature of international 
trade agreements, combined with the drive for increased transparency, should favour such a thrust 
to include civil society in both the ex ante and ex post oversight of trade agreements. 
 
4. ENSURE INTERACTION WITH THE GOVERNMENTS 
The governments should be informed about the discussions at the civil society meetings and 
follow up on the questions and recommendations that are expressed during these meetings. 
Without two-way communication and accountability of the respective governments, the civil society 
meetings lose its relevance, as CSOs do not see the benefit of investing resources in participation.  
While the interaction between governments and CSOs is important, one should be cautious about 
the presence and active participation of governmental actors during the actual meetings. In the 
CARIFORUM Consultative Committee for example the participant from the government was quite 
vocal and dominant, and in turn, this seemed to hamper free and substantive discussions.  
It is however possible to ensure government-civil society interaction without resorting to 
governmental presence. The EU-Canada agreement for example obliges the governments to 
annually report on how they have followed up the communications from the civil society meetings. 
 
5. COORDINATION AMONG CSOs WITHIN THE REGION 
CSOs within each region should coordinate among themselves in order to increase their weight in 
terms of expertise and impact. 
                                                       
12 See In the case ‘Kenya Small Scale Farmers Forum & 6 others v Republic of Kenya & 2 others’ Petition No. 1174 of 
2007, wherein the High Court of Kenya ruled in favour of the Petitioners in 2013. 
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Without coordination within the regions, the communication between the civil society of both regions 
risks being very slow and difficult. For instance, so far there is no coordination between the Central 
American domestic meetings that take place at national level to prepare for the transnational 
meeting or, in general, to communicate on the EU domestic meeting. During the civil society 
meetings in June 2016, the EU domestic meeting pointed out that this was the most crucial issue to 
overcome. As a result, the Central American domestic meetings will now endeavour to have a more 
coordinated collaboration. Also in the context of the EU-Peru-Colombia agreement, there has not 
been an exchange of views among Peruvian and Colombian civil society. This pitfall is especially 
relevant for the African EPAs, because they involve a high number of countries (which makes 
coordination more cumbersome). Moreover, the agreements do not foresee the establishment of 
domestic meetings where coordination could take place. 
Despite the lack of provisions foreseeing a domestic meeting, in the context of the EU-CARIFORUM 
EPA, CARIFORUM civil society meets prior to the transnational EU-CARIFORUM civil society 
meeting to align their regional position beforehand. In general, such coordination could be facilitated 
by a secretariat, like the EESC for the EU domestic meetings, which centralises the communication 
efforts of the meetings. Alternatively, one person per country could be appointed as a contact person 
to manage the coordination. 
 
6. Pursue CONTINUOUS FOLLOW-UP  
The domestic and transnational meetings should be complemented by other contact opportunities 
for CSOs to follow up and advance the work of these meetings.  
Most transnational meetings only take place once a year with little or no follow-up in between. This 
puts any substantive advancement and continuity at risk. This issue is related to the previous 
recommendation, where, in the case of Central America, the lack of coordination coincides with a 
lack of communication and follow-up leading to little or no progress on substantive issues. This has 
been discouraging for participating organisations. 
Virtual communication tools (e.g. videoconferencing, web streaming, a communication portal, 
improved website) and concrete arrangements for communication (e.g. a secretariat and one contact 
person per domestic mechanism as mentioned in the previous recommendation) can help to address 
this issue. Such arrangements would enable the civil society meetings to be more dynamic and react 
more promptly to recent developments. 
 
7. Foresee FUNDING  
Funding is necessary to cover travel expenses and other organisational costs of the civil society 
meetings, as well as evidence-based research.  
The European Commission covers travel expenses for a number of members of the domestic 
meetings in the EU, whereas partner countries rarely do so. This lack of resources has a serious 
negative impact on the attendance at these meetings. In the case of Central America, very few 
organisations, except for a small number of business representatives, are able to attend meetings in 
Brussels. Moreover, in the case of the EU-Peru-Colombia agreement, it has proven impossible for 
Peruvian civil society to attend the meetings when these took place in Colombia and vice versa. 
Difficulties for CSOs to attend meetings even within their own region (let alone to the EU meetings in 
Brussels) are obviously all the more relevant for the African regional EPAs. The limited activity of the 
ACP Civil Society Forum is also due to a lack funding and support from the ACP Secretariat. A more 
positive example can be found in the case of the EU-Korea agreement where the rules of procedure 
stipulate that the travel costs are to be covered by the respective government.  
In addition, there is a lack of knowledge about the social, economic and environmental impact of (EU 
and other) trade agreements. While the civil society meetings can serve to highlight relevant issues 
to the Parties and monitor possible deficiencies, this should be complemented with independent 
research into the impact of the EU trade agreements. The EU could contribute to funding these 
studies and to disseminating their results to civil society. In this regard, we could also point to the 
role of the civil society-led observatories such as the ‘Central American Regional Observatory of 
Free Trade Agreements and Corporate Responsibility’ and the ‘Observatory of the EU-Central 
American Association Agreement’. By means of case studies and newsletters these networks want 
to create more knowledge on the impact of the trade agreement. 
In any case funding for these trade-related meetings should be coherent with development policy: 
by funding civil society in third countries (as envisaged in the EU’s ‘Agenda for Change’) or 
dedicated development budgets to the civil society meetings. Within the European Commission, 
some bureaucratic obstacles between DG Trade and DG DEVCO should be addressed to make this 
possible. If EU funds would be considered too patronising towards the EU’s partner country, a 
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common fund with the partner country could be created. This could be included in the legal text of 
future agreements or in the protocol that was suggested above.  
 
8. COORDINATE with other relevant actors 
Several EU and international actors are dealing with similar issues. It is therefore necessary to align 
with these actors, share expertise and shape a coherent work agenda.  
So far, little or no communication between the different relevant actors exists. For example, there 
seems to be no discussion in the civil society meetings about the pending labour case under the US-
Peru trade agreement. In this case, CSOs from Peru and the US have jointly complained to the US 
Department of Labour on the lack of freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining in 
the agricultural and textile sector in Peru. The same goes for the labour case in Honduras that was 
submitted under the US-Central America trade agreement. While these cases also apply to the EU 
trade agreements with these countries, this issue does not seem to be followed up on in the civil 
society meetings.  
Relevant actors include international organisations (such as the International Labour Organisation), 
EU institutions (relevant units in several DGs - Trade, Development, Employment and Social Affairs, 
Environment - and the monitoring groups and delegations in the European Parliament) and EU 
Member States working on these topics through their embassies and development aid. In this regard 
the presence of a member of the Committee on International Trade in the European Parliament at 
the EU domestic meeting of the EU-Peru-Colombia agreement, can be seen as a positive sign. 
Another positive example concerns the presence of an ILO representative at the 2015 transnational 
meeting of the EU-Korea agreement.  
 
Further reflection 
 
9. Consider the FEASIBILITY of a growing number of meetings 
New ways of organising the civil society meetings should be examined to anticipate the growing 
number of trade agreements and avoid an unmanageable patchwork of meetings.  
If the current evolution of an increasing number of civil society meetings continues, one can seriously 
doubt whether CSOs, the European Commission, and the EESC can continue investing sufficient 
resources. For some European or international trade unionists, the situation already seems quite 
challenging.  
Alternative ways of organising these meetings should be considered. One possibility would be to 
cluster some meetings of the several trade agreements, as many of the members (at least on the 
EU side) are part of several of them. In this regard, the EU could draw inspiration from the National 
Advisory Committee in the US where a fixed group of people monitors the implementation of the 
labour provisions of all US trade agreements. In addition to the vertical meetings organised for each 
trade agreement, horizontal thematic meetings could be considered where for instance child labour 
or the environmental impact of extractive industries are discussed.  
 
10. The EU should be MORE ASSERTIVE to enforce the agreement 
Even though the EU prefers a cooperative approach, it should take a stronger stand to make sure 
that civil society meetings in the partner country are effectively established.  
For now the EU is insufficiently following up on the existence and functioning of the civil society 
meetings in the partner countries. This is especially evident in the case of Peru. The text of this trade 
agreement does not allow the EU, or the members of the EU domestic meeting, to be informed 
about the composition and agenda of the Peruvian meeting domestic group. As the Peruvian 
government is reluctant to share information on its domestic meetings, it is difficult for the EU to 
know whether Peru is complying with its treaty commitments. At the same time it complicates the 
efforts of European CSOs to engage with their counterparts in these third countries.  
The EU could overcome this hurdle by being more assertive both in the trade agreement as well as 
in the implementation thereof. The civil society meetings are perhaps the most outstanding ‘soft’ 
aspect of the EU’s approach. If the EU is really serious about its commitment to such an approach, 
pushing for these meetings is the least that can be expected.  
 
However, the inconsistent approach to civil society across EU trade agreements, sets EU-ACP CSO 
engagement apart from the other new generation of EU trade agreements. This Briefing note has shown 
that there are clearer rules for engagements in the new generation of trade agreements – including 
provisions for domestic meetings and chapters for engagement on sustainable development – that were 
not included in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA and the three new African EPAs. Therefore, the question could 
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be asked, to what extent does this differentiation maintain a holistic ACP approach to trade and sustainable 
development, and to what extent can this be indicative of a holistic post-Cotonou approach to the ACP in 
general? What is clear is that this differentiated approach sets ACP group apart from other third country 
partners and in turn, reflects on a broader EU policy incoherency for development. As this Briefing note has 
suggested, a more coherent approach to all third party CSOs in trade agreements could maximise 
the potential benefits for CSOs and the EU alike. 
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